

MOSKAU—BONN: DIE BEZIEHUNGEN ZWISCHEN DER SOWJETUNION UND DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND 1955–1973, DOKUMENTATION, 2 vols. Edited and with an introduction by *Boris Meissner*. Volume 3, parts 1 and 2 of *Dokumente zur Aussenpolitik*. Cologne: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1975. Part 1: 733 pp. Part 2: 953 pp. (pp. 743–1695). DM 165 for 2 vols.

These two volumes encompass a comprehensive collection of documents on the relationship between the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic of Germany from 1955 to 1973. The first volume covers the period from the establishment of diplomatic relations between Moscow and Bonn in 1955 through the ratification of the treaties concluded under the aegis of Brandt and Brezhnev, terminating in the diplomatic exchanges which attended the Soviet leader's visit to Bonn in May 1973. Featured are the full texts of all the notes, memorandums, and other official statements that passed between the two sides over an eighteen-year period. To augment these materials, the editor, Boris Meissner, has also included excerpts from governmental declarations, press interviews, and position papers from the opposition. The entire offering of primary source materials treats not only political relations but also economic, commercial, and cultural ties.

The collection should be especially welcomed by scholars who believe, with George F. Kennan, that proper diplomatic history can only be written on the basis of the closest scrutiny of all the available documents, down to the very last *aide-mémoire*. Yet, no matter how comprehensive their coverage of the *bilateral* Soviet-West German relationship, these two volumes cannot be said to constitute a sufficient basis for any definitive diplomatic history. Relations between Moscow and Bonn have to be studied in their *multilateral* setting. This entails, as Meissner himself notes, examination of Soviet-East German relations and consideration of the domestic sociopolitical foundations of the Soviet-German relationship. It should also dictate attention to West Germany's evolving role in the Atlantic Alliance, with particular emphasis on Bonn's steadfast but changing relationship with Washington.

The documentary sources aside, virtually all the foregoing dimensions are commented upon in Meissner's splendid introductions to each of the volumes. He is especially good in pointing up the many nuances manifested by Soviet policy throughout the entire period. Nowhere is Meissner more tantalizing, however, than in the hints he drops to the effect that Khrushchev's 1958 "ultimatum" on Berlin may have constituted the first move toward a negotiated settlement of the entire German question, involving concessions on both sides. Willy-nilly one is reminded of Ulam's unconventional analysis of Khrushchev's designs in installing missiles in Cuba. Both Ulam's interpretation of the Cuban missile crisis and the one tentatively broached by Meissner with respect to the Berlin crisis suggest the need for a fresh look at Nikita Sergeevich as a global strategist. As for the state of Soviet-German relations in 1973, Meissner is correct in ascribing their "ambivalent character" to Moscow's malaise over West Germany's pursuit of a "special relationship" with East Germany and Moscow's discomfiture at Bonn's continued commitment to the "right of self-determination" for the German people as a whole. As Meissner sees it, the strategic reorientation wrought by Brandt's *Ostpolitik* to accommodate Soviet security concerns has yet to be reciprocated on the Soviet side in regard to German national interests. Nonetheless, Meissner does not at all rule out the possibility of such a Soviet strategic reorientation in the future, as the result of an "evolution in the Soviet Union" that may come to "accord primacy to internal renewal over the external deployment of power." Unfortunately,

the documents so painstakingly collected by Meissner and so nicely presented in these two handsomely printed volumes do not offer any great hope for the eventual outcome their editor so ardently desires.

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CHALLENGERS TO CAPITALISM: MARX, LENIN, AND MAO. By *John G. Gurley*. San Francisco: San Francisco Book Company, 1976. xii, 175 pp. Illus. \$3.95, paper.

This is a curious work. It is characterized on the cover as "a nonpolemical examination of three giants of Marxism," but it would be more accurate to describe it as an uncritical summary of what the author takes to be the central ideas of Marx, Lenin, and Mao, based as much on clues from selected secondary sources as on the writings of his central figures. Although it is an elementary exposition, one expects the author, if only for pedagogical purposes, at least to mention, if not to meet, obvious difficulties which his own text suggests. This he fails to do. His opening sentence, "Marxism and capitalism are now engaged in an intense world struggle," would have puzzled Marx, and will surprise any scholar who can distinguish between a social system and a set of ideas. And if by "Marxism" is meant a movement or a state, Dr. Gurley's account makes inexplicable the struggle which has on occasion led to military clashes between "Marxist" Russia and "Marxist" China. Nor is the bearing of this rift or of phenomena like the line-up of nations during the Second World War—in which societies with a capitalist mode of production joined a society with a socialist mode of production in order to destroy other capitalist societies instead of making common cause with them—explored to test the Marxist theory of war or the Leninist theory of imperialism, both of which the author accepts.

If anything is clear in Marx's writings, it is his view that socialism will come only when the objective material conditions are ripe for it in the highly industrialized West. His theory of historical materialism requires this to be so—changes in the economic foundations determine the political and ideological superstructure. On the face of it, then, does not the seizure of power to build socialism by Lenin and Mao under the banner of Marxism in the most backward areas of the world constitute an empirical refutation of historical materialism? And if not, why not? Even if one were to deny that socialism currently exists in Russia or China, in view of the world-shaking consequences of the events in those countries, how can one account for the attempt to achieve the historically impossible? Does this not show the primacy of political factors in our time? Gurley ignores these questions, although he does admit that both Lenin and Mao first seized political power and then proceeded to build the economic foundations under it—something that Marx declared could not be done and therefore should not be attempted. Judging by how he uses the term in other contexts, Gurley would probably call the situation "dialectical," which is an easy way of refusing to take responsibility for a contradiction or inconsistency in what we say about things or theories.

Gurley's account of the development of socialist societies becomes more confusing—or shall we say "dialectical"—when he discusses the economies of the Soviet Union and Communist China. After Lenin's death and in consequence of it, capitalism "of a new kind" was established in Russia, largely as a result of "Stalin's policy of over-stressing growth of the productive forces thereby postponing real (as opposed to superficial, juridical) socialist transformations of the relations of production."