

Alexander Shliapnikov's role in the Russian Party and his later execution; Soviet workers' strikes in 1930, 1961, and 1962. In this vein the book spells out what Solzhenitsyn sees as the implications of *The Gulag Archipelago*: that a system so corrupt and abusive to its own people cannot be trusted in its dealings with foreign partners, especially if the latter, spellbound by capitalist greed, pragmatism, and democratic procedures, manifest little stomach for long-term struggle.

Such is the message of five statements to United States and British audiences in 1975-76, collected here in one handy volume.

To tilt lances with one of the bravest, most knowledgeable, and most prolific intellects of our time makes the critic feel like a gnat attacking a mammoth. It strikes me, however, that Solzhenitsyn has overshot his real competence. What he knows in depth is the Soviet life that he has observed or heard about firsthand. When he talks about Western policies or even about Soviet actions abroad his broadsides often fall short of historical accuracy or, in my opinion, political wisdom. Thus, he asserts that Roosevelt "gave unlimited aid, and then unlimited concessions" to Stalin during World War II, charging that "seven or eight more countries were surrendered" to Moscow, even though "England, France, and the United States were the victors in World War II" and could have dictated the peace (p. 23). As for recent events, Solzhenitsyn says that "China and the Soviet Union . . . have quietly grabbed three countries of Indochina" (p. 29).

Solzhenitsyn's capacity for overstatement about matters close to the West raises questions about his reports on the less accessible USSR. Americans "eliminated" the *émigré*-staffed Institute for the Study of the Soviet Union, "the last genuine institute which could actually study this Soviet society" (p. 74). His predictive powers fail when we read that "very shortly Portugal will be considered a member of the Warsaw Pact" (p. 69). His descriptive faculties also collapse with his assertion that Soviet military power will soon exceed Western by a factor of 2 to 1 (p. 77). Even his borrowing of historical analogies seems crudely inept: Russia has "trodden the same path seventy or eighty years before the West" (p. 101).

But if we believe that Solzhenitsyn has exaggerated both the flaccidity of the West and the Soviet threat, we nonetheless put the book down uneasily. He asks whether we have a meaningful *détente* when Westerners can spend their time agreeably "while over there people are groaning and dying or confined in psychiatric hospitals" where doctors apply drugs to destroy the brain; when the regime with which we sign *détente* agreements is unbound by public opinion, a free press, or a freely elected parliament; and when ideological warfare persists.

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SOWJETISCHE ENTSPANNUNGSPOLITIK HEUTE. By *Borys Lewytskij*. Zeitpolitische Schriftenreihe, 14. Stuttgart: Seewald Verlag, 1976. 286 pp. DM 24, paper.

SALT II: PROMISE OR PRECIPICE? By *Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr.* and *Jacquelyn K. Davis*. Monographs in International Affairs. Coral Gables, Fla.: Center for Advanced International Studies, University of Miami, in association with the International Security Studies Program, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, 1976. x, 45 pp. Appendixes. \$5.95, cloth. \$3.95, paper.

A question that has occupied those in the West concerned with Soviet foreign policy is the extent to which it is based on Marxist-Leninist doctrines. In answering this question three schools of thought have emerged, broadly speaking: (1) those who maintain that power-political considerations are subsumable to doctrine, (2) those who

argue that Marxist-Leninist ideology is largely rhetoric, and (3) those who believe Soviet policy to be a balance between the two. Disagreements within the individual schools of thought are not uncommon.

Borys Lewytzkij, a prolific writer on Soviet politics residing in Munich, belongs to the first group. From the questions that he poses and from the way he does so, one may easily draw conclusions without waiting for answers. Yet it would be unjust to dismiss Lewytzkij's study merely because answers may be readily anticipated.

In his attempt to get at the foundation of the Soviet policy of détente the author relies almost exclusively on Soviet sources. But in contrast to many Kremlinologists he does not limit his attempt to an analysis of détente from the political perspective alone. Instead, he looks at it from domains as far afield as the military, the economic-industrial complex, and the cultural. His conclusion: Underlying the Soviet policy of détente is a coherently constructed political concept to which all other domains are reducible.

Central in this context is the belief on the part of the Soviet leadership that the Soviet Union, in accordance with Marxist-Leninist principles, is an integral part of the historical process and the future thus belongs to it. The foremost threat to the forward march of history is posed by nuclear weapons. Hence every effort must be made to avoid a nuclear holocaust.

Lewytzkij points out that the Soviet leadership, in order to achieve its historical destiny, has in recent years opted for a total "restructuring of international relations" (p. 64). From the perspective of the Kremlin, this entails a political shift of the emphasis of the class struggle away from relations among states. Stabilizing such relations through ever-growing cooperation in politics, economics, technology, and culture, however, does not in the least imply defusing of the class struggle. On the contrary, the Soviet leadership believes, according to the sources Lewytzkij introduces, that contradictions in capitalist states will intensify this struggle and this, in turn, will further exacerbate rivalries between capitalist states. The Soviet Union, obviously, will reap the benefits.

Although one learns little that is new, Lewytzkij's study is a sobering reminder that Moscow and Washington continue to operate on entirely different political wavelengths, despite the convergence of interest in avoiding a nuclear holocaust.

The slim SALT II monograph handsomely complements Lewytzkij's study. In contrast to the Soviet Union, the United States, according to the authors, lacks a "consensus . . . on the interests and goals of American foreign policy" (p. 38). On the question of détente specifically, the authors state that the United States has "viewed détente as a means toward a more peaceful world" (p. 33), whereas Moscow sees it as "an instrument of Soviet foreign policy that is designed not to stabilize the global strategic balance . . . but rather to accelerate the whittling down of American power and influence" (p. 3). Given this assessment, the authors insist that the "United States [must not] pursue arms control negotiations as an end in themselves" "but must aim at the evolution of a Soviet-American military relationship that is compatible with U.S. national security interests" (p. 39). Perhaps beyond the scope of this monograph, it, nevertheless, would have been helpful to find out precisely what these interests are.

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KISSINGER: THE EUROPEAN MIND IN AMERICAN POLICY. By *Bruce Mazlish*. New York: Basic Books, 1976. xiv, 330 pp. Photographs. \$10.95.

At the present time, when the issue of human rights has been placed into the center of American foreign policy, the reader will expect from a book with the subtitle "The