

Cuba to the more familiar USSR-East European group. (Unfortunately, Albania, Mongolia, North Korea, and North Vietnam are excluded; the editors note the gap with regret.) The volume might be used profitably as a readings book for scholars and advanced students.

In the Neuberger/Duffy volume, socialist systems also are compared, but to an economic model. The authors develop a highly original paradigm for the comparison, the DIM system. (The DIM acronym is unfortunate in my judgment.) The system of comparison divides economic structure into three basic functions: for Decision-making, for Information, and for Motivation. Again, the work is nonideological and empirical. Roughly a third of the book is devoted to developing the DIM paradigm; the remainder studies eight economic systems according to the paradigm: the United States, the Soviet Union, China, France, Yugoslavia, Hungary, Sweden, and Japan. As no pair of authors could have detailed knowledge of so many economic systems, these two wisely called on Alan Brown and Joseph Licari for the chapter on Hungary and on F. Reed Johnson for the chapter on Sweden. The authors assume extensive and intensive familiarity with economic terms, and the book would be a suitable text only at an advanced level.

The DIM paradigm, however, should be studied by any serious scholar of comparative economic systems. More traditional texts study outcomes of economic growth and of efficiency, but this text analyzes the processes by which those outcomes were achieved. In doing so, the authors utilize recent developments in economic theory of information and decision making, and add work on motivation. Ideology is assumed to be exogenous to the economic systems. The resulting paradigm reorders our knowledge and methodology in comparing economic systems. For example, it distinguishes between a planning system which limits the choices or decisions of a lower echelon unit (administrative decentralization) and one which manipulates the consequences of a decision by that unit (manipulative decentralization), while granting it the freedom to choose. The first is closer to a traditional planned system, the second to a market. In another example, coercion becomes a motivation system, costly in its use of scarce resources, which can occur in any society.

Both books approach inquiry concerning socialist systems with a positive spirit lacking in normative, or "ideological," bias. Paul Hollander (in *Mesa-Lago/Beck*) terms this the "optimistic-evolutionary" perspective. He hypothesizes that technocrats, who are by definition rational and apolitical, create such an environment. Although the positive environment itself is salutary, it disguises questions answered by ideology. One is the question of legitimacy or the ideological support for a social system. Neuberger/Duffy include legitimacy as motivation by "solidarity," where an individual subverts a personal objective to group goals, thus acknowledging their superior legitimacy. To generalize this principle would be an accomplishment indeed. The books, together and singly, are full of such challenges.

ELIZABETH CLAYTON

University of Missouri, St. Louis

ON THE EVE OF POLTAVA: THE LETTERS OF IVAN MAZEPA TO ADAM SIENIAWSKI, 1704–1708. Edited, annotated, and with an introduction by *Orest Subtelny*. Preface by *Oleksander Ohloblyn*. New York: The Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the United States, 1975. 159 pp.

Much has been written about the reign of Peter I and the Northern War (1700–1721), and one might think that the history of Russia, Sweden, and Poland for this period would hardly be in need of rewriting as a result of the discovery of previously

unknown though significant documents. This holds true as far as these three states are concerned, but the involvement of the Cossack Ukraine, and in particular of Hetman Ivan Mazepa, in this prolonged war, which most significantly changed the course of East European history, has been seriously neglected. The historian, to expose this negligence, should pose the question: What would have happened to Russia, Sweden, the Ukraine, and Poland had Peter I been defeated at Poltava in July of 1709? The answer is obvious. Muscovy-Russia would have been locked within her ethnographic territory without access to the Baltic or Black seas, and the Ukraine, consequently, would have remained an independent state with a real chance to recover all territories populated by Ukrainians.

The work under review explicates this thesis by providing the missing links in the historian's attempt to better understand Mazepa's strategy, intention, and secret diplomacy, all of which were clearly aimed at regaining the Ukraine's independence and at ending Russian encroachment as a result of the Pereiaslav Treaty of 1654. Mazepa's task was not easy. Muscovy and the Polish Commonwealth clearly were not interested in the restoration of the Ukraine's independence. Indeed, Peter I, the Polish kings (August II and Stanislaw Leszczynski, the Swedish protégé), and Adam Sieniawski, Crown Hetman of Poland, all opposed such a plan. Nevertheless, Mazepa, in the aftermath of the Northern War, skillfully began to develop a solid base in the Ukraine through the imposition of his authority and the elimination of potential rivals.

Professor Subtelny, while conducting research in the archives of Poland in 1971, came upon a collection of Hetman Mazepa's letters (fifty-four) to Adam Sieniawski, dating from 1704 to 1708. Although Polish and Ukrainian historians have been aware of the existence of such letters, no special attention has been paid to them. The letters, housed in the Czartoryski Library in Cracow, are written in the Polish language of the early eighteenth century, heavily mixed with Latin, the language of the educated of that time. They represent a significant contribution to the study of Mazepa's diplomacy prior to the final break with Peter I and the alliance with Charles XII.

The editor did his homework well. The introductory section (pp. 12-36) concisely discusses Mazepa's letters in relation to the historical background. Subtelny seems to suggest that Sieniawski's narrow-mindedness, egocentrism, and lack of ability to grasp important issues played a significant role in Mazepa's failure to make his final move at the right time and with sufficient preparation. The letters reveal that the unsecured western borders of the Ukraine and the absence of strong Polish support in the crucial period prevented Mazepa from summoning a large army of Cossacks to strengthen Charles XII's forces at Poltava.

The only criticism this reviewer wishes to express is of the editor's decision to provide brief English summaries instead of translating the letters *in toto*, for the present publication can only be used by a small group of experts in command of Polish and Latin. The index of place names and proper names and the two photographs of original likenesses of Sieniawski and Mazepa are valuable additions to the volume. The photograph of Sieniawski is especially appreciated because it is the first and only one available in Western literature.

STEPHAN M. HORAK
Eastern Illinois University