

HITLER'S STRATEGY, 1940-1941: THE BALKAN CLUE. By *Martin L. van Creveld*. International Studies. Published for the Centre for International Studies, London School of Economics and Political Science. New York and London: Cambridge University Press, 1973. xi, 248 pp. \$13.95.

The author analyzes the strategy of Hitler toward Greece and Yugoslavia in the months after the defeat of France, on the basis of German and Italian documents, unpublished as well as published. He has made good use of German military records, and the interweaving of military and diplomatic detail is done with a care that adds to our understanding of both. On the German attempt to mediate the Italo-Greek war in December 1940 he has also drawn on newly opened English records.

Van Creveld presents some new conclusions. He demonstrates that Hitler's attitudes toward Yugoslavia and Greece were quite different: he thought of the former as part of the Balkans and of interest to Germany but considered the latter a Mediterranean country in Italy's sphere. The author is successful in explaining that Hitler gave Mussolini the green light to attack Greece and then decided to invade it when the Italians failed. He unravels the complicated problems of harnessing Bulgaria to Germany. He shows that the planned German attack on Russia was affected by the decision to occupy all of Greece, instead of only the northern part, but was *not* postponed because of the decision to occupy Yugoslavia after the March 27 coup. The postponement was caused by entirely unrelated problems in readying German divisions for the great offensive in the East.

On the broader issues of the relation of Hitler's strategy in Southeastern Europe to his Russian policy, the author is so wedded to the misconception that Hitler made his decision to attack Russia in late November 1940 that he contradicts himself. There is some discussion of the impact of Hitler's decision to increase the German army from 120 to 180 divisions two months *after* the defeat of France, but van Creveld evidently thinks the extra sixty divisions were to walk across the Mediterranean rather than to implement a July 1940 decision to attack the Soviet Union. The author assures us that in November 1940 Russia demanded for an alliance an "infinitely higher price than Hitler ever dreamt of paying" (p. 82), after acknowledging elsewhere that Hitler in 1939 instructed von Ribbentrop to offer the European part ("even as far as the Dardanelles." p. 186, n. 8) and in 1940 himself pressed the Asiatic part (p. 70) on the Russians. Some clues are found, but others are missed.

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MINORITIES UNDER COMMUNISM: NATIONALITIES AS A SOURCE OF TENSION AMONG BALKAN COMMUNIST STATES. By *Robert R. King*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1973. ix, 326 pp. \$14.00.

The subtitle of this book is more descriptive of its contents than the main title is. Dr. King, senior analyst for Rumania and Bulgaria in Radio Free Europe, is less interested in the political, cultural, and socioeconomic conditions per se of the ethnic minorities in the several Balkan Communist states than he is in ascertaining how the relations between a *Staatsvolk* and the ethnic minorities in any particular