

Senn has made a definite contribution to the study of his secondary themes, as well as to that of his main theme. One wishes nevertheless that the subject nationalities could have been dealt with in a separate volume.

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LA RÉVOLUTION INCONNUE, 1917–1921: DOCUMENTATION INÉDITE SUR LA RÉVOLUTION RUSSE. By *Voline*. Collection “Changer la Vie.” Paris: Éditions Pierre Belfond, 1969. 690 pp. 59 F., paper.

A by-product of the recent interest in anarchism, this book is a reprint, stimulated by the May 1968 rebellion in Paris, of a significant memoir-history-tract by a prominent Russian anarchist, Vsevolod Mikhailovich Eikhenbaum, better known under the pseudonym Voline. Published first in French in 1947, two years after the author's death, this account was translated into English, in two parts, published in London and New York in 1954 and 1955 under the titles *1917: The Russian Revolution Betrayed* and *The Unknown Revolution*.

It is useful to have available again a general interpretation of the Revolution from a distinctive anarchist point of view, but in several ways the book is disappointing. As an historical account it treats the Revolution in a superficial, often repetitious manner, albeit with a definite anarchist slant. For Voline the Bolsheviks are clearly the villains, who deceive the masses and become worshipers and wielders of state power, crushing in the process the nascent libertarian movement of 1917. As a memoir the book contains a number of vignettes and episodes from Voline's bitter experience in Russia during the period 1917–21, but most of the reminiscences are trivial rather than revealing, with the possible exception of anecdotes concerning a congress of workers and peasants sponsored by Makhno in October 1919, and sketches of various leaders of the Makhno movement.

Voline propounds the “true” story of the origin of the first soviet in 1905. He recalls it as a group formed in January–February 1905 to distribute to workers in St. Petersburg strike benefits collected by the lawyer Nosar. After the strike that followed Bloody Sunday had ended, the group continued to meet for several weeks as a council under Nosar's leadership, and it was easily reconstituted in October 1905. This explanation is quite similar to the one offered by Miliukov in his *Memoirs*, although the Kadet leader naturally credited the liberals with directing such workers' strike committees in the winter of 1905. Though workers' groups that were formed early in 1905—including those organized to elect delegates to the government-sponsored Shidlovsky Commission—undoubtedly contributed to the general experience and understandings from which grew the soviets of the summer and fall of 1905, Voline's ascription of the birth of the soviet to a specific group led by Nosar seems implausible, since Nosar himself, writing later about the events of 1905, made no such claim.

Over a third of Voline's study is devoted to the revolt at Kronstadt in 1921 and to the revolutionary movement in the Ukraine led by Makhno. Yet even here he contributes relatively little that is new. Much of his account of the Kronstadt rising is based on excerpts from the *Izvestiia* of the Provisional Revolutionary Committee (as earlier he has made liberal use of editorials and stories from *Golos truda*, an anarchist newspaper). Voline's treatment of the rise and fall of Makhno draws heavily on a detailed study by another anarchist, P. Arshinov. Voline presents a

rather labored defense of Makhno's various agreements of expediency with the Bolsheviks and of the atrocities charged to Makhno's forces, but he concludes with an incisive and frank evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of the movement Makhno led. He notes the courage and love of freedom that undoubtedly characterized many of Makhno's supporters, while conceding the movement's lack of clear goals and positive policies, its increasing militarization, the personal weaknesses of Makhno, and the insouciance of Makhno's attitude toward the Bolsheviks.

Voline's study, though it adds little specific information to our knowledge of the Russian Revolution, nevertheless remains a forthright statement of the views of a small but important group of losers in that great upheaval.

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GERMANY'S DRIVE TO THE EAST AND THE UKRAINIAN REVOLUTION, 1917-1918. By *Oleh S. Fedyshyn*. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1971. xii, 401 pp. \$15.00.

Dr. Fedyshyn tries to evaluate in his book the interplay of the German *Ostpolitik* and the Ukrainian striving for national self-determination during the eventful years of the Ukrainian Revolution in 1917-18. While making an extensive use of German and Austrian official documents, numerous memoirs, and an impressive number of secondary works written in English, German, Russian, and Ukrainian, the author guides the reader briefly through the history of the Ukrainian national awakening, and then deals more elaborately with the major stages of the German involvement in the Ukrainian problems from the outbreak of World War I up to the ultimate collapse of the Second German Empire. Whereas most of the primary sources cited in this work are not new, but have been used already in related writings by Reshetar, Fischer, Baumgart, Borowsky, and others, the broader aspects of the German war aims and of the German occupation policy in the years in question, with particular reference to the Ukraine, were never before integrated and presented in such a systematic fashion.

In dealing with the German policy toward Russia before the outbreak of World War I, and shortly after the war began, the author finds no evidence of an official German policy in favor of a Ukrainian state within the framework of a so-called *Randstaatenpolitik* (policy of buffer states), thus disagreeing with the version of Professor Fritz Fischer and his "school" on this account. He describes the official German support to the Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine from the beginning of hostilities as one of the measures of psychological warfare, contending that the concept of a Ukrainian state independent of Russia emerged in the official German war plans only at a later time, as a result of the German military successes on the Eastern front (pp. 18-20, 30, 38-41).

The ambiguity of the German attitude toward the Ukraine provides the setting for Fedyshyn's thesis that the German military intervention in the Ukraine caught the German leaders politically unprepared, and that the lack of clearly defined aims and an inadequate evaluation of the situation in the Ukraine led to a policy of narrow-minded economic exploitation that was geared to the needs of the German war economy. He states that economic rather than national or ideological considerations determined the overthrow of the Rada and the support of the Hetman's state by the Germans (pp. 257-58).