

DEMOCRACY AND POPULISM: Some Recent Studies

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- DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA: PROMISE AND PROBLEMS.* By ROBERT WESSON. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982. Pp. 201. \$26.95.)
- THE CONTINUING STRUGGLE FOR DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA.* Edited by HOWARD J. WIARDA. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1980. Pp. 313. \$24.50.)
- AGRARIAN POPULISM AND THE MEXICAN STATE: THE STRUGGLE FOR LAND IN SONORA.* By STEVEN E. SANDERSON. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981. Pp. 310. \$22.75.)
- LATIN AMERICAN POPULISM IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE.* Edited by MICHAEL L. CONNIFF. (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1982. Pp. 248. \$9.95, paper.)
- URBAN POLITICS IN BRAZIL: THE RISE OF POPULISM, 1925-1945.* By MICHAEL L. CONNIFF. (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1981. Pp. 227. \$19.95.)

Interpretations of Latin American political systems vary widely, but overall the academic establishment has developed ever more sophisticated analytical constructs for defining political and social behavior in these countries. Over the past twenty years, two important trends have emerged in contemporary scholarship. On the one hand, social scientists have abandoned the ethnocentric framework that includes the "pathology of democracy" school and the "developmentalist" school, both of which were popular in the 1950s and 1960s.¹ On the other, Latin American scholars have defined new models for studying their countries, and these new theoretical perspectives have come to dominate the North American literature. The three principal concepts are populism, dependency, and bureaucratic-authoritarianism.²

Three of the authors under consideration in this essay are writing to confront these recent developments in research on Latin America. The two collections of essays, *Latin American Populism in Comparative Perspective* edited by Michael Conniff and *The Continuing Struggle for Democracy in Latin America* edited by Howard Wiarda, as well as the general survey by Robert Wesson, *Democracy in Latin America: Promise and Problems*, all

agree that dependency theory and bureaucratic-authoritarianism are, to a greater or lesser extent, passing fads. In his introduction, Conniff states his conviction that populism will continue to exist and “be a valuable concept for understanding twentieth-century urban politics” (p. 27). His hypothesis is based on a belief that populism is stronger, more widespread, and more representative of Latin American culture than other paradigms.

Wiarda also suggests that the bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes may be just a wave and that many Latin Americans still have a genuine desire for democracy (p. 4). Wiarda nevertheless attempts to redefine the “new realities” and to build a unique Latin American model of democracy that accommodates a variety of regimes. This new checklist for measuring democracy in Latin America is more sophisticated than Conniff’s in that it incorporates some of the recent hypotheses growing out of dependency relationships and bureaucratic-authoritarianism.

A more simplistic approach is that of Wesson, who is convinced that democracy is impractical in Latin America. He sees the evolution of the Latin American political systems as a continual swing between authoritarian-elitist systems on the one hand and populist-democratic regimes on the other (p. 185). But Wesson makes little use of the recent analytical constructs so prevalent in the growing literature on authoritarian regimes.³

The Failure of Democracy: How, What, Where, Why

Setting aside the quality of these works for the moment, all focus primarily on explaining the reasons why democracy failed in Latin America during the 1970s and 1980s. Wesson’s *Democracy in Latin America*, a country-by-country historical survey, documents the breakdown of democracy in Brazil, Peru, Bolivia, Chile, Uruguay, and Argentina; it also explains the few places where democracy has succeeded. The author asserts that as a foreign import, democracy was acceptable only as long as it was limited to a small minority (p. 15). As more and more groups were allowed to participate after the 1930s, the tenuous hold that democracy exerted began to weaken. In the case of Argentina, Wesson states that antidemocratic strains of thought have been stronger there than in other Latin American countries (p. 61). It is this historical tradition of nondemocratic leadership, according to Wesson, that explains the wide receptivity of the first Peronist era in the 1950s. Wesson provides similar explanations for the other countries where authoritarian regimes have become dominant.

After this brief overview of a series of countries, Wesson tries to define the factors that have made democracy more difficult to sustain in Latin America than in the United States and Canada. First, he points to a

series of geographical factors: poor communications, difficult climate, paucity of mineral resources, crowding on the land, and endemic diseases. Racial divisions are cited as a contributory element that has made it difficult to attain a consensus. Second, domination by outside powers has served as a deterrent to representative government. The Iberian tradition is especially at fault for creating a rigid, status-oriented society with huge gaps between rich and poor. Wesson then documents the lack of economic and cultural autonomy that accompanies the lack of complete political autonomy. The author asserts that once Latin American countries were incorporated into the U.S. hemispheric system, they lost the freedom to confront each other. This outcome in turn destroyed the moral basis of nationalism, which is a key factor in creating democratic conditions. He concludes that "subordination to external power demoralizes and stunts political development" (p. 105). Wesson also criticizes the applicability of dependency literature. He concludes, somewhat mistakenly, that American foreign investment has declined and therefore has weakened U.S. dominance in the region (p. 109).

A third factor, "the uncivic society," includes such elements as a "weakness of attachment to community and civic values," "apathy, fatalism and nonwork ethic," and similar attributes. Wesson asserts that "the traditions of machismo and the patriarchal family likewise run counter to democratic and productive values" (p. 112). He cites the importance of a strong, large, independent middle class as a basis for democracy and concludes, in a rather offhand manner, that such a breed is hard to find in Latin America.

The litany of characteristics continues as Wesson lists economic impediments to democracy such as inflation, faulty taxation systems, an expanded state role, and political obstacles such as lack of local autonomy, low levels of voter participation, and personalistic political parties. Wesson attributes the most weight, however, to the separation of rich from poor. He characterizes unequal societies as featuring the concentration of landownership in the hands of a few, economic inequality as reflected in the skewing of personal income, and racial discrimination. Polarization of income groups reinforces the strong tendency toward an elitist form of government. In other words, the hierarchical political order is translated into an authoritarian political system. In this chapter, Wesson firmly asserts that even if the masses were to vote, they would not change the structure of government.

In trying to identify the causes of a weak democratic tradition, Wesson casts his net too widely. As a result, *Democracy in Latin America* is so all-encompassing that it makes generalizations that are at best meaningless and at worst ethnocentrically prejudiced. To cite an example, Wesson states that "Latin American literature was slow to gain any sort of independence and still does not have a great deal" (p. 101). It is hard

to believe that Wesson, writing in 1982, is unaware of the Latin American literary boom and its current influence on literature worldwide. Another problem is that Wesson relies on secondary sources that are often biased in their analysis of a particular country, which in turn allows Wesson to make value judgments about leaders and systems that are poorly documented. In sum, this work is not a particularly important one. While the book is well written and contains some insights, it shows only a superficial knowledge of the region and lacks the rigorous analysis required by those defining the political evolution of Latin American society in the 1980s.

Howard Wiarda, a prolific writer whose theories are well known, addresses the issue of the "failure of democracy" from a contrasting perspective.⁴ His main thrust is to provide an analytical framework that "discover[s] an indigenous Latin American sense and meaning of democracy" (p. 7). He sees Latin America as a mix of three strains: the corporatist-authoritarian tradition, the liberal-democratic tradition, and most recently, a socialist paradigm. Politics therefore becomes a process of ongoing conflict and compromise among these three traditions. For Wiarda, the key to understanding Latin America is to abandon the democracy-dictatorship dichotomy in order to appreciate the Latin American "genius for improvisation" (p. 15). Relying on Charles Anderson's widely used interpretation of how Latin American political systems function,⁵ Wiarda builds a model that allows for the wide range of changes that occur when elections, violent revolution, or military coups alter the policy choices. In reassessing Anderson's formulation, Wiarda observes that the accommodationist politics of the past are no longer viable. As more and more new power contenders are added to the political arena, immobility sets in. Wiarda foresees the day when a new elite may emerge that will totally reject the old system and rewrite the rules of the game.

Wiarda's analysis is based on several new trends that he sees emerging in Latin America. The following summary serves as the basis of Wiarda's new paradigm for redefining democracy in Latin America. First, Wiarda identifies the recent development of socialism as both an ideology and a model for revolutionary movements. The rise of the left, together with the growing organization and mobilization of the masses, will contribute to more frustration with the increased political fragmentation and economic stagnation that are so prevalent in Latin America today. Second, the United States has declined in influence as a model society and has also lost its economic dominance. At the same time, many Latin American nations have sought to diversify their trade, nationalize U.S. companies, and move toward a nonaligned position in foreign affairs. Wiarda sees a new pragmatism developing together with new political forms that are oriented toward change and nationalism.

Democracy in Latin America is viewed by Wiarda as an evolving

concept that may take a variety of organizational forms. This redefinition attempts to incorporate such indigenous Latin American institutions or goals as: personalistic leaders, the right to rebel against unjust authority, independence from foreign dominance, respect for competing power contenders, autonomous corporate groups, and paternalism. The usual criteria for democratic growth are included but may be more limited.⁶ It is this qualifying condition that determines how countries are located on a continuum. Wiarda then proceeds to rank each country with regard to twelve variables that he has arbitrarily selected as representative of the Latin American version of democracy.

The advantage of this formula is that an element of dynamic change is incorporated into the comparative study of Latin American political systems. Regimes like that in Mexico, which is classified as a "single-party, executive-dominated government," rank high despite the fact that by U.S. measures of democracy, the Mexican regime would be ranked low. The Wiarda reformulation allows the student of politics to compare such diverse regimes as those in Cuba and Peru, both of which are categorized as "mixed and marginal."⁷ The lack of precision, however, leads Wiarda to rank Argentina and Uruguay higher than Chile. It is difficult to understand the logic behind this difference. There are several other problems with this model, but they will be addressed later in this essay.

In contrast with the creative thinking found in Wiarda's introduction, conclusion, and his study of the role of military coups, the rest of the essays do not elaborate or discuss the hypotheses set forth by the editor. Instead, they are primarily concerned with chronicling the reasons why democracy failed, why it was never appropriate for the Latin culture, or under what conditions it will return. Neale Pearson writes on the problems of labor and rural organization, Ieda Wiarda bemoans the lack of democratic population policy, and Michael Kryzanek argues that the lack of a strong opposition is a major deterrent to the success of democracy. Other authors examine the role of elites, the failure of the Alliance for Progress, the decline of the democratic left movements, leadership, bureaucracy, and human rights. None of the articles deal with substantive research; they all draw instead on a wide range of specialized studies. Although Wiarda's conclusion is suggestive for the future analysis of democracy in Latin America, no effort is made to link these hypotheses to the themes of the individual contributions. Even though all the essays were written on a common topic—the success and failure of democracy—they were apparently prepared separately. In sum, there appears to be a discrepancy between the editor's viewpoint that scholars should throw away their preconceived notions of democracy and redefine the types of political systems in Latin America and most of the other contributors, who stress the lack of traditional demo-

cratic values or the belief that Latin America is a static society resisting major social and political changes. Many view Latin America as essentially a corporatist entity where militarism and personalist leadership persist. This book admirably demonstrates the weaknesses inherent in analyzing democracy and its future in Latin America. One is left with the conclusion that it is almost impossible to agree on a common frame of reference.

Populism: A Relic of the Past?

From the 1920s through the 1960s, populist governments and leaders were one of the main forces in Latin American politics. In recent years, the rise of military technocrats and the continual challenge of revolutionary groups in Central America have led many critics to announce the demise of populism. But if Latin America is both a "living museum" and a dynamic, innovative laboratory for social change, it would be foolish to order a premature burial for populism. In countries such as Brazil that begin to liberalize their rule, the emergence or reemergence of charismatic leaders like Paulo Salim Maluf or Leonel Brizola will surely lead scholars to revive the populist label. Similarly, in countries like Ecuador or Peru, where large sectors of the population have yet to be mobilized, popular movements may flourish. Other countries, such as Argentina and Bolivia with their long histories of populist movements, now have fledgling multiclass coalitions.⁸

What needs to be done is to separate populism as an intellectual construct from populism as a recognizable style of politics in Latin America. While most populist movements or regimes came to fruition as oligarchic governments broke down under mounting social and economic pressures, scholars nevertheless disagree about which governments were populist. The problem with populism as a concept is that it was never a well-defined, coherent system.⁹ In their efforts to describe the nature of the beast, several essays under review are welcome contributions to this task. As Ronald Newton points out in his essay in the Wiarda book, from the perspective of comparative politics, populism is a useful model. It allows the Latin Americanists to integrate their analyses into a world context because populism has existed in both developed and underdeveloped countries. The major thrust of the series of case studies in Conniff's edited work, *Latin American Populism in Comparative Perspective*, is precisely that of exploring the comparisons within Latin America and between Latin America and other geographical areas. The essays, which are well integrated, chronicle the link between European socialism and the origins of populism in Latin America.

The second outstanding issue in these discussions is the need for agreement on a skeletal outline of what populism means in the Latin

American context. Paul Drake's fine article in the Conniff book goes a long way toward clarifying some of the traps and setting forth priorities for research. A primary focus should be on the structural determinants of Latin American populism and the timing of different movements. Drake identifies three periods: first, the early populism of Yrigoyen in Argentina and Alessandri in Chile; second, the classic populism of the 1930s and 1940s as exemplified by Peru's Haya de la Torre, Mexico's Cárdenas, Venezuela's Betancourt, and Argentina's Perón; and third, the late populists of the 1970s, who would include Mexico's Echeverría and Argentina's Perón. The evidence will show that populist coalitions did not follow a single path of development, nor did they evolve into a prescribed type of political system.

One of the major trends in books and articles on populism in recent years has been a series of pioneering studies on the dynamics of populist movements over several decades, the origins of populism, the role of personalist leadership, the different patterns of social differentiation and mobilization, the economic legacy of populism, and the relationship between urban or rural growth and populism.¹⁰ It is through these monographs that scholars have grappled with insights into populism. These fresh approaches have extended the analysis of populism to provide new explanations for patterns of social change and the evolution of Latin American political systems.

One such historical study, Conniff's *Urban Politics in Brazil: The Rise of Populism, 1925–1945*, defines Brazilian populism within the larger context of urban history and politics. While other authors have defined Latin American populism as part of the urbanization process, little research has been done to trace the formative years of populist movements as a distinctly urban phenomenon. Conniff asserts that the first populist movement arose in Rio de Janeiro during the 1920s as a means of extending the vote to lower- and middle-class citizens. A main thesis of his study is that populism, which had started in Rio as a way of reforming a closed political system, was eventually adopted at the national level in the 1930s under the Vargas regime. This new urban politics created the conditions for mass politics and populism. It was the strength of this movement that led to a state interventionist system with new political parties and an expanded electorate.

As the study of Latin American urban studies goes beyond a limited focus on migration patterns and marginal settlements, more attention will be placed on social stratification and the class structures of Latin American cities.¹¹ Scholars should be encouraged to go beyond studies of the charismatic populist leader to understand the complex socioeconomic conditions that gave rise to such leaders. These would include such multiple factors as patterns of industrialization in cities, shifts in urban spatial structure, the role of communications networks,

the types of linkages between labor unions and party machines, and the response of the municipal political structure to new interest groups.

Incorporation of the urban masses into the electorate was, of course, the principal achievement of such populist leaders as Haya de la Torre, Betancourt, and Perón. As Conniff points out in the introduction to his edited volume, by the 1960s, between 40 and 50 percent of the urban population was enfranchised in countries that had passed through a populist phase. But the means used to expand popular participation, the timing of these changes, and the reactions of elites varied tremendously in each country. Exploring the complexities of the tactics of both leaders and followers requires more penetrating analysis.

Whether authoritarian or democratic, populist leaders formed multiclass social coalitions aimed at gaining the support of the working classes but led by the middle or upper classes. The failure and ideological incoherence of the polyclass coalitions are frequently cited as reasons behind the demise of populist regimes. These coalitions tended to fragment, were too broadly or narrowly based, or tried to coopt existing mass organizations, especially labor unions.

In the case of Mexico, the populist alliance of the early postrevolutionary years evolved into one of the most stable one-party systems in Latin America. The lower classes, however, were skillfully coopted into the system as functional sectors of the Partido Revolucionario Institucional. Recent studies have documented the contradictory nature of Mexican populism, specifically its failure to redistribute wealth or land. Over the years, the Mexican bourgeoisie has forced the state to assume the role of capitalist promoter in a mixed economy, leaving the popular masses, especially the peasants, in a precarious state of misery. Although Lázaro Cárdenas, president from 1934 to 1940, is well known as a populist leader who sought to implement the social promises of the revolution, little has been written about the truncated efforts of Luis Echeverría to revive the populist banner during his *sexenio* (1970–76).

Steven Sanderson's book, *Agrarian Populism and the Mexican State*, traces the evolution of this process from the Porfiriato through the Echeverría government. During the postrevolutionary period, the Mexican state consolidated its legitimacy by forming a multiclass coalition composed in part of peasants and labor. The state had to balance the needs of the bourgeoisie with the demands of the workers and peasants. It was Cárdenas who actively sought to mobilize and organize the peasants through aggressive land-reform policies. Instead of bringing social justice to the countryside, the state used the promise of land as the means for effectively coopting the rural masses and neutralizing the potential for rural conflict. The agrarian problems did not go away, and by the time Echeverría came to office, the country was ready for a revival of the populist strategy.

In a series of policies aimed at expediting the long-stagnant agrarian reform, Echeverría succeeded only in exacerbating conflict. By focusing on the origins of this violence in the northern state of Sonora, Sanderson explains the evolution of a system in which agrarian reform meant favoring highly organized productive agriculture at the expense of landless peasants. The history of land-reform failures in Sonora is an excellent case in which the national state created a clever legal-bureaucratic agrarian system to stifle peasant demands. Written in 1981, Sanderson's *Agrarian Populism* provides a remarkable distillation of the impending economic crisis and decline that was to explode with the balance-of-payments problems in 1982. Furthermore, Sanderson's central themes focus on the intricate relationship between the Mexican state and the contradictions of populism, which tried unsuccessfully to achieve economic progress as well as social justice.

In the future, the pattern of fragile political coalitions that has been a constant characteristic of populist regimes must be explored from a structural perspective. A crucial factor in the fragmentation of such movements is the political uncertainty of the middle class. Although some scholars have alluded to the inevitable clash between a middle class that feels threatened and the masses that continually expand their demands, little substantive research has explored these patterns of behavior. One reason is that some writers downgrade the importance of class structure in Latin American political movements. In his introduction to the collection on populism, Conniff claims that the social integration of masses and their subsequent political participation leads to a classless electorate, a concept that "is obviously more applicable to the complex Latin American movements than to those of Russia and the United States" (p. 16). Another problem is that even when analysts do use class analysis, they tend to view the middle class as a monolithic group pitted against an ever more militant worker-peasant alliance, which is also considered as a single bloc.

More research needs to be done on the structural cleavages of Latin American societies. The types of both class division and group differentiation will determine the dynamics of political alliances. In the case of populism, more attention must be given to the complexity of middle-class factions and their level of consciousness, their demands, and their organizational weaknesses. Populist parties start out serving broad group interests, but once the pressure for economic benefits becomes intense, fractions of the middle class become conservative and will usually support military takeover. Other fractions will restructure their alliance with the masses, a situation that tends to polarize the society into mutually antagonistic sectors. The complexities of middle-class fractions must be described over time—as regimes change, as eco-

conomic stagnation accelerates, and as different sectors of the working class are mobilized.

Historically, populism in Latin America has been viewed as an alternative to socialism. During the early formative stages in Argentina, Venezuela, Peru, and Bolivia, populism was significant as an answer to the leftist alternative with its ideology of class conflict. By allowing the growth of reformist electoral alliances, the elites hoped to halt the activities of militant anarchist or communist labor unions. The programs set forth by populist leaders have almost always espoused economic development and national integration without radical structural reforms. But efforts to encourage the expansion of a mixed economy—in which a central government supports both private enterprise and a welfare society—did not lead to the desired social control and integration.

As the level of class conflict increased, the populist alternative gave way to bureaucratic military regimes. Today, as these governments are relinquishing power to civilian democracies, populism may again be hailed as a coherent response to more radical solutions. If populism arrives in the 1980s as a reaction to discredited military technocrats, it is incumbent upon the scholar to research the relationship between populism and socialism and to chronicle the historical roots of this antagonism.

Studying Latin American Politics: A Combination of Approaches

Neither the democratic nor the populist model is sufficient as an academic construct for explaining Latin American politics. Just as students of populism would do well to use Marxist analysis in their studies, so too should writers on dependency incorporate the Iberian-Latin tradition of corporatism into their model. Given the complexity of these societies and the wide variety of systems that have emerged, it is necessary to use all the theoretical language that is available. Understanding political change and the dynamics of Latin American institutions means recognizing the degree of improvisation and accommodation that is so characteristic of Latin American regimes. Similarly, it is misleading and analytically wrong to try to create a distinct model for Latin America, as is suggested by Wiarda.¹² The types of regimes—whether democratic, authoritarian, socialist, populist, or some other variant—must be examined in conjunction with the patterns of political behavior in other regions. Scholars must be encouraged to develop theories of political change that account for both similarities and differences across regions. In that way, the cultural context of the Latin American area will become another dependent variable, enabling writers to extend their grasp of Latin America's contribution to social science theory.

NOTES

1. In his concluding chapter, Wiarda summarizes these approaches in *The Continuing Struggle*, pp. 10ff. and pp. 277ff. In brief, the "pathology of democracy" school criticized the lack of democratic institutions and encouraged students to study constitutions and party systems that were meaningless in the Latin American context. The "developmentalist" school encompasses such diverse writers as Gabriel Almond, Samuel Huntington, and John Johnson. Latin American societies were supposed to progress along a continuum from traditional to modern. Traditional patterns such as personalism and military intervention in politics would disappear as the middle class grew in strength.
2. For the literature on populism, see the writings of Weffort, Alba, DiTella, and Ianni, as cited in Conniff, *Latin American Populism*, pp. 29–30. On dependency, the main Latin American sources are Cardoso and Faletto, Dos Santos, Quijano, and others as cited in *Latin America: The Struggle with Dependency and Beyond*, edited by Ronald H. Chilcote and Joel C. Edelstein (New York: Wiley and Sons, 1974); and Fernando Henrique Cardoso, "The Consumption of Dependency Theory in the United States," *LARR* 7, no. 3 (1977): 7–24. The original work on bureaucratic-authoritarianism was written by Guillermo A. O'Donnell, *Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics*, Politics of Modernization Series No. 9 (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, 1973).
3. It should be noted that there is one exception: Wesson in *Democracy in Latin America* uses the following two terms when describing different countries: "exclusionary coup" (p. 61) and "incorporating political system" (p. 7).
4. For a fuller understanding of what Wiarda considers to be a "distinct" Latin American political system, the reader should refer to the following sources: Howard J. Wiarda, "Corporatism and Development in the Iberic-Latin World: Persistent Strains and New Variations," in *The New Corporatism: Socio-Political Structures in the New World*, edited by Fredrick B. Pike and Thomas Stritch (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1974), pp. 3–33; *Politics and Social Change in Latin America: The Distinct Tradition*, edited by Howard J. Wiarda (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1974); and Howard J. Wiarda, *Corporatism and National Development in Latin America* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1980). Most recently, Wiarda has been appointed as Director of the Center for Hemispheric Studies of the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. His new essays relate more to current foreign policy issues: "The Crisis in Central America," *AEI Foreign Policy and Defense Review* 4, no. 2 (1982), and *Human Rights and U.S. Human Rights Policy: Theoretical Approaches and Some Perspectives on Latin America* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1982).
5. Charles W. Anderson, *Politics and Economic Change in Latin America* (Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1967), chap. 4.
6. Some usual features are: separate and coequal parliament and courts, local government autonomy, political parties, legal and strong opposition, regular elections, and free speech.
7. January 1978 was the cutoff date used for ranking the countries.
8. After seven and a half years of military rule, Raúl Alfonsín came to power in December 1983 as the leader of the center-left Radical Civic Union party. Although writers differ over whether the Radicals can be considered populist, Alfonsín clearly represents a multiclass coalition that promises to unite Argentines under a democratic government. In Bolivia the veteran populist Hernán Siles Zuazo led a multiparty coalition to power in October 1982. After eighteen years of nearly uninterrupted military rule, Siles Zuazo heads the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario de Izquierda, the leftist faction of the old populist movement that has dominated Bolivian politics since the 1950s.
9. David Collier, "The Bureaucratic-Authoritarian Model: Synthesis and Priorities for Future Research," in *The New Authoritarianism in Latin America*, edited by David Collier (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), p. 372.

10. In addition to the books under review, the following studies on populism should be examined by the interested reader: Steve Stein, *Populism in Peru: The Emergence of the Masses and the Politics of Social Control* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1980); Christopher Mitchell, *The Legacy of Populism in Bolivia* (New York: Praeger, 1977); A. E. Van Niekerk, *Populism and Political Development in Latin America* (Rotterdam: Rotterdam University Press, 1974); Paul W. Drake, *Socialism and Populism in Chile: 1932–52* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1978); Lars Schoultz, *The Populist Challenge: Argentine Electoral Behavior in the Postwar Era* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1983); Thomas E. Skidmore, "A Case Study in Comparative Public Policy: The Economic Dimensions of Populism in Argentina and Brazil," *The New Scholar* 7 (1979): 129–66; Instituto de Investigaciones Sociales de UNAM, *América Latina: historia de medio siglo*, 2 vols., especially the articles on Argentina, Bolivia, and Brazil (Mexico: Siglo Veintiuno, 1977); and "Populismo" in *Diccionario de política*, edited by Norberto Bobbio and Nicola Matteucci (Mexico: Siglo Veintiuno, 1982).
11. John K. Chance, "Recent Trends in Latin American Urban Studies," *LARR* 15, no. 1 (1980): 183–88.
12. Wiarda, *Politics and Social Change in Latin America*.