

brought no benefits to women and for those who believe that the abolition of capitalism will automatically solve the "woman question."

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THE TECHNICAL INTELLIGENTSIA AND THE EAST GERMAN ELITE: LEGITIMACY AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MATURE COMMUNISM. By *Thomas A. Baylis*. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1974. xx, 314 pp. \$12.50.

EAST GERMAN CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS: THE IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGY, 1949-72. By *Dale Roy Herspring*. Foreword by *Peter C. Ludz*. Praeger Special Studies in International Politics and Government. New York, Washington, London: Praeger Publishers, 1973. xxxvii, 217 pp. \$17.50.

The interaction between technological adaptation and political control (or, in Richard Lowenthal's brilliant formulation, the tension between "development" and "utopia") has long been a major concern of students of Communist political systems. Both volumes under review address themselves to the role of technical specialists in East Germany, which has achieved a high level of technological development without sacrificing ideological-political discipline and direction.

Professor Baylis treats the East German technical intelligentsia as a whole. The first part of his study describes the technocrats' political characteristics, their experience as a "stratum" under Communist rule, and the efforts of the East German regime to socialize its technical specialists as well as to politicize the various milieus in which they work. The second section of the book deals with technocratic recruitment into the political elite and touches upon the thorny issue of its "representation" in the highest party bodies. It includes two particularly useful chapters on "technicians and policy," the second of which covers the technicians' prominence during the initial phase of the New Economic System (1963-65) and their relative decline afterwards. Throughout the study Baylis employs the tantalizing term "technical strategic elite" without, however, fully exploring the implications of his own terminology which markedly differs from the juxtaposed categories, "strategic clique" (that is, the nontechnocratic political elite) and "institutionalized counter-elite" (those technocrats co-opted into politically relevant positions), employed by Peter C. Ludz in his seminal work, *The Changing Party Elite in East Germany* (Cambridge, Mass., 1972; German original, *Parteielite im Wandel*, Cologne and Opladen, 1968). Baylis regards Ludz's celebration of the political rise of the technocrats to have been excessive, but he also believes in the likelihood of "profound" if "undramatic" changes in basic patterns of political authority for the longer term. Whether right in this respect or not, Baylis's judicious study offers much interesting material for further speculation.

Dale R. Herspring's monograph is narrower and considerably less stimulating. In order to measure the impact of technology on East German civil-military relations, Herspring has devised seventeen "indicators of technology" and fifteen "indicators of political control," all of which are enumerated at the outset. Subsequent chapters apply both sets of indicators to five separate periods from 1949 to 1972, scoring individual indicators and correlating levels of technology with degrees of political control at each turn. Despite the claims for the study advanced

in Ludz's foreword, that by combining quantitative measurement with substantive considerations Herspring avoids the pitfalls of abstract modeling, his monograph strikes this reviewer as an altogether mechanical exercise. No one will dispute the basic findings; namely, that both the level of military technology and the degree of political control have increased over time, so that today the East German military is staffed by cadres who are both "red" and "expert" and thus may be said to constitute "dual executives." Some readers will undoubtedly find the elaborate scoring and correlation of indicators to their taste. But far greater light would have been shed on the extremely significant phenomenon of the fusion of political capacities with technological capabilities through an analysis of such factors as the sociological background of East German military elites, their career patterns, the integration of the German Democratic Republic's armed forces with Soviet forces stationed in Germany and so forth. An entire range of considerations either receive short shrift or else are neglected entirely in this methodologically rigid treatment.

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DIE AGRARPREISPOLITIK DER DDR: ZIELE, MITTEL, WIRKUNGEN.

By *Theodor Berthold*. Osteuropastudien der Hochschulen des Landes Hessen, Series 1. Giessener Abhandlungen zur Agrar- und Wirtschaftsforschung des europäischen Ostens, vol. 53. Berlin: Im Kommission bei Duncker & Humblot, 1972. 295 pp. Illus. DM 45, paper.

Agricultural price policy was assigned a key role in the socialization of agriculture in Eastern Europe. With the virtual completion of this process during the early 1960s (Poland excepted), agricultural policy-makers have sought to transform their price structures by giving them a more solid economic basis. This transformation has not been an easy one, as Mr. Berthold amply documents in the case of the German Democratic Republic. His study is organized in five sections: theoretical framework, historical overview, price policy by commodity, agricultural prices relative to prices for farm inputs and retail food prices, and critical evaluation.

During the period of collectivization, agricultural prices were differentiated by type and size of farm by means of obligatory quotas with relatively low prices and much higher (often two and three times higher) prices for above-quota deliveries. This differentiation, which favored the collectives over private farms, was extended to apply to the quotas themselves, prices paid for farm inputs, geographic location, and even to relative economic performance within the collective sector. The two-price system was abolished in the German Democratic Republic in stages—from 1962 to 1964 for most crops and ended in 1969 for livestock products as well.

The author has done an excellent job in documenting the many changes in agricultural price policy for the period up to 1970. He does not, however, attempt to analyze the impact price policy had on resource allocation within the agricultural sector or (particularly for labor) between agriculture and other sectors of the economy. The current agricultural price system, which embodies uniform purchase prices together with extensive subsidies, is designed primarily to offset the effect of differential land rents on farm incomes, rather than as a guide to resource allocation. Nor is there much discussion of how price policy relates to other agri-