

LETTERS

TO THE EDITOR:

In your September, 1963, issue Professor Liliana Archibald complains: "Albert Parry scolds me for not having used the 1958 edition of Vasili Kliuchevsky's *Peter the Great* for my translation. Since Professor Parry devotes nearly half his review (March, 1963) to this point, I feel that I should say that had he read the foreword he would have seen that I had finished translating in 1957. It must therefore be obvious that the 1958 edition was not yet available."

But did she read my review carefully enough? I wrote: "The Soviet editors' comment and footnotes appended to the 1958 book would have been an interesting addition to Professor Archibald's translation, since they so clearly reveal the dichotomy in the latter-day Moscow attitude toward Kliuchevsky and his subject."

Of course I knew that she finished her translation of the Soviet edition of 1937 in 1957 when the 1958 edition was not as yet available. But the 1958 edition was available by 1959 when her 1957 translation was printed. Surely the addition about which I wrote could have been made in her text between the time her translation was done (1957) and the time it went to press (1959).

ALBERT PARRY
Colgate University

TO THE EDITOR:

I should like to raise a question relating to the discussion of Professors Sugar, Kohn, and Fischer-Galati on "The Nature of the Non-Germanic Societies under Habsburg Rule" in the March, 1963, issue. As the fourth point of his comment on Professor Sugar's analysis, Professor Kohn (p. 41) asserts that Austria-Hungary should have pursued a neutralist foreign policy. Here I feel his otherwise valid analysis and equally valid analogy to Switzerland breaks down. How could such a policy have been pursued in view of Russian expansionism in the Balkans? It was a combination of Russian ambitions in the Balkans and Austro-Hungarian fears concerning those ambitions that explains so much of the seemingly turgid Habsburg foreign policy of the post-*Ausgleich* period. No great power had designs on territory claimed by Switzerland; not even the wildest of Italian irredentists had a plan to "liberate" the Ticino, for example. But the Russian menace was a real one, and in the minds of public men in Vienna and Budapest it loomed large—perhaps even larger than it really was, but it is men's impressions of situations, at least as much as the actual situations, that galvanize them into action.

This brings us to Professor Kohn's further assertion that the occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1878 was "a step in the wrong direction." Professor Sugar, in his reply, states (p. 44) that Bosnia-Herzegovina determined Habsburg foreign policy for forty years, adding that the Magyars accepted the occupation as the lesser of two evils. The latter part of that statement is undeniably true, but the first part places the cart before the horse. Gyula Andrassy and other Magyar leaders were motivated by antipathy toward