

mittee of the University of Illinois, which commissioned Professor Jones to prepare a documented, objective account of United States lend-lease to Russia. The study uses U.S. presidential papers, government reports, memoirs, and press accounts, with occasional references to a few standard official Soviet sources, to compile an admiring and somewhat heavy-breathing narrative of United States efforts to aid a suspicious and ungrateful ally. A scholar seeking to evaluate the contribution of lend-lease supplies to the war and postwar Soviet economy would have to go beyond this United States-focused study to the increasingly rich Soviet sources that have become available in the last decade.

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THE SOVIET SYSTEM AND MODERN SOCIETY. By *George Fischer*.
New York: Atherton Press, 1968. A Joint Project of the Bureau of Applied Social Research and the Russian Institute of Columbia University. xiii, 199 pp. \$7.50.

George Fischer's latest book is innovative in method, provocative in thesis and assertion, and somewhat inconclusive and speculative in logic and theory. On balance, it constitutes in this reviewer's opinion a significant and valuable addition to the growing body of scholarly literature on Communist systems that seeks to apply advanced methods of analysis to the very poor data available and to substitute reasoned discussion for moralistic polemic. Unfortunately, Fischer at times departs from sober quantitative analysis for cloudy realms of confusing speculation about such abstractions as "monism" and "Capitalist Democracy," but for the most part he sticks to the scholarly business at hand.

Both in his useful data assembly and tabular analysis and in his much less successful effort at grand theory construction Fischer makes an interesting contribution to the rapidly burgeoning literature on the sources of stability and survival power of the Soviet system. The data and arguments he adduces in support of his thesis that the Soviet system is a stable and adaptive polity are impressive. They serve as a salutary corrective to the views of some scholars who seem to think that contemporary Soviet Russia has entered a state of advanced political decay. However, as will be indicated subsequently, this reviewer feels that Fischer's arguments against the prophets of Soviet doom are stronger than his case for the continued success of a relatively changeless Soviet system.

The heart of Fischer's study is a quantitative analysis of the composition, in terms of past work experience, of a sample of 306 incumbents, in 1958, 1958-62, and 1962, of six categories of leadership posts at the all-union, republic, and oblast levels of the CPSU. Fischer breaks his sample down into four categories: Dual Executives, "who as a rule did extensive work of two kinds within the economy, technical work and party work, prior to getting a top party post"; Technicians, "who did extensive technical work, but not extensive party work, within the economy"; Hybrid Executives, "who received technical training but had no extensive work in the economy"; and Officials, with "neither technical training nor extensive work in the economy." Using more than sixty statistical tables, Fischer argues that there is a trend toward more top posts being held by men of Dual Executive career experience. It should be noted that only 16 percent of the total sample of 306 falls within this category, although the figure increased from 10

percent in 1958 to 17 percent in 1962. However, the Official category, by far the largest, remained consistent in its proportion of the total.

Although Fischer's statistical techniques are simple—no significance levels are given, and techniques such as regression are not employed—the use made of them is sometimes complicated. Because of the smallness of some of the subsamples, and the relatively small differences between some results compared, one is left in doubt as to the significance of statements made about trends. Also, this reviewer finds it puzzling that no use was made of the 1966 Soviet publication corresponding to the Soviet data on Supreme Soviet deputies elected in 1958, and in 1962, from which the author obtained most of his data. Adequate discussion of the problems of data and methodology involved would require a great deal of space. Generally speaking, Fischer's analysis does not seem to relate with sufficient precision the dependent variable of elite composition to independent variables such as education and experience. Moreover, Fischer's sample accounts for less than half of the members of the 1956 or 1961 CPSU central committees—though it could be argued that it includes the most influential ones.

It should be emphasized that the tables and the laconic explanations accompanying them provide us with a great deal of interesting and pertinent information, well displayed and largely or wholly unobtainable elsewhere. Even those skeptical of Fischer's efforts to find support for the "Dual Executive trend" by relating his sample's pattern of past career patterns to attributes such as class origin, nationality, education, and the like will find in this study information that increases understanding of many aspects of Soviet society and politics, perhaps especially in the areas of social mobility, rising levels of education and skill of Soviet politicians, and the relationship between ethnicity and politics.

Fischer's major theoretical view seems to be that if the trend that he perceives as "possible" but not necessarily "certain" could develop much more fully than it already has, then a "monist" model of society—in contrast with the "pluralist" model of "Capitalist Democracy," to use his language—would have established its probability of long and stable persistence in Russia, and its relevance also as a model for modernizing societies. This is a tall order. The case rests on the major assumption that the possession of economic skills by political leaders can strengthen both polity and economy, and can inhibit the development of pluralistic tendencies. It also involves other links in a long, sketchily elaborated chain of arguments.

For example, Fischer devotes only a few pages to his argument that skills acquired by party leaders in their work in the economy make them more capable of directing the factory managers and other industrial specialists, and he fails to indicate just which subsets of party and industry leaders work together. Also, though he touches briefly on noncognitive factors in the party leader-specialist relationship, he does so in a superficial manner. Then, too, he tends to regard both the industrial specialists and the party leaders, without much qualification, as separate groups, homogeneous in their perspectives and goals. On the whole, he pays very little systematic attention to the diverse patterns of group and occupational attitudes that may be highly relevant to the processes he seeks to delineate. Fischer's arguments against the inevitability of pluralism—like those advanced by Jeremy Azrael, Jerry Hough, and indeed the majority of experts on Soviet politics—are not implausible, but, to this reviewer at least, they are also not entirely convincing. Fischer's data could be interpreted as indicating the development, in the CPSU, of increasing differentiation of interests. Is it not possible that a new

“economic interest group,” consisting of Dual Executives allied with technically trained managers, might be emerging? Along similar lines, could not a new grouping, composed of scientists versed in politics and politicians trained in science, develop?

No further attention will be devoted here to the conceptual and theoretical issues raised, rather than fully developed, by Fischer in his introduction and conclusion, except to say that, unlike the quantitative core of the book, these sections are marred by a number of contradictory statements, and they tend, moreover, to pursue an uncertain and wavering course. For example, the USSR is described as both a “status quo”-oriented society and as a “revolutionary” one. However, Fischer deserves praise for tackling enormously difficult problems in a highly stimulating fashion. His study is a step in the right direction. It will greatly facilitate the work of the considerable band of innovative young scholars whose efforts may yet transform the style and content of research on Communist systems.

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THE MARXIAN REVOLUTIONARY IDEA. By *Robert C. Tucker*. A publication of the Center of International Studies, Princeton University. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1969. xi, 240 pp. \$5.95.

In this collection of carefully reasoned and documented essays, Robert Tucker extends the highly original interpretation set forth in his *Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx* (1961) to the phenomena of contemporary Marxism and Communist movements. Marx, he argues, located the source of revolutionary energy in the frustration of man in his capacity as a producer, not consumer. Marx, in Tucker's view, never outgrew his wish to abolish the occupational specialization founded on the division of labor; the liberation of human creativity was his main goal. “The common image of Marx as a prophet of social justice is a false one” (p. 37), Tucker argues; Marx's orientation toward production led him to regard ethical discussions of “distributive justice” as the “ideological nonsense” of “vulgar socialism.” Marxism, according to Tucker's analysis, appeals basically to societies in which modernization has been “arrested” and the class structure has become “bifurcated.” Where modernization has been blocked, the path of revolutionary political change has been taken. Tucker attempts to steer midway between the Kautskyan and Leninist interpretations of the “dictatorship of the proletariat”: on the one hand, it signifies more than the democratic role of a proletarian majority, for it does have a repressive character; on the other hand, its connotation did not include a one-party state. In his most powerful chapter, Tucker argues that “deradicalization” is the fate of all radical movements, for inevitably they adjust themselves to the order that they aimed to transform. In this sense he believes that Mao is right when he regards the Soviet Communists as becoming revisionist. Tucker observes cogently that an intensified verbal allegiance to the alleged ideological goals can go hand in hand with the process of deradicalization.

Has Tucker's analysis, for all its originality, actually succeeded in defining the Marxian revolutionary idea? Marx did not venture to include a demand for abolishing the division of labor in the program which he largely drew up in 1880 for the French socialists, nor did Engels regard the lack of such a demand as a defect in the Erfurt program of 1891. The chief passage in *Capital* which looks to the superseding of occupational specialization is footnoted oddly with a reference to the variety of employments in the Californian frontier, and scarcely has any