

brief time and due to circumstances resulting from the *Pugachevshchina*. Indeed, prior to Schrader's chosen date of 1860 there were several investigations of exilic matters, though the most significant during this period were those culminating in Mikhail Speranskii's 1822 Siberian Reforms, which included two regulations that restructured Siberia's penal apparatus and the convoy system. Observing the sudden increase in the annual numbers of exiles sent to Siberia, Schrader assumes that Speranskii's reforms "depended upon" and "astronomically expanded the number of convicts and vagrants banished to Siberia" (236–37). But this was not the case. As both his personal correspondence and these regulations' precisely stated figures make clear, Speranskii had actually convinced himself that annual numbers would remain steady, which largely explains why his system soon malfunctioned. As for explaining the rise in numbers, Schrader fails to account for the 1823 Vagabond Regulation (*Ustav o brodiagakh*), distinguishable among other (unmentioned) factors by having excluded vagabonds (*brodiagi*) from military service and designating them instead for exile (see my "Vagabondage and Exile to Tsarist Siberia: Disciplinary Modernism in Tsarist Russia," in Paul Ocobock and Lee Beier, eds., *Cast Out: A History of Vagrancy in Global Perspective* [Athens, 2007], 165–87).

These and other developments are described in studies by the Justice Ministry, S. V. Maksimov, G. S. Fel'dstein, N. M. Iadrntsev, and I. Ia. Foinitskii (*Ssylka v Sibir': Ocherk eia istorii i sovremennago polozeniia*, 1900; S. Maksimov, *Sibir' i katonga*, 3 vols., 1871); G. S. Fel'dstein, *Ssylka: Eia genezisa, znacheniiia, istorii i sovremennogo sostoiianiia*, 1893; N. M. Iadrntsev, *Sibir' kak koloniia: K iubileiu trekhsotletiiia. Sovremennoe polozenie Sibiri. Eia nu-zhdy i potrebnosti. Eia proshloe i budushchee*, 1882; I. Ia. Foinitskii, *Uchenie o nakazanii v sviazi s tiur' movedeniem*, 1889). Despite discussion of these and other indispensable sources in Alan Wood's numerous articles as well as my dissertation, none are cited in Schrader's article. Familiarity with this secondary literature might have forestalled several mistakes, including her belief that "Russian rulers began treating Siberia as a repository for convicts and undesirables" in 1753 (230), when in fact the first exiles were sent no later than 1593, and in any case an exponential increase in Siberia's use as an open-air asylum came on the heels of the 1649 *Ulozhenie*. Schrader is similarly incorrect in claiming "we lack precise figures for the number of wives and daughters who accompanied men into exile" (248). Such figures may be found in Maksimov's work. Finally, Maksimov also presents evidence that the Senate relieved infirm women and similar others of having to march into exile in 1827, that is, thirty years before Schrader's date of 1857.

In conclusion, Schrader's research promises to add much to our knowledge of a topic made all the more important because of its link to the twentieth-century gulag. But contributions are most serviceable when the considerable contributions of other scholars, both living and dead, are acknowledged and accounted for.

ANDREW GENTES

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Professor Schrader responds:

As Andrew Gentes has indicated, it is indisputable that nineteenth-century Russian authorities sought to increase the number of women available to marry male exiles banished to Siberia and facilitate their conjugal unions. I have concluded that it is most fruitful to contextualize officials' obsession with exile marriage and Siberia's shortage of women within the framework of contemporary Russian views of gender. Rather than offer an alternative interpretation, Gentes lodges ill-founded accusations casting doubt on my scholarship. Many of his claims result from less than careful analysis of my article. I will take these on in the first three paragraphs and engage his letter's more substantive comments in the next four.

Gentes's claim that I lack familiarity with secondary literature on Siberian exile is misplaced. I refer to S. V. Maksimov's and N. M. Iadrntsev's writings in notes 19, 31, and 33. These works, along with those by E. N. Anuchin, S. Chudnovskii, N. Vasin, Alan Wood, Marc Raeff, George Lantzeff, and others provide the backdrop for my primary research. I have consulted I. Ia. Foinitskii's 1889 monograph on punishment for other projects but am unaware how it would enhance this particular article.

Gentes misread the section concerning whether infirm wives had to accompany husbands to Siberia (page 247, first paragraph). My focus here is on the wives of men *administratively* exiled, not felons' wives. In 1720, Peter I made it voluntary for the wives of felons stripped of their rights to follow their husbands to Siberia but this had no bearing on the wives of men banished administratively. Likewise, the ukaz of 4 August 1827 (*PSZ*, 2d ser., no. 1280), which prohibited transporting infirm vagrants, was irrelevant to this question. In 1857, Saratov's civil governor brought before the Minister of State Domains a matter concerning Domna Kondrat'eeva, who was legally blind and elderly. The governor wanted to exempt her from transportation alongside her husband, a state peasant, but lacked legal grounding for this ruling. The Committee of Ministers agreed to this change and recommended that the tsar generalize it, which he did on 29 January 1857.

Gentes is incorrect when he asserts that I fail to account for the 1823 legislation expanding the exile system by transporting, rather than conscripting, vagrants. On page 236, I employ the term *vagrant* instead of *vagabond* when discussing the massive increase in transportation to Siberia that resulted from promulgating the ukaz of 23 February 1823 (*PSZ*, 1st ser., no. 29328).

Some convicts were certainly exiled to Siberia before 1753. Nevertheless, we cannot speak of a Siberian exile *system* before Elizabeth's replacement of the death penalty with knouting and penal servitude. Although the Muscovites banished some convicts to Siberia immediately after the region's conquest (see notes 37 and 75), this banishment was practiced on a limited basis and most felons remained subject to traditional penalties like execution and the amputation of limbs. Peter the Great formalized *katorga* by legally articulating the concept of exploiting convict labor, but he consigned felons to galleys and construction projects in St. Petersburg, Azov, and elsewhere. He reserved Siberia for schismatics and rebellious soldiers. After Peter's death, Siberian exile expanded. In 1753, it became the cornerstone of the penal system; instead of amputating criminal's limbs or executing them, the Senate opted for punishments that were less likely to impede productivity and banishment to Siberia became more common. This was when Siberia became a true "repository for convicts and undesirables." An extended discussion of Siberia's role in the Russian penal system is inappropriate here. I have elaborated upon this in *The Languages of the Lash: Corporal Punishment and Identity in Imperial Russia* (DeKalb, 2002), particularly pp. 78–80.

I am confused by Gentes's objections to my conclusion that exile legislation was gender specific given his acknowledgment that different laws governed men and women. I concur with Gentes that "both sexes were equally expected to serve the state" but feel that this statement requires nuancing. Here, I show that authorities' attempts to use women instrumentally by wedding them to male exiles was predicated upon a desire to harness male exiles' productivity.

I am not suggesting that Speranskii wished to increase the number of exiles banished to Siberia; rather, his 1822 projects sought to transform Siberia into a well-ordered realm that could feed and administer itself. Accomplishing this goal was complicated because the region was distant and desolate and the autocracy had prohibited serfdom from spreading to it, which deprived it of peasants to work the land and nobles to administer it. In the long run, Speranskii hoped to attract officials and free Russians to Siberia by offering them relocation incentives. Yet he understood that this would take time, resources, and a better infrastructure. In the meantime, the state needed to use exiles to settle, labor in, and even administer the realm. It is in this sense that I use the verb *depend* in the first paragraph on page 236. Especially after 1823, with the influx of a large number of vagrants to Siberia, officials complained vociferously about exiles' disorderly nature. Consequently, Nicholas I convened several committees between 1830 and the early 1850s that sought to standardize Siberia's penal system; these yielded few results. Given the persistent problems generated by Siberian exile and the states' inability to improve or restrict it, officials sought creative and ultimately unsuccessful ways to settle exiles through marriage.

I have chosen 1860 as an ending point because the Great Reforms altered deliberations concerning Siberia. Particularly after the 1861 emancipation, a pool of relatively more mobile land-hungry Russians was available to colonize the region. This presented its own difficulties, but delving into these is beyond the scope of my article.

It is possible to explain the projects designed to marry off male exiles in various ways. My understanding of Siberian developments, exile, and Russian views of gender shape my interpretation of the considerable primary data examined here. I encourage Gentes to formulate an alternative analysis, as this would enrich Russian and Siberian studies by demonstrating the centrality of gender to political, social, and cultural processes more broadly.

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To the Editor:

Neil Edmunds, in his review of Kiril Tomoff's "Creative Union" (*Slavic Review*, vol. 66, no. 3), states: "more reference should have been made to the work of Leonid *Maksim*enkov, who has consulted similar archival sources." My name is Maximenkov (sometimes transliterated Maksimenkov), and I have not only "consulted" the sources used in Tomoff's book but published extensively on them, since 1993. Tomoff's book has three essential flaws: a chaotic chronology (in which effect often becomes cause) coupled with the absence of significant events; a lack of understanding of the institutional history and decision-making process within the Communist Party apparatus and the Soviet government, not to mention the secret police and armed forces, among other entities; and inaccurate reconstruction of the bureaucratic biographies of the individuals involved. These failures are enhanced by the author's uncritical and selective use of sources, archival and published, in English and in Russian.

LEONID MAXIMENKOV  
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Professor Edmunds chooses not to respond.

Professor Tomoff chooses not to respond.

*Slavic Review* apologizes for the misspelling of Dr. Maximenkov's name.