offers to furnish detailed source references on request. The point can be made, however, that even the general reader would be better served by some additional information: for example, publication dates of the texts, and—in the case of the Appendix materials—some indication as to the wartime position, background, and functions of the original authors, whom the reader suddenly encounters out of context in the first person. It would seem also that the book would have benefited from use of illustrations from the quoted texts themselves, instead of items culled from various archives and libraries. Judging from the 1973 edition of *Istoriia SSSR,* at least, photographs and graphics are in good supply, and another dimension of understanding could have resulted by passing along to the reader some sense of the selection of pictorial content.

Despite these criticisms, there is much of value here, both of informational substance and—although this is implied rather than stated—of historiographical context and method. In Lyons's book, we have the basis for a mini case study in comparative historical interpretation: Soviet historians spell out a sequence of events, actions, and imputed intentions which add up to a very different view of the war and an indictment of their Western allies, a mirror image of the resentments and fears depicted by Western historians. Treatments of perceived Western attempts to turn Hitler eastward, Allied procrastinations on the Second Front, separate peace negotiations with the Nazis in 1943, and Lend Lease are of outstanding interest to Western readers. Particularly in the interpretation of the Warsaw Uprising of August 1944, the reader confronts two diametrically opposed versions, which cannot be reconciled by mere differences in perception. Mr. Lyons's premise that "if we want to know the feeling of a nation about great events in its history, the best possible sources are its school books" (p. xiv) is well illustrated in the material he presents. His book should be of genuine value to anyone concerned with questions of political socialization and the sociopolitical aspects of historiography, as well as to historians.

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HENRY WALLACE, HARRY TRUMAN, AND THE COLD WAR. By *Richard J. Walton.* New York: The Viking Press, 1976. xii, 388 pp. $12.95.

This book will provoke. It is unabashed and challenging. It is out of place in the recent Truman renaissance. It is partisan on behalf of the much-maligned Henry A. Wallace. The work, intended for a lay audience, is designed to remind a new generation of Americans that a sincere and courageous man had the energy and intelligence to speak out against a misguided Cold War diplomacy, to offer alternative policies, to run on a third party ticket, and to risk a distinguished political career for principle. Walton is harsh on the liberals in the 1940s, of the Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. persuasion, who engaged in the Red-baiting that the author documents at length.

Henry Wallace, Harry Truman, and the Cold War is part scholarly monograph, part biography, and part political tract. Walton makes good use of the private papers of Wallace, Truman, the Progressive Party, the Americans for Democratic Action, and others. He relies heavily on the often overlooked, encyclopedic *Gideon's Army* written in three volumes by Curtis D. Macdougall. Walton concludes, like Wallace, that the Truman Administration followed an expansionist, militant, and self-righteous Cold War foreign policy. The author simplifies history at points, sometimes slips into a "good guys-bad guys" mold, and does not say much that has not been presented already by John Blum, Norman Markowitz, and others. Although he provides impressive evidence for the virulent anticommunism of the postwar decade, he does not adequately, for this reviewer's taste, explain *why* Americans were so susceptible to the infection. Walton is well read (although Athan Theoharis's fine studies do not appear

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to have been used), is an accomplished writer (his book on John F. Kennedy's foreign policy is very good), and is cognizant of the crucial questions.

Henry A. Wallace served as secretary of agriculture and vice-president under Franklin D. Roosevelt, and, next to the president himself, Wallace was considered the voice of the New Deal. He became secretary of commerce under Truman and was fired from the cabinet in September 1946 for criticizing the "get tough" diplomacy of the accidental president. One of the very few leading politicians in American history to leave high office in protest and then to take his case to the electorate, Wallace became an editor at the *New Republic* and then ran as a Progressive in 1948, losing badly. Wallace questioned a unilateral foreign policy, repeatedly called for negotiations between Washington and Moscow, denounced the anti-Communist mania at home, recommended disarmament measures, cautioned against too much emphasis on military aid, and urged close analysis of foreign conflicts to determine whether they were civil or international in character. Because he criticized American foreign policy, his critics assumed wrongly that he was condoning the ugly Soviet record. As Walton well demonstrates, Wallace scrutinized and condemned the machinations of the Soviets, holding them also responsible for postwar tension.

Walton dismisses the popularized and politically exploited myth that Wallace's Progressive Party was the creation and tool of the Communist Party. Communists attached themselves to the third party movement, but Wallace was his own man. Propaganda from the politically vulnerable Truman camp deliberately tried and succeeded in distorting reality. Wallace refused to reject the support of the Communists, because he would not engage in the Red-baiting so unbecoming to the liberals who would themselves fall victim to McCarthyism. Wallace sought to explain how his position differed from that of the Communists, but the hyperbole of the 1948 campaign subverted his case. In 1950 Wallace said: "The Communists have their party. We have ours. We agree with the Communists that peace with Russia is possible—but that doesn't make us Communists. We agree with the Democrats and Republicans that capitalism can be made to work—but that doesn't make us Democrats or Republicans." Nevertheless, Schlesinger, the ADA, and the Alsops depicted Wallace as a Kremlin stooge. Towns would not rent halls to him for political speeches; newspapers printed the names of people who signed Wallace petitions in the hope that they would be intimidated; and the ADA published the dishonest but influential pamphlet, *The First Three Months of the Wallace Campaign.*

Wallace had his faults and Walton catalogs them. The Progressive standard-bearer disliked the details of the political game and made serious tactical errors; he failed to coddle the press; he made unguarded statements; he did not sufficiently emphasize his criticisms of the Soviet Union; and he often spoke in shrill tones. Walton concludes that Wallace was a Christian missionary, a naïve capitalist, and an idealist who was right.

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ZAGADKA SMERTI STALINA (ZAGOVOR BERIIA). By *A. Avtorkhanov.* Frankfurt/Main: Possev-Verlag, 1976. ii, 316 pp. DM 22.40, paper.

Avtorkhanov, in his book *Zagadka smerti Stalina,* recounts five or six different versions of the circumstances of Stalin's death. It is to his credit that he does not try to determine which of these tales is the "true" one. Avtorkhanov seems to be telling us that there is a fundamental truth to all of them—that is, prior to Stalin's death his associates conspired to have him removed.

Because the period studied in the book, 1947–53, is, in the words of the renowned student of Stalinism, Professor Adam Ulam, perhaps the most obscure in the entire

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