Dr. Bastian stated that he had examined the prisoner at the request of the Treasury, and that the prisoner's mind appeared to be saturated with delusions of persecution. Prisoner's act in killing Mr. Terriss was the result of those delusions. He did not think that the prisoner was capable of exercising self-control at the time. The judge: Would it make any difference in witness's opinion if he thought that prisoner had premeditated the act? Witness: No, because insane persons do premeditate. "I am perfectly certain that the prisoner was insane." Prisoner knew that he was making an assault on Mr. Terriss, but he did not know the quality of the act.

Dr. Hyslop of Bethlem and Dr. Scott of Holloway Gaol gave similar evidence. The learned judge told the jury that there was no doubt that the prisoner committed the act, and there was also evidence that it was premeditated, but premeditation did not prevent a man's being so insane as to be irresponsible at law. The judge then referred to the well-known rule of law, and said that it was clear, according to law, that a person might be insane to a certain extent, and yet be responsible. The mere fact of insanity was not enough to make a person irresponsible.—Guilty, but insane.—Central Criminal Court, January 13, 1898 (Mr. Justice Channell).—*Times*, January 14.

The usual latitude was permitted to the medical witnesses, who were allowed to give evidence of their opinion of the state of mind of the prisoner at the time of crime. The judge summed up in the strict terms of the answers in the McNaghten case, but plainly intimated to the jury that they were at liberty to find the prisoner insane.

Reg. v. Cross.

Prisoner, a coal merchant, aged 22, was indicted for the attempted murder of Annie Drury. Prisoner, disguised with a handkerchief over his face, with two holes cut in it for vision, went to the house at which Mrs. Drury was staying. He had a revolver in one hand, and in the other a dagger made out of the tine of a pitchfork fixed in a wooden haft. He fired the revolver at one of the women in the house, and stabbed another several times. Subsequently he came undisguised to the house in which they had taken refuge, and talked about the outrage, saying that the man who committed it ought to be caught. The plea of insanity was set up, but no details are given in the report. The jury found the prisoner guilty, but recommended him to mercy on the ground that he was of weak mind, although not insane.—Norwich Assizes, February 26, 1898 (Mr. Justice Grantham).—*Times*, February 27.

Another instance of the growing practice of taking into consideration a mental state which, while not involving complete irresponsibility, is yet a reason for mitigation of punishment. In this case, by inflicting only twelve months' imprisonment, the judge appears to have given effect to the plea.

Barnett v. Blagg and others.

This was one of the rare cases in which a will is upset on the ground of insanity. The testator was proved to have suffered from delusions of persecution, which gave rise to a groundless and intense feeling of hostility towards his father, brother, and sister, whom he excluded from benefit by his will. Sir F. Jeune, sitting without a jury, pronounced against the will.—*Times*, December 9, 1897.

THE INSANE POOR IN PRIVATE DWELLINGS IN MASSACHUSETTS.

BY SIR ARTHUR MITCHELL, K.C.B., M.D., LL.D.,

Ex-Commissioner in Lunacy of Scotland.

[In view of the fact that the State of Massachusetts has the near prospect of getting a new Lunacy Law, Sir Arthur Mitchell thought it might be useful to make an effort to secure good provisions in that law, especially in

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