

The man responsible for bringing this superb source to print is Andrija Radenić of the Historical Institute in Belgrade. Radenić has annotated the text with enormous erudition. In over one hundred and fifty pages of small print, he summarizes and sometimes even reprints the diplomatic dispatches that correspond to Kallay's almost daily entries, and comments extensively on the development of Serbian politics. These remarks and notes are a gold mine of scholarly information.

Although Radenić has never written the synthesis of Serbian history from 1858 to 1903 of which he is capable, he has made a considerable contribution to Serbian history by publishing documentary collections and specialized articles. Some of the most important of these articles have now been republished, including a lengthy study of the offbeat radical, Dragiša Stanojević, a sensible review of Svetozar Marković's career, and a detailed history of Serbia's first newspaper. Most intriguing, however, are his articles on uprisings and revolts in Serbia, particularly the lengthy investigation of the Timok Uprising of 1883, published here for the first time. Radenić shows that although the leaders of the Radical Party, including Nikola Pašić, were not directly involved in the outbreak of this revolt, they did create an atmosphere in which it could occur. Above all, however, and this was true also of the Topola Revolt of 1877 which led to the hanging of Jeverm Marković, Svetozar's brother, the villains were the state officials, whose arrogance toward the peasantry and eagerness to please Prince Milan pushed them to extremes of bad judgment. Radenić concludes that the first half of the nineteenth century saw true peasant uprisings in Serbia, elemental outbursts that produced their own leaders. Although uprisings after 1858 had spontaneous roots in peasant poverty, isolation, and protest, they were led by urban parties using ideas imported from bourgeois Europe. By the 1890s even these peasant revolts ended, as Serbia more and more closely approximated a developed polity.

Radenić's work, like that of Benjamin Kallay, is thorough, detailed, and professional. Anyone who has an interest in nineteenth-century Serbia needs to know it well.

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VANJSKA POLITIKA JUGOSLOVENSKE DRŽAVE 1918–1941: DIPLOMATSKO-HISTORIJSKI PREGLED. By *Bogdan Krizman*. Zagreb: Školska knjiga, 1975. 200 pp.

This brief but meaty survey of Yugoslav foreign policy in the interwar period is more in the nature of a textbook than a scholarly monograph, but is nonetheless authoritative despite the absence of footnotes to back up every point. Its virtue is that it draws on a great body of research done by Yugoslav historians, including Krizman himself, that has appeared in many scattered periodicals. Bibliographical notes at the end of each chapter give evidence of the wealth of this material, and a critical essay reviews general Yugoslav historical works covering the period.

The book falls naturally into two parts on each side of 1934, the year of King Alexander's assassination. In the first part, Krizman shows how thoroughly Alexander himself dominated foreign policy, and in the latter period it is evident that Prince Paul was no mere dilettante and that he, not his ministers, had the central role. Incidentally, there is no indication that Krizman had access to Paul's papers, which are outside Yugoslavia. Much of the book is concerned with diplomatic visits, conferences, and treaties (including a useful documentary appendix), but this is far more than a plodding history of diplomatic events. The author, who is obviously fascinated by his subject, seeks out the key questions and decisions and takes account of the personalities of the

leading actors. On most subjects it is possible to write objective history in Yugoslavia today and Krizman does so, without following an ideological line. But one senses his satisfaction in recording how much at home Alexander, Paul, and the bourgeois politicians were in dealing with the Fascist powers and how badly, in some respects, they served the interests of their country. Throughout the volume, and especially where he digs more deeply—as into Alexander's secret talks with Italy, the question of recognition of the USSR, the attempt to maintain neutrality, and finally the road to the signing of the Tripartite Pact—Krizman makes use of the voluminous published documents on the policies of the Great Powers to complement the Yugoslav side of the story.

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YUGOSLAVIA AFTER TITO. By *Andrew Borowiec*. New York and London: Praeger Publishers, 1977. xii, 123 pp.

The Cold War has not died; it has been resurrected in the pages of Borowiec's confused diatribe against "Titoism." His one hundred and nine pages of sweeping and unfounded generalizations, gross simplifications, scare tactics, misquotes, and yellow press journalistic methods carry on a tradition that should gratify the nostalgic urges of those Western political commentators who yearn for that simpler time. The basic theme of the book is that in Yugoslavia there exists a high probability of violence and Soviet interference following Tito's death, and that Yugoslavia must align itself more closely with the West in order to forestall this eventuality. The theme itself may be legitimate, but the author's unrestrained rhetoric and poor standards of argumentation make critical and scholarly review very difficult.

Although *Yugoslavia After Tito* is being marketed as a scholarly text, it offers very little new information about current political affairs in that country. The book seems to be oriented more toward the general population with its limited sources of information. In terms of its premises, assumptions, outlook, and conclusions, Borowiec's work reinforces the opinion of some Western security and military organizations: namely, that nonalignment is impossible and that Yugoslavia's sole salvation from the Soviet Union's deadly embrace entails closer cooperation, if not alignment, with the Western powers. It is certainly not an unbiased, objective treatment of the subject; if anything, *Yugoslavia After Tito* lays a foundation for justifying Western preemptive action in the eventuality of instability following Tito's death.

Although Borowiec uses precious few sources and has a pitifully small bibliography, he still manages to misquote or misinterpret these sources. For example, as a result of the author's convoluted reasoning and misinterpretation, Dr. Najdan Pašić, a mild-mannered Yugoslav professor whose aggressive instincts are limited solely to the chessboard, becomes a supporter of repressive action to solve the nationality crisis (p. 13). Through sloppy writing, Professor Gary Bertsch is quoted as if he were a spokesman for the Yugoslav regime (p. 28).

*Yugoslavia After Tito* presents some sweeping general statements with strong policy implications that are unsubstantiated by any data. Borowiec states, for example, that the Cominform organization may have as many as 200,000 members and that there "are some 3,000 anti-Tito exiles in the Soviet Union." The author's analysis of self-management is limited to ridiculing the amount of time spent in meetings, and the League of Communists is dismissed as a group of opportunists. He also claims, without evidence, that the hope of Yugoslavia resides in the army since it is not "shackled by the constraints of self-management" (p. 91), that the security forces "have been keeping