

IDEOLOGY, NATIONAL SECURITY,
AND THE CORPORATE STATE:
The Historiography of U.S.-Latin American Relations

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- THE AMERICANIZATION OF BRAZIL: A STUDY OF U.S. COLD WAR DIPLOMACY IN THE THIRD WORLD, 1945-1954.* By Gerald K. Haines. (Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, 1989. Pp. 227. \$35.00.)
- DOLLAR DIPLOMAT: CHANDLER ANDERSON AND AMERICAN DIPLOMACY IN MEXICO AND NICARAGUA, 1913-1928.* By Benjamin T. Harrison. (Pullman: Washington State University Press, 1988. Pp. 168. \$15.95 paper.)
- U.S. POLICY TOWARD ECONOMIC NATIONALISM IN LATIN AMERICA, 1917-1929.* By Michael L. Krenn. (Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, 1990. Pp. 169. \$35.00.)
- ARROGANT DIPLOMACY: U.S. POLICY TOWARD COLOMBIA, 1903-1922.* By Richard L. Lael. (Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, 1987. Pp. 194. \$30.00.)
- AMERICA AND THE AMERICAS: THE UNITED STATES IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE.* By Lester D. Langley. (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1989. Pp. 307. \$30.00 cloth, \$15.00 paper.)
- THE UNITED STATES AND THE CARIBBEAN IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY.* Fourth edition. By Lester D. Langley. (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1989. Pp. 341. \$30.00 cloth, \$14.95 paper.)
- REQUIEM FOR REVOLUTION: THE UNITED STATES AND BRAZIL, 1961-1969.* By Ruth Leacock. (Kent, Ohio, and London: Kent State University Press, 1990. Pp. 317. \$30.00 cloth, \$18.50 paper.)
- THE SOUTHERN DREAM OF A CARIBBEAN EMPIRE, 1854-1861.* By Robert E. May. (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1989. Pp. 304. \$15.00 paper.)
- EISENHOWER AND LATIN AMERICA: THE FOREIGN POLICY OF ANTICOMMUNISM.* By Stephen G. Rabe. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1988. Pp. 237. \$29.95 cloth, \$9.95 paper.)
- MEXICAN LOBBY: MATIAS ROMERO IN WASHINGTON, 1861-1867.* By Matías Romero, edited and translated with an introduction by Thomas D. Schoonover. (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1986. Pp. 184. \$21.00.)
- THE ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS: A RETROSPECTIVE.* Edited by L. Ronald Scheman. (New York: Praeger, 1988. Pp. 267. \$42.95.)

Even the small sample of scholarship on inter-American relations surveyed in this review reveals several striking characteristics. The first is embodied in the title of this essay: the continuing debate among analysts over the relative importance of ideology, questions of national security, and economics as the motive forces in U.S. foreign policy in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. A second feature is the almost exclusive preoccupation in U.S.-based scholarship with Washington policy and policymakers. Such an approach is enlightening on the U.S. side but detrimental to understanding inter-American relations, and it sadly bears too marked a resemblance to the nature of U.S.–Latin American policy. A third dimension, which perhaps contradicts the previous tendency, is an effort to incorporate culture in its broadest sense into analyses of foreign policy in attempting to understand more acutely how perceptions, values, and traditions influence the decisions of policymakers and the society that nurtures them. Finally, this literature underlines the continuing struggle of historians of U.S. foreign policy to identify a methodology that transcends the traditional narrative-analysis.

Ideology, national security, and corporatism—these terms embody the essence of U.S. foreign policy in general and its Latin American policies in particular. These terms also reflect the core of the debate among analysts during the past twenty years over the nature of U.S. foreign policy. Postrevisionist scholars, represented most effectively by the work of John Gaddis on Soviet-U.S. relations, have sought to integrate these factors into their analyses of the policymaking process. Meanwhile, analysts who have stressed the corporatist model of policymaking have placed overwhelming primacy on economics, the place of the corporation in the modern state, and the extent to which ideology and national security have been as much the handmaidens as the masters in a corporate, capitalist society. Although the two views may not at first glance appear either strongly divergent or irreconcilable, they represent fundamentally distinct interpretations of the sources of power in U.S. society and the reasons for its exercise.

The literature discussed in this review reflects the endurance of a liberal, pluralist interpretation of U.S.–Latin American policy. From this perspective, a variety of ingredients—culture, national security, trade and investment, and ideology—have each played a role in determining policy, with the relative importance of any single variable changing according to time, place, and circumstance. The pluralist model is represented in varying degrees here by the comprehensive work of Lester Langley, Richard Lael's study of Colombian-U.S. relations over the Panama crisis, Robert May's study of antebellum U.S. Southern expansionism, Benjamin Harrison's short assessment of Chandler Anderson's role in the determination of policy toward Nicaragua and Mexico in the 1910s and 1920s, Stephen Rabe's penetrating treatment of policies of the Eisenhower ad-

ministration, Gerald Haines's critical overview of U.S. policy in Brazil during the Vargas years, the collection on the Alliance for Progress edited by L. Ronald Scheman, and Ruth Leacock's critical interpretation of U.S. policy toward Brazil during the presidencies of John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson. Benjamin Harrison's study is strongly critical of the corporatist model, which he appears to confuse with economic determinism. Thomas Schoonover's introduction to the translated selections from Matías Romero's diaries on the Civil War era remains neutral on this issue, simply appealing to historians to develop more fully the relationship between domestic and foreign policy.

Occasionally, the pluralist approach is incorrectly identified with an uncritical assessment of U.S. foreign policy. Except for the self-congratulatory Scheman volume on the Alliance for Progress (an unsurprising outcome given that most of the contributors participated in the alliance), the main thrust of the pluralist scholarship reviewed here is highly critical of U.S. policy. Its concerns range over the cultural and political chauvinism of U.S. society, an obsession with the red specter of Communism (especially during the cold war), perversion by the state of the desires of the U.S. people in determining a foreign policy that would otherwise be more benign toward Latin America, the negative role played by U.S. multinational corporations, and encouragement of the Latin American military to become an instrument of policy. Although pluralist analysts may not strike at the heart of U.S. society the way that revisionists of the 1960s did, they often present a sweeping indictment of U.S. policy and policymakers during the past century. At the center of that indictment appears to be the critique that U.S. policymakers have exaggerated the threat of Communism to the United States, failed to come to terms with Latin American economic nationalism, and placed too high a priority on superficial political stability at the expense of economic development and democratization.

Michael Krenn's *U.S. Policy toward Economic Nationalism in Latin America, 1917–1929* most closely resembles the corporatist model of analysis in his acceptance of the thesis that corporate industrialism is the primary force behind U.S. expansionism. But like Stephen Krasner's earlier study, *Defending the National Interest*, Krenn's work presents the state rather than the corporation as the main actor in formulating foreign policy. This study is not premised on pluralist assumptions about U.S. foreign policy, however, and thus stands apart from most of the literature under review here.

The emphasis on ideology as a determinant of policy pervades the historiography of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Its many forms include U.S. exceptionalism and manifest destiny in the first half of the nineteenth century, an increasing sense of racial superiority in the late nineteenth century, and the anti-radicalism, anti-economic nationalism,

and anti-Communism of the twentieth century, with their more positive expressions embodied in support for pluralist, democratic, and capitalist politics.

Robert May's recently republished *Southern Dream of a Caribbean Empire, 1854–1861* underlines the difficulties of distinguishing narrowly between ideological and economic motivation. Although this study is not primarily concerned with U.S. policy toward the Caribbean and Central America before the Civil War but with the sources of pro- and anti-expansionist sentiment in the Southern slave states, it in fact casts considerable light on the nature and roots of U.S. policy. As May indicates, prior to the 1850s, differences in foreign policy, at least in relationship to Caribbean expansion, were less sectional than partisan in nature, with Democrats tending to support expansion into Mexico, Cuba, and Central America while the Whigs in both the North and the South opposed such efforts as the all-Mexico movement during the Mexican-American War. The Kansas-Nebraska debate sectionalized the views over expansionism, with opposition to that expansion in the Caribbean Basin premised largely on opposition to extending slavery. Yet as late as the 1856 presidential elections, the Democrats (led by James Buchanan) represented the most advanced imperialist position, supporting Cuban annexation and "ascendancy in the Gulf of Mexico," a position that presidential candidate Abraham Lincoln condemned in the 1860 campaign (pp. 72, 76). Clearly implicit in May's study is the point that the debate focused on the extension of slavery, not on an aggressive foreign policy toward the remnants of European empire in the Caribbean or the desirability of the United States extending its diplomatic, military, and economic sphere of influence. Significantly, South Carolina (arguably the most radical state) consistently opposed Caribbean expansion because it detracted from the effort to resolve domestic economic and political questions.

In general, as Lester Langley's recent synthesis, *America and the Americas*, convincingly suggests, pervasive support existed in the United States throughout the first half of the nineteenth century for policies that advanced U.S. republican ideals, improved the commercial advantage of the United States, and strengthened U.S. national security. Such goals were achieved, or at least pursued, by acquiring one-half of Mexican territory, encouraging Latin American nations to adopt a U.S. political model, promoting the annexation of Cuba, and restraining the reckless abandon of filibusters, who threatened to undermine great power relations as well as to injure the U.S. position in the Caribbean and Latin America by provoking vigorous anti-Americanism. A similar attempt sought to neutralize competitive European powers in the Caribbean through such devices as the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty of 1850, which established a degree of parity between Britain and the United States for constructing any canal across the isthmus. When combined with the U.S.–

New Granadan Bidlack-Mallarino Treaty of 1846, which involved the United States in the defense of the isthmus, the advance of U.S. hegemonic design was evident. Ideology and pragmatic national self-interest were indistinguishable in this expansionism, not competing factors in policy formation.

The insights of William Williams and Walter LaFeber on the critical transitional importance of the last third of the nineteenth century in shifting the United States toward a more vigorous expansionism, albeit with a preference for informal empire rather than formal colonies, are now widely accepted in the historical literature, including Langley's studies. His *America and the Americas* makes no effort to provide a systematic analysis of the relationship between industrialism in the United States and the new outward thrust in the 1890s. But it recognizes the inter-relatedness of the strategic considerations advanced by Alfred Thayer Mahan and Stephen Luce, the commercial importance of expanded markets, new sources of raw materials for the domestic economy, and the ideological and cultural features of the 1890s embodied in a new manifest destiny, racial assumptions of U.S. individual and institutional superiority, and fear of the loss of frontier creativity.

Langley's *America and the Americas* and the fourth edition of his *The United States and the Caribbean* intersect with Richard Lael's *Arrogant Diplomacy: U.S. Policy toward Colombia, 1903–1922*. Both treat the early-twentieth-century emergence of the United States as a world military and industrial power, increasingly hegemonic in the Caribbean and Central America and willing to exercise a police power in the region in defense of U.S. national interests. Langley and Lael are critical of U.S. policy under Theodore Roosevelt, William Taft, and Woodrow Wilson, although Lael has the easier time in maintaining that critical posture as he retells one of the most unfortunate series of events in U.S.–Latin American relations, the U.S. role in Colombia's loss of Panama. To Lael's credit, his study adds new information on the expansion of the U.S. economic presence in Colombia during the period before 1920 and the strategic importance during World War I of not only the country's location but Colombian raw materials. The account is less satisfying on the Colombian side, however. Although Lael unfortunately does not address the debate of pluralist versus statist or corporatist interpretations, the evidence advanced in his analysis lends more credence to the statist and corporatist paradigms than to the pluralist. The Roosevelt administration's support for Panamanian secession and the later willingness of the Wilson administration to end the long-standing dispute derived from fundamentally geopolitical considerations. By 1903, construction of a U.S.-controlled canal had been a basic premise of U.S. policy for more than half a century, and the Roosevelt administration defended that premise when Colombia appeared to impede its realization. The initiative on Panama was a state action, irre-

spective of whether a U.S. economic presence existed in Panama. Private capitalist interests as well as ideological and racial assumptions about Colombian politicians and character may have facilitated rationalization of the Roosevelt actions, but the actions themselves were driven by considerations of realpolitik. Langley presents Roosevelt as a “reluctant imperialist,” but the evidence suggests Machiavellian caution rather than reluctance, unless Langley means no more than a general opposition to formal colonies. The Colombian situation was altered more in degree than in essence by the start of World War I. At that time, oil and other raw materials like platinum redefined Colombia’s strategic importance to the United States, and private U.S. investment in oil resources intensified private-sector pressures on the Wilson and Harding administrations to restore harmonious relations between the two nations.

Michael Krenn confronts these interpretative issues more directly in *U.S. Policy toward Economic Nationalism in Latin America* in the crucial period between World War I and the onset of worldwide depression. This decade was characterized by major capital expansion, significant efforts to apply “progressive” ideals to Latin American development, and Latin American analyses of development strategies of their own. Krenn’s general assessment of the growth of the U.S. economic presence and opposition to Latin American radicalism is strong on the U.S. side but considerably less satisfying in its treatment of the Latin American political and intellectual dimension, even in the chapters devoted to Colombia, Brazil, and Venezuela. His contention that historians have focused almost exclusively on U.S.–European relations in the 1920s is inaccurate and would have been even twenty years ago. Krenn argues more convincingly that U.S. policymakers devoted little energy to attempting to understand the roots, nature, or legitimacy of Latin American ideas on development.

Not everyone will agree with Krenn’s contention that the ideas of U.S. policymakers contained a strong degree of racism. The term *cultural chauvinism* might have been more appropriate, given the differing meaning of racism to the 1920s generation, particularly for those like Henry Stimson, whose ideas crystallized during the Theodore Roosevelt years. The suggestion that Latin American economic nationalism was not anti-U.S. in nature is also only partly correct. It is true enough that the main debate over development strategies was an internal one and that broader anti-foreign sentiment existed in Latin America. But one cannot so easily separate ideas of economic nationalism from the larger Latin American intellectual discussion of the nature of U.S. society and values and the extent to which those values were being injected into Latin America by the expanded Yankee economic presence. Many prominent Latin Americans found Europe, even imperialist Europe, more culturally palatable than the United States. This dimension requires more development. Krenn makes only passing references to José Martí and José Enrique Rodó

and gives no consideration to other prominent intellectuals such as Rubén Darío or Manuel Ugarte.

In the Colombian context, one finds no systematic consideration of the significance for later U.S.–Colombian relations of the regeneration movement of Rafael Núñez and Miguel Antonio Caro in the 1880s and 1890s, with their emphasis on Catholicism and agrarianism. It is true that the positivist tradition in the late nineteenth century contributed to a more favorable environment for development, the expanded role of the state, and foreign investment. But much of that legacy was under review well before the 1920s, and it is questionable in the Colombian case how firmly rooted positivism was prior to 1920. For understanding the larger context, Langley's work is a better guide among the works reviewed here, and Clarence Haring's badly dated *South America Looks at the United States* (1929) is still worth consulting. On Argentina, David Sheinin's recent work also casts additional light on the nature of Latin American economic nationalism.¹

One would like to see more systematic analysis of the relationship between Latin American economic nationalism and the rise of organized labor, indeed the emergence of urban industrial labor, as well as an urban-industrial middle class. Krenn effectively argues that new groups emerged in the context of industrial growth, especially at the time of World War I, and they were less tied to the interests of the old landed oligarchy and the export-import sector of the economy. What is only hinted at here will hopefully attract more systematic analysis by other scholars. Considerable need exists for thorough studies of both industrial and agricultural labor in these years and more generally the middle sector, set in a historical context rather than in contemporary sociological and political science analyses. For instance, the detailed, well-documented work on Colombia by Charles Bergquist and David Johnson of the relationship between political orientation and economic holdings and occupation during the War of the Thousand Days needs to be applied to the 1920s. Also particularly insightful is Catherine LeGrand's study of landholding, labor patterns, and the arrival of U.S. foreign investment in the Santa Marta banana zone. None of these works deal with foreign policy, but they provide foreign-policy analysts with vital understanding of domestic political and economic trends that influenced the response to a foreign economic presence. LeGrand's work in particular suggests that scholars need to exercise caution in concluding that workers in an expanding capitalist sector are necessarily supporters of modernization.²

1. David Sheinin, "The United States and Argentina, 1910–1929," Ph.D. diss., University of Connecticut, 1989.

2. Charles Bergquist, *Coffee and Conflict in Colombia, 1886–1910* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1978); David Johnson, "What Coffee Wrought and Did Not: The Regional Ori-

Benjamin Harrison's *Dollar Diplomat: Chandler Anderson and American Diplomacy in Mexico and Nicaragua, 1913–1928* raises doubts about the validity not of the corporate paradigm but of instrumental Marxism in understanding U.S. policy. Harrison is careful to demonstrate that the specific proposals advanced by Anderson and the business interests he represented for Mexico and Nicaragua were not adopted in Washington. But the implication here that business interests are monolithic is not sustained. The evidence presented in the extant literature sustains his thesis that individual business groups and Washington policymakers are often in conflict, but it also indicates that the collective policy behavior of Washington has consistently supported the broader interests of a capitalist political economy.

Krenn's study underlines the inaccuracy of one of the basic premises of Haines's otherwise insightful analysis of U.S. cold war policies toward Brazil. In *The Americanization of Brazil; A Study of U.S. Cold War Diplomacy in the Third World, 1945–1954*, Haines claims, against massive historical evidence to the contrary, that U.S. policymakers in these years made their "first attempts to deal with emerging Third World nationalism and the Third World's political and economic problems" (p. xi). Although a case might be made for this argument in U.S. policy toward Africa or the Middle East, it simply cannot be sustained in the case of Latin America. On the contrary, economic nationalism was one of the essential features of U.S. concern in responding to the Mexican Revolution and its aftermath and to the widespread Latin American search for alternative routes to development following World War I.

Haines stands on more solid ground in his thesis of continuity in U.S. policy toward Latin America during the presidencies of Harry Truman and Dwight Eisenhower. My own reading of the Eisenhower papers, however, inclines me to support the well-developed argument in Stephen Rabe's *Eisenhower and Latin America: The Foreign Policy of Anticommunism* that a shift, tactical or otherwise, occurred in the Eisenhower administration's second term. This shift was prompted by pragmatic considerations, the influence of critical individuals surrounding President Eisenhower like his brother Milton, the departure from the cabinet of John Foster Dulles and Secretary of the Treasury George Humphrey, and the rise of a far more vigorous Latin American developmentalist movement led by Juscelino Kubitschek of Brazil and Alberto Lleras Camargo of Colombia. In actuality, the enabling legislation for much of what became the basis of the Alliance for Progress was drafted under Eisenhower. As Douglas

gins of Colombia's War of the Thousand Days," paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Historical Association, May 1990, Vancouver, B.C.; and Catherine LeGrand, *Frontier Expansion and Peasant Protest in Colombia, 1830–1936* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1986).

Dillon's contribution to the Scheman volume on the alliance points out, the Eisenhower team brought Kennedy on side while he was still a presidential candidate. Rabe's study strongly reinforces the revisionist literature on Eisenhower's presidential leadership in foreign policy. For instance, those who have read through the minutes of the National Security Council for the 1950s will find entirely palatable Rabe's thesis that in the final analysis Dwight Eisenhower determined policy in Latin America and elsewhere, regardless of personality and bureaucratic tensions within the administration.

Haines and Rabe share the same basic premise in their studies: that U.S. anti-Communism lay at the root of U.S. policy throughout this period. Yet as the evidence advanced in Haines's study in particular suggests, anti-Communism was only one dimension of U.S. ideology. It also emphasized a developmentalist approach in Brazil and elsewhere that would preserve U.S. state and corporate power and influence, undercut foreign influence (Communist or otherwise), and divert Latin American nations from a statist model of development. Haines demonstrates that unlike U.S. leaders, Brazilians like Getúlio Vargas, Enrico Gaspar Dutra, and João Café Filho viewed themselves as pragmatists "unencumbered by rigid ideological commitments." Although the leaders of both nations supported a largely capitalist model of development, U.S. officials translated fears of Communism at home into anti-statist, private-sector investment initiatives in Brazil, often favoring the Brazilian military over civilian agents of economic development. Haines and Rabe advance the thesis that in the Truman and first Eisenhower administrations, the United States rigidly resisted overtures for a Marshall Plan for Latin America. Then during the years when Humphrey was Secretary of the Treasury, there was little movement away from an insistence on private-sector development, attempting to tie Export-Import bank loans to U.S. trade promotion in sectors that would not compete with U.S. exports. At one stage, the U.S. Treasury sought to barter a U.S. loan for a Brazilian guarantee of U.S. private-sector participation in Brazilian oil development. The U.S. initiative failed in these years, in part because the protectionist sentiment regarding natural resources enjoyed a broad consensus in Brazil that included the military. Significantly, the U.S. Department of State was more favorable to the Brazilian position than were other sectors of the U.S. bureaucracy in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Even there, however, the approach had changed very little since the 1920s, when the department viewed the use of U.S. technical experts, engineers, managers, and economists as the road to economic development and political stabilization. Haines and Rabe both demonstrate the increasing militarization of development programs in the transition to the Eisenhower administration, with the Technical Assistance Program in 1953 being absorbed largely into the operations of the Mutual Security Agency.

Haines and Rabe are fundamentally critical of the basic thrust of U.S. policy in the cold war years. The prevailing view was that Communism constituted a real threat in Latin America that justified lending support to authoritarian regimes, whose often corrupt leaders (such as Marcos Pérez Jiménez in Venezuela, Rafael Trujillo in the Dominican Republic, Anastasio Somoza in Nicaragua, Fulgencio Batista in Cuba, and Gustavo Rojas Pinilla in Colombia) systematically violated human rights, diverted potential development assistance into personal investments, and reinforced the extractive-export dependency that retarded real economic growth and political democratization. Both authors demonstrate the comparative weakness of Latin American Communism. In no instance prior to 1959 did it threaten to gain legitimate political power or even to subvert such power, as Rabe points out regarding Guatemala before the surrogate coup of 1954.

Internal and Latin American pressure on the Eisenhower administration and then the Cuban Revolution raised the U.S. consciousness regarding impending revolution. But it was John Kennedy's transition team in 1960–61 that spoke in terms of the need for action at the eleventh hour of inter-American relations, before centuries of economic inequality, political repression, and anti-Americanism boiled over into widespread social revolution. This is the period covered by Ruth Leacock's analysis of Brazilian policy and Ronald Scheman's edited collection on the Alliance for Progress.

These two studies are distinct in tone, research methodology, scope, and conclusions, although each is useful in its own way. Leacock's *Requiem for Revolution: The United States and Brazil, 1961–1969* is more complete on the Latin American, or at least the Brazilian, side. She demonstrates a subtle understanding of the internal dynamic of Brazilian politics in the 1960s and the way in which U.S. policy evolved to contend with the Brazilian left. Her conclusion that the 1964 bloodless military coup against João Goulart "bore an American anti-Communist imprint" suggests that little had changed in the basic trajectory of U.S. policy since the 1950s. Leacock's analysis underlines the extent to which the Kennedy call for revolutionary action to alter the Latin American political economies contained less substance on development and more of an orientation toward counterinsurgency programs, the arming and training of anti-Communist elements, and the mobilization of Latin American groups, including Brazilian businesses, the military, local priests, housewives, and students against Communist or allegedly Communist forces. The rapid and unseemly U.S. recognition of the new military regime in 1964 and continuing support despite its abysmal record on human rights echoed the past. This approach also served as harbinger for future actions in Chile, Nicaragua, Guatemala, and El Salvador. More than Rabe or Haines, Leacock sustains the corporatist model of foreign-policy formula-

tion, although her analysis leans at times more toward an instrumentalist view than toward a structuralist Marxist one in which the state serves as little more than the instrument of the capitalist class. Thus her interpretation more closely approximates that of Gabriel Kolko in his survey of U.S. Third World policies in the cold war years than it does the corporatist interpretation advanced by Michael Hogan and Thomas McCormick.³ As Leacock notes, "especially in the Brazilian case, American corporations played an important role in altering policy guidelines and establishing new performance tests for the beleaguered Brazilian government" (p. viii). She indicates that what was new by 1963 was the idea that it was an appropriate civic duty for U.S. multinational firms and their officers in Latin America to engage in anti-Communist civic-action operations. She also outlines effectively the more specific initiatives of the American Institute for Free Labor Development in the area of organized labor.

Like Rabe and Haines, Leacock documents the extent to which U.S. policymakers exaggerated the threat from the Brazilian left. In the 1960 presidential campaign, Jânio Quadros praised Fidel Castro and proposed recognizing China and renewing diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. But even the Brazilian conservatives did not think he constituted a threat, so deeply ingrained in Brazilian politics was the tendency to lash out at U.S. interests during electoral campaigning. Nonetheless, the Kennedy team (including Walt Rostow, who later served as National Security Adviser to President Lyndon Johnson) were convinced that the Third World (whether Vietnam or Latin America) constituted the next Communist target in the cold war struggle. Thus in the aftermath of the Cuban Revolution, the Kennedy administration determined that Latin America would have a priority second only to general defense. Brazil became a special target because of its size and population, geographic proximity to Africa, shared borders with most South American countries, rich potential in raw materials, and seemingly precarious political situation. The Kennedy administration, including Ambassador Lincoln Gordon, were concerned that Goulart's willingness to work with labor and Communist groups would result in acceptance of Soviet aid, allowing the USSR to establish ties of obligation. In one of the supreme acts of political arrogance of the Kennedy administration, Bobby Kennedy visited President Goulart for five hours in late 1962 to lecture him on the presence of Communists and anti-American leftists in his administration. As Leacock effectively documents, Goulart's real problems in 1963 were

3. See Gabriel Kolko, *Confronting the Third World: United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1960* (New York: Pantheon, 1988); Michael Hogan, "Corporatism," *Journal of American History* 77, no. 1 (June 1990):153-60; Hogan, "Revival and Reform: America's Twentieth-Century Search for a New Economic Order Abroad," *Diplomatic History* 8 (Fall 1984):287-310; and Thomas J. McCormick, "Drift or Mastery? A Corporatist Synthesis for American Diplomatic History," *Reviews in American History* 10 (Dec. 1982):318-30.

domestic politics and the need to hold together a center-left coalition against polarizing tendencies. U.S. active campaigning against the left and undisguised support for military action against Goulart undermined that effort and encouraged a coup attempt. Given Goulart's increasingly isolated political position, it was bound to succeed.

The Alliance for Progress was not well received in Brazil during these years. As Leacock indicates, its programs were considered failures by 1968 and the end of the Johnson administration, even though Kennedy's death had transformed him into a folk hero in Brazil and throughout Latin America. Kennedy's personal popularity, however, did not alter the view of some Brazilians that the alliance was little more than an extension of Truman's Point Four Program and a new form of imperialism.

The view of the Alliance for Progress that emerges from the Scheman volume contrasts strongly with that of Leacock, yet much in the Scheman collection would sustain Leacock's interpretation. *The Alliance for Progress: A Retrospective* is a collection of essays by individuals, most of whom helped formulate policy in the Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson administrations or in Latin American governments and inter-American agencies in the same period. Although the contributors are not uniformly favorable to the alliance, most of the critical essays were written by Latin Americans. Several of the U.S. authors (such as Douglas Dillon) document the origins of the alliance program, the priority given to Latin American initiatives, and the legislation in the Eisenhower administration. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., contends that Kennedy had no illusions about the ability of the United States to solve the economic problems of other nations. Yet Schlesinger lends support to Leacock's interpretation in observing that Castro was correct in contending that the U.S. national security bureaucracy generated a program that gained a life of its own and undercut the development-oriented initiatives. The implicit assumption was that the initiatives themselves were radical in nature, a conclusion that Leacock's study undermines. The same thesis is advanced by Lincoln Gordon, former ambassador to Brazil and a major architect of U.S. policy at the Punta del Este Conference. According to Gordon, while U.S. policy was sincerely committed to development in Brazil, Quadros and Goulart were interested "not in economic and social progress" but in the "pursuit of personal and illegitimate power."

Critical of the more fundamental assumptions that underlay the alliance, Howard Wiarda presents one of the most incisive essays in *The Alliance for Progress*. He outlines what he perceives as the basic inability of the United States to understand that more than three models of political and economic development coexisted in Latin America: one in the Castro mold and socialist, a second authoritarian and capitalist, and the third capitalist and democratic. The vigorous rejection of the Castro model left only democratic or authoritarian capitalism, and when democratic forms

failed, authoritarianism became an acceptable substitute. Miguel Wionczek's assessment is equally critical, presenting the developmentalist assumptions of the alliance as "a liberal and naive dream." José Luis Restrepo, a Colombian economist with the Organization of American States during the alliance years, critiques the alliance's basically political motivation, its excessive reliance on marketplace forces, and the spirit of free enterprise in contemporary U.S. policy, an orientation he views as antagonistic to the alliance's basic intent.

In considering the array of works reviewed here, the kaleidoscope of issues and interpretations of inter-American relations that they present attest to the vibrancy of scholarship in the field on one level. They also evidence the continuing high level of political interest in Latin America on another level and what Lester Langley provocatively suggests is a divergence between U.S. government views toward Latin America and those of the American people. Yet it is disappointing that U.S. scholars have not made more use of Latin American sources or developed the Latin American side of their bilateral or multilateral studies more fully. Such collective works as *Viejos desafíos, nuevas perspectivas* or Juan Toklatian's study of Colombian foreign relations in the twentieth century indicate the existence of a very different range of questions, issues, and perspectives as well as a body of literature and sources that U.S. scholars need to assimilate and address.⁴

4. Raúl Benítez Manaut et al., *Viejos desafíos, nuevas perspectivas: México-Estados Unidos y América Latina* (Mexico City: Miguel Angel Porrúa, 1988); and Juan G. Tokatlian and Rodrigo Pardo, *Política exterior de Colombia* (Bogotá: Tercer Mundo, 1988).