

argue that Marxist-Leninist ideology is largely rhetoric, and (3) those who believe Soviet policy to be a balance between the two. Disagreements within the individual schools of thought are not uncommon.

Borys Lewytzkij, a prolific writer on Soviet politics residing in Munich, belongs to the first group. From the questions that he poses and from the way he does so, one may easily draw conclusions without waiting for answers. Yet it would be unjust to dismiss Lewytzkij's study merely because answers may be readily anticipated.

In his attempt to get at the foundation of the Soviet policy of détente the author relies almost exclusively on Soviet sources. But in contrast to many Kremlinologists he does not limit his attempt to an analysis of détente from the political perspective alone. Instead, he looks at it from domains as far afield as the military, the economic-industrial complex, and the cultural. His conclusion: Underlying the Soviet policy of détente is a coherently constructed political concept to which all other domains are reducible.

Central in this context is the belief on the part of the Soviet leadership that the Soviet Union, in accordance with Marxist-Leninist principles, is an integral part of the historical process and the future thus belongs to it. The foremost threat to the forward march of history is posed by nuclear weapons. Hence every effort must be made to avoid a nuclear holocaust.

Lewytzkij points out that the Soviet leadership, in order to achieve its historical destiny, has in recent years opted for a total "restructuring of international relations" (p. 64). From the perspective of the Kremlin, this entails a political shift of the emphasis of the class struggle away from relations among states. Stabilizing such relations through ever-growing cooperation in politics, economics, technology, and culture, however, does not in the least imply defusing of the class struggle. On the contrary, the Soviet leadership believes, according to the sources Lewytzkij introduces, that contradictions in capitalist states will intensify this struggle and this, in turn, will further exacerbate rivalries between capitalist states. The Soviet Union, obviously, will reap the benefits.

Although one learns little that is new, Lewytzkij's study is a sobering reminder that Moscow and Washington continue to operate on entirely different political wavelengths, despite the convergence of interest in avoiding a nuclear holocaust.

The slim SALT II monograph handsomely complements Lewytzkij's study. In contrast to the Soviet Union, the United States, according to the authors, lacks a "consensus . . . on the interests and goals of American foreign policy" (p. 38). On the question of détente specifically, the authors state that the United States has "viewed détente as a means toward a more peaceful world" (p. 33), whereas Moscow sees it as "an instrument of Soviet foreign policy that is designed not to stabilize the global strategic balance . . . but rather to accelerate the whittling down of American power and influence" (p. 3). Given this assessment, the authors insist that the "United States [must not] pursue arms control negotiations as an end in themselves" "but must aim at the evolution of a Soviet-American military relationship that is compatible with U.S. national security interests" (p. 39). Perhaps beyond the scope of this monograph, it, nevertheless, would have been helpful to find out precisely what these interests are.

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KISSINGER: THE EUROPEAN MIND IN AMERICAN POLICY. By *Bruce Mazlish*. New York: Basic Books, 1976. xiv, 330 pp. Photographs. \$10.95.

At the present time, when the issue of human rights has been placed into the center of American foreign policy, the reader will expect from a book with the subtitle "The

European Mind in American Policy" a discussion of the contrast between the Machiavellian and the moralistic approach in foreign affairs and an evaluation of the reciprocal advantages and disadvantages. But Mr. Mazlish's book, which appeared last year, was written before the new emphasis of American statesmen on human rights had emerged. The main theme of the book is not so much insistence on differences between American and European attitudes in diplomacy but an attempt to show how in Kissinger's case the experiences of growing up in Europe and in exclusively Jewish surroundings in New York, and then the impact of the army and of Harvard, were joined to a very personal political philosophy in thought and action. Here again the time of the composition of the book beclouds the presentation of the issue. Mazlish's book was written when Kissinger was in power and when his prestige, if not at its full height, was still very great. According to Mazlish, Kissinger is for the American people a "culture hero" and the question of how this could happen and to what extent it required that European basic attitudes had to be transformed by the American social milieu is the issue which the author is most anxious to analyze and clarify. But the view that Kissinger, in the minds of a large number of Americans, had the status of a culture hero seems now a most questionable proposition. Frankly, Mazlish's book raises questions that are of doubtful relevance and he does not enter upon discussions which would have been worthwhile.

Nevertheless, the book contains much interesting material on the development of Kissinger's ideas and career. There emerges in the volume a certain pattern of Kissinger's successes and difficulties, first in his academic career at Harvard and the Council of Foreign Relations and then in his political career in Washington. Kissinger has always had patrons who first use his talents and then gradually become dependent on him; and his ambition, combined with an obstinate concentration on what to him seems interesting and important, also always creates enemies.

Mr. Mazlish is a psychohistorian and, although I find his psychological interpretations frequently far-fetched, I think he is right when he suggests that in Kissinger's rather arrogant and patronizing attitude toward Europe is an instinctive feeling "that, as a part-European, he automatically knows how Europeans think and feel" mixed with pride of no longer belonging to Europe but to a country stronger than Europe. Mr. Mazlish suggests that Kissinger, as a man who had to make his way with a certain ruthlessness, has a "dislike for the weak."

Mr. Mazlish also offers an explanation for the strange phenomenon which has astounded many people: that his young years in Nazi Germany and the destruction of the Jews by the Nazis seem to have left few traces in Kissinger's mind. Mr. Mazlish's explanation is that a "displacement" has taken place: hostility toward the Nazis and the trembling accompanying the extinction of the Jews has been displaced by anti-communism and fear of possible nuclear destruction of human life.

According to Mazlish, the main conclusion which Kissinger drew from the Nazi experience was the need for order and stability. Thus, his anticommunism was not contradictory to his policy of détente with Russia. Kissinger distinguishes sharply between great and small powers. Great powers are needed as partners for the establishment of a stable world order. Out of these concerns arose Kissinger's advocacy of the primacy of foreign policy and of noninterference in the internal affairs of great powers.

I doubt that it is very fruitful to give a psychological explanation of such a policy. The contrast between a moralistic and a realistic American foreign policy has existed since the founding of the Republic: for example, the struggle between Hamilton and Jefferson; and in our time Wilson's democratic idealism was followed by Roosevelt's emphasis on national security. It seems likely that in future years Kissinger will

appear more as an outstanding representative of the realistic tradition in American foreign policy than as a "European mind in American policy."

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SOVIET-CHINESE RELATIONS, 1945-1970. By O. B. Borisov and B. T. Koloskov. Edited and with an introduction by Vladimir Petrov. Bloomington and London: Indiana University Press, 1975. xviii, 364 pp. \$12.50.

In recent years the Soviet leadership has been trying in various ways, and with some success, to get its position on the Sino-Soviet dispute before the educated American public. The volume under review is at least objectively helpful to that effort. It is an abbreviated translation of a book by two pseudonymous Soviet China watchers, allegedly compiled in part from official sources not previously drawn on in a published work. (All the notes refer to previously published material.) It was presumably intended in the first instance for the Soviet public, and it is almost pure propaganda.

Throughout the book, the Soviet Union is purported, without examination and certainly without proof, to have acted from pure and selfless motives in its policy toward China, as well as, presumably, in every other respect. For this, the Soviet Union is said to have been repaid by Mao and his colleagues with perverse, nationalistic, anti-Soviet behavior. That the Soviets could ever have done anything wrong, or the Chinese anything right, does not appear to have entered the authors' heads, or if so then this dangerous thought has been rigorously prevented from passing through their typewriters.

It might reasonably be asked whether the book, granted its essentially propagandistic nature, nevertheless does contain new material, at least on the Soviet side of the Sino-Soviet dispute. The answer is yes, but not very much. Information, whether accurate or not, that has not been previously published in the Soviet Union is indicated by the editor with daggers, which appear on pages 98, 99, 118, 119, 120, 122, 157, 158, 175, 181, 210, 224, 239, 240, 267, 270, and 273. None of it is particularly surprising.

The authors' glowing version of the Soviet economic and technical assistance program in China during the 1950s needs to be balanced by a reading of the more objective account of one of the participants in it (Mikhail Klochko, *Soviet Scientist in Red China*). The ideological and political differences that emerged between Moscow and Peking after the mid-1950s have been analyzed much better by Western specialists, notably Donald S. Zagoria (*The Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956-1961*). The border crisis of 1969 is plausibly attributed to a Chinese initiative, but nothing is said of the ensuing retaliatory bullying of China by its obviously stronger Soviet adversary.

The American edition of Borisov and Koloskov's book includes a foreword and an introduction by Professor Vladimir Petrov. In the foreword he concedes that the book is polemical and onesided and, apart from its more or less "inside" character, suggests no specific reason why it is sufficiently important to warrant an American edition. In the introduction he discusses the general principles of relations among Communist states and Stalin's foreign policy down to 1950, including his policy toward China, in a clear and competent fashion. He draws heavily, however, on the Yanan diary of the TASS correspondent P. Vladimirov (*China's Special Area, 1942-1945*), whose authenticity and accuracy are highly suspect.

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