TOPICAL REVIEW

RECENT RESEARCH AND WRITINGS ON THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN LATIN AMERICA

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AS RECENTLY AS 1960, EDWIN LIEUWEN OBSERVED THAT "ON THE GENERAL subject of militarism in Latin America no important books have yet appeared," (*Arms and Politics in Latin America,* N.Y., 1960:279) a judgment that has never been seriously disputed. This is not to say that before that year the political role of the Latin American armed forces went unnoticed by historians and social scientists. On the contrary both the scholarly and popular literature dealing with the area abounds with references to militarism. From a scholarly point of view, however, the bulk of this production is unsatisfying.

In the first place, it is conceptually and semantically confusing. Under "militarism" tend to be subsumed all forms of organized violence employed for political ends ranging from the institutional action of the armed forces through the authoritarian regimes of quasi-professional soldiers and the maraudings of armed civilian factions to anomic *machetismo*. Second, it is largely descriptive rather than analytical and explanatory. Third, it tends to concentrate on the military *caudillo* and the more spectacular manifestations of military political action such as *cuartelazos* and *golpes* at the expense of more subtle but pervasive institutional and environmental factors. Fourth, the subject tends to be peripheral to the primary interest of the authors so that it does not receive systematic attention.

Although many might not regard it as an unfavorable criticism, traditional literature on the political role of the military has also displayed a strong normative and prescriptive tone which frequently degenerates into polemic. This characteristic, in turn, may explain some of the shortcomings itemized above. As heirs of eighteenth century rationalism and nineteenth century positivism, western intellectuals have traditionally regarded violence, including its more structured forms, as evil and abnormal. "Militarism" and "militaristic"

societies were regarded as inferior and as cruder forms of social organizations than industrial societies. In the course of "Progress," military establishments along with their political manifestations would wither away and civilization would assume a rational, liberal, civilist and violence-free character.

As a result of these intellectual biases and the powerful influences of the political experiences of the Anglo Saxon peoples, writers concerned with Latin American political systems and processes implicitly or explicitly employed a democratic-civilist political system model in which the military was nonpolitical and subject to strict civilian control. Thus, much of the history of Latin America has been written in terms of a movement toward the approximation of the model, that is, "The Struggle for Democracy," while political science literature has been concerned with how and why Latin American political systems have deviated from the norm. Within this frame of reference, instances where the military exceeded their normatively prescribed role were conceptualized as "intervention," a process which interfered with the perfection of the model.

As a consequence of this outlook, the military were not regarded as an interest group forming an integral part of society. They were alien and sinister forces existing outside the body social and politic which did not interact with civilian groups and sectors but acted independently through conspiracies organized by greedy and ambitious generals and colonels or by narrow and selfish military cliques. Students of Latin America much preferred to devote their analytical efforts to more congenial and "normal" phenomena—constitutions, political parties, the church, labor movements, intellectual trends and the like. The political role of the military was acknowledged, described and deplored, but its institutional and societal bases were not regarded as worthy of or susceptible to systematic analysis. Under these conditions, it is hardly surprising that no "important books" appeared. The traditional literature on Latin American militarism reveals more about the authors' feelings than the morphology of the phenomenon itself.

At about the time Lieuwen made his judgment, writings on the Latin American military, particularly in the United States, began to exhibit new forms and orientations, the most noticeable of which were the acceptance of their political, social and economic roles as discrete, legitimate, and important problems susceptible to scholarly analysis; the abandonment of the simplistic conspiracy theory of militarism; and the search for social and institutional explantations of military political behavior. These developments may be attributed to several influences. First is the emergence, or rather, the belated recognition in the United States of Latin America's strategic importance in the Cold War and the appearance of a Marxist state in the Caribbean. It is generally assumed that the armed forces of Latin America will have an important effect on the outcome of the hemispheric struggle against communism although there is

substantial disagreement as to what that effect should or will be. At the one level it is argued that they can make significant military contributions to defense against aggression from outside the hemisphere and, internally, control communist inspired insurgency. Therefore, they should be strengthened so as to increase their capabilities in both areas of operations. At another level it is held that they alone can guarantee the political stability essential for economic development and modernization and, moreover, can employ their technical skills and logistical resources directly in these processes.

Contrary and more traditional opinion holds that the armed forces, because of an inherent institutional conservatism and corporate self-interest, will inhibit economic development and social reform undertaken through democratic institutions. As a result, pent up popular aspirations will explode in revolutionary attempts at solution. A third view is that reform and modernization in Latin America can be accomplished only by revolution and that the regular military are the principal obstacles to this process. In any case, U.S. policy considerations have been an important stimulant to the study of the Latin American military; not only because of the intrinsic interest and importance of this factor, but because policy oriented organizations such as the Council on Foreign Relations and various agencies of the United States Government have provided financial support for research.

A second influence has been the rapid development of political systems analysis. Works such as Gabriel Almond and James S. Coleman's, *The Politics of Developing Areas* (Princeton, N. J., 1960); David Easton's, *The Political System* (N. Y., 1953), and his more recent *A Framework for Political Analysis* (N. Y., 1965); and Seymour M. Lipset's *Political Man* (N. Y., 1960) have suggested new, if not more sophisticated alternatives to the democratic-civilist model as a point of departure for the study of the political role of the military.

Third, the recognition of the political role of the military as a universal phenomenon has produced a number of general or theoretical studies such as Samuel Finer's, *The Man on Horseback* (London, 1962) and Samuel P. Huntington's *The Soldier and the State* (Cambridge, Mass., 1959), as well as more specialized empirical contributions such as Morris Janowitz's *The Professional Soldier* (Glencoe, Ill., 1960). These works have stimulated interest in the subject and developed concepts which have been applied to Latin American situations. Although Huntington did not discover the importance of professionalism or Janowitz the significance of social origins of officers, their systematic treatment of these concepts appears to have been particularly influential. Within this general category of materials, studies of the role of the military in new nations such as Morris Janowitz's, *The Military in the Political Development of New Nations* (Chicago, 1964), Lucian Pye's, "Armies in the Process

of Political Modernization" (1962)[1], and H. Daalder's, *The Role of the Military in Emerging Countries* ('S-Gravenhage, 1962), require special mention. Although the Latin American republics are by no means "new," their developmental problems and the political behavior of their armed forces appear to be analogous if not homologous to phenomena in the post World War II nations of Africa, Asia and the Middle East.[2]

The newer literature has a pervasive theme: that the political role of the Latin American military is changing due both to structural changes within the general societal environment and within the armed forces. There is considerable disagreement, however, as to the extent and character of the new role. Common sub-themes treated as explanatory factors are: (1) military structures and attitudes as affected by the professionalization of officer corps and the increasing recruitment of officers from the lower middle and working classes; (2) foreign influence and particularly that of the United States exercised through military assistance programs, military missions and the professional schooling of Latin American officers in North America; (3) the actual and potential role of the military in development and modernization and its political implications.

In the following analysis, considerations of space and manageability have forced me to be rather arbitrarily selective of the contributions to be reviewed.[3] I have limited my observations to published books, monographs and papers which in my judgment have something new to offer in the way of concepts, theory, methodology, data or interpretation. At the cost of omitting a number of excellent items, I have not included material which is purely descriptive of particular situations; theses, dissertations and other unpublished manuscripts; and, with a few exceptions, works which are not explicitly and primarily concerned with the political role of the military in Latin America. Needless to say, I have not included studies produced by and for governmental agencies which are not readily accessible to the scholarly community. For a comprehensive annotated listing of works in the field as of 1964, I refer the curious reader to the bibliography in John J. Johnson, *The Military and Society* (Stanford, 1964).

For purposes of analysis, items to be considered may be grouped into three categories: (1) theoretical and theoretical-empirical works concerned with explaining the role of the military in general in Latin America as a whole, (2) more specialized treatments of particular aspects of military role or particular explanatory factors for Latin America in general and (3) individual and comparative national studies. In the broadly generalizing group, the most extensive contributions are: Edwin Lieuwen, *Arms and Politics in Latin America* (1st ed. N. Y., 1960; rev. ed. N. Y., 1961), its sequel, *Generals vs. Presidents: Neomilitarism in Latin America* (N. Y., 1964), and Johnson's pre-

viously cited, *The Military and Society*. These volumes appear to have had a significant impact on thinking within the academic community, United States government agencies and the general public about the political role of the Latin American military.

Lieuwen's and Johnson's books have several common features. Both authors are historians and employ an historical approach. Both have as a principal theme the changes in role of the Latin American military which they agree have taken place since the 1930's and are still underway. Both affirm that although this role has not declined in importance it has assumed new forms. It has become less personalistic and more institutional; somewhat less predatory and more oriented toward the solution of national problems; less dependent on the employment of naked force and more prone to rely on manipulation and negotiation; less ready to defend the traditional order and more inclined to support or at least tolerate middle class political leadership. Both explain these trends in terms of structural changes within the general society and the armed forces themselves. They disagree substantially, however, in their basic approach to the problem, on the rate and specific directions of change, on its implications for the economic, social and political development of Latin America, and on the relative weight of explanatory factors.

Lieuwen's work continues the reliance on normative political theory characteristic of the more traditional literature. The dynamic of Latin American history is the struggle for democracy and, within a democratic-constitutional framework, economic development and social reform. He agrees, particularly in his second book, that the political behavior of the Latin American military can no longer be explained adequately in terms of the conspiracies of ambitious and greedy colonels and generals, that Latin American armed forces may have legitimate institutional interests which they may have to defend politically, that changing recruitment patterns are producing younger officers with more progressive attitudes, and that the military may intervene for quite patriotic reasons or because they are suborned by civilian factions. He concludes, nevertheless, that Latin American militarism continues to be essentially predatory and irresponsible. With respect to the sources of political attitudes and behavior he contends:

> Today's officers are lower-middle class in social origin, but their institutional identification is so strong that it obliterates any meaningful identification with civilian social groups. Institutional considerations, the traditional insistence upon law and order, and the almost morbid fear of a social revolution that might destroy their organization combine in a political philosophy that is basically conservative.[4]

Lieuwen, in a strongly policy oriented section of *Arms and Politics,* argues that the United States must bear a share of the blame for the creation, survival

and continued existence of Latin American militarism. During its occupation of Cuba, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Panama and Nicaragua, its efforts to train professionalized gendarmeries created new military elites which "produced some of the most striking examples of unprincipled and tyrannical rule in the history of Latin America."[5]

North American guilt has been compounded by the Military Assistance Programs which began during World War II and which were developed more systematically in response to the Cold War. Lieuwen doubts that Latin America's armed forces could, even with United States aid, develop the capabilities to participate effectively in the defense of the hemisphere against external aggression, and he is skeptical about the internal communist threat in the several republics. He suggests that Military Assistance has political rather than military objectives, that is, to influence governments to adhere to United States policy, to promote stability, and to protect strategic needs. Even if these aims are regarded as legitimate, military policy as a means of achieving them is self-defeating. The shipment of arms to Latin American countries enhances the status and power of the armed forces and encourages militarism. Thus, in Brazil, "following the receipt of nearly $300 million in Lend-Lease equipment and the sending of a token expeditionary force to Italy during World War II, the armed forces assumed the right to depose President Vargas when the war was over."[6] In 1954, following the acquisition of more military aid, and the assumption of enhanced hemispheric defense responsibilities under the 1953 MDA Pact, they repeated the act. And in Colombia, "United States military aid must certainly be considered as one contributing factor that helped to tip the balance, bringing the Colombian army back into politics [in 1953] after a half-century of civilian rule."[7] By arming the Latin American military, Washington alienates progressive democratic forces with which it will have ultimately to deal.

In his *Generals vs. Presidents,* Lieuwen blames United States leniency in recognizing governments established by force as another contributory cause of Latin American militarism. Although it had warned the Argentine and Peruvian military before their coups of 1962, it very soon relented after the accomplished fact. Thus, "The favorable diplomatic denouements obtained by the *golpistas* (coup leaders) . . . were interpreted as a green light from Washington for the military elsewhere in Latin America to right situations of civilian misrule. Accordingly, the year 1963 was an open season for bagging constitutional governments."[8]

In *Arms and Politics,* Lieuwen saw clearly the decline and ultimate demise of Latin American militarism in the then recent cases where civilian rule had supplanted military domination, and constructed a typology in which the republics were ordered in three groups: (1) those in which the military domi-

nated politics, (2) those in which they were in transition from political to nonpolitical bodies, and (3) those in which they were nonpolitical. In *Generals and Presidents,* because of the wave of military coups in 1962 and 1963, he is somewhat less sanguine about the rate of change but continues to be optimistic about the ultimate triumph of democratic civilian leadership.

Johnson describes himself as a realist in contrast to Lieuwen's idealism.[9] Latin American militarism he regards not as a cause of repeated abortions of democratic processes; rather, both phenomena are related effects of more fundamental social tensions and maladjustments. "Force and violence," he posits, "are still important parts of the political process in most of the republics, and they must be considered as such."[10] As long as this is the case, they will be employed for political ends, if not by the regular military establishments, then by other sectors. Indeed, he finds civilian leadership as much to blame as the military for the political ills of Latin America. Thus, historically "it was probably true that, except in Argentina, Chile, and Colombia, civilian politicians were no more worthy of the public's respect and confidence than were men in uniform."[11] Furthermore, in view of the persistence of corruption and violence as norms of political behavior, "The armed forces cannot be judged by absolute standards but, it would seem [their conduct] should be evaluated in comparison with the groups with whom they 'compete.' By this measurement they do not fare badly."[12] Johnson concludes that "it cannot be assumed that the armed forces will withdraw from politics until civilians evolve stable, organized institutions and provide responsible leadership capable of pursuing solutions to the problems of the republics."[13] He adds, however, that the "increasingly unimaginative leaders of the present generation"[14] are unlikely to create such a situation.

Johnson also emphasizes the positive roles of the Latin American armed forces. In countries still groping for true national identity, "the military establishments are now and will continue to be symbols of national sovereignty."[15] The importance of this function, he continues, is evident in civic functions where the armed services have replaced the church as marks of social unity. Furthermore, he offers the proposition that in the face of intense popular pressures for reform and modernization, the military by forestalling violent revolutionary solutions buys time for the achievement of these goals through democratic evolutionary processes. In fact, they possess technical skills and logistic resources which permit them to participate directly in development through civic-action type programs. He feels that at least the younger generation of Latin American officers would find participation in great national efforts congenial and challenging.

In explaining the mainsprings of political attitudes of Latin American officers, Johnson differs sharply from Lieuwen. While agreeing with C. Wright

Mills that in highly professionalized officer corps social origins are of less importance in shaping the military ethos than in any other social type, he believes that this condition does not pertain to Latin America. "There, although the situation is changing, a uniform still does not always make an individual first of all a soldier, and at least until that stage is reached the officer's social background will remain one of the keys to his behavior."[16] Thus, "now that officers are coming increasingly from the lower middle sectors and the working masses, the armed forces may be expected to be more inclined than formerly to gravitate toward positions identified with popular aspirations and to work with the representatives of the popular elements. . . ."[17] Further, as officer recruitment penetrates more and more to lower social strata, "it will mean that the industrial-commercial bourgeoisie in Latin America will be surrendering control of the armed forces, which are maintained by their taxes, to groups more radical than themselves. . . ."[18]

In contrast to Lieuwen, Johnson does not attempt to relate Latin American militarism to the action of the United States and eschews any formal policy prescriptions. He suggests, however, that a number of policy decisions would seem to follow from his conclusions and more specifically implies strongly that the United States should encourage and support developmental activities for the Latin American armed forces.

Finally, "But change, constant and profound, both in society and in the military, is the principal theme of [this] volume. If there is a message, it is that the attitude of the officers toward change and toward emerging groups, rather than toward force and violence and the size of military budgets, will ultimately have the greater effect upon Latin America's position in the world."[19]

Although its publication antedates by one year Lieuwen's judgment on the state of knowledge about the Latin American military, Victor Alba's smaller volume, *El militarismo: Ensayo sobre un fenómeno político-social* (Mexico, 1959)[20] can appropriately be included in the new literature under discussion. His major contributions are his analysis of the psychology of Latin American officers and his often cited classification of the major groups within officer corps: *militares de cuartel*, *militares de escuela*, and *militares de laboratorio*.

The "barracks officers" are old line types, often preprofessionals who owe their ranks to political preferment or successful revolutionary activity. They are professionally and politically conservative. Many have had training in Germany or Spain. They constituted the major military backers of the conservative caudillos of the first decades of the twentieth century and also supported the modern dictators who appeared after 1930. Although their numbers are decreasing through death and retirement, they are still influential in many Latin American countries. The "school officers" are the middle age or middle rank group. They are the products of the military academies and have had advanced professional

instruction, many of them in Germany and Spain. They are career soldiers who owe their professional advancement to ability rather than influence. Today they comprise a very important element in Latin American officer corps. Despite their professionalism, however, they have not renounced intervention. The "laboratory officers" are in general the youngest age group. They too are academy trained but have received advanced instruction in the United States rather than Europe. Of the three groups, they are the best trained, the least bound by tradition, possess the liveliest intellectual curiosity, and are the most idealistic. Although they are less politically inclined than their seniors, frustrations arising from tradition-bound military environments and their awareness of the relative backwardness of their countries and their armed forces make them a potential political force. In the seven years that have elapsed since Alba published his volume, it can be assumed that the relative strength of the three groups have altered with the barracks officers continuing to decline in members and the school group increasing.

A number of shorter items of a broadly generalizing nature have also appeared since 1960. Among them are my "Civil-Military Relations in Latin America" (1961).[21] This paper challenges some of the traditional concepts about the political role of the Latin American military, attempts to define the parameters and structure of the problem, and constructs a typology of civil-military relations based on two general variables, level of social and political organization and degree of professionalization within the armed forces. Thus four "ideal types" emerge: the "Praetorian State," the "Gendarmist State," the "Garrison State" and the "Civilist State." (I might add that I now find this scheme simplistic.) Finally, the paper suggests to historians some new research approaches to the problem of civil-military relations.

A second item is Theodore Wyckoff's previously cited "The Role of the Military in Latin American Politics." Wyckoff observes that the Latin American nations may be ordered along a spectrum according to the level and frequency of military political action. The ordering may be explained in terms of the differential effects and different patterns of interaction in the several countries of a given set of variables. These are: size of the national territory, ethnic composition of the population, social structure, economic organization, level of political development, historical experiences, and the internal characteristics of the armed forces themselves. The two extremes of the spectrum and its midpoint may be regarded as three basic types: (1) countries in which the military *always* play a political role; (2) those in which they *never,* or almost never, do so; and (3) those in which they *occasionally* do so. Wyckoff places the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua and Paraguay in the first category, and Costa Rica and Uruguay in the second. The remaining twelve republics fall in the *occasionally* type.

In conclusion Wyckoff offers a set of hypotheses, two of which appear particularly interesting:

[First], . . . it would appear to be a valid hypothesis that the underlying social and political conditions are more significant in the political life of a country than the actual role of the military. The military follows courses of action adapted to the political conditions of the country in question, and is not by itself primarily responsible for the absence or presence of democracy or democratic institutions. Although it may frequently be true that 'although the Army does not govern, in the last analysis it determines who does,' the Army is not responsible for the conditions which make this situation possible. The political role of the military is not a 'political disease'; rather it is but a symptom of a condition of political immaturity.[22]

[Second], A fourth (and final) hypothesis is that under certain conditions the military—far from being a threat to democratic institutions—may serve as a force to uphold and safeguard them. Constitutional provisions might even be rewritten so as to formalize this arrangement, making of the top uniformed officers a sort of *judiciary*, with power to interpret the rightness or wrongness of acts of the executive and the legislative branches of government. If this hypothesis should prove to be correct, democracy in such countries would have nothing to fear from the political role of the military. It is suggested that this step might fruitfully be added to the thoughtful and constructive suggestions with which Victor Alba concludes his perceptive study of Latin American militarism.[23]

A third contribution is Gino Germani and Kalman Silvert, "Politics, Social Structure and Military Intervention in Latin America" (1961).[24] The authors' assumption is that "if the armed forces are viewed as having a limited and specialized set of functions having only to do with internal order and external defense, then a widening of castrensic activities into other social domains implies a generally weakened and sickened social system, no matter the country or even the special cultural conditions concerned."[25] Continuing from this assumption they construct a general typology of civil-military relations based on the "direct listing of the institutional arrangements between the military establishment and the political institution treated as a variable dependent upon other social factors."[26] After analyzing and typing the social factors which affect the political institution, they identify the following types of civil-military relations: (1) the classical military garrison state, (2) the modern totalitarian state, (3) the totalitarian politico-military relations, (4) the military as institutionalized governors, (5) the military as trustee governors, (6) the military as orienters of national policy, (7) the military as a pressure group with veto power, (8) the military as a simple pressure group, (9) the military as a simple police force in complete subordination to the government and (10) the military as a political arm of the state.

Because of inadequate levels of social, bureaucratic and technological organization, types (1), (2) and (3) have not appeared in Latin America. In

types (4) through (9), Latin American cases may be found with type (4) being historically the most common because of the consistently low level of social legitimacy of most governments and regimes. Type (10) tends to develop from "revolutionary situations of the left." At least incipient examples of this type were post-revolutionary Bolivia, where the government attempted to create a political militia as a counterpoise to the regular army, and Cuba, where Castro destroyed the old army and created a powerful militia as a support for his regime. Germani and Silvert conclude with the observation:

> Military intervention in civilian affairs, as is suggested by this typology, clearly does not occur either in an ideational vacuum or in the absence of a sometimes very wide range of interests and pressures. Military politics inevitably and invariably involve identification with wider social interests and ideologies. The patterning of these identifications depends in important measure on the social origins of the officer corps and the social mobility functions which the military institution may serve.[27]

Among the more theoretical general works, I consider the most original and stimulating to be José Nun's "A Latin American Phenomenon: The Middle Class Military Coup" (1965).[28] Nun presents a critique of the existing literature on the political role of the military in Latin America and develops a more sophisticated theory than those hitherto advanced about the relationship between middle class origins of Latin American officers and their political behavior.

Writings on the political role of the military in Latin America, he contends, suffer from a "defective structuring of the object of analysis." Much of the literature produced by North Americans is based on a "three legged" conceptual scheme whose elements are political instability, the size of the middle class, and militarism. The employment of this device has developed in two stages, the "traditional" which culminated with Lieuwen, and the "modern" beginning with Johnson. The traditional interpretation views militarism as the principal cause of instability which in turn victimizes the emerging middle classes; it holds that only when these classes are consolidated will the military go back to their barracks and stable democracies become a reality south of the Rio Grande. The "modern" interpretation is that although military intervention temporarily contributes to political instability, it may promote economic development which will in turn encourage the growth of the middle class and thus permit the emergence of democratic political systems. In both interpretations, he observes, "value connotations go beyond the cognitive meaning of the concepts in use: democratic stability and growth of middle classes are *a priori* positive and interdependent phenomena, while militarism has an ambiguous conceptual status: from being a total misfortune to being a partial misfortune and even a commendable inconvenience."[29]

Nun criticizes both interpretations on the grounds that they are based on

inappropriate models. The "traditional" view derives from European nineteenth century antimilitarism. Latin America, however, is not Europe and the "more or less explicit assumption that progress and civilian rule are in turn synonymous" is not necessarily valid for Latin America. The "modern" view is based on the experience of the new nations of Africa and Asia, but the Latin American republics are not new and have had quite different historical experiences. Furthermore, neither interpretation provides an answer to the key questions: "why do army men intervene in Latin American politics? What will be the orientation of this intervention?"[30]

Nun accepts, as a basis for his own explanatory theory, the "three legged" conceptual scheme employed in the works he is criticizing, but sees the interrelationship of its components in quite a different way. The fallacy of both the "traditional" and "modern" interpretations, he contends, is the assumption that although the Latin American middle classes are composed of diverse social and occupational elements, some "invisible hand" adjusts conflicting interests and aspirations among them so that they possess collectively a basic set of principles and objectives. This view, he holds, is quite inapplicable in Latin America. There the middle classes lack any social, programmatic or ideological cohesion and, as a result, are at a distinct disadvantage in competing with the oligarchy and the working classes which are more homogeneous and know what they want. The weapon in this struggle is the vote. Therefore, when the middle classes are threatened, the army, which in the majority of the Latin American nations represents them, comes to their defense and *"allows for instability in the defense of a premature process of democratization.* . . . In other words . . . there are enough reasons to see the Latin American middle classes as factors of political instability, whose instrument is the army, and whose detonator is precisely the democratic institutions which these sectors appear to support."[31]

Several contributions deserve mention although they are not primarily concerned with the Latin American military. Irving Horowitz in *Three Worlds of Development. The Theory and Practice of International Stratification* (New York, 1966)[32] examines Latin American militarism within an original and somewhat broader context than the works discussed above. In the first place, he believes that analysis of the phenomenon cannot be based on one structural type of armed force, the "federal army" sponsored by the national state, but must take into account those representing other interests: regional armies and gendarmeries sponsored by local sub-governmental units; feudal and private armies sponsored by the super-ordinate class, race, or ethnic group; and guerrilla armies sponsored by subordinate class, race, or ethnic groups. He provides us, thus, with a fourfold classification.

Second, although other writers admit or advance United States policy as a contributory factor in Latin American militarism, they nevertheless treat the

latter as primarily a product of local circumstances. Horowitz, however, advances the proposition: "What has taken place in increasing degrees is the external foreign management of internal conflicts in Latin America."[33] While the term "foreign management" might be taken to include Russian and Chinese, what he appears to be suggesting is a new United States imperialism based on political rather than economic considerations. More specifically, "With the rise of overall strategies on a grand scale, with the assertion that the basic purpose of American national policy is to promote and secure a structure of world relationships compatible with the values of the United States and the Free World, local control, idiosyncratic regimes, and classical Latin American strongmen can no longer be considered compatible with this projected *Pax Americana*."[34]

The new imperialism is conducted largely through military policy whose principal instrument is military assistance with increasing emphasis on the preparation of the armed forces for counterinsurgency operations. Such programs circumscribe the level and form of the political activity of Latin American military establishments. They are faced with the choice of supporting United States policy for developing their counterinsurgency capabilities and thus "jeopardizing their self-created image of national redeemers, or supporting national redemption and jeopardizing their foreign aid."[35] Thus, "United States policies of military globalism tend to make obsolete earlier efforts at a standard typology of Latin American military styles and forms based exclusively on internal political affairs."[36]

Horowitz, like Lieuwen, challenges the theses on which United States military assistance is based and views continued arms shipments to Latin America as bolstering the status and self-esteem of the military. Furthermore, he adds,

> . . . it might well be the irony of hemispheric affairs that counter-insurgency units precede in time the formation of insurgency units. This, at any rate, seems to have taken place in the Dominican Republic. When the legitimate aspirations of the people are frustrated by military action, and when newly formed, foreign-sponsored counter-insurgency units spearhead the ouster of legitimate regimes, then a rise in guerrilla action is likely to follow. The exact causal sequence is important. If it is the case that counter-insurgency precedes the formation of insurgency units, then the self-fulfilling prophetic aspects of United States foreign policy may well turn into self-destructive actions.[37]

Quite aside from its policy implications, Horowitz suggests that for research purposes the transition from local to foreign determination of the form of Latin American militarism "requires a supple methodological approach—one able to control for the degree to which the current 'four-fold' military division within Latin American countries [types of armed forces] is either autonomous of or dependent upon external intervention."[38]

A second item in this category is Argentine General (ret.) Benjamin Rattembach's *El sector militar de la sociedad* (Buenos Aires, 1965), which is essentially a revision of his earlier *Sociología militar*. Rattembach attempts to develop a systematic and logical structure of military sociology based on the political, economic, juridical, moral, psychological and religious issues that the existence of military establishments create for society. Although the approach is universalistic, the intellectual style and orientation reflected the author's Argentine experience.

Third, is George Blanksten's "The Politics of Latin America,"[39] in which he attempts to apply Gabriel Almond's general political system model to Latin America. In this schema, the Latin American armed forces are regarded as institutional interest groups, competing politically with other groups and performing input and output functions. Blanksten makes a plea for systematic studies of the military from this point of view and, particularly, of the process of political clique formation within officer corps and the relationship between militarism and class systems. Blanksten's work represents a recent trend among political scientists writing on Latin American politics and government. This trend explicitly accepts the military as an institutional interest group.[40]

Finally, Jaques Lambert, *Amerique Latine. Structures sociales et institutions politiques* (Paris, 1963), one of the most perceptive and sophisticated analyses of contemporary Latin America extant, must be mentioned. Lambert views the military and its political role within the same middle class context as Johnson and Nun but with insights and nuances which, perhaps, involved or committed North Americans or Latin Americans might find difficult to achieve.

Many of the problems raised in the general works analyzed above have been examined more explicitly, more systematically or in more detail in specialized studies. The most complete treatment of the structure of a Latin American officer corps is José Luis de Imaz, *Los que mandan: Las fuerzas armadas en Argentina* (Buenos Aires, 1964). This study, a result of extensive research at the National University of Buenos Aires' Institute of Sociology, analyses recruitment procedures and patterns, social and regional origins, education and military socialization, and career experiences of army generals, naval admirals and air force brigadiers, using as samples all officers who held their ranks at five-year intervals from 1936 to 1961. Empirical data were obtained both from military personnel records and public sources. Imaz also enumerates and describes the several levels of political intervention of the Argentine military and suggests that increased concern with countersubversive warfare has altered their traditional role. He does not, however, systematically relate his structural analysis to political behavior.

A second work of the same genre is Philip B. Springer's "Social Sources of Political Behavior of Venezuelan Military Officers: An Exploratory Analysis."[41]

Springer attempts to analyze the influence of regional background, military education, foreign service and contacts, and command and staff experience on the behavior of fifty-two officers whom he identifies as political activists. For purposes of comparison, he introduced seventeen non-activists for a total of sixty-nine cases. The data were gathered from military personnel records.

His conclusions are: (1) a disproportionate number of officers come from the Andean states, particularly Táchira, and the per cent of officers who are activists is higher for this group than for those recruited in other regions of the country; (2) officers who have had advanced training in Venezuelan military schools are less active than those who have not, a finding suggesting that "advanced military education in Venezuela is not only technical but may also be a mechanism for socializing the officer to conform to norms of subordination to civil authority"; (3) no relationship exists between attendance or non-attendance at service schools in the United States, a finding contradicting "journalistic interpretations which have frequently linked U.S. training with involvement of indigenous officers in Latin American coups";[42] (4) on the other hand officers who had held posts in the United States as military attachés, members of purchasing commissions and the like tended more to be activists than those who had not. One might hypothesize, however, that the correlation exists because the kind of work done encouraged the development of political interests and skills rather than because of the foreign context itself; (5) officers who had not held command posts tended more to be activists than those who had, suggesting the hypothesis that the latter's occupation with the "routine of management of troops . . . leaves [them] little opportunity to contemplate the politics of the capital city and the role [they] might play there";[43] (6) in the case of staff posts, intelligence or operations assignments had little or no relationship to activism, but the occupation of personnel on logistic posts reduces the likelihood of activism. This suggests the hypothesis that since the latter assignments are task-oriented and "instrumental," their holders "may be among the 'new technocrats,'—the military modernizers who are, allegedly, emerging in Latin America";[44] (7) the impact of schooling and foreign experience is independent of earlier, regional background.

Springer concedes that because of the difficulties of acquiring data, his samples are inadequate in number and also are weighted in favor of higher ranking officers whose biographies were more accessible; hence the "exploratory" reservations in the title of his paper. However, even should his findings be questionable, his study is a commendable attempt to test empirically, popular generalizations about military political behavior.

The social and institutional sources of the political behavior of Latin American officers is also a central theme in Martin C. Needler, *Anatomy of a Coup d'Etat: Ecuador 1963*.[45] As did Springer, Needler found the acquisition

of firm biographical data on officers extremely difficult, and his samples are even more limited than Springer's, a deficiency compensated for, at least in part, by a good deal of perception. He concludes that "social class origins seemed not to stand in any systematic relation to the political orientations assumed by high military officers," [46] and that "class interests seemed not to have figured in the motives of the military conspirators, although party interests, which are based in part on class interests, were present in the motives of the civilians associated with the *coup*."[47] Moreover, he concludes, the same was true of regional origins.

Corporate self-interest of the military proved to be more influential than he had anticipated and its key element appears to have been the militant anti-communism of the armed forces. Before his interviews, he had hypothesized that this attitude was based on middle class hostility to Marxist economic doctrine, religious objections to communism as atheistic, or derived from the fact that the internal mission of the armed forces was the maintenance of order and that the violent demonstrations inspired by the Communists interfered with this task. His interviews with both civilians and military personnel, however, revealed that the basic source of the military's anti-communism was their fear that should the communists come to power, in this case through Arosemena, they would destroy the army and replace it with a militia.

Needler also tested the widely held assumption that Latin American officers' political and ideological attitudes are affected by professional association with foreign military personnel. He concluded that any influence German or Italian preceptors may have had has been completely dissipated in the twenty-five years elapsed since the outbreak of World War II. North American influence now predominates, but Ecuador also has training arrangements with Great Britain for the navy and air force, with Brazil, for the air force, and with Chile for the army and navy. He finds that "No differences in ideological orientation among the Ecuadorean armed services can be ascribed to courses of training in one of these countries rather than any of the others. . . ."[48]

Finally, he discovered that aside from class and corporate interests and the effects of foreign contacts, personal loyalties and allegiances of officers were important factors in the anatomy of the coup. He adds, "The reader may feel, as the author did, that this stress on individual motives and personal connections makes the task of social scientists in search of generalizations that can be made relevant to important theoretical questions more difficult; nevertheless, one must accept facts as they are."[49]

Another category of research deals with the popular proposition that large defense programs, including United States contributions to them, encourage militarism in Latin America.[50] Among the defenders is John D. Powell in his "Military Assistance and Militarism in Latin America," (1965).[51] Powell does

not express the traditional horror at the absolute size of the armed forces and their budgets in Latin America and, indeed, points out that the latter are relatively quite small in proportion to Gross National Products. He contends, however, that such comparisons are misleading. "The small size of the armed forces," he argues, "indicates that the arms purchased by these modest defense expenditures are quite highly concentrated in the hands of a very small minority within the total population. This might give these few men a high degree of relative superiority over the average citizen in any situation of physical conflict."[52] Drawing on Wyckoff's typology, he argues further that in countries where the military is always playing a political role, defense expenditures go largely for infantry type weapons and a few tanks, while in the *ocasionally* countries, emphasis is on the acquisition of high cost equipment such as jet aircraft and naval vessels, suggesting "that the modest defense budgets in the *always* countries are more efficiently allocated if the objective of the military is control of the civilian populace."[53] The same arguments apply to United States military assistance. In the *always* countries a higher proportion of aid goes for weapons effective in holding civilians in check than for high cost status equipment and high cost training for operating personnel. On the basis of these observations, Powell infers that United States military assistance encourages militarism in Latin America and, further, "the shift in emphasis from hemispheric security to internal security capabilities will make the Latin American military better trained and equipped than ever to intervene in the political systems of their nations."[54]

Charles Wolf is skeptical about the causal relationship expounded by Powell. In "The Political Effects of Military Programs: Some Indications from Latin America," (1965)[55] he attempts to test: (1) what he terms the "erosion of democracy" hypothesis; that is, that relatively large military programs in general and United States military assistance in particular are associated with political shifts *from* democracy toward authoritarianism and, (2) the "support-for-authoritarianism" hypothesis; that is, that such programs are associated with the support of established authoritarian regimes. The tests consist of statistical comparisons between Russell H. Fitzgibbon's and Kenneth F. Johnson's ordinal indices of levels of democracy and changes in rankings of the Latin American republics, 1950–1960,[56] and data for total military assistance received by them during the same period; per capita military assistance received; average total annual defense expenditures; and average per capita military expenditures.

Wolf summarizes his conclusions as follows: "Whether we consider U. S. military aid programs or domestic defense programs in Latin America, both the 'support-for-authoritarianism' and the 'erosion-of-democracy' hypotheses appear to be contradicted by the results [of statistical correlations]. Larger mili-

tary programs do not appear to be associated with more restrictive and authoritarian political institutions. Nor do larger military programs appear to be associated with movements toward more restrictive and authoritarian political institutions."[57] The only significant relationship, he adds, that emerged from the tests provides "mild support" for the proposition that there may be a *positive* relationship between the level of democracy and domestic defense expenditures. He suggests, however, that this result should not be unexpected because of the generally positive correlation between both variables and per capita income.

Wolf's correlations do not conclusively prove that in particular situations large defense budgets and United States military aid might not contribute to the "erosion-of-democracy" or provide "support-for-authoritarianism." He admits, moreover, that Fitzgibbon's indicators are imprecise and subjective and that data on defense expenditures and United States military assistance are incomplete and possibly not entirely accurate. He suggests, however, that the results "warrant a healthy dose of skepticism," and that "simple and easy assertions about the political effects of military programs should be discouraged."[58]

A theme which runs through much of the recent literature on the Latin American military is their potential as modernizing and developmental agencies. This modernizing role may be played at two levels. The first is simply the employment of the technical and logistical resources of the military in the construction of communications systems and schools, and in mapping projects, colonization, reforestation and the like. The second level is the assumption of power by the military and the placing of the total national effort under their direction. This role, sometimes described as "Nasserism," may involve not only the purely technical and administrative aspects of development but attempts at the moral and political regeneration of the nation.

The simple developmental functions of the military in Latin America are by no means new.[59] Recently, however, they have been given a more explicit definition and a new dimension in the form of Military Civic Action. While Johnson, Lieuwen, and others, touch on the subject; more specialized academic type studies are still rare. Two items, however, may be mentioned. The first is Edward Glick's, *The Nonmilitary Use of the Latin American Military: A More Realistic Approach to Arms Control and Economic Development* (1965).[60] Following up the theme of another paper,[61] Glick recommends that as long as meaningful disarmament is unfeasible in Latin America, the military can and should be put to work on constructive projects. Such activities, moreover, should continue to be encouraged and supported by the United States. Examples are cited of the accomplishments of civic action in Colombia, Brazil, Guatemala and Cuba.

Glick suggests, however, that increased emphasis on civic action is not simply a matter of administratively redefining the military mission. There are problems. Influential elements in Latin America's armed forces regard such programs as incompatible with their primary functions and their professional status, and purely military requirements may place units in areas where they can contribute little to developmental activities. Furthermore, in some countries the levels of technical and logistic capabilities of the armed forces are so low that they have little to contribute. At another level, civic action may be opposed by civilian bureaucrats who see it as a threat to their status and their jobs. Furthermore, he raises the question as to whether, if resources were provided to them, civilian agencies could not accomplish the same objectives more effectively, but adds, "if given the choice between one built by the military at inflated prices and no road at all, most of us would, I think, choose the road."[62]

A more comprehensive treatment is Willard F. Barber's and C. Neale Ronning's, *Internal Security and Military Power: Counterinsurgency and Civic Action in Latin America* (Columbus, Ohio, 1966). As the title suggests, the authors deal with civic action within the broad context of hemispheric defense and United States military assistance. Its aims they define as:

1) expanding and accelerating traditional developmental activities;

2) forestalling Maoist-Castroist type insurgency through the participation of the armed forces in community development projects which, presumably, win the allegiance of deprived social sectors to the national government and, at the same time, conveniently place troops in disaffected areas;

3) improving the public image of the military through the preceding activities.

Barber and Ronning suggest that counterinsurgency aspects of civic action have tended to supersede in importance the more traditional developmental activities. This change they attribute to a shift, beginning in the late 1950's, of United States military policy away from the preparing of Latin American armed forces for hemispheric defense to training and equipping them for operations against insurgency.

The bulk of the book is concerned with the development of United States counterinsurgency doctrine and the organization and administration of civic action programs with emphasis on the United States role in them. Relatively little attention is payed to their effectiveness in achieving their goals so that as the authors themselves admit, their conclusions must be regarded as highly tentative. In general they are skeptical. With respect to the contributions of the military to national development they state that as yet not enough data exists to evaluate them objectively and that if an evaluation is to be made it should be done not by citing isolated achievements but through comparing in some sort of quantitative way the military contribution and its costs with total national

efforts. They suggest, moreover, that the military can make its most effective contribution in countries where an infrastructure for development is yet to be built rather than in the more advanced nations.[63]

Turning to other objectives, Barber and Ronning suggest that experiences in Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador and Colombia indicate that civic action can be a temporary deterrent to insurgency. They feel, however, that it will not in the long run be a major weapon. Insurgency, they argue, is not merely a result of poverty or the intrigues of a few Communists. It arises from frustrations that transcend immediate economic dissatisfactions and these cannot be eliminated by the expansion of military capabilities or developmental programs. "Furthermore," they add, "there are limits to which the Latin American military is willing to be converted, for professional considerations, from a sword to a plowshare." (p. 206)

Quite aside from their reservations about the general effectiveness of United States inspired and supported counterinsurgency programs in general and civic action in particular, Barber and Ronning detect positive dangers in them. They automatically involve the military in policy matters outside of their purely professional sphere and thus may encourage their political interests and appetites. And, reverting to an old theme, they may be used by the military to justify increased expenditures which in turn increases their capabilities for intervention.

Victor Alba, in his "El ascenso del militarismo tecnocrático" (1963),[64] examines aspects of the regenerative role of the military. As a result of a recent series of journeys to Latin America, he is convinced that the wave of "Nasserism" is swelling much more rapidly than that of social democracy. Nasserism he defines as a species of military socialism advocated by military technocrats (his *soldados de laboratorio*) in alliance with civilian technocrats, progressive businessmen, and marxists; all of whom are impatient with the backwardness of their countries and see a military dictatorship of the type established by Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser as the only hope for rapid modernization and the achievement of their own particular objectives. The term "Nasserism" appears to be used for descriptive convenience. Although Alba contends that it is not an original Latin American phenomenon but an imitation of movements which have developed elsewhere, he does not demonstrate that ideological or intellectual links exist between Latin American and Asiatic or Middle Eastern officers.

Alba is opposed to Nasserism on both doctrinaire and pragmatic grounds. As a social democrat he deplores its threat to democratic institutions, and he regards military efficiency, particularly in administering a nation, as a myth. He does not, however, revert to the conspiracy theory of military intervention, but blames the rise of military technocracy on the weakness, the intellectual

cowardice, the lack of political imagination, and the social conformity of contemporary democratic social revolutionary leadership.[65]

A more positive view of the modernizing and regenerative potential of the military is taken by Argentine Lieutenant Colonel (ret.) Mario Orsolini. His *La crisis del ejército* (Buenos Aires, 1964) offers an unusual conceptual scheme for understanding the schisms within the Argentine army and analyzes the impact of the loss of national purpose on the officer corps. In his more recent *Ejército argentino y crecimiento nacional* (Buenos Aires, 1965) Orsolini undertakes to redefine national purposes and offers a rationale for the army to assume the role of orienting the nation toward these goals. In a letter to me of May 29, 1966, Robert Potash offers the opinion: "this is a provocative book, one whose message, if taken to heart by the officers to whom it is directed, could well effect the country's future." In the light of events in Argentina since late June, 1966, this turned out to be a prophetic statement.

A final category of works to be considered are analyses of the political role of the military in individual countries and comparative analyses. Aside from descriptions of particular coups, juntas, and the like, national studies include a number of exploratory essays such as Robert Potash, "The Changing Role of the Military in Argentina," (1961),[66] Leon Helguera, "The Changing Role of the Military in Colombia" (1961),[67] Howard Wiarda, "The Politics of Civil-Military Relations in the Dominican Republic" (1965),[68] Karl M. Schmitt, "The Role of the Military in Contemporary Mexico" (1964),[69] and somewhat longer surveys such as Jorge Abelardo Ramos, *Historia política del ejército argentino* (Buenos Aires, 1959) and Victor Villanueva's somewhat polemical *El militarismo en el Perú* (Lima, 1962).

Carefully researched and objective studies in depth are limited to the best of my knowledge and judgement to Robert E. Gilmore's historical analysis, *Caudillism and Militarism in Venezuela, 1810–1910* (Athens, Ohio, 1964). One of Gilmore's principal contributions is to point out and clarify the conceptual and semantic confusion arising from the use of the concepts "caudillism" and "militarism." As a point of departure and a basis of comparison, he quotes Alfred Vagt's definition of modern militarism, "the domination of the military man over the civilian, an undue preponderance of military demands, an emphasis on military considerations, spirit, ideals, and scales of values in the life of states. It has also meant the imposition of heavy burdens on a people for military purposes, to the neglect of welfare and culture and the waste of the nation's best manpower in unproductive army service."[70] Militarism, he adds, is also closely associated with imperialism.

Gilmore finds that although it has been customary among historians to portray post-independence Venezuela as a barracks, the social and political disorganization of the country throughout most of the nineteenth century

precluded the development of militarism in its generally accepted meaning. After 1831, furthermore, the regular army was reduced to an insignificant force and its officers, largely political appointees, lacked the professional attitudes and sense of corporate unity necessary to make it an effective interest group. Violence as a political instrument assumed the primary form of armed bands and factions led by civilians and unprofessional soldiers acting as political entrepreneurs rather than as representatives of an institution. The political system that emerged was based on a set of shifting loyalties and allegiances among these men beginning at local levels and pyramiding to a leader at the national level. Such a system, Gilmore contends, can more properly be termed caudillism than militarism.

In the late 1890's, however, Venezuela, following the trend in a number of other Latin American nations, began to strengthen and professionalize its army. This modernized instrument of violence was then employed by national caudillos to consolidate their political positions but at the same time it developed a strength, a set of interests and a will of its own which permitted it to destroy its masters. Thus by 1935, caudillism had been replaced by something approaching true militarism. Aside from its conceptual and historical contributions, Gilmore's work would seem to be pertinent to the current debate on the relationship between military professionalism and political role.

Again, to the best of my knowledge, the only published study dealing with the political role of the military in Latin America which could properly be called comparative is Lisa North's *Civil-Military Relations in Argentina, Chile, and Peru* (Berkeley, 1966).[71] This work is part of a "Politics of Modernization Project" under the general direction of David E. Apter which is concerned with comparing political modernization in four West African and the three Latin American republics indicated in the title. The point of departure of North's study is the proposition that after the achievement of independence, their colonial heritage provided the African nations with some degree of political "coherence" which could serve as a basis for political integration within an "organic" community and under the direction of a charismatic leader. In the case of Latin America, however, although leaders appeared, "The concept of an 'organic' community was so closely identified with the Spanish colonial system that, in rejecting colonialism, a quite loosely integrated and essentially secularized system of government came into being in each of the three countries being considered."[72] Although based legally on elaborate constitutional forms, in practice the system produced intense competition between the several existing classes and interest groups which even the strongest leaders could not control.

In each of the three countries the army emerged as a powerful interest group so that, according to the author, a study of the structural and behavioral

elements in military roles is of key importance to understanding the general political systems affected and the differences among them. The term "structural" is employed to describe the relationships between the army and other social groups, "behavioral" to denote the "subjective" identification of officers, which may or may not correspond with the social classes from which they are recruited. After analyzing civil-military relations in each country, North concludes: "In these terms—structural and behavioral—Argentina, Chile, and Peru offer three sharply contrasting cases of military development and civil-military relations."[73] The different patterns are summarized in a chart which can better be reproduced than described.[74]

	Argentina	Chile	Peru
I. Personal armies (*caudillismo*)	1810 to about 1865	1818 to 1831	1821 to about 1890
II. Military identified with ruling group			
A. Recruitment into the officer corps limited to members of the ruling group		1830 to 1879	
B. Recruitment into the officer corps open to all classes	1865 to about 1910		1890 to 1950's
III. Military politicized by middle class parties	1910 to present	1919 to 1933	
IV. Military politicized but with independent ideological orientation			1950's to present
V. Military "objectively" controlled or devoted to its specific expertise (Recruitment into the officer corps open to all classes)		1879 to 1919; 1933 to present	

A more specific conclusion is also presented:

. . . The Peruvian military's effort to *combine* politics with professionalization through the new technocratic military role (i.e., to act as a coherent unit in the political sphere while maintaining some isolation and the profession's norms) is perhaps the most interesting development we have examined. The ideology of development, and its justification for professional intervention, may be a genuine new factor in the future role of the military in Argentina and Chile as well as Peru.[75]

A useful reference feature of the monograph is an appendix which tabulates military revolts in the three countries under the headings: (1) Year, (2) Government in Power, (3) Rank of Officers Participating, Branches of Armed Forces, Units, (4) Successful/Unsuccessful, and (5) Civilian Collaborators, Objectives, General Comments.[76] While historians may have reservations

about the depth of historical research involved and the sometimes thin data, North's study presents a new approach to old problems and some stimulating propositions.

A general overview of recent literature, including items not specifically cited in this paper, reveals that a substantial proportion of it consists of denunciations, apologies, prescriptions, and commentaries by both soldiers and civilians in this country and in Latin America. Although often not based on academic type research this material reveals what articulate, and often influential, people think about the political role of the Latin American military. Such pronouncements are often widely read and serve to confirm or change public attitudes and undoubtedly have a feedback into the structure of civil-military relationships in Latin America. In a practical sense, therefore, this type of publication may very well be more influential than objective analyses.

The more scholarly literature exhibits several distinct patterns and trends. In terms of scope and focus, the bulk of it deals in broad theories and generalizations about the political role of the military in Latin America. Intensive analyses of particular aspects, causal factors, or situations are relatively rare. This imbalance might be attributed to any one or combinations of several influences. First, inasmuch as Latin American policy is thought about and discussed on a continental scale and, as suggested early, policy considerations have influenced many studies, continental generalizations are in order. Also, if one wishes to be a "Latin American expert" rather than a narrow regional or national specialist, he must think and pronounce in continental terms. Second, the construction of theories, typologies, and generalizations is more congenial work for most people and produces more immediate rewards than the painstaking and tedious empirical analysis of particular problems and situations. It would be more gracious, however, and I think more valid to attribute preoccupation with the area-wide approach to the basic and long-standing assumption that Latin America is a cultural unit with enough common elements to make generalizations about it both valid and desirable.

In terms of approach and conceptualization, recent literature, while still retaining a normative flavor and a preoccupation with intervention, has accepted the military as an integral component of Latin American society *interacting* with other elements rather than *acting* against them. Perhaps as a cause, perhaps as an effect of this view, more sophisticated methodology has been introduced into the field and pluralistic social and institutional explanations of military values, attitudes and behavior are tending to replace the simplistic conspiracy theory.

In terms of authorship most of the contributions have emanated from North American scholars. Except for a few military intellectuals, Latin Americans have shown little interest in studying their own armed forces seriously.

Reasons for North American interest have been discussed above. I find it more difficult to explain Latin American indifference. Perhaps it springs from a congenital distaste of intellectuals for institutions of which they do not approve and which have caused mental and physical anguish to many of them. Perhaps it represents a prudent avoidance of a kind of research which conceivably might lead to further anguish. Or it may well be that since Latin American social scientists have entered a problem solving phase, they prefer to devote their efforts to problems over whose solutions they may have some control.

Among North American scholars, historians were first in the field and have produced the bulk of published studies. This also I find difficult to understand, since it would seem that in view of the prominent position of the military in Latin American society, its political and developmental roles would have attracted the serious attention of sociologists and political scientists much earlier. By way of explanation, I can only offer the hypothesis that although historians may be more conservative in their methodology and their view of human behavior and misbehavior, they are more catholic in their interests and less bound by intellectual styles and commitments. Or perhaps, since there are more historians than social scientists with primary research interests in Latin America, it was simply a matter of statistical probability that the former should first hit upon the role of the military as a promising field of investigation.

In terms of content and substance the most noticeable feature of recent literature is, with the exception of a very few items, the absence of firm data and of empirical support for conclusions offered. What has really come out of it is a set of propositions and counter-propositions about the role of the Latin American military—which are theoretically testable—and about what their role ought to be—which are not.

For reasons advanced in the introduction of this paper, I have not attempted to review unpublished manuscripts or research in progress. However, the following table indicates that if generalizations are extended to both published and unpublished research, some of the preceding observations would have to be changed. (See p. 30 for table.)

In terms of scope and focus the emphasis shifts from general to more specialized works largely because of the substantial number of national studies. Within the latter category the breakdown by country is as follows: Brazil (5), Argentina (3), Chile (3), Mexico (2), Colombia (1), El Salvador (1), Nicaragua (1), Peru (1), and Venezuela (1). Although the predominance of studies on the Brazilian and Argentine militaries probably reflect concern with the particular character of their recent behavior, the overall distribution suggests, perhaps, that interest was based on national size and importance rather than on particular styles or forms of military political role. There is still little being done on the recruitment, military socialization, structure, and values of

UNPUBLISHED RESEARCH, COMPLETED OR IN PROGRESS[77]

d, Ph.D. dissertations
o, other

Category	Field									
	Economics		History		Political Science		Sociology		Totals	
General role, Latin America					1d	2o		1o	1d	3o
Special aspects, problems, factors										
1. Recruitment, structure, attitudes, etc. of officer corps.					1d				1d	
2. Defense programs, U.S. military asistance.						4o				4o
3. Developmental role, civic action	1o				1d	1o			1d	2o
National			11d	4o		1o	2d		13d	5o
Comparative				1o	1d				1d	1o
Totals	1o		11d	5o	4d	8o	2d	1o	17d	15o

officer corps, factors which are generally accepted as having a key explanatory value. The modernizing and developmental role of the military is receiving relatively little attention, while comparative studies remain scarce.

In terms of approach and conceptualization, tabulations or even the titles and annotations on which they are based are not very revealing. On the basis of items with which I am familiar, however, I would judge that research in progress continues the trend toward more sophisticated treatment already noted in connection with published works.

In terms of authorship, historians still lead numerically, although the contributions of political scientists appear to be increasing. Sociologists, economists and anthropologists have shown little or no interest. North American scholars or graduate students working in North American universities continue to dominate the field. Indeed, the figures in the table represent only their production for the simple reason that a search through *Pesquisas em realização ou em projecto na América Latina, levantamento provisório* (1966)[78] reveals no investigations in progress or contemplated. I have no knowledge of specific projects in other parts of the world.

With respect to substance and content, again it is difficult to make evaluations from titles and abbreviated abstracts. I would judge, however, that unpublished materials contain a substantial body of firm data which, I hope will soon find its way into print, and that the trend of research in progress is toward empirical analysis rather than high level theorizing and broad generalizations.

Such a tendency would be in accord with general trends in social science research related to Latin America. I might add finally that studies of the military constitute only a fraction of a per cent of the total corpus of research on Latin America.

The criticisms of published materials offered above are not meant unkindly. The field is a relatively new one and the formulation of testable propositions is a logical preliminary to empirical research. Moreover, further development of serious research faces a number of formidable problems. If, as is now generally assumed, the role of the military is a function of the interaction among variables existing both within the military system and its societal environment, the scholar is immediately confronted with the scarcity of empirically based studies of environmental factors such as social structure, interest group organization, political leadership, and civilian attitudes toward the military, for most Latin American countries. Remedying the deficiency will require the systematic collection of large bodies of data by government and private agencies, the training of a generation of Latin American scholars, a major contribution from European investigators and, in the case of North Americans, not only sound methodological preparation, but strong measures of empathy, tact and modesty.

Turning more particularly to the military, problems of data collection are compounded by the very nature of the armed institutions. Because of their peculiar function, they are in all countries highly sensitive and tend to surround even their most routine activities with security restrictions. In Peru, for example, the *Oficina Nacional de Racionalización y Capacitación de la Administración Pública* (ONRAP) published in 1964 a *Directorio del Gobierno Central* which was intended to list the names, titles, addresses, and telephone numbers of senior functionaries in the executive, legislative and judicial branches. The compilers, however, were unable (or reluctant) to obtain the necessary data for the Ministries of War, Marine and Aeronautics so that in their sections appears only the notation, "sin información oficial." The military, moreover, are sometimes unable to distinguish between scholarly research and espionage, particularly if the investigator is a foreigner. When they are politically active they tend to be particularly sensitive and may use their security status to obscure their maneuvers. The over eager researcher, therefore, may at best be frustrated and at worst find his project aborted and himself *persona non grata.* These observations apply particularly to social scientists concerned with contemporary situations and who rely heavily on formal survey techniques for gathering data. The difficulties are not as apparent for historians whose impersonal investigations in libraries and archives are less sensitive and less likely to attract attention.

Research on the military also raises some ethical problems. First, despite

the difficulties described above, it is theoretically possible for an aggressive investigator who is not too concerned about the niceties of interpersonal relations to make a successful research "raid" and return home with substantial amounts of firm data. No harm is likely to come to him unless he wishes to return to the country. However, he may leave behind him a residue of ill will or suspicion which will adversely affect the reception of those who follow him.

Second, in the course of interviews or more informal conversations, Latin American officers may speak quite frankly about matters of considerable delicacy. Information obtained in this fashion cannot, of course, be used with or without attribution unless express permission is obtained from the source. If permission is withheld, the investigator may find himself in the possession of valuable and perhaps critical data which he cannot ethically incorporate in his findings. Or, if permission is allowed but attribution not authorized, the writer must forego standard forms of scholarly citation.

Third, in view of the interest of United States government agencies and particularly the Department of Defense, in the Latin American military, the question arises as whether the academic scholar should seek or accept sponsorship from these sources. My own position is that the United States is still involved in a Cold War with powers which are publicly committed to doing it in. The State Department and the Defense Department are charged with making and executing policy in the struggle. They may appear to be consistently or occasionally wrong-headed but it is precisely for this reason that scholars should seek to provide them with the best data and counsel obtainable, providing *no restrictions are placed on freedom of research and publication and no sanctions are imposed on dissent.* I make no secret that part of my research was supported by the Special Operations Research Office, now happily rechristened Center for Research in Social Systems. Within the very broad area of the role of the military in Latin America, I was free to define research problems and develop a research design that suited my own intellectual interests. No predefined conclusions were expected. Initially, no restrictions were placed on freedom of research. However, the unfortunate *denouement* of Project Camelot produced injunctions emanating from the Department of the Army against free inquiry in the field and restrictions on overseas travel which I was unwilling to accept. Other scholars working under government sponsorship had the same experience. The consequences of Camelot brought to a head the problem of the relationship between the academic community and federal agencies in the field of Foreign Area research. No resolution is in sight.

The difficulties inherent in research on the Latin American military compelled Frank Bonilla to observe:

> And the fact that the Latin Americans haven't studied the military I don't think really stems from the fact they have made a wiser choice about research or they have

discounted the importance of this, but it is largely related to the fact that both to Latin America and we non-Latin Americans who go to Latin America to make studies of this kind, the military are in fact powerful enough to shield themselves from any kind of serious examination, as I have found out through bitter experience. So I'll just say I think we can largely forget about getting serious answers to a great many of these questions because of the fact that the possibilities of carrying out any kind of really useful research in this [are few] . . .[79]

If by "useful research" Bonilla is referring to the systematic collection of masses of data by means of structured interviews and questionnaires which can be machine processed and statistically correlated, and if by "serious answers" he means definitive explanatory formulae permitting scientific predictability, I concur. There is, however, more than one road to knowledge and perception. Historical approaches are still quite feasible and historical explanations acceptable. And although the social scientist may be unable to use effectively some of the most valuable tools of his trade, there are alternative methods of acquiring reliable data. Patient cultivation of cordial and empathetic relationships with military personnel can be rewarding while documentary sources remain largely unexploited. Latin American service journals constitute a particularly promising opportunity. They frequently include articles and editorials expressing the armed forces' conception of their mission and proper role within the general society. Although such statements may sometimes be somewhat less than frank and disinterested or may represent ideals rather than actuality, this is probably no more or less so that in the public utterances of civilian leaders. Where materials do not express explicitly military attitudes on non-professional matters, intelligent inference or systematic content analysis may define them. Furthermore, the distribution of contents as between purely technical or professional pieces on one hand and items concerned with national problems on the other provide a gross indication of what the armed forces regard as important. Finally, service journals often contain valuable biographical data on individual officers and historical articles which reveal how the military views its own past. If "answers" cannot be obtained by these methods, it is still possible to produce a more sophisticated or more refined body of propositions than now exist.

NOTES

1. In John J. Johnson, ed. *The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries* (Princeton, 1962), pp. 69–89.
2. See the observations of Theodore Wyckoff, "The Role of the Military in Latin American Politics," *Western Political Quarterly,* XIII (Sept. 1960), 748, n. 4.
3. I wish to thank Robert Potash and Irving Horowitz for their suggestions. The responsibility for selection, however, is mine.
4. *Generals vs. Presidents,* p. 104.

5. *Arms and Politics* (Rev. ed., N.Y., 1961), pp. 186–87.
6. Pp. 230–31.
7. P. 231.
8. *Generals vs. Presidents,* p. 117.
9. The different views of the two authors are highlighted in their remarks in United States Military Academy, "The West Point Conference on Latin American Problems, 15–17 April 1964," pp. 56–71 and particularly p. 68.
10. *The Military and Society,* p. viii.
11. P. 89.
12. P. 255.
13. P. viii.
14. P. 262.
15. P. 258.
16. P. 105.
17. P. 152.
18. P. 250.
19. P. viii.
20. The substance of this volume originally appeared in a series of articles appearing in *Combate,* I, nos. 1 (July–August, 1958)—6 (May–June, 1959) entitled "Armas, poder y libertad."
21. *Journal of Inter-American Studies,* III (July, 1961), pp. 341–50.
22. Wyckoff, *op. cit.,* p. 761.
23. P. 762.
24. *European Journal of Sociology,* II (1961), pp. 62–81.
25. P. 66.
26. P. 62.
27. P. 80.
28. University of California, Berkeley, Institute of International Studies. *Trends in Social Science Research in Latin American Studies* (Berkeley, 1965), pp. 55–99.
29. P. 55.
30. P. 65.
31. P. 56.
32. Appendix D. "The Organization and Ideology of Hemispheric Militarism," pp. 272–290.
33. P. 285.
34. P. 286.
35. P. 282.
36. P. 287.
37. Pp. 289–90.
38. P. 285.
39. Almond and Coleman, pp. 455–531.
40. Other examples are, Robert Alexander, "The Army in Politics," Harold E. Davis, ed., *Government and Politics in Latin America* (N. Y., 1958); Martin Needler, *Latin American Politics in Perspective* (Princeton, N.J., 1963); Karl M. Schmitt and David D. Burks, *Evolution or Chaos. Dynamics of Latin American government and politics* (N. Y., 1963); R. A. Gomez, *Government and Politics in Latin America* (N. Y., 1963); Alexander T. Edelmann, *Latin American Government and Politics* (Homewood, Ill., 1965); John D. Martz, *The Dynamics of Change in Latin American Politics* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1965).
41. *Il Politico,* XXX (June, 1965), pp. 348–55.
42. P. 351.
43. P. 353.

44. P. 354.
45. Washington, Institute for the Comparative Study of Political Systems, 1964.
46. P. 37.
47. P. 40.
48. P. 36.
49. P. 39.
50. The questions involved as seen by North Americans are summarily reviewed in Bruce M. Mason, ed., *The Political-Military Defense of Latin America* [Bureau of Government Research, Arizona State University, Public Affairs Series, No. 5], Tempe, Ariz., 1963, and Theodore Wyckoff, ed., *The Defense of Latin America: The Changing Concept* [Bureau of Government Research, Arizona State University, Public Affairs Series, No. 8], Tempe, Ariz., 1964. Francis J. Michael, "Military Aid to Latin America in the U.S. Congress" (*Journal of Inter-American Studies*, VI [July, 1964], pp. 389–404) is a well documented study of the historical development of military assistance policy toward Latin America from 1951 to the early 1960's with particular attention to the shift of emphasis from hemispheric defense to the internal security of the Latin American nations. It is also useful for its presentation of differing views of United States public officials on the political implications of military assistance.
51. *Western Political Quarterly,* XVIII (June, 1965), pp. 382–393.
52. P. 384.
53. P. 385.
54. P. 388.
55. *Orbis,* VIII (Winter, 1965), pp. 871–893.
56. Presented in "Measurement of Latin-American Political Phenomena: A Statistical Experiment," *American Political Science Review*, XLV (June, 1951), pp. 517–523; "A Statistical Evaluation of Latin-American Democracy," *Western Political Quarterly*, IX (September, 1956), pp. 607–619; and "Measurement of Latin American Political Change," *American Political Science Review*, LIV (September, 1961), pp. 515–526.
57. P. 890.
58. P. 893.
59. A review of military contributions to nation building and economic development may be found in my paper, "The Military," in John J. Johnson, ed., *Continuity and Change in Latin America* (Stanford, 1964), pp. 136–160.
60. "The Nonmilitary Use of the Latin American Military," *Background*, VIII (November, 1964), pp. 161–173.
61. "The Feasibility of Arms Control and Disarmament in Latin America," *Orbis*, IX (Fall, 1965), pp. 743–759.
62. "The Nonmilitary Use of the Latin American Military," p. 171.
63. A reasonably objective account of a particular civic action program and its achievements is the Peruvian Ministry of War's illustrated booklet, *El ejército del Perú en acción cívica* (Lima, 1965).
64. *Panoramas,* No. 6 (November–December, 1963), pp. 5–39.
65. For a somewhat more sympathetic but apocalyptic view of Nasserism see Rogelio García Lupo, "Los militares nasseristas en América Latina," In: G. A. Nasser, *La revolución nasserista* (Buenos Aires, 1962), pp. 9–29.
66. *Journal of Inter-American Studies*, III (October, 1961), pp. 571–578.
67. *Ibid.*, (July, 1961), pp. 351–358.
68. *Ibid.*, VII, (October, 1965), pp. 465–484.
69. *The Caribbean: Mexico Today.* Ed. A. Curtis Wilgus (Gainesville, 1964), pp. 52–62.

70. P. 5.
71. University of California. Institute of International Studies, Politics of Modernization Series, No. 2.
72. P. v.
73. P. 60.
74. P. 60.
75. P. 63.
76. Pp. 68–69.
77. The tabulation is based on data from *Survey of Investigations in Progress in the Field of Latin American Studies*. Comp. Philip F. Flemion and Murdo J. MacLeod (Washington, Pan American Union, 1962); U.S. Department of State, Office of External Research, *External Research, American Republics,* 6.25–1966; *Dissertation Abstracts*; and personal knowledge of research in progress. It includes only items dealing explicitly and primarily with the role of the Latin American military. Identification of the project by field is based on the affiliation of the author. Although I may have missed some items, I think the figures are reasonably representative.
78. Supplement, *Latin American Research Review*, I (Spring, 1966).
79. In "Discussion" of Nun's previously cited paper, p. 91.