

he hated autocracy, liked freedom, loved the common people, and had nothing but contempt for "bourgeois Philistinism." A positivist and rationalist, he believed in progress and in a humanistic civilization which would make mankind happier and morally better. As a scholar he evaded political turmoil and did not belong to any political party.

During World War I Konchalovsky served as an artillery officer at the front. He paints a tragic picture of the decay of the army at the front in 1917 under the influence of defeatist propaganda, and the steadily growing chaos at the rear where the people endlessly "celebrated" the coming of the "new regime" but did nothing to consolidate it.

After the October Revolution Konchalovsky could not continue as a university professor of history, because he would not accept the compulsory ideology of Marxism-Leninism. He eked out a scanty living for himself and his family as a translator and teacher of foreign languages. But by remaining close to university circles he could observe and describe the gradual suppression of academic freedom at Russian universities. The atmosphere of moral and intellectual oppression created by the dominant materialism, and especially the martyrdom of confessors of the persecuted Orthodoxy, turned Konchalovsky's mind to religion and to the Orthodox Church (p. 339). During World War II he left the Soviet Union, and in 1947 came to Paris, where he died in 1952. But he did not find his beloved France as he had expected. He was disappointed and saddened by Western democracy, which in his opinion differed little from communism and was guided by the same principles of materialism and expediency (pp. 328, 332).

Such was Konchalovsky's life, and such are the essential contents of his book. It does not reveal any entirely new or unknown aspects of contemporary historical events, but it does have historical value as a testimony on a tragic period of Russian and world history, offered by a cultured and thinking witness who lived and suffered through that period.

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LENIN AND THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION. By *Harold Shukman*. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1967. 224 pp. \$5.95.

DIE RUSSISCHE REVOLUTION: HISTORISCHE PROBLEME UND PERSPEKTIVEN. By *Dietrich Geyer*. Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer Verlag, 1968. 163 pp. DM 13.80, paper.

THE KREMLIN'S HUMAN DILEMMA: RUSSIA AFTER HALF A CENTURY OF REVOLUTION. By *Maurice Hindus*. Garden City: Doubleday, 1967. x, 395 pp. \$5.95.

In many ways Professor Geyer and Harold Shukman cover the same ground—Russia from the late nineteenth century through the Revolution and Civil War—but in quite different ways. Mr. Shukman attempts "to set out the main course of the events which broadly constituted the revolutionary situation . . . in Russia during the last twenty years or so of Tsarist rule" (p. 7). The narrative of these events is concise and clear, and is notable for its critical balance. The author finds the tsarist government guilty of "an overweening propensity to govern solely through a centralised bureaucracy at a time when modernisation was synonymous

with democratisation," but he is equally critical of a political opposition which "clung to the idea of revolution, regardless of changes which may have rendered their point of view socially irrelevant" (p. 7). A similar critical balance is evident in the treatment of the complex political events of the 1905 Revolution and its aftermath, and for the events of 1917. In every case, whether the individual in question is a revolutionary socialist or a government official, he is evaluated in terms of his character, objectives, and the specific circumstances within which he acted. Thus the efforts of Witte and Stolypin to achieve a constitutional state based on law receive an unaccustomed appreciation, and the presentation of the liberals and democratic socialists of the Provisional Government (a government which "did not yet know how to stop behaving like the opposition") takes ample cognizance of the dilemma of a government faced with the alternatives of protracting an impossible war effort or of terminating it and inviting civil war (p. 196). Lenin is given his due for his genius as a revolutionary leader, but in a melancholy postscript Shukman notes that his "regime had accustomed the Russian people . . . to violence and subordination, and the habit, once acquired, would outlive more than one generation" (p. 202).

Professor Geyer has written a brief interpretive essay on the Russian Revolution, its origins and meaning. The context is much broader, because the author makes use of a wide range of insights based on Russian and European intellectual and cultural history. Moreover, the interpretive comments on Bolshevism provide more background in the history of German Marxist thought than Shukman's book does. The study concentrates on the period of World War I and the Revolution, and provides an excellent brief survey and analysis of that crucial period of Russian history. It concludes with a thoughtful essay entitled "Die Russische Revolution als zeitgeschichtliches Problem." Geyer notes that past historical interpretations have tended to stress the "horizontal" extension of the influence of European institutions and ideas in modern history. This was valid, to a considerable degree, for the era of "bourgeois-democratic emancipation and capitalist rationalization in the countries bordering Europe" (p. 140). But this era of change was succeeded by the era of the revolutionary ideologue, the *Denkmuster* revolutionary, whose ideas came out of socialist, especially Marxist thought, but were more subject to the influence of national traditions, both intellectual and cultural, than were the more cosmopolitan revolutionary trends of an earlier era. The heterogeneous "vertical" influences of varied national environments and nationalist movements upon the forces of revolutionary change underlie the fragmentation of contemporary revolutionary movements and explain the rapid disintegration of the bipolar power structure of the postwar era. Nationalism thus continues to play a powerful role.

Maurice Hindus brings to his task over forty years of reportage on Soviet life, and an intimate knowledge of the country and its peoples. The result is a remarkable panorama of Soviet life—the city, the village, the economy, and the social classes and the plight of dissident intellectuals, the national minorities, and religious believers. The book's title is a faithful representation of its chief concern—the experiences and hopes of a greatly varied human population under Soviet rule. Hindus is ever mindful of the material and cultural achievements of the Soviet government, but he is equally attentive to the manifold ways in which a dogmatic political ideology has combined with an enormously centralized power structure to create impossible dilemmas for those whose aspirations or cultural traditions are in conflict with the system. Because the book is informative and stimulating on so many themes

(the complex problems of agriculture, problems created by information manipulation, the Soviet official view of the West, Russification of minorities), it can be strongly recommended both to specialists and to the general reader.

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FOUNDATIONS OF A PLANNED ECONOMY, 1926–1929. Volume 1, in two parts. A HISTORY OF SOVIET RUSSIA. By *Edward Hallett Carr* and *R. W. Davies*. New York: Macmillan, 1971 [London, 1969]. Part 1: pp. xv, 1–452. Part 2: pp. 453–1023. \$12.50 each.

These two volumes represent the first half of the final series in Professor Carr's mammoth history of Soviet Russia from the Revolution to 1929. Here (for the first time with the aid of a coauthor, the economist R. W. Davies of the University of Birmingham) Carr covers in exhaustive detail the economic institutions and development of the USSR during the three years just before the initiation of the First Five-Year Plan. Subsequent volumes, dealing with political history and foreign relations in this period, will bring the entire series to a close.

As it has progressed, Carr's work has become more encyclopedic than historical. It avoids all reference to secondary sources and to the issues of interpretation that have long characterized the study of Soviet history. The organization of the work into topical studies within a succession of very short time spans facilitates the presentation of exhaustive detail on legal and institutional arrangements, but at the cost of pulling apart the overall contemporary context and the interrelationship of events. "The Economic Order" is examined in the present two volumes in highly informative though narrowly defined sections dealing with agriculture, industry, labor, trade and distribution, finance, and planning. On the other hand, political influences on the economic order—especially the factional struggles raging in this period—are barely mentioned in passing, and are rarely considered as decisive factors. Even among the sections on the economy some important interconnections are not made. For instance, such matters as the industrial productivity drive and the rising accident rate are discussed in some detail, but in different chapters, and the question of a causal relationship is never asked.

The Carr-Davies work is most useful in its descriptions of specific institutions: in agriculture, the details of land tenure, the development of the cooperatives, and the early kolkhoz arrangements; in industry, the shifting relationships among ministries, syndicates, and trusts; the status of private enterprise and the treatment of managerial specialists; and the myriad of competing proposals and conflicting agency involvements that lay behind the ultimate formulation of the First Five-Year Plan. In their dedication to detail Carr and Davies have implicitly underscored the complexity that was Soviet society even in its relatively "backward" state in the 1920s, as well as the momentum with which a web of institutions and problems can carry the leadership along (as Richard Neustadt has demonstrated concerning the U.S. government), regardless of the ideological simplicities that may be fired back and forth at the surface level of politics.

In this connection the Carr-Davies material on economic planning brings out the crucial institutional factor in the genesis of economic planning—the competition between Gosplan, which was relatively conservative and scientifically oriented, and