

survey from Vernadsky's pen has special value and should be listed among his major publications.

The articles by Pushkarev, Vernadsky's colleague and friend in both Prague and New Haven, are another important feature of the first nine volumes of the *Zapiski*. Pushkarev's articles in the nine volumes total about 250 pages. In addition to his article on historians of the Russian Orthodox church in volume 8, Pushkarev has done sizable articles on the Time of Troubles (vol. 1), the Don Cossacks and the Muscovite State in the seventeenth century (vol. 2), Lenin's foreign policy in the period 1914–23 (vol. 4), and Peter the Great (vol. 7), plus a moving obituary on Vernadsky (vol. 7) and a short piece marking the 250th anniversary of the Russian Academy of Sciences (vol. 9). In these works Pushkarev displays his customary combination of erudition, human interest, and occasional humor, all set forth in a Russian that is careful, clear, and at times eloquent.

Still another major contribution to the contents of the first nine volumes has been made by Nicholas Arseniev, mentioned above as one of the founders of the Russian Academic Group. Arseniev has had articles in eight of the first nine volumes. He has written on his personal recollections of Moscow University in 1906–10 (vol. 1), Russian family traditions (vol. 2), religious life in the Middle Ages (vol. 3), Romantic images of Italy (vol. 4), Dostoevsky (vol. 5), and Pushkin (vol. 9), plus shorter items. Two of Arseniev's articles are in English. Among the other contributors of three or more articles in the first nine volumes are Hunter College Slavist Alex E. Alexander, chief editor Belousow, Oberlin Slavist John B. Dunlop, editor Haugh, New York art historian (and banker) Nikita D. Lobanov-Rostovsky, the late Albany Slavist Marianna A. Poltoratzky, Lafayette College chemist George A. Siemiencow, and Berkeley Slavist Gleb P. Struve. There are also posthumous pieces by Nikolai O. Lossky and Eugene V. Sectorsky, among others.

Constantine Belousow and his colleagues have much to be proud of in the nine volumes they have produced to date.

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THE MAKING OF A MISSILE CRISIS: OCTOBER 1962. By *Herbert S. Dinerstein*. Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976. xiv, 302 pp. \$14.95.

The Cuban missile crisis, if it is to be defined as that period between August 1962, when American U-2 reconnaissance planes photographed eight SAM-2 missile sites in Cuba, and October, when ground to ground medium and intermediate range missiles were removed by the Soviet Union, has been well recorded by historians and dramatists. But Professor Dinerstein's highly researched book gives the reader an insight into the causes of the crisis dating back to when the Soviets first introduced arms into Latin America in Guatemala in 1954 at the peak of the Cold War.

According to Dinerstein, faulty perceptions, miscalculations, and varying theories within and among the three involved nations led to a situation that none of the three desired and all could have avoided. Castro saw American imperialist counterrevolution and the eventual invasion of Cuba as the greatest threat to his revolution. The Soviet Union, only passively supporting Cuba at first, saw an opportunity to place its missiles within range of the United States for the first time, and thereby partially offset American missile bases overseas. At the same time, the USSR wanted to protect a budding socialist state in the Western Hemisphere under the umbrella of nuclear threat.

The United States looked upon the placement of offensive nuclear missiles only ninety miles away as a dangerous tipping of the world balance of power. Now, for the first time, the Soviet Union would have the capability of delivering nuclear warheads to any part of America—an advantage enjoyed up to then only by the United States in regard to the Soviet Union. Not only was there a Communist government in the Western Hemisphere, but there was a Communist government effectively armed.

Dinerstein, who made extensive use of contemporary news reports in the American, Cuban, and Soviet press, points out the differences of opinion within the three countries on the Cuban revolution and the subsequent placement and use of offensive nuclear missiles in Cuba. Castro looked upon the revolution as a social movement and shunned the Partido Socialista Popular (PSP), the Cuban Communist party. Ignoring the Marxist-Leninist theory of revolution, Castro based his reform not on the proletariat but upon a combination of the middle class and the peasantry. Only much later did he become “radical with a rush,” out-radicalizing even the most fervent Communist revolutionaries and absorbing the PSP into the revolutionary government.

Within the councils of the Soviet Union, the hawks and the doves debated the situation much as their counterparts did in the United States. When a Soviet SAM-2 missile shot down an American U-2 reconnaissance plane over Cuba in October 1962, it is unknown, according to Dinerstein, whether this was an act of the Soviet military faction showing its muscle contrary to the more moderate Khrushchev, or whether Khrushchev supported the action. It could even have been, Dinerstein speculates, the act of an individual trigger-happy missileman.

In the United States a congressional election was coming up and the air was full of campaign rhetoric. The Soviets were unsure whether Kennedy knew that missiles were being placed in Cuba and was maintaining silence until after the election, or whether he was still unaware of the missile installation. It is clear from Dinerstein's account that neither the Soviet Union nor the United States enjoyed the prospect of a world holocaust over this issue. The Russians thought that Kennedy would back down from such a prospect when presented with the presence of the missiles as a *fait accompli*. Politically, as well as strategically, Kennedy could not tolerate their proximity. There was even talk of impeachment were he to do so.

Through it all, Castro had at last found the protection he sought against an American invasion and counterrevolution.

The crisis ended in a victory of sorts for all. The Soviets were happy to get out unscathed when they saw that they had badly miscalculated Kennedy's reaction. The United States was relieved to have the missiles withdrawn after the showdown. And Cuba profited from an agreement, however informal, that the United States would not again sponsor an invasion of Cuba. “The antagonists frightened each other into their senses—a rare instance in the history of human folly,” says Dinerstein.

The Making of a Missile Crisis should be required reading for the student of world diplomacy and Russian, Latin American, and United States foreign policy.

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THE CITY IN RUSSIAN HISTORY: Edited by *Michael F. Hamm*. Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1976. x, 350 pp. Maps. \$15.00.

Urban history has often been neglected by Western students of Russia. This collection is meant as “the first attempt outside the Soviet Union to examine the character of the Russian town . . . from the medieval period to the present” by “a new generation of specialists” (p. 1).