

justification, and they can therefore be said to have “hijacked” China’s National Revolution by exploiting the Japanese invasion. But this would seem to ignore the fact that Mao explicitly suspended agrarian revolution in 1937 and switched his focus for the next eight years to resisting Japan and reforming people’s livelihood. The evidence Lai himself presents suggests that the Communists achieved legitimacy in the region by restoring the economy, currency, trade, and social networks, tasks at which the Guomindang largely failed, and by replacing the notorious *tianfu* 田賦 system with an egalitarian grain tax that foreshadowed the radical changes implemented after 1945. By building new institutions, a disciplined army, and a coherent, highly adaptive administration and by mobilizing patriotic sentiment, they were eventually able to eclipse the Nationalists, who largely neglected Shandong, failed to develop an effective military response to the Japanese there, had little interest in establishing a unified command, spent much of their time squabbling violently among themselves, and relied on local strongmen, many of whom defected. As a result of their wartime successes, the Communists could sink deep roots in Shandong, which later provided more than a quarter of the PLA’s soldiers. The description of the Communists in Shandong as “totalitarian” would also seem to contradict some of the book’s key findings. The study shows, for example, that Communist social and economic policy in the province changed constantly in the war years, suggesting that local leaders were aware of the severe limits to their authority and sensitive to the constraints on them.

The writing is often inelegant and unidiomatic, and there are transcription errors. This is hardly the author’s fault. Publishers of works in English by nonnative speakers have a duty to ensure that they are edited to an acceptable standard. Sadly, that did not happen here.

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Lineage Society on the Southeastern Coast of China: The Impact of Japanese Piracy in the 16th Century. By IVY MARIA LIM. Amherst, N.Y.: Cambria Press, 2010. xxx, 390 pp. \$129.99 (cloth).
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If this were an online response, I would click on “like,” because this book is a gem. On the basis of sound historical detective work, Ivy Maria Lim has produced a creative, interesting, and carefully researched study that juxtaposes an underworld crisis, imperial court policy, and local response to provide a new perspective on the *wokou* (Japanese pirate) crisis of the mid-sixteenth century, portraying it as the catalyst for lineage formation in southeast China.

The focus of the book is the transformation (or evolution) of local society from the *lijia* household registration system to lineage as the primary form of social organization, in the town of Yuanhua in Haining County, Zhejiang

Province, during the sixteenth century. This change, according to the author, was intensified by, even if not necessarily caused by, the *wokou* crisis. Drawing on the rich holdings of family genealogies in the Shanghai Municipal Library for the four great families of Yuanhua—Zhu, Zha, Dong, and Xu—the author discovered that between 1550 and 1560, at the height of the *wokou* crisis, narratives of lineage creation far overshadowed those of anticipated physical destruction. In puzzling out an explanation for this disparity, Lim begins the book with an account of the *wokou* raids in Zhejiang and analyzes the ramifications of the *wokou* suppression campaigns to argue that even areas not necessarily ravaged by the *wokou* were nevertheless affected by them. According to Lim, this was because the two major problems surrounding the suppression endeavors were how to identify the individual *wokou* to be targeted and how to finance the campaigns against them from local, rather than central government, resources. Herein lies the nexus that enables her to link the two issues of *wokou* and lineage, and to speculate that the early deployment of troops, particularly outside reinforcements, may have heightened officials' sense of crisis and caused them to indiscriminately apply the label *wokou* as a term of treason, not only to coastal marauders, but also to refugees, tax evaders, and others, such as saltern households, who were outside the *lijia* system. In this context, where it became necessary to establish one's status as a "good person" (*liangmin*) in contrast to *wokou*, local residents responded by creating lineages with impressive lines of descent and by constructing expensive ancestral halls in order to obtain the "potency of legitimacy-conferring labels and actions of political alignment" (p. 241), i.e., as means of acquiring ritual and political legitimacy through the establishment of literati credentials, formal alliance with the court, and fulfillment of their tax obligations.

At the same time, lineage creation and the construction of ancestral halls, endowed with corporate holdings to finance their upkeep, allowed "good people" to shift much of their tax burden from their individual persons to their corporate estates and tenants. Lim surmises that, after the construction of ancestral halls, the incentive for newly incorporated families to expand their landholdings in the name of charitable endowments or the education of youth may have stemmed from the anti-*wokou* campaigns and the increased demand for taxes and corvée that resulted therefrom.

The question of why lineage formation prevailed over some other form of social organization is answered by the explanation that the Ming court's 1536 change in ritual law may have paved the way for ordinary folks to build ancestral halls while also popularizing the idea of descent-line ethics among the non-elite. Thus the growth of lineages, according to Lim, was the logical outcome of "the spread of literacy and Confucian values, facilitated by the national school system and by the increasing prosperity that allowed families to ensure a Confucian education—and hence, upward social mobility for their sons" (p. 242). The long-term result was the expansion of imperial authority in rural society, as "ritualistic and political alignment with state-sanctioned practices allowed the self-professed groups in Haining—hitherto, groups on the fringes of littoral society on account of their *lijia* status or lack thereof—to enter the administrative embrace of the Chinese state" (p. 244).

Although Lim is judicious in her assertions and takes great pains not to overstate what is at best a speculative, albeit convincing, hypothesis based on a limited locale, one wonders to what extent the experiences of Yuanhua Town and Haining County are representative of the wider southeast China littoral, and to what extent lineage formation experienced the same impetus and followed the same patterns elsewhere. Nonetheless, in the context of this original contribution, Lim has also produced in clear, crisp English a fascinating recital of political intrigue and familial interaction that should hold the interest of undergraduates and could serve as the basis for broader discussion of China during the Ming dynasty.

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Transforming History: The Making of a Modern Academic Discipline in Twentieth-Century China. Edited by BRIAN MOLOUGHNEY and PETER ZARROW. Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 2011. xi, 429 pp. \$52.00 (cloth).

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According to editor John Makeham, the series in which this conference volume appears addresses such questions as: “To what extent were new knowledge systems viewed as tools in the recovery of tradition rather than its abandonment?” (p. vii). Liang Qichao recognized the issue when he wrote in 1901 that “. . . China (Zhongguo) formerly never had any history,”² and, in 1902, that “of all the disciplines that have recently come from the West, the only one already present in China is history” (p. 3). Twenty years later, Liang tried to resolve the contradiction with another oversimplification, writing: “In ancient China, all disciplines were but sub-branches of historiography” (p. 90).

In their introductory essay, “Making History Modern: The Transformation of Chinese Historiography, 1895–1937,” editors Moloughney and Zarrow try to square the circle by arguing that “it was not necessary to *create* a historical discipline; rather, through an engagement with global developments historians could refashion inherited practice into a modern discipline” (p. 3). In reaction to Western imperialism and on the model of Meiji historiography, China’s “New History” moved from revering an ancient golden age to accepting perennial militarism, from scholar-official loyalty to the emperor to popular and professional devotion to the nation, and from moral judgments to social analysis. The results included the first History Department in 1917, specialization in Western-defined periods, a European-style research institute in 1928, a professional society and debates, women faculty, and courses on gender. New

²Liang Qichao, *Zhongguo lishi yanjiu fa* [Methods of studying Chinese history] (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2009), 161.