

objectivity—proof that Hungarian Marxist historiography has adopted the eclectic approach and come of age.

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CRIME AND COMPROMISE: JANOS KADAR AND THE POLITICS OF HUNGARY SINCE REVOLUTION. By *William Shawcross*. New York: E. P. Dutton, 1974. 311 pp. \$10.00.

The author of this well-written book is on the staff of the *London Sunday Times*, and collected his material during trips to Central and Eastern Europe in 1970–72. In addition to interviews in Hungary, he consulted Hungarians living abroad. He used the library of Radio Free Europe, together with some other source materials. Although the book does not have a topically well-organized structure, the content reflects Kadar's life, his policies, and the conditions he created in Hungary. Consequences of the New Economic Mechanism (NEM) are especially well evaluated. In general, Shawcross characterizes vividly and in some detail the political and socioeconomic conditions in Hungary during recent years.

The book does have some shortcomings, particularly in the lack of a systematic examination of the political setting in which Kadar emerged in postwar Hungary. In this perspective, the first important event (almost entirely ignored by the author) was the astounding defeat of the Communist Party in the elections of 1945, an event not yet forgotten in Moscow, Budapest, or the Hungarian countryside. Eleven years later the Hungarian people enjoyed freedom for a few days as a result of a seemingly successful revolution. Shawcross writes very little about the years of terror which followed 1956, when the hostility of the Hungarian people toward the Russians was counterbalanced by the feeling of complete abandonment by the West. (The United Nations resolutions had little effect on conditions in Hungary.)

The catchy title, *Crime and Compromise*, and the narrative oversimplify the psychology of developments. The situation in Hungary is the result of a tripartite compromise. Events of the last thirty years have shown the Hungarian public that electoral victory and bloody revolution are inconsequential. During the past fifteen years, the Hungarian people have appreciated relative stability, improved living conditions, and limited freedom. Kadar, in turn, has realized that, to obtain popular support, he has to liberalize political, social, and economic conditions. Because Moscow's approval is needed for reforms, he has had to convince the Kremlin that relaxed rules will make the Communist regime in Hungary more effective and also will strengthen East European communism. This compromise—tacitly accepted by the Kremlin, the Kadar government, and the Hungarian people—has made possible more relaxed conditions of life. From Moscow's point of view, political reliability remains the determining factor. As long as Kadar supports Soviet foreign policy and sticks to the Muscovite ideological line, controlled liberalization may survive in Hungary.

Although the author is a skilled journalist and a perceptive observer of the Hungarian scene, the narrative clearly demonstrates the difficulties which confront the writer of contemporary history about a Russian-occupied Communist country. Several versions of most episodes of Kadar's checkered life have been in circulation for many years but little verification is possible in such matters. Hearsay is not a

reliable source but in many instances documentary evidence is not available.

Since Kadar's life and actions are full of contradictions, a real answer to the title of the book, "Crime and Compromise," could come only from Kadar himself. Shawcross quotes Kadar's outburst in front of the Soviet ambassador, Iurii Andropov, on November 1, 1956: "I am a Hungarian and I will fight your tanks with my bare hands if necessary." A few days later Kadar reappeared as the head of the new Moscow-sponsored government. There are several plausible explanations for his change of heart but the authentic version is not known. The same can be said of other important aspects of Kadar's life. Only he could explain some of his actions as minister of the interior, especially in the Rajk affair, or his own Stalinist trial and experiences in prison. He could clarify his role in the execution of Imre Nagy and the cruelties following the revolution, when the Soviet army was the real master of the country. How he obtained the blessing of the Kremlin for his economic reforms and other liberalizing measures would make fascinating reading. Hopefully he will write or dictate his memoirs as Khrushchev did. Until Kadar's memoirs appear, however, Shawcross's book will remain a useful account of how Kadar's accomplishments appear to a keen British observer.

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A SZOCIALISTA GAZDASÁG FEJLŐDÉSE MAGYARORSZÁGON. 1945–1968. By *Iván T. Berend*. Budapest: Kossuth Könyvkiadó and Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó, 1974. 237 pp. 42 Ft.

A MAGYAR GAZDASÁG SZÁZ ÉVE. By *Iván T. Berend* and *György Ránki*. Budapest: Kossuth Könyvkiadó and Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó, 1972. 329 pp. 24 Ft., paper.

HUNGARY: A CENTURY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. By *I. T. Berend* and *G. Ránki*. Translated by *Richard Allen*. National Economic Histories Series. Newton Abbot, Devon, England: David & Charles. New York: Barnes & Noble Books, a division of Harper & Row, 1974. 263 pp. £5.75.

The first of these books—Professor Berend's monograph on postwar Hungary's economy—might strike an untutored reader as doctrinaire. It shows little objectivity toward, for example, the Smallholder Party of 1944–48 or the "counter-revolutionaries" of 1956. Yet this monograph will delight the knowledgeable reader. It is historiographically important as the first economic history of Communist Hungary to derive primarily and directly from archival materials; as the first to recognize the continuity of socioeconomic problems and policies from Old Hungary through the revolution of 1945–61 to the present; and as the first to apply comprehensively the methods of modern sociology to the Hungary of today. The book is also an important historical document—it was written in 1968 and represents the historical perspective which led Kadarist reformers to introduce the New Economic Mechanism (and it contains an appendix assessing the first five years of the NEM).

Even the uninitiated reader will recognize the significance of the second book under review (the third volume is a translation of the second). Professors Berend and Ránki describe the emergence in Hungary of not only industrialism and