

to the United States of a nonaligned Yugoslavia. Obviously, this is a message that should be heeded, and for that reason alone I would recommend *Yugoslavia After Tito* to the general public.

In a scholarly sense, *Yugoslavia After Tito* is a failure. The author, I believe, may have the distinction of writing the first full-length manuscript on the subject without using a single non-English-language source or even making a single reference to any personal knowledge of the country. In fact, he may be the first of the "post-Tito groupies" to rely exclusively on materials produced by his predecessors.

The organization of *Yugoslavia After Tito* is similar to an army intelligence briefing, but it lacks the sophisticated analysis that usually follows. Its analysis is grossly simplistic, uncomprehensive, and almost completely ignores the impact of Yugoslav domestic politics on foreign policy behavior. To his credit, however, Ra'anan does not make sweeping conclusions about the probability of Soviet intervention in Yugoslavia, nor does he raise the traditional clarion call for the forces of NATO to come to "little Yugoslavia's" rescue.

The author's rhetoric is frequently emotional or imprecise, for example, when he refers to the "alleged Soviet-Egyptian rift" (p. 79). At other times, the logic is not fully developed, such as when he claims that the Italian Communist Party is more likely than the Christian Democrats to renew attempts to repress Italian grievances in Yugoslavia (p. 126).

On the whole, the style of *Yugoslavia After Tito* makes it easy to read and understand, and it can be quite entertaining. Nevertheless, Ra'anan's book should not be perceived as the definitive word on the subject, and it should not be taken as a serious, scholarly tract. Finally, the book may help others to produce an annual encyclopedia of similar works, including "Poland after Gierak," "Korea after Kim Il Sung," and even "CBS after Cronkite."

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SOCIAL CHANGE IN ROMANIA, 1860-1940: A DEBATE ON DEVELOPMENT IN A EUROPEAN NATION. Edited by *Kenneth Jowitt*. Institute of International Studies, Research Series, no. 36. Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1978. xii, 207 pp. \$4.50, paper.

A new paradigm for understanding Eastern Europe seems to be in the making. Until recently, scholars wishing to go beyond national histories have used two basic models. Social scientists have investigated various aspects of the struggle between capitalist democracies and Communist autocracies, whereas historians have studied diplomatic relationships as a way to relate Eastern Europe to the West. Recently, these frameworks have been challenged by a refurbished Marxian idea, the notion that Eastern Europe is a dependency area, the semiperiphery of the world economic system of capitalism.

One does not have to accept the controversial thesis of Immanuel Wallerstein (*The Modern World System*, 1974) to agree that new and interesting points can be made by those who are familiar with dependency theory. For example, the editor of this collection, Kenneth Jowitt, describes Rumania's development in terms of Max Weber's distinction between class and status societies. When the shift from Ottoman to European dependency imposed a class style of political structure on a society still regulated by status relationships, a tension was created that no amount of speculation over the content of the national character could resolve. This suggestive analysis is complemented by Andrew Janos, who comes to the arresting conclusion that neither communism nor fascism have to do primarily with industrialization, since the impera-

tives for survival in a changing world system generate pressures for this in any event. Instead, they are efforts of the peasant periphery or the middle-class semiperiphery, respectively, to find original paths out of dependency.

One advantage of this approach is that it provides an explanation of right-wing movements that are otherwise apt to be dismissed as transient irrationalities. Indeed, it is a strength of this collection that all the authors, even those who do not use dependency theory, clarify issues that are broader than the Rumanian particulars they discuss. For this reason, I have the feeling that some of the ideas Jowitt and his collaborators bring forward will have considerable impact on the direction of East European studies over the next few years.

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CLASH OVER ROMANIA: BRITISH AND AMERICAN POLICIES TOWARD ROMANIA, 1938–1947. By *Paul D. Quinlan*. Los Angeles: American Romanian Academy, 1977. 173 pp. Paper.

Although not identified as such, this monograph probably began as a dissertation. The author's adviser should have restrained his candidate from the herculean effort of researching the overwhelming amount of materials for the period and the topics under study. Dr. Quinlan waded into a tidal wave in a vain effort to produce a study of diplomatic, military, economic, and social history of the period preceding, during, and following the Second World War. In so doing, he could not investigate all relevant archival materials in Britain and the United States, so essential for understanding Anglo-American actions regarding the Balkan states. For example, Quinlan devotes about one page to the Churchill-Stalin agreement on the Balkans reached in Moscow on October 9, 1944, whereas Albert Resis, in "The Churchill-Stalin Secret Percentages Agreement on the Balkans" (*American Historical Review*, 83, no. 2 [April 1978]: 368–87), refers to more sources on that event alone than on all the sources cited by Quinlan put together!

When such unwittingly bold studies appear in print, one wonders what motivates a young scholar to attempt the impossible. Is this study a polemic? Is it intended to postulate some thesis? If, as Dr. Quinlan asserts, "by the summer of 1943 it had become evident that most of the Balkans would fall within the military sphere of the Red Army" (p. 159), why does he fail to follow up this view with some analysis of Roosevelt's and Churchill's efforts at Teheran and Yalta to mitigate this apparently inevitable development? It is precisely Quinlan's selective, and not inclusive, outline which gives this reviewer the impression that this is an undertaking which requires infinitely more research and analysis. One outstanding virtue of historical research in the West is that it has the right to produce works of this kind. But academic freedom also requires examination of *all* available evidence, not merely those items which can substantiate some vague thesis.

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KARA MUSTAFA POD WIEDNIEM: ŹRÓDŁA MUZUŁMAŃSKIE DO DZIEJÓW WYPRAWY WIEDEŃSKIEJ 1683 ROKU. By *Zygmunt Abrahamowicz*. Cracow: Wydawnictwo literackie, 1973. 410 pp. Illus. 75 zł.

This is a timely publication of Turkish sources concerning the Vienna campaign of 1683. Dr. Abrahamowicz has translated a selection of Ottoman chronicles and letters pertaining to the campaign of Grand Vizier Kara Mustafa (1638–83), which cover