

Lasch, and Pauline Tompkins. These omissions cannot really be excused by the justification in the acknowledgments. Otherwise the work sets a high standard for subsequent volumes in the new series, *Topics in United States Diplomatic History*, under the general editorship of Norman A. Graebner.

D. N. Stashevsky's book is primarily an analysis of political, social, and economic forces, especially the "progressive" elements in the United States, which worked for or against or were indifferent to recognition of the Soviet Union. It contains no new material of significance and its arguments and conclusions are predictable. In the course of his research the author did, however, consult most of the important and several obscure American works on the subject, as well as a good deal of the periodical literature, particularly from the left-wing and labor press. His explanation for the opposition and in some cases apathy of much of the working class in the recognition debate is that it was "stupefied by anti-Soviet propaganda, terrified by government repression, and preoccupied with its own personal 'prosperity,' although sympathetic at heart with the Russian workers and peasants."

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THE OTHER SIDE OF COEXISTENCE: AN ANALYSIS OF RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY. By *Albert L. Weeks*. New York: Pitman Publishing Corp., 1970. v, 304 pp. \$7.50.

The focus of the book is the other (i.e., Soviet) side of coexistence. On the basis of the interrelationship between four modes, national security, ideology, leadership, and economics, Professor Weeks hopes to arrive at a useful analysis of Soviet foreign policy. However, Weeks's understanding of these categories will leave many readers dissatisfied. For example, he explains Soviet motivation in concluding the Nazi-Soviet pact as, first, national security and, second, "traditional Russian expansion, a characteristic form of service to the national interest" (p. 50). When Weeks chides a recent Soviet writer for failing to mention Soviet national interest as a motivation for the Soviet invasion of Poland and he quotes *Kommunist* as saying "it was crucial for the U.S.S.R. to undertake whatever measures necessary to postpone the danger of an immediate military conflict," one wonders what Weeks understands by "national security" or "interest." Most definitions of the terms would encompass measures to delay a war with a stronger power and precipitate a conflict among several powers all viewed as potential if not actual enemies of the Soviet Union.

Ideology is interpreted rather narrowly as a set of beliefs which impel Soviet leaders to support revolutions where they do not conflict with Soviet national interests. No consideration is given to the legitimizing function of ideology within the Soviet Union. Thus Weeks can speculate (pp. 256-57) that a major motivation in the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 was "girding up NATO" because of the potential danger from China. The consequences for Soviet internal affairs of Czechoslovak heresy or defection do not enter into the analysis.

Professor Weeks is well informed and his speculations are often original and imaginative, but the lack of rigor in his conceptual framework, illustrated above, renders the book unsatisfactory.

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