

VICIOUS CYCLES:
Recent Works on Argentine History

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- A HOUSE DIVIDED: ARGENTINA, 1880–1980.* By EDUARDO CRAWLEY. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985. Pp. 472. \$35.00.)
- THE DISMANTLING OF THE GOOD NEIGHBOR POLICY.* By BRYCE WOOD. (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1985. Pp. 290. \$27.50.)
- THE ARGENTINE LABOR MOVEMENT, 1930–1945: A STUDY IN THE ORIGINS OF PERONISM.* By DAVID TAMARIN. (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1985. Pp. 273. \$27.50.)
- POLITICA Y CULTURA POPULAR: LA ARGENTINA PERONISTA, 1946–1955.* By ALBERTO CIRIA. (Buenos Aires: Ediciones de la Flor, 1983. Pp. 357.)
- JUAN PERON VS. SPRUILLE BRADEN: THE STORY BEHIND THE BLUE BOOK.* By GARY FRANK. (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1980. Pp. 172. \$8.75.)
- PERON Y EL G.O.U.: LOS DOCUMENTOS DE UNA LOGIA SECRETA.* Edited by ROBERT A. POTASH. (Buenos Aires: Editorial Sudamericana, 1984. Pp. 481.)
- THE ANGLO-ARGENTINE CONNECTION, 1900–1939.* By ROGER GRAVIL. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1985. Pp. 267. \$22.00.)
- ARGENTINA, 1516–1982: FROM SPANISH COLONIZATION TO THE FALKLANDS WAR.* By DAVID ROCK. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1985. Pp. 478. \$35.00.)
- THE FITFUL REPUBLIC: ECONOMY, SOCIETY, AND POLITICS IN ARGENTINA.* By JUAN E. CORRADI. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1985. Pp. 175. \$30.00 cloth, \$15.00 paper.)

Argentina has been described so often as a land of paradoxes that the observation has become a cliché. A country rich in natural and human resources, Argentina has been trapped in a pattern of economic stagnation and decline for the past half-century. The most cultured of the Latin American republics, with a skilled and literate population and all the seeming prerequisites for progressive democratic government, it

has instead undergone a vicious cycle of inept civilian governments replaced by equally inept and often brutal military dictatorships. Over the course of the past fifteen years (until 1983, at least), a country that realistically aspired to world-power status at the beginning of the century appeared to have reached the point of virtual self-destruction.

What historical factors lie behind "the miracle of Argentine underdevelopment"? Over the years, social scientists, politicians, diplomats, novelists, and other observers, foreign and domestic, have probed for answers and obtained varying results. In recent years, a new generation of Argentine, North American, and British scholars have drawn on new documentation, methodologies, and interpretations to explain the Argentine paradox. Their work collectively represents a welcome contribution to general knowledge of Argentina, perhaps especially welcome following the terrible political and cultural retrogression of the past decade.

The dean of North American scholars of contemporary Argentine political history is Robert Potash. His two volumes on the role of the military in Argentina have become classics in the field. They also became best-sellers in Argentina, causing a publishing sensation in the early 1980s and turning their author into something of a major celebrity.¹ Potash's latest contribution, *Perón y el GOU*, is also a best-seller in Argentina. The work is a collection of original documents of the GOU (initially the Grupo Organizador y Unificador, later the Grupo Obra de Unificación), the secret military organization of junior officers who engineered the coup of June 1943 that ousted the civilian government of Ramón Castillo and instituted the military dictatorship that paved the way to power for Colonel Juan Perón.

Following a brief introduction by Potash, the collection is organized into seven separate sections, each with some commentary by the editor, according to a general chronological and thematic scheme. The documents, which came from the archives of the GOU and the private papers of one of its founders, are mostly presented in a coherent manner. Interspersed with the typed and printed materials are photocopies of handwritten letters and memoranda that reinforce the authenticity of the originals but are generally difficult to decipher.

Perón y el GOU is not a work for the casual reader. It has no narrative to follow and requires some knowledge of the period from 1943 to 1946. The documents themselves are repetitive, detailed, and written in a style intended for military officers, not the general public. But for the informed and diligent reader, the collection reveals many interesting features of the GOU. First, the documents illuminate the leading role played by Perón in the organization and activities of the group, reinforcing Potash's interpretation in his first volume, which was written before he had access to these materials.² Second, the docu-

ments reveal a previously unknown GOU plan in September 1943 to remove President Pedro Ramírez from office if he did not realign his cabinet to their liking, a threat eventually lifted when the president acceded to their demands in October. Third, the documents detail the organization of the GOU, from its founding in early 1943 to its dissolution in early 1944, revealing it to have been an organization based on a cellular system like that frequently employed by communist parties.

Perhaps the most valuable information to emerge from these documents concerns the general ideological orientation of the group and what they claimed as the motivations behind their actions: first, their belief that civilian leadership was hopelessly inept and corrupt, failings that would pave the way for a disaster of the kind Spain had experienced in the previous decade; second, the need to guard against foreign influences, particularly U.S. efforts to pressure Argentina into abandoning its traditional neutrality and joining the Allied cause in World War II; third, the emergence of a conspiratorial view that lumped together a bizarre coalition of Masons, Jews, and Rotarians in an alleged plan to weaken the nation's traditional values and institutions; and finally, the conviction that only a united military led by younger officers imbued with a "healthy sense of nationalism," "superior" moral sensibilities, and discipline could purify a system corrupted by materialism and liberalism and save the nation from chaos. With hindsight, one can see that these ideas eventually engendered the basis of the perspective of the nationalist wing of the Argentine military throughout the postwar era.

The period when the GOU appeared has been the subject of renewed scholarly interest. Several recent studies have focused on the changing patterns of internal developments and international relationships in Argentina during World War II and the immediate postwar aftermath. Drawing extensively on U.S. State Department and British Foreign office archives, these studies analyze the complex, shifting interrelationships among Argentina, the United States, and Great Britain in these years. Although their interpretations diverge, all these works concentrate on U.S. attempts to influence the course of Argentine affairs during the war and the consequent British efforts to remain on good terms with its most important wartime ally while protecting its diplomatic and economic position in Argentina.³ These years comprised a crucial turning point in Argentine history, when Perón and Peronism emerged as determining forces and British hegemony was gradually replaced by U.S. economic and diplomatic predominance in Argentina.

Gary Frank's *Juan Perón vs. Spruille Braden: The Story behind the Blue Book* deals with one of the most dramatic confrontations between the United States and Argentina during this era. As is well known, U.S.

Ambassador Spruille Braden did everything in his power in late 1945 and early 1946 to prevent Perón from being elected president. The failure of this effort underscored both the limits of personal diplomacy and Braden's (and Washington's) misperceptions of the socioeconomic changes that had occurred in the republic during the previous decade as well as the depth of Argentine nationalist sentiments.

Frank tells his story clearly, tracing the specific narrative within the larger context of domestic and international events. He provides useful information on the careers of both protagonists and effectively highlights the personal antagonisms between Perón and Braden, achieving a good deal of balance in his presentation. In the last analysis, however, the work is disappointing. The story of Braden, Perón, and the Blue Book (Braden's attempt to link Perón with the Axis) is important but has been told many times before. The informed reader will find little that is new. Frank's interview with Braden is somewhat interesting, but the juicier bits are unfortunately buried in the notes.

Unlike other recent works on this period, Frank's account uses little official documentation, only four generally available items. Failure to consult U.S. State Department records on Argentine Internal Affairs in the National Archives in Washington (records containing considerable information on the Blue Book) seems particularly glaring. Finally, Frank does not place the Braden-Perón duel into the larger perspective of inter-American relations. The author concludes that Perón versus Braden was "one of the most tempestuous diplomatic duels in Inter-American history" (p. 111), but it was not the only such confrontation. What was unique about the Braden-Perón conflict, and what does that particular confrontation reveal about the role of personal diplomacy and the use of U.S. influence in Latin America?

Bryce Wood, in *The Dismantling of the Good Neighbor Policy*, views the confrontation between Braden and Perón as an important preliminary step toward the postwar return to direct U. S. interventionism in Latin American affairs. Wood focuses closely on U.S. attempts to pressure Argentina into entering World War II on the Allied side and later to prevent the election of Perón. In doing so, Wood draws heavily on British diplomatic sources to show the tripartite nature of these efforts. One of his most intriguing discoveries concerns the extraordinary efforts of Assistant Secretary of State Nelson Rockefeller in early 1945 to assure U.S. recognition of the Argentine government and the country's entrance into the United Nations. In this instance, Rockefeller bypassed official U.S. channels to communicate with Perón through a British diplomat acting as an intermediary. This episode represented personal diplomacy at its purist and was, as Wood argues, "one of the most remarkable maneuvers in the history of U.S. diplomacy" (p. 87).

The subject of U.S.-Argentine relations in the early 1940s occu-

pies over half of this volume. Other topics covered are the role of U.S. Ambassador Adolf Berle in Brazil in 1945 during the period when Getúlio Vargas was persuaded to abandon the presidency and the differing U.S. responses to revolution in Bolivia and Guatemala in the early 1950s. Wood's analysis of why these responses varied is a useful one, as is his careful scrutiny of the 1954 CIA-backed intervention in Guatemala, which signaled the definitive end of the Good Neighbor Policy.

The Dismantling of the Good Neighbor Policy is a fitting successor to Wood's earlier study on the formation and implementation of the Good Neighbor Policy.⁴ Based on painstaking research, Wood's latest book provides a wealth of detail and supporting evidence for his analysis of changing U.S. policy in the 1940s and early 1950s. Because he lets the major participants speak for themselves, the lengthy quotations occasionally produce the effect of a documentary collection without much narrative flow. But the material is presented in a lucid and comprehensive manner that makes this book an impressive addition to the history of U.S.–Latin American diplomacy in general and U.S.–British–Argentine relations in particular.

While Frank and Wood deal with the diplomatic climate surrounding Perón's election to the presidency, David Tamarin's *The Argentine Labor Movement, 1930–1945* covers the history of the most important part of the Peronist coalition prior to the election. His study is especially useful in analyzing the strengths and weaknesses of organized labor in the 1930s and early 1940s. Using the publications and papers of the Confederación General del Trabajo (CGT), Tamarin describes the ferocious infighting that raged among socialists, syndicalists, and communists for control of Argentine labor in these years. Although the general outlines of the story have been sketched before, Tamarin's study is the first effective treatment of the specifics of the struggle. The story is also well grounded in the larger political, social, and economic developments in Argentina prior to the rise of Perón. These topics are ably reviewed in the book's initial chapters.

Tamarin's analysis of how Perón captured control of Argentine labor in the period from 1943 to 1946 is less original but still effective. Entering the longstanding debate over whether Perón built his political base on the new workers drawn from the countryside to greater Buenos Aires by the industrial expansion of the period or on a combined coalition of old and new laborers, Tamarin firmly seconds the latter interpretation. He convincingly shows how Perón maneuvered to win the support of both groups: by taking clever advantage of the divisions created by the internecine struggles and resultant fragmentation of the previous years to capture control of the established unions; by enforcing by decree social legislation already on the books as well as creating new measures; and by encouraging organizations tailored to the new prole-

triat in the city and the countryside. Tamarin argues that socialist and communist failures to satisfy the demands created by their own efforts laid the groundwork for a labor movement that would be responsive to an authoritarian leader offering concrete solutions and immediate benefits. Tamarin's work expands knowledge of Argentine labor in three key areas: the general history of labor, the period preceding the appearance of Perón, and Perón's rise to power.⁵

Roger Gravil also examines the pre-Perón period in *The Anglo-Argentine Connection, 1900–1939*. Peronists argued that this connection had subordinated Argentina to a dependent semicolonial position vis-à-vis Great Britain and had largely caused the nation's economic difficulties following the Great Depression. This connection also gave Perón ample opportunities to use economic nationalism as a potent theme in developing his political base and consolidating his power.

The connection between Argentina and Great Britain spanned the years from the early nineteenth century through World War II. Great Britain's key role in the economic growth of the republic, especially in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, has been generally acknowledged. But in focusing on a shorter segment of the connection, Gravil can detail with a skeptical eye the particular features of what generally has been viewed as an informal imperial relationship.

Gravil agrees that in the late nineteenth century, "Britain's contribution to the capital formation of Argentina was enormous" (p. 19). He also notes that Great Britain provided the principal foreign market for Argentine goods and that British investors controlled certain key sectors of economic life, notably the nation's railroads. He argues nonetheless that "[t]hough Argentina is fondly believed to have been the bastion of British interests in Latin America," nationals of other countries either predominated or provided the British with stiff competition in important sectors of Argentine economic activity (p. 28). In separate chapters, Gravil analyzes the grain trade (largely controlled by German companies), the meat trade (where North American *frigoríficos* played an important role), and the British export trade to Argentina (marked, in his view, by British ineptitude and an inability to respond effectively to Argentine consumer demands). The facts presented convincingly ground Gravil's assertion that in Argentina, "investment, trade, and enterprise were far from displaying a close national correlation" and that Britain's alleged economic hegemony was weaker than it appeared (p. 28).

Two international crises, World War I and the Great Depression, gave British economic interests golden opportunities to undermine competitors and, with the aid of the British government, to achieve the dominant position that so angered Argentine nationalists. But Gravil asserts that these two episodes represented aberrations rather than the

general pattern of British-Argentine relations. From the larger picture of intense competition, particularly by Germany and the United States, he concludes that “[i]t is quite wrong to suppose that the Anglo-Argentine connection bestowed a monopoly on British capitalism” (p. 217).

Not all analysts will agree with Grivil that “[i]n general, the unassisted efforts of British capitalism in the Argentine trade appear pathetic rather than imperialistic” (p. 217). But all students of Argentine history should nevertheless consider the stimulating arguments and evidence of this important book. Grounded in extensive research, buttressed with numerous statistical tables, and logically presented in a balanced manner, *The Anglo-Argentine Connection* contains many rewards for the careful reader.

Another rewarding work is Alberto Ciria's *Política y cultura popular: la Argentina peronista, 1946–1955*. Long fascinated with Peronism, Ciria in this volume examines the first Perón regime, seeking to delineate those features that produced lasting changes in Argentina and still persist as determining factors in the nation's history. The book is divided into five chapters, each dealing with aspects of the Perón government that are often ignored.

The first chapter analyzes the ideology of Peronism and underscores the influence of military thinking and concepts on Perón's approach to politics. Ciria argues that Peronism was much closer to Latin American populism than to European fascism. The second chapter examines the role of the Argentine Congress under Perón, most notably the Chamber of Deputies. Dominated by the Peronists, this body served largely as a rubber stamp for the president. But it also provided an important forum for Radical party opposition. Ciria's review of its debates highlights characteristics of Peronist thinking and the various strains that emerged in the Peronist coalition. The third chapter describes the organization of the Peronist party as well as the fate of opposition parties during this period. Chapters four and five are the most original in analyzing the impact of Peronism on Argentine life in terms of formal educational institutions and popular culture. This survey examines Peronist textbooks and classrooms as well as Peronist themes in the theater, popular music (especially the tango), and the cinema.

Ciria concludes from his study that Perón's regime produced a kind of bloodless revolution that changed Argentine society irrevocably. He argues that certain features of the first Perón era have continued to repeat themselves in the years since 1955: “the formal democratic legalism that Perón preferred,” “the reactive character of many official measures,” certain contradictions between theory and practice obscured by myth and rhetoric, the politicization of the labor movement, and the further politicization of the armed forces. Ciria believes that Perón's first regime left the “ambiguous legacy” of a movement having many char-

acteristics of “popular democracy” but ultimately depending on a powerful authoritarian leader (pp. 319–28).

Ciria’s innovative and insightful study is based on an extensive knowledge of Argentine political history. He shows that Peronist ideology, as reflected in a number of documents and forums, must be taken more seriously than it has been in the past and that the impact of Peronism on Argentina must be measured in psychological and cultural terms as well as in political and economic terms. The work lacks some coherence, however, and its title is a bit deceiving in that the subject of popular culture per se occupies only a relatively small portion of the total work.

While the books discussed thus far deal with particular aspects and periods of Argentine history, David Rock’s *Argentina, 1516–1982: From Spanish Colonization to the Falklands War* covers the entire sweep of the country’s history. Like many previous observers, Rock seeks to analyze “what went wrong,” given the republic’s early promise and recent decline. In doing so, he rejects the approach that would blame personalities, notably Juan Perón, for the republic’s precarious state in the postwar era. Nor does Rock believe that Argentina lacked certain “essential” resources to achieve the bright future that so many had predicted. He concentrates instead on the structural factors of a society that he describes as “classically colonial,” a society that for all its apparent growth and change has remained fundamentally the same from Spanish colonization to the 1980s.

The basic features of these colonial structures, Rock posits, were securely implanted during the three centuries when the Río de la Plata region was part of the Spanish empire. Accordingly, he devotes more extensive analysis to the Spanish colonial period than is usual in recent general histories of Argentina. Rock emphasizes the development of a “colonial economy” in the interior and at the port. This economy was oriented toward exporting primary goods and importing finished products; it produced a highly stratified social order and was highly susceptible to the vagaries of external events.

The role of foreign wars and depressions in Argentine history is a recurring theme in this account. Rock skillfully traces the impact of these events on the development of the colony and republic from the colonial period to 1982. Although wars and depressions sometimes seemed to provide opportunities to reorient Argentina toward developing more autonomous economic structures, they inevitably produced instead a deepening of dependence and a recurring cycle of crisis. These events have thus emphasized the vulnerability of Argentina’s dependent economy.

The late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries are often seen as Argentina’s “golden age of growth.” The spread of public education,

massive European immigration, the emergence of Buenos Aires as "the Paris of South America," an explosion in agricultural production, expansion of the export economy, and the establishment of a stable political order together transformed Argentina into Latin America's leading country by the outbreak of World War I. But, Rock argues, these changes also produced "new structural imbalances and distortions that were to afflict its later development" (p. 119).

Argentine history in the twentieth century occupies over half of the book, with a focus on the evolving efforts to deal with the conflicts and contradictions produced by this distorted pattern of development. Rock traces in some detail the struggle to implant democratic government between 1890 and 1930. He argues that failure was virtually inevitable, given Argentina's dependent development, and concludes that democracy "fell victim to Argentina's colonial heritage" (p. 213).

The first Perón regime also receives careful scrutiny. Rock elucidates the background factors leading to the rise of Perón and assesses his years in office. Rock concludes that internal changes, notably the shift from an economy based on agriculture to one based on industry and the resultant mass internal migration, coupled with external changes revolving around World War II and emerging U.S. economic dominance, would have produced a crisis in Argentina regardless of its leader. "In sum," he observes, "Argentina was destined for crisis with or without Perón, although he deepened and intensified the crisis, making its resolution more difficult. Perón's legacy was a nation that continued to be ensnared by the same problems he had failed to surmount" (p. 319).

The sad history of economic decline, political instability, and social disintegration that have been Argentina's lot since 1955 concludes Rock's work. His epilogue argues that the last twenty or thirty years reflect a recurring pattern established in the Spanish colonial era, when periods of "upswing" featuring "growing foreign trade, complementary commercial and investment links, and relative social and political stability" were followed by "downswings" when "foreign markets were disrupted and external partnerships dissolved," producing "severe social dislocation" (p. 377).

Rock's history of Argentina has many virtues. Based on an enormous amount of secondary literature, it provides the most comprehensive and up-to-date synthesis of Argentine history yet produced. The reader is carried along by both the power of the author's prose and the compelling force of his argument. The interplay between political and economic developments, which is brilliantly analyzed, may be the major contribution of this study. Considering the scope of the undertaking, Rock has done an exceptional job of covering the totality of Argentine history with factual precision.

Not all who read this work will agree with its main theme and conclusion. Rock's emphasis on the colonial heritage and the dominating effect of economic structures seems to impose a kind of inevitability on the history of Argentina that renders human actors inconsequential. Some scholars may find the organization and argument excessively schematic, while undergraduate students may find the material on economic history difficult to absorb. But all students and scholars of Argentina will benefit from considering Rock's arguments and explanations for the complex puzzle of the republic's history.

Juan Corradi's *The Fitful Republic: Economy, Society, and Politics in Argentina* is in many ways a pocket version of Rock's larger volume. Like Rock, Corradi begins his slim book with the observation that "Argentine underdevelopment and international dependency have their roots in the colonial period, in the specific manner in which Spanish mercantilism affected the River Plate region" (p. 7). He argues that the development of latifundia and a dominant landed oligarchy in the colonial era (in contrast with the North American emergence of small, independent capitalists) irrevocably shaped the subsequent pattern of Argentine development. "Dependency and misdevelopment," he notes, "were the prices that Argentina paid for the effortless enrichment of its ruling class" (p. 16).

Corradi also agrees with Rock that the late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century "modernization" of Argentina only deepened existing internal structural ambiguities and weaknesses. The particular process of Argentine development, largely stimulated by external factors, produced "an urban, semi-industrial, service-oriented society" with a small, weak manufacturing sector and a large, but dependent, middle class. Corradi asserts that this middle class failed to develop an autonomous character or to offer any serious challenge or viable alternative to the dominant oligarchy. The principal political representative of those sectors, Hipólito Yrigoyen, "left the Argentine economy almost exactly as he had found it: dependent on the big export industries and foreign markets" (p. 36).

"Peronism," Corradi observes, "came to fill a vacuum created by the debilitation of the different social classes and the weakening of the political fabric in the previous decade" (pp. 58–59). Both the "old" and "new" working classes "were more united in the expression of their interests and in their support of Peronism than has been customarily acknowledged" (p. 52). Moreover, the crisis of October 1945 marked a major turning point in the nation's history and in the career of Perón himself, who was transformed "from a military man of fascist proclivities into a new sort of civilian politician—a democratic populist" (p. 60).

Corradi observes that after Perón was ousted in 1955, "his suc-

cessors did worse." From 1955 to 1983, Argentina "has . . . been underdeveloping at a steady pace" (p. 62). This deepening underdevelopment has exacerbated the deterioration of a society fragmented into powerful interest groups created by the special nature of Argentine growth, factions concerned more with protecting or enhancing their own well-being than with uniting for the common good. Indeed, this volume might well have been entitled *The Selfish Republic*.

The general malaise of the post-Perón era contributed to a spreading national cynicism and pessimism that profoundly affected the middle-class youth of the republic. In the 1960s and 1970s, they sought in their own version of Peronism an "armed utopia" that would dramatically alter the course of Argentina's history. Their efforts in turn produced a military-led counterrevolution that tried to turn the clock back to some imaginary and unattainable "golden age." When the military governments of the late 1970s and early 1980s "proved no more competent at running the economy than those they had berated, political dissension began to affect the ranks of the services themselves," ultimately leading to the disastrous Falklands War in 1982. The elections of October 1983, Corradi concludes, may represent "a major political change" (p. 149), but only if an "unruly, impatient society [will] grant the present democratic regime enough time to learn to muddle through" (p. 152).

Another useful general history is Eduardo Crawley's *A House Divided: Argentina, 1880–1980*. Crawley, an Argentine journalist, focuses on the period since 1955. Presumably drawing on firsthand experiences, he describes the political maneuvering and infighting that occurred in all administrations, civilian and military, after the initial overthrow of Perón. Crawley also demonstrates the continuities, especially in economic policies, that prevailed despite regime changes. He traces the emergence of rural and urban guerrilla movements in the 1960s and 1970s, linking them to the overall impact of the Cuban Revolution on Argentina. Throughout the narrative, he manages to interweave details about the life and career of Juan Perón.

A House Divided lacks the interpretative power and impressive scholarly apparatus of the Corradi and Rock histories and is also marred by certain factual inaccuracies, especially in the early chapters.⁶ Nevertheless, lay readers as well as scholars will learn from this solid, but engaging, account of twentieth-century Argentine history. Writing from the viewpoint of a "participant observer," Crawley provides a compelling portrait of a society often bitterly at war with itself.

The quantity and quality of scholarship on Argentina often reflects the ups and downs of that nation's turbulent history. The recent outpouring of new works, of which the books reviewed are only a sample, suggests that the nation is on what Rock would describe as an

“upswing” after the nightmare of the 1970s and early 1980s. While much remains to be done, the vital signs for Argentina and Argentine scholarship are more encouraging than they have been for some time. Ongoing critical examination of Argentina’s past, as represented by these works, may contribute in the future to a break with the “vicious cycles” that have afflicted so much of Argentine history.

NOTES

1. Robert A. Potash, *The Army and Politics in Argentina 1928–1945: Yrigoyen to Perón* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969); and *The Army and Politics in Argentina, 1945–1962: Perón to Frondizi* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1980).
2. See Potash, *Army and Politics, 1928–1945*, 185.
3. For example, Carlos Escudé, *Gran Bretaña, Estados Unidos y la declinación argentina, 1942–1949* (Buenos Aires: Editorial de Belgrano, 1983); R. A. Humphreys, *Latin America and the Second World War*, 2 vols. (London, 1981, 1982); Mario Rapoport, *Gran Bretaña, Estados Unidos y las clases dirigentes argentinas: 1940–1945* (Buenos Aires, 1981); and Randall Bennett Woods, *The Roosevelt Foreign-Policy Establishment and the “Good Neighbor”: The United States and Argentina, 1941–1945* (Lawrence: Regents Press of Kansas, 1979).
4. Bryce Wood, *The Making of the Good Neighbor Policy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961).
5. Some representative works in English that deal with these issues are Robert J. Alexander, *The Perón Era* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1951); Samuel L. Baily, *Labor, Nationalism, and Politics in Argentina* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1967); George I. Blanksten, *Perón’s Argentina* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953); *Prologue to Perón: Argentina in Depression and War, 1930–1943*, edited by Mark Falcoff and Ronald H. Dolkart (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1975); Joseph A. Page, *Perón: A Biography* (New York: Random House, 1983); and Arthur P. Whitaker, *The United States and Argentina* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954).
6. For example, Alfredo L. Palacios was Latin America’s first socialist deputy, not senator (p. 28); Hipólito Yrigoyen did not enjoy a majority in the Chamber of Deputies when elected in 1916 (p. 37); Roberto Ortiz was not president in 1936 (p. 64); and the election that elevated Perón to the presidency in 1946 was held on 24 February, not 26 February (p. 106).