

SCHOLARLY CONTROVERSY

Women, Work, and Citizenship

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Women have achieved citizenship in Great Britain, France, Germany, and the United States in this century. Yet, the rights and responsibilities included in women's citizenship have varied. They have been acquired at different moments in time, in different sequences, and with different outcomes. How can we explain this variation? Under what conditions has citizenship per se aided women in the arenas of gender and family relations? To what extent have the outcomes been positive responses to women's needs? What does this historical experience tell us about possible reversals of rights, recent curtailments of entitlements, and mounting political opposition to their expansion? Based on a comparative reading of the historical political context, women's movements, political struggles/negotiations/coalitions, and the rate and timing of change, I will argue that:

1. The conditions under which suffrage was granted were only partially shaped by the strength and efficacy of women's movements. In all four countries, male politicians, who held the power to grant suffrage, were motivated by powerful concerns other than gender justice; both internal and international political alignments determined when suffrage was granted.

2. Equally important in shaping women's civil and political rights were historical conditions such as the comparative importance of individual rights, earlier patterns of women's participation in waged labor, and socio-cultural visions of family and women's roles in it held by the powerful elites involved in negotiating programs for political rights and social provision. The policies shaped by these historical and ideological factors have been long-lasting.

3. There have been both political and economic conjunctural effects on the timing of the achievement of political and social rights and efforts to modify or end them. Two sorts of political transitions—the ends of wars and major party realignments—were especially important. Unusually long-lived economic prosperity (especially that associated with post-World War Two growth) made a major expansion of social rights possible. Large-scale economic changes, such as global restructuring, have been associated with reduced expansion of social programs, and even outright cutbacks.

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4. National legal and geopolitical institutional factors have contributed favorably or unfavorably (and sometimes both, as in the case of US federalism and its racial divisions) to the achievement of women's rights concerned with both redistribution and recognition.

Following T. H. Marshall's taxonomy of citizenship rights (but rejecting his view of an unvarying chronological sequence in the achievement of those rights), I examine civil, political, and social rights, guided by the conviction that achieving citizenship (no matter what definition one adopts) is a political process, the central goal of which is the achievement of the rights and responsibilities that go with citizenship.¹ I conceive a relational formulation of citizenship as a tie between persons and a specific state, through which these persons' rights and responsibilities to that state acquire legitimacy and continuity. Identities are located in the connections between and among individuals and groups. Citizenship, in short, is the outcome of a process of struggle and/or negotiation between citizens and state actors in which the legitimacy of citizens' claims is won.²

Feminist social scientists and philosophers have criticized conceptions of citizenship like those of Marshall as overly focused on the economic and political spheres because most women have always played distinctive roles in these spheres, both different from and unequal to those of men. In industrial economies, women have been largely limited to segregated jobs which few men want or hold, jobs with lower wages and less desirable characteristics (often part-time, hence associated with fewer or no benefits and lack of on-the-job training and promotion ladders); they have also faced the challenge of managing productive work of some kind with the work of reproduction. In politics, women have been admitted to the franchise in this century yet continue nearly everywhere to be underrepresented in national politics and in appointed or elected public office. Most critically, women chronically lack power in the political arena or are limited to segregated spheres of authority, such as socialized reproduction.³

In order to take account of this critique, as well as to understand how full citizenship was achieved and the meaning of this process, I draw on two bodies of theory. The first is Nancy Fraser's recent work, which makes a strong case for recognizing difference in theories of justice and discussions of citizenship. She defines the concept of "recognition" as one-half of a dual conception of social justice incorporating both "redistribution" (in the political and economic spheres, to which Marshall primarily refers) and "recognition" (of cultural/symbolic needs like identity and self-respect). Fraser limits, however, the scope of recognition, insisting that it should identify and defend "only those versions of difference that can be coherently combined with the social politics of equality." By difference, she means socioculturally constructed distinctions, which in the contemporary "late-capitalist political culture" have come to be called multiculturalism. She assumes that social justice requires both redistribution and recogni-

tion. In the *historical* cases and time period I consider, the relevant differences are primarily gender and race (the latter relevant especially in the United States, less so elsewhere), which Fraser sees as paradigmatically cultural *and* socioeconomic, and contested in situations involving the allocation of rights. She seeks situations in which socioeconomic redistribution reinforces rather than undermines cultural recognition.⁴

In practice, of course, these two concepts are not distinct and separable. As Fraser writes,

Even the most material economic institutions have a constitutive, irreducible cultural dimension; they are shot through with significations and norms. Conversely, even the most discursive cultural practices have a constitutive, irreducible political-economic dimension; they are underpinned by material supports. Thus, far from occupying two airtight separate spheres, economic injustice and cultural injustice are usually interimbricated so as to reinforce one another dialectically. Cultural norms that are unfairly biased against some are institutionalized in the state and the economy; meanwhile, economic disadvantage impedes equal participation in the making of culture, in public spheres and in everyday life. The result is often a vicious circle of cultural and economic subordination.⁵

I adopt Fraser's concepts and taxonomy as the basis for evaluating and comparing the content and meaning of rights and policies.

The second basis for my analysis is social movement theory. By definition, those seeking citizenship are currently excluded from it; hence, their problem is persuading or forcing those with the power to grant citizenship to do so. Indeed, the concept of citizenship in its modern sense emerged in the French Revolution of 1789–1795, when the first (parliamentary monarchical) constitution divided male taxpayers into active (voting) and passive citizens.⁶

In all the western countries compared here, the social movement was the form of contention through which men and women sought to achieve the civil and political rights (especially suffrage) associated with citizenship in the nineteenth century. Sidney Tarrow defines social movements as “collective challenges by people with common purposes and solidarity in sustained interaction with elites, opponents, and authorities.” He argues that the historical emergence of the social movement was tied to previous possession of minimal citizens' rights and that this kind of nationally oriented collective action gradually came to replace local, less independent, and older repertoires of making claims on political authorities.⁷ Not surprisingly, then, the social movement emerged first in England, where the rights of the “freeborn Englishman” celebrated by E. P. Thompson were still a viable concept in the late eighteenth century.⁸ The United States was not far behind in forming movements, and, just as English women joined the movement for the abolition of Caribbean slavery, so too did American women demand the abolition of slavery in the United States. Both these

groups of women were also early in calling for their own rights and shared an interest in each other's activities. In her essay on "The Enfranchisement of Women," for example, Harriet Taylor Mill reported on an American woman's rights conference in 1850 as the "first collective protest against the aristocracy of sex."⁹

The rest of this essay is organized into four sections, each illustrating the validity of these claims by reviewing the historical experience of women's rights in the civil, political, and social spheres in one country. A concluding section returns to the questions posed in the first paragraph.

British Politics and Women's Rights

Some early English social movements, like those for the abolition of colonial slavery (starting in the late eighteenth century), Catholic emancipation, Chartism, and electoral reform, aimed at the political sphere and concerned rights in that arena. Others, like the agitation for the Factory Acts or the Anti-Corn Law League, sought goals in the economic arena, as did Chartism. All these social movements combined elements of redistribution and recognition—even the effort to repeal the Corn Laws, which was perceived to threaten not only the livelihood but the identity of the English. After the 1832 Reform Bill expanded suffrage, increasing electoral participation and the organization, mobilization, and collective action of workers promoting their interests did not go unnoticed by women. Middle-class women's aspirations for rights should be seen in the context of this rise in claim-making and social movements.

The midcentury British movement for women's citizenship rights first focused on married women's rights, including control of their own earnings and child custody in divorce, which were both economic handicaps and signifiers of the absence of cultural recognition. A committee was established to promote these reforms, and with the help of male allies they were achieved with relative ease. The divorce law was amended in 1857, and the first liberalized Married Women's Property Act was passed in 1870; it was expanded several times in the ensuing decades. These reforms were of greatest interest to middle- and upper-class women who entered marriage with property of their own or earned money themselves.

Women also published critiques of the limits on education and jobs for women. As the structure of the economy changed through the creation of new jobs or transformation of old ones, women gradually gained access to higher education; to increasingly professional occupations like nursing, social work, and teaching; and to a broad range of service occupations like office work (in government and private business) and retail clerking. Many of these were designated as "women's jobs," for the work force as a whole remained highly segregated, and all "women's jobs" paid more poorly than men's jobs requiring similar qualifications. These changes especially ex-

panded single women's capacity to support themselves and contribute to their families but left them at an economic disadvantage vis-à-vis men.

The question of women's suffrage entered the public debate forcefully with John Stuart Mill's amendment to the Second Reform Bill of 1867, which changed the word "man" to "person." It was defeated. In the same year, urban women founded a federated National Society for Women's Suffrage. By 1900, when a group of female Lancashire textile workers petitioned Parliament in support of suffrage, middle-class suffrage supporters were actively promoting working-class women's participation in the movement. There followed a broadly based campaign during which a radical alternative—the Women's Social and Political Union—was founded in London by Manchester natives Emmeline Pankhurst and her daughter Cristabel. The movement was radicalized by these "suffragettes," who developed a campaign that included heckling Liberal party parliamentary candidates (even those who individually endorsed the vote for women) because their party refused to support suffrage; petitions and huge demonstrations; violence against symbols and persons of authority; and reciprocal police violence against the women involved.¹⁰

The struggle was suspended during the early years of World War One, but the question was raised again by 1917 because new conditions had arisen. Political opportunity opened and, Richard Evans argues, those who seized it were not the suffragists and suffragettes but male politicians, many of whom had supported suffrage before the war, and others (the Irish Unionists, for example) whose reason for opposition had disappeared in the interim. The wartime coalition government leadership saw to it that pro-women's-suffrage MPs were appointed to the committee originally established to study granting suffrage not to women but to nonenfranchised men who had fought in the war. The committee worked out a compromise that included suffrage for women over thirty, which was voted into law in 1918. (The vote at age twenty-one—as for men—came in 1928.) Evans concludes that female suffrage was "enacted to maintain stability in the face of increased threats of disorder [he acknowledges, however, that the prospect of a reprise of prewar suffragette violence had a positive effect] and revolution."¹¹ The Russian Revolution of 1917 had raised the specter of possible upheaval in the West, and the women's vote in England was seen by those with power as a conservative, stabilizing force. Male political motivations behind the achievement of suffrage should, however, not obscure the fact that this was a substantial recognition of women's potential in politics and of their efficiency in seeking positive change for themselves.

Social reformers had become concerned about women's roles in the family before the war. While middle-class women criticized marriage and hoped to find independence through education and work, working-class wives, with their limited access to good jobs, saw their household work as a contribution that was as important to their families as the wage work of their husbands. The Women's Cooperative League called for "some form

of economic independence” to be granted to the working-class wife in recognition of her contribution to the household. However, the first national welfare laws (passed in 1909 and 1911), which set up unemployment and health insurance for workers, limited eligible contributors primarily to male and skilled workers. (Only ten percent of the latter were women.)¹² Although stated in economic terms, this legislation both denied recognition of gender difference and asserted male privilege.

After the war, the expansion of suffrage made it possible for Labour party women to work at the local level, running for such public offices as poor law guardian or municipal councillor, promoting public housing projects, organizing domestic servants, and agitating for birth control clinics.¹³ However, marriage bars in the workplace and lack of maternity leave policies continued to hinder women workers during the economically depressed interwar years of high male unemployment.

The celebrated post–World War Two welfare legislation enshrined the expectation that wives would stay home with children (or at most work part-time) and that male workers would be responsible for the maintenance of their wives and children. Today, British women ordinarily receive pensions and other benefits (and are encouraged by policy to do so) as dependents of their husbands rather than as individual workers and contributors. In the mid-1970s, an allowance was granted to those caring for infirm dependents—but denied to married women as this was considered part of their “normal duties.” Needless to say, difference was obfuscated here, continuing gender inequality.¹⁴

Equal pay legislation passed in 1970 offered redress against sex discrimination but accepted the existing sex-segregated occupational structure. The mixed message of this legislation and the grudging policies that have since been implemented, along with the almost total lack of socialized child care, have resulted in very few mothers of young children (except for lone mothers) doing wage work and a high proportion of working wives doing part-time work, especially what is called “precarious” part-time work by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Thus, Jane Lewis concludes, British policies are based on the assumption that if “women enter the public sphere as workers, they must do so on terms very similar to men.” To make matters even worse, the Thatcher years saw already-inadequate maternity benefits reduced.¹⁵

Lewis regards this outcome—puzzling, given the strength of the British women’s suffrage movement in the decade before World War One—as primarily due to the “strong male breadwinner model” advocated by labor unions. Seth Koven and Sonya Michel give greater credit for this mixed message to the “maternalism” preached and practiced by British feminists in the post–World War One period. Although these explanations are partially valid, Susan Pedersen’s examination of the political process and context in which the early legislation was passed is both more nuanced and satisfyingly complex. Pedersen demonstrates that the two interwar efforts

to pass family allowances (one by organized feminists, the other by socialists as part of a larger campaign against working-class poverty) failed because of opposition from the trade unions. The British unions had emerged from World War One in a strong position, partially because of agreements with state agencies protecting their jobs against both wage reductions and female claimants who had taken men's places during the mobilization. They firmly resisted any policy with the potential to reduce male salaries, as indeed family allowances (which also recognized women's needs in the family) had. The combination of feminist and labor strength in post-World War One Britain, then, had the counterintuitive effect of preventing the passage of family allowances in the strong form then advocated by British feminists and some Labour party women.¹⁶

British unions remained powerful in the post-World War Two period when the Beveridge Plan was adopted. The Labour party's program was aimed at reducing class inequality via redistributive policies that would improve the lives of male workers, and especially their wives. Echoing the efforts of the Women's Cooperative League in the first decade of the century, Labour sought to upgrade housework to the status of wage work, a policy that was supported by socialist feminists. This, combined with post-war concerns about population decline, produced policies that reinforced wives' dependency. Union opposition to married women's labor force participation had been securely institutionalized within the context of Labour's reforms. Jane Jenson argues that this also accounts for the 1965 Abortion Act, which defined the procedure "as a medical question rather than as a woman's right." Similarly, the 1970 Labour-sponsored Equal Pay Act articulated its goal as "equal pay for equal work" (rather than for work of equal value), thus excluding segregated occupations (the key to wage inequality) from its purview.¹⁷

The Tangled but Persistent Political Context of Women's Rights in France

The French revolutions of 1789 and 1848 both saw the emergence of advocates for women's political rights (some of whom had radical or—especially in 1848—socialist connections); on both occasions they were silenced. Although there was a great deal of misogyny as well as political rivalry and a consolidation of Jacobin power involved in the ejection of women from popular politics, the argument of 1793–1794 connecting citizenship and military service (an exclusionary conceptualization which prevented any legal recognition of women as citizens) had long-lasting influence in political debates.

Moderate feminist groups reemerged or were organized as a new republic was constructed after France's military defeat by Prussia in 1870 and the repression of the Paris Commune in 1871. Sensitive to the fragility of national political consensus, these feminists (most of them firm supporters of the new Third Republic, allied with anticlerical male members of the

Radical party who feared that women's vote might be dictated by Catholic priests) did not make suffrage one of their immediate goals. Instead they called for reform of the civil status of women (through amendment of the Civil Code, especially the sections on property, marriage, and family) and access to education and employment. Those who did call for women's suffrage were rebuffed or ignored by the secular republican Radicals in power. Women's civil status was somewhat improved by legislation in the period up to 1914 (divorce was again legalized and married women were granted some control over their own earnings), but suffrage remained elusive.

The decade before World War One saw a further growth of women's groups in which vigorous claims to citizenship and suffrage were raised by more militant individuals. The associations founded in the nineteenth century—bourgeois, highly supportive of the republic, usually allied with the liberal Radicals—were slow even to adopt suffrage as a goal, but some small groups tried tactics like those of the British suffragettes. At a relatively unified conference held in 1908 (significantly, neither Catholics nor Socialists participated), a new organization, the French Union for Women's Suffrage (UFSF), was founded. It formally renounced violence and other radical tactics and affiliated promptly with the International Association for Woman's Suffrage. Optimism about the possibility of achieving suffrage grew as the UFSF spread in the provinces and won male allies, including members of the Chamber of Deputies. These allies, whether Radicals or Socialists, had other, higher priorities than women's suffrage, however. The women's campaign peaked in 1914, when a newspaper poll garnered over 500,000 paper ballots declaring support for women's suffrage. The first successful (and decorous) demonstration for suffrage, in which some 5,000 participated, was held in Paris that July. However, with the coming of war in August, the campaign was suspended and women threw themselves into supporting the war effort.

In 1919, as elsewhere in Europe at war's end, the French Chamber of Deputies voted for women's suffrage, but a Senate vote (delayed until 1922) rejected it, along with recognition of women as political equals. The reasons are complex. In this period, concerns about population decline loomed large, spurred by France's heavy casualties in World War One. Further, an unanticipated consequence of the Bolshevik Revolution affecting the suffrage cause was Catholic acceptance of women's suffrage. To Catholics, as to the Radicals, women's votes meant conservative votes, but whereas for the Radicals such a vote was a threat to the republic, for the Catholic hierarchy it looked desirable, given the newly intensified Communist threat from the Left. Catholic support for women's suffrage merely reconfirmed Radical concerns about female voters. The Senate, in which the Radicals were overrepresented and Socialists underrepresented, continued to reject bills for women's suffrage through the interwar period. Although some Radical politicians individually supported the vote for

women, the majority did not, and although women's suffrage was part of the Socialist program, it was not a high priority. Christine Bard's recent study of French feminisms in the interwar years sums up the problem: "The particularity of the French was located in the strong political bifurcation between clericals and anticlericals, which dominated political discourse throughout the Third Republic." Finally, by the mid-1930s, the Radical and Socialist fear of fascism (again believed to be a program that conservative women voters would support) emerged as another brake on expanding voting rights. Hence, as in Britain, the French decision on women's suffrage was shaped by fears of instability, but it was the stability of the republican constitution, not the state, which seemed to Radicals to be most threatened—from the *Right*, not the *Left*.¹⁸

Throughout the interwar years, feminists pressed claims based on recognition of women's needs for changes in the Civil Code and in the ferocious antiabortion and anti-birth-control law of 1920 as amended in 1923. A 1938 law emancipated women in some aspects of civil law, but the patriarchal claims of the male head of household (whose permission was still required, for example, for wives to work outside the home, to set up separate bank accounts, or to take children out of the country) continued in force as late as 1970. It is significant that in both Germany and France, women's civil rights were granted considerably later than the vote.

In France, the twentieth-century expansion of social provisions was influenced by the complex mix (very different from the British) of political interests in the interwar years. Even before 1914, pronatalist groups, both Catholic and secular conservative, had introduced programs to reinvigorate French families and restore higher birth rates, including publicly subsidized housing and paid maternity leave. (Both were implemented on a modest scale, but expanded later.) Moreover, women's labor force participation continued to be high, partly due to the smaller scale of many businesses (often family-owned) and the large agricultural sector, which was dominated by modest-sized family farms. In the 1920s, several large French employers' groups established family allowances for their male workers, partly at least to remove a portion of wages from contractual bargaining, and also as a measure to reduce labor mobility. French labor unions were not strong enough to prevent this strategem.

Concern about "depopulation" also led in 1932 to passage of a state-sponsored family allowance system which, working with large businesses, coordinated and controlled funds to which employers contributed and from which allowances were to be paid. This worked poorly for many reasons, and it was only after the defeat of the Popular Front government of 1936–1937 that pronatalist interests were able to push their profamily program fully; the Family Code was passed on the eve of World War Two in late July 1939 and was implemented piecemeal during the war years. This relatively generous program established a precedent for the redistribution of income not vertically, from rich to poor, but horizontally, from childless families to

those with children. As expanded after the war, these policies did not reduce the proportion of women, including mothers, who did wage work, nor were they intended to do so; instead, they supported women as workers *and* mothers.¹⁹

As the secular Right was discredited in post-1945 France and social Catholics participated in reformist governments, political opportunities for social legislation again appeared. The outcome was even more substantial commitments to family benefits but continuing limitations on married women's civil rights. The strength of the Left, however, brought a measure of gender equity to civil service pay scales and further integration of women into the labor force. Family allowances were kept separate from the rest of the social provision and continued to be pronatalist.²⁰ Pronatalism also meant that the interwar feminist goal of abrogating or amending the 1920 law on abortion and birth control was not realized until 1967, when the section outlawing birth control was eased, and 1974, when abortion was legalized.²¹

In the 1970s and 1980s the orientation of French redistributive policies shifted partially from horizontal to vertical to aim at class inequalities, as more categories of benefits became means-tested rather than universal. Proportionately more French mothers than British (indeed, ten times as many) were working in the 1980s, but the proportion of the former who worked part-time increased. French maternity and parental leave provisions, tax allowances for child care, and public child-care provisions remain superior to all in Europe. (Even those of Sweden fall short of the French standard for public child care.)²²

French women received the right to vote only in 1944 with the support of General DeGaulle over the continued opposition of Radicals, who had lost their prewar hegemonic position in French politics. In the 1980s, the proportion of women was higher in both the French National Assembly and Senate than in the British Parliament and was similar to that in the United States Congress. However, women continue today to be under-represented in elective political office and have actually slipped in comparison to other countries. As of the 1993 elections, French women's under-representation is one of the most extreme in the European Union.²³

Social indicators continue to demonstrate that in education, employment, and support for motherhood, French women are better off than women in Britain or Germany. For example, in 1963, forty-three percent of French university students were women, compared to thirty-four percent in the United States, thirty-two percent in England, and twenty-four percent in West Germany; in 1981, the respective proportions were forty-five, fifty-two, thirty-five, and forty-four percent.²⁴

An interesting study, which unfortunately only compares the occupational status of British women with those of France and the United States, considers occupations outside the agricultural sector (which has continued

to account for a larger proportion of the labor force in France than in the other countries considered here). The authors, Shirley Dex and Patricia Walters, find that French and American women in the early 1980s held a greater proportion of high-status jobs than did British women. Dex and Walters conclude that this is related to the very high proportion of British mothers and women in general working part-time.²⁵

In the first term of the Mitterand presidency, Yvette Roudy, the minister for women's rights, quickly oversaw the 1983 passage of equal-pay legislation extending to the private sector. The outcome, as noted earlier, was disillusionment—for, as in all the European countries reviewed, most jobs held by women continued to be in segregated, heavily female sectors. The recent review by Jane Jenson and Mariette Sineau of the accomplishments of Mitterand's two presidential terms concludes that positive outcomes for women were few. The proportion of women candidates for public office in the period was never more than ten percent of all candidates, and the proportion elected was even less—under seven percent at best. Only in 1994, after an electoral defeat, did the Socialists begin to allocate numbers of candidacies to women equal to those for men. The one positive action Jenson and Sineau acknowledge (although they correctly see it as tokenism) is that women were favored in appointments to the socialist cabinets and other high offices in the Mitterand presidency. Female ministerial or sub-ministerial appointments have included—in addition to the gender-related women's rights, family and human rights ministries—positions in agriculture, environment, defense, foreign affairs, and European affairs.²⁶

Women have also been very active in recent social movements to defend abortion and contraception, as well as in university and labor disputes. A Coalition of Associations for the Right to Abortion and Contraception (CADAC) was organized in 1990 to expand access to these services and combat the recently activated right-to-life movement (composed of members of the political extreme Right and religious fundamentalists of various sorts). Members of CADAC were joined by feminists, antifascists, the unemployed, political associations, and left-wing unions in a unified demonstration of 40,000 in November 1995. Earlier that fall, university students (mainly from provincial universities) had protested the miserable overcrowding and unfair distribution of funds for higher education, which was heavily weighted in favor of the *grandes écoles*, the elite graduate programs. Josette Trat investigated these events and the active role of women in them, as well as the civil servant strike wave which mounted from October into December 1995. Quoting interviews with participants, she argues that women's high level of participation was facilitated by the sharp decline of Communist party influence in the left-wing unions and the unified nature of the movement, which included many civil service jobs in which women workers were heavily represented. The strike wave gained remarkable pub-

lic support across the political spectrum, but the Left parties did not support it in the political arena. Nevertheless, the importance of women in the actions may be a harbinger of their greater readiness to work for change.²⁷

Authoritarian Politics, Paternalistic Policies, and Women's Movements in Germany

Even a brief recital of the history of feminist movements in Germany confirms the twists and turns, the cyclical destruction and reconstruction of women's movements, which reflect not only the political history of Germany but the sociocultural and economic divisions among Germans.²⁸

The self-limiting General Association of German Women, founded in 1865 in the nationalist fervor of Bismarck's wars to unify Germany, never broached the question of women's votes and even rejected the notion of working for the elimination of state regulation of prostitution. What is more, the Association retreated from its original concern for women's education, philanthropy, and the economic status of women to simple charitable activities by the mid-1870s, as German liberalism in general fell into disarray. Bismarck's authoritarian but paternalist regime granted health care, unemployment, and old-age insurance in an unsuccessful attempt to gain workers' support. After Bismarck's fall, a new industrial code was passed that limited women's work hours in large-scale settings but at the same time created a compulsory, employer-provided four-week maternity leave (which did not, however, cover women workers in the putting-out system).

The lifting of the ban on membership in the Social Democratic party (SPD), also an outcome of Bismarck's dismissal, permitted it in 1894 to introduce a bill for women's suffrage in the Reichstag; that and several later efforts were unsuccessful. However, in the more open political climate, new local women's associations flourished, many of them sponsored by the Social Democrats. In 1896, Clara Zetkin proposed organizing women's party sections, promising her male comrades that feminism would play no role in their activities. Male socialist fears were assuaged by Zetkin's impressive organizational prowess. As in France, however, there was no meeting of minds or hearts between the socialist and bourgeois women's movements.

The Federation of German Women's Associations was formed in 1894 and allied with the Liberals. Like its French equivalents, the Federation campaigned against the Imperial Civil Code (formally passed in 1896, it made no change in the restricted marriage rights of middle-class women.) In 1902, the first women's suffrage society was founded in Hamburg, and the Federation endorsed the demand for universal (male and female) suffrage. In 1907, both associations agreed on an agenda that included equal pay, equal education, full and equal suffrage rights, and the abolition of state-regulated prostitution. At the same time the stage was set for later

splits, as leaders of the Federation began advocating the abolition of prostitution, calling as well for free access to contraception and legalization of abortion, for which they received support from some of their colleagues.

Women's achievement of the right to form political associations in 1908 simply meant that more conservative women organized. The Federation continued to grow, but the Suffrage Union did not, as associations multiplied with different positions on sexuality and the future basis for women's suffrage. (There was universal manhood suffrage for elections to the Imperial Reichstag, but not at the level of the states, including Prussia, which had more restricted suffrage. And it was in states that important decisions, especially budgetary ones, were taken. Hence the struggle over a more democratic suffrage included much more than the gender issue.) The decision of a majority of left-liberals to support the coalition government of 1907–1908 led the Suffrage Union to split with the left-liberals, and to divisions within the Union as well. Richard Evans argues that “female suffrage could itself only be achieved through such a reform as the feminists thought it would bring about,” for in the German political context of continued limited suffrage for men, women's suffrage would not be accepted separately. (This was also true, in a less acute form, in Britain, where the passage in 1920 of universal male suffrage was coupled with a suffrage limited by age for women.)²⁹

Like the French, German women's rights in marriage continued to be highly constrained, but unlike the French, the last years before 1914 saw no unified action from feminists. Indeed, a coup by the moderates within the Federation against its liberal leader moved it away from demands for universal suffrage and world peace to polite declarations of their worth as wives and mothers. At the end of World War One, the Federation became pronatalist, condemned the Treaty of Versailles, and refused to join the International Council of Women.

Nevertheless, women received the vote in 1919 after the collapse of the German empire, when the majority of Social Democrats joined the successor Weimar Republic (rejecting the demands of their former colleagues, communist revolutionaries who advocated soviets of soldiers and workers as an alternative to parliamentary elections). Bourgeois women's associations during the Weimar Republic continued moral crusades to abolish legalized prostitution and to censor films and plays, although their lack of financial resources and divided membership (professionals, white-collar workers, housewives) undermined their effectiveness.

Despite a constitutional clause about equal rights and duties for men and women, women's willingness to stand for office declined after the early elections in Weimar. Moreover, fewer and fewer women voted for parties that advocated women's rights, and many supported parties that opposed such rights. The socialist women's associations moved away from the more radical theoretical positions held by Clara Zetkin (who had become a Communist) and into voluntary social welfare and family-oriented activ-

ities. Many female members of the SPD were the wives of members rather than workers themselves. Those who were workers were underrepresented in the unions. Male socialists declared their belief in equality, supported reform of the Civil Code and better working conditions for women, yet thought of them as “special beings.”³⁰

The programs of the Socialists and Communists included women’s right to work, protective legislation, better maternity and health care benefits, legal status for out-of-wedlock children, daycare, and other social welfare programs. Both parties supported birth control clinics, and the sale of contraceptives was legal; they disagreed over abortion, with the Communists in support, the Socialists, divided.³¹ Socialist rhetoric enjoined cooperation between men and women, but in the Reichstag, the party’s women deputies were shunted into activities that kept them out of the limelight of “politics,” and they were not permitted to speak on behalf of the party. To make a dreary story even worse, in the elections between 1930 and 1932, both male and female former left-wing and liberal voters deserted their parties to vote for the Nazis. However, according to Christl Wikert, women were not overrepresented (as has been charged) among Nazi voters in the localities in which gender composition is known.³² The Weimar period, then, saw both the entry of unmarried women into the labor force and more egalitarian gender relations especially among intelligentsia, leftists, and youth, *and* women’s limited exercise of their political rights and continuing inequality in marriage and family.

The Nazi party’s women members in the 1920s, before Hitler became chancellor, were generally believers in gender “equality” within a gendered separation of spheres of activity. Claudia Koonz argues that their tough leaders were dedicated, independent militants who looked forward to serving the Nazis in power. After 1933, however, these outspoken women were quickly replaced by more passive figureheads who were granted no part in decision-making. Indeed, Nazi policy oscillated during the 1930s from a “back to the kitchen and motherhood” dictum in the early years (when pronatalist policies like marriage loans, which would be partially excused as children were born, were implemented) to mobilization of women for production on the home front as war approached and enveloped the country. Koonz argues that Nazi misogyny and anti-Semitism were abhorrent, indeed criminal, but even under that regime, “women lobbied for particular programs, organized their separate sphere, and worked for the state. Despite its overt opposition to women’s equality, the fascist version of an ideal society incorporated the notions of nineteenth-century women’s rights advocates who envisioned a strong society founded on separate but equal spheres.” She concludes that “welfare states have incorporated social policies advocated by both Hitler and Mussolini.”³³ In France, too, the prewar Family Code was implemented by the collaborationist Vichy regime, which incorporated “Family” into its alternative “*Famille, Travail, Patrie*” to the republic’s “*Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité*.” Although the underlying motiva-

tion of promoting births may have been similar in the two regimes, the conditions under which authoritarian Vichy France and Nazi Germany implemented such policies of course were quite different from those in the postwar parliamentary welfare states. The line between recognition of women's needs and unjust social policy is not always sharp.

The divided Germany that emerged from World War Two consisted of two very different states, but I consider here primarily West Germany—the German Federal Republic. As Ilona Ostner points out, the slogan of the long-lasting Adenauer era was, “Prosperity for everyone—but no social experiments.” Germany joined other West European countries in constructing a corporatist welfare state. The chief partners were industry and labor, which jointly worked out procedures for planning, contracting mutual rights and responsibilities, and implementing policies that did not disturb economic progress or social order. Other social groups, such as agricultural sector employees and workers, civil servants, and white-collar workers, both men and women, also had roles to play. Not surprisingly, these partners also did not disturb gender relations to any extent, for there has been widespread agreement about “family values,” to use an American code phrase.³⁴

Ostner makes the point that West German feminists have never accepted the notion current in the United States and other West European and Nordic countries that independence comes with employment. They have focused instead on the unsolved problem of reconciling parenthood and work, concluding that in order to handle both one should not allow oneself to be drawn too fully into either. Conservative German marriage and family policies did nothing to discourage this kind of thinking. Although the 1949 Constitution declared equal rights for men and women, the Civil Code (which contradicted the Constitution) was not amended until 1957. Moreover, from then until 1977, husbands retained paternal power to force their wives either to work or not to work; women did not get a legal role in decisions about their children until 1980. There has been little full-time public daycare, and school hours and school holidays are set without giving thought to possible adult female schedules and roles other than those of full-time mothers. To encourage births, parental leaves (available for those working part- as well as full-time and usually taken by mothers, as they are elsewhere) were added in the 1980s to the already-established fourteen-week maternity leaves. Many social services are partially voluntary, provided by church organizations and families, which are understood to owe each other services and assistance across generations.³⁵

In such a system, one-parent families are considered anomalous, and states can still assume custody for children born outside marriage. At a more basic level (as in the other cases examined here), single mothers and their children are usually worse off than two-parent families and the mothers are often forced to work at low-wage jobs that few married woman would take.

To satisfy the great need for workers to rebuild the postwar economy, the German Democratic Republic (East Germany) combined more comprehensive maternity and child care policies and recognized a state responsibility for “social fatherhood” of children whose biological father was absent. Women, including mothers, were expected to work. East German women workers “paid” for their social rights with considerably lower average wages than men. The equal expectations held out to women workers were not matched by equal treatment.

Since unification, change has been mostly in the direction of the extension of less generous GFR policies to the new eastern provinces. Ostner does not believe that the path followed by West Germany in the 1950s is possible for unified Germany. Nevertheless, the task remains the “economic and cultural integration” of the two formerly independent regimes, and social politics is the terrain on which this will be resolved.³⁶

Federalism, Racism, and Women's Associationism in the United States

Compared to the two continental European countries just discussed, what immediately struck the outside observer of the nineteenth-century United States (most famously Alexis de Tocqueville) was the extraordinary amount of activity, male and female, that went into voluntary associations at the local level. For most of the nineteenth century, the federal state was relatively unimportant compared to the courts and political parties. Before the Civil War (1861–1865), women participated in abolitionism, Protestant revivalism, philanthropic and civic improvement activity, and a movement for their own emancipation (chiefly concerned with property and other rights in marriage). In the debate about the war's political settlement, which involved questions of freedom for former slaves and the rights of black Americans, their status as citizens, and their claim to the franchise, the women's movement split. At issue was whether universal suffrage (including all women, former slaves, and free blacks) or male suffrage (including free blacks and former slaves) should come first. The latter strategy was adopted in the Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution in 1870, and the divisions in the women's suffrage movement continued until 1890.³⁷

By then, women had made considerable progress in the professions and education and they had been enfranchised in the territories of Wyoming and Utah. The largest women's organization was the Women's Christian Temperance Union, the leader of which was instrumental in reuniting the suffragists. At first, the unified suffragists pursued a state-by-state campaign, and by 1896, four states had passed woman's suffrage; there followed fourteen years with no change.

One reason for the lull was the generalized crisis of the 1890s: severe industrial and financial depression, Populist revolt in the Midwest and South, labor struggles in the large and growing industrial sector, and heavy immigration. As in Germany, the enfranchisement of women was being

sought in a climate in which male suffrage was in question as well. In the South, the systematic and often legal disfranchisement of black men (and poor or unschooled white men as well) was proceeding, and in the cities the high level of immigration was overburdening available housing, health care, and schools.

In 1915, the stalemate was ended when an energetic organizer, Carrie Chapman Catt, was elected president of the unified suffrage association. New methods, including large-scale campaigns, brought many new states into the suffrage column and produced pressure and petitions for a suffrage amendment to the federal Constitution. Richard Evans emphasizes the connections (both in timing and in geographic distribution of activists) between the women's suffrage movement and the revived temperance movement. Led by the Anti-Saloon League, the latter had adopted the same strategy of seeking a constitutional amendment, which was ratified in 1919. Evans argues that "Both [movements] represented an attempt by middle-class white Anglo-Saxon Protestants to control the blacks, the immigrants and the big cities. They were a response to what was felt as a growing threat to the supremacy of American values."³⁸ There is plenty of evidence of racism and anti-immigrant bias in the suffrage movement.

Despite its overall conservatism, however, the unified women's suffrage association was perceived as extremist because of its more militant sometime ally, the Congressional Union (later renamed the National Women's party, which pushed for an equal rights amendment in the postwar period) and because it adopted some of the British suffragettes' tactics, including blaming the party in power. The women's suffrage movement also suffered in the 1914–1918 period from the continuing pacifism of some of its most articulate members, because being antiwar became antipatriotic when the United States entered the war. Like the majority of feminists in all the countries considered here, American suffragists supported the war effort. The women's suffrage amendment was endorsed by President Woodrow Wilson as a wartime measure and finally ratified just before the 1920 election. By then, the Red Scare of 1919–1920, in which alarm at the potential subversion of "American" values by immigrants was translated into a repressive government drive at both national and state levels against immigrants and political radicals, had targeted the women's movement as well.³⁹

In the nineteenth century, both black and white women's clubs had helped found clinics, schools, kindergartens, playgrounds, settlement houses, and other institutions to improve urban environments. In the first decade of the twentieth century, their "improvement" programs, which generally involved "good government" issues as well, were closely linked to the Progressive movement. Organized middle-class women social reformers (sometimes called social feminists), and especially those connected to the settlement houses in the presuffrage period, came to focus on poor and immigrant children (inadequately fed, clothed, and cared for), and

especially children of lone mothers (widowed, divorced, separated, never married). These child-savers, allied with male Progressives, had notable success in their national campaign for a US Children's Bureau, which was established in the Department of Labor. On the urban and state level these women joined Progressive "good government" reformers, campaigning for "mothers' pensions" for single women and their children.⁴⁰ The reformers hoped to promote the Americanization of immigrant mothers and children in this process, but many local ordinances and state programs required citizenship. The mothers were expected to work (usually as laundresses or cleaning women) to supplement the benefits. The net result, Linda Gordon concludes, was "a more extensive charitable sector rather than a welfare state." She lays the rejection of entitlement in this arena to the absence of a working-class voice, racist divisions, and the strong middle-class women's movement, which was suspicious of big government.⁴¹

Only two national laws implementing the social and suffrage feminist programs—the Sheppard-Towner Act, which provided funds for local maternal and infant care projects and was not renewed, and the Cable Act, which granted American women married to foreigners the rights of naturalized citizens—were passed in the early 1920s. Conservative administrations and economic troubles pushed feminist issues off the political agenda, and the earlier female community of reformers and administrators lost its political influence.⁴²

Beginning in 1929, the Depression brought mass unemployment and the collapse of state and local social programs as a result of the financial burden of supplying relief for children and adults. Franklin D. Roosevelt's election in 1932 led quickly to emergency work relief programs, but these offered few jobs for women. A permanent welfare program was developed more slowly and with much political negotiation and struggle, in which the women's social reform community had less and less influence. The result was a two-track system. As Barbara Nelson and other scholars have noted, one was contributory—old-age insurance and unemployment compensation—for which mostly white men were eligible (both agricultural workers and domestic servants, most of whom were black, were excluded in order to earn the support of southern Democratic senators); the other was means-tested Aid to Dependent Children (ADC), received almost exclusively by mothers "under stingy and humiliating conditions," as Gordon puts it.⁴³

The early population receiving ADC was mostly white single mothers (perceived as widows or deserted women and their children); black applicants were largely excluded by the state-level administrations in the South. It was only in the 1950s and 1960s that the recipients of means-tested child support programs came to be predominantly black women.

The revitalized and renamed women's liberation movement of the 1960s and 1970s worked with considerable success for equal opportunity in education and employment and reopened the fight for an Equal Rights Amendment to the Constitution, which failed.⁴⁴ It also brought issues of

sexuality and private life (such as abortion, gay and lesbian rights, sexual abuse, and other forms of family violence), the displacement of homemakers, and the poverty of female-headed households onto the political agenda as claims for recognition. These issues had been carefully excluded by the suffrage movement in order to avoid “scandal” and “divisiveness.” In the social movement climate of the 1970s, the women’s movement made cultural and personal issues political. These questions, quintessentially those of recognition, were often adjudicated in the federal courts, which in that period were frequently staffed by progressive judges, many of them appointed in the long period of Democratic administrations from 1932 to 1952 and during the 1960s. Feminists enjoyed some notable successes (for example, the winning of abortion rights), which nevertheless continue to be threatened as the composition of federal courts has come to reflect the increasingly conservative administrations from 1982 on.⁴⁵

Conclusion

Despite the fact that there were notable differences in the strength of their women’s movements, Britain, Germany, and the United States granted women’s suffrage in the aftermath of World War One at least partially in a search for social stability and conservative women’s votes. In the same period, and for decades after, the French Senate, motivated by fears shared by most of France’s political class of a clerical and conservative women’s vote, blocked the enactment of women’s suffrage in the interwar period.

In none of the countries examined have women played a role in the political arena commensurate with their potential power as voters in that period or since. Helga Hernes shows that even in the widely admired (even envied) Nordic welfare states, a division of labor in the economy and politics has developed which assigns men to “production” and women to a female world of “public reproduction” where, although benefiting as workers and clients in that world, women are not “policy shapers.” The result, she concludes, is a “tutelary state for women, since [they] have had a minimal role in the actual decision-making process concerning distribution.”⁴⁶ There is a similar process of assignment to social reproduction in state jobs and gender recognition issues in politics in Britain—Margaret Thatcher, of course, being a notable exception. In Germany, according to Brigitte Young, women remain segregated not in social sectors of the labor force but in the private sphere. “Because of the largely intact notion of the social-integrative family,” she explains, “the public service sector has expanded slowly since the 1980s.”⁴⁷ Women in the now-reunified Germany continue to be excluded from the segregated social sector reserved for them in Britain.

In France, women have been less well represented in the national legislative bodies than in Britain although they have been well represented (whether as tokens or not) in high appointive administrative posts,

including those in ministries outside the sphere of public reproduction. This may be related to the fact that, overall, women have been more likely to be in the labor force in France than in Britain and Germany, and in the public sector they have been better able to advance over the years to higher levels. The US public social welfare sector (counting women in schools and other social services of state, county, and local government) is similar in size to that of Britain (smaller than that of France, but similarly feminized). Female members of Congress have complained that they must be concerned with social issues because, if they were not, no one else would care. In the past ten years, women have increasingly been secretaries of cabinet-level departments other than health and human services or education. In short, today women have more possibility of shaping policies outside the area of public reproduction in France and the United States than in Britain and Germany, where they are underrepresented in the labor force as well.

In all four cases, the circumstances in which questions of women's political and civil rights were posed—especially the political strength of groups which believed their interests were threatened by some aspect of granting those rights—were critical to the timing of these grants and the sequence in which they occurred. The granting of civic rights, especially in the realm of marriage and the family, divides the cases neatly in half: on the one hand, Britain and the United States, in which this preceded women's suffrage; on the other hand, France and Germany, in which it came after political citizenship. There was no standard temporal sequence for the granting of women's rights as citizens, even among national states with roughly similar histories of economic and political development. The answer is in the details. The expansion of women's rights in the private sphere was more compatible with the individualism of British and American legal theory than in the familistic vision of German and French law.

Broad social programs focused on supporting family and reproduction were first passed in France in the interwar period by a Catholic/conservative, pronatalist, profamily coalition that supported supplementing male wages, often with some feminist support. In Britain, these issues were first addressed through policies aimed at strengthening male workers (pension and unemployment insurance), but wage policies were resisted by the labor unions until that country too succumbed to concerns about population growth rates in the post-World War Two period. In Germany, social provision was addressed even earlier than in Britain through male workers' social rights (pensions and unemployment insurance), and German policy has emphasized family responsibility in social welfare and reproduction with limited government intervention. In the United States, the racial divide and the political balance of power in the 1930s produced both a system of social rights reflecting this history and sharp gender, race, and class differentiation among recipients of benefits.

Matters like maternity leave and public child care mix redistribution

and recognition. To what extent, as Nancy Fraser asks, does the recognition of women's needs as mothers as well as workers do so without undermining the social politics of equality? The answer has varied from country to country. In Britain and Germany, the practical working out of limited state programs, plus working-class expectations that mothers stay home in Britain and an even broader cross-class cultural preference for the same in unified Germany, produce not only lack of recognition of the needs of mothers and children but also serious economic disadvantage to those women who must work for wages, or those who choose to do so. In France, the long history of women's labor force participation led in the post-World War Two period to universal public programs such as early childhood schools. French recognition that most women, including many mothers, will work has produced a much more supportive situation. Despite opportunities in the United States for high-level employment for women, thanks at least partially to affirmative action, the lack of universal maternity leave or child care provision has increased differences among women, especially mothers. Wealthier mothers, usually those with well-paid jobs, can hire high-quality private child care. Less privileged mothers must make do with kin assistance (which they may prefer, but which is often less reliable) or less satisfactory private daycare centers. There is little public commitment to children in the United States. Ironically, given the collective nature of the problem of reconciling wage work and parenthood, child care problems are being at least partially solved at the level of couples themselves, since fertility rates are close to or below replacement levels for native-born populations in all these countries.

In the United States and France, the two countries in which social policies have served to support women's opportunities in the economic and (less so in France) political spheres, I believe that the elusive goal of social equality has been served far better than in Britain and Germany. Nevertheless, the policies fall far short of ending gender inequality or promoting social justice.

What have citizenship and its attendant rights and responsibilities meant for women? Again, the picture is one of variation. Although in Britain and the United States women's movements were very active in claiming civil and political rights, this did not bring them quickly or fully into the political arena. In both countries, conservative politics and economic troubles in the 1920s and 1930s limited both activism and change. In the postwar period Britain's woes continued, but the US economy and its global power boomed; both the civil rights and the women's liberation movements pressed in the prosperous 1960s and early 1970s for legally protected opportunities in education and jobs and raised possibilities for blacks and women in politics. It has only been in the last twenty years that American blacks and women have become visible and important actors in business, political parties, and state and national government (including the courts). The court-enforced federal equal employment opportunity legisla-

tion and the boom in higher education positioned both blacks and women much more favorably for advancement. In France, women have also attained relatively egalitarian opportunities, since its meritocratic education and public administration systems have been relatively gender blind, and women there have benefited in these areas from citizenship. Germany lags behind the other countries in the public sphere, given the universal antipathy toward state intervention in private life and German familialist culture.

And what of support for the right to abortion, and for free decisions regarding childbearing and sexuality? The first is still an open question in Germany, where the problem of reconciling unlimited access to abortion in the East and the hedged provisions in the West continues to be debated. In the United States, federal abortion guarantees have been limited, but any attempt to challenge the juridical underpinning of abortion rights can bring tens of thousands of demonstrators to Washington, DC. In France, as shown above, abortion supporters also have mobilized tens of thousands in protest. Questions of sexuality likewise are still open in the countries discussed.

Social movements everywhere now face the much less favorable environment of global competition, which limits the power of states. Yet assertive public stands can be observed in strikes and demonstrations like those of 1995 in France. What has been missing is the long-term push onto the political agenda that must follow symbolic acts of social protest. The power holders are still male, and their concerns remain elsewhere, even in the countries in which women have made the most progress. As the economic arena becomes more volatile, and economic and political redistribution comes under attack, it may become harder to press for recognition. Whether more or less difficult, however, citizenship claims will go nowhere without organization and struggle in the political sphere.

NOTES

1. T. H. Marshall, "Citizenship and Social Class," presented as the Alfred Marshall Lecture, Cambridge, 1949, in T. H. Marshall, *Class, Citizenship, and Social Development: Essays by T. H. Marshall*, ed. Seymour Martin Lipset (Garden City, NY, 1965). For a skeptical view of Marshall, see Miriam Cohen and Michael Hanagan, "Politics, Industrialization, and Citizenship: Unemployment Policy in England, France and the United States, 1890–1950," in *Citizenship, Identity, and Social History*, ed. Charles Tilly, Supplement 3 of *International Review of Social History* (Cambridge, 1996), 91–129.

2. Charles Tilly, "Citizenship, Identity and Social History," in *Citizenship, Identity and Social History*, ed. Charles Tilly, 8–9.

3. Ann Shola Orloff, "Gender and the Social Rights of Citizenship: The Comparative Analysis of Gender Relations and Welfare States," *American Sociological Review* 58 (1993):303–28; Laura Levine Frader, "Social Citizens without Citizenship: Working-Class Women and Social Policy in Interwar France," *Social Politics: International Studies in Gender, State and Society* 3 (1996):111–35.

4. Nancy Fraser, "From Redistribution to Recognition? Dilemmas of Justice in a 'Post-Socialist' Age," *New Left Review* 212 (1995):69; see also Fraser, "Women, Welfare, and the Politics of Need Interpretation," and "Struggle over Needs: Outline of a Socialist-Feminist Critical Theory of Late Capitalist Political Culture," both in Nancy Fraser, *Unruly Practices:*

Power, Discourse, and Gender in Contemporary Social Theory (Minneapolis, 1989) (a shorter version of "Struggle Over Needs" is in *Women, the State, and Welfare*, ed. Linda Gordon [Madison, 1990], 199–223); Nancy Fraser, "Social Justice in the Age of Identity Politics: Redistribution, Recognition, and Participation," Tanner Lecture on Human Values, Stanford University (unpublished manuscript, 1996).

5. Fraser, "Redistribution to Recognition," 71–72.

6. Rogers Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany* (Cambridge, 1992); Charles Tilly, "The Emergence of Citizenship in France and Elsewhere," in *Citizenship, Identity and Social History*, ed. Charles Tilly, 223–36; Pierre Rosenvall, *Le sacre du suffrage universel en France* (Paris, 1992).

7. Sidney Tarrow, *Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action, and Politics* (Cambridge, 1994), 3. He writes (65–66) that "[i]t was the expansion and consolidation of the national state that prodded the social movement into existence, and this was true all over the west, regardless of the degree of state centralization . . . the state not only penetrated society—it integrated it. By producing policies intended for large populations and standardizing the procedures for citizens to use in their relations with authorities, states provided targets for mobilization and cognition frameworks in which challenging groups could compare their situations to more favored constituencies and find allies. Expanding states attacked the corporate institutions of the past and tried to impede new kinds of association. But their activities provided a matrix in which new identities, new associations and broader claims developed. Within this matrix, citizens not only contested state expansion, but used the state as a fulcrum to advance their claims against others."

8. E. P. Thompson, *The Making of the English Working Class* (New York, 1966); Charles Tilly, "Britain Creates the Social Movement," in *Social Conflict and the Political Order in Modern Britain*, ed. James E. Cronin and Jonathan Schnerer (New Brunswick, 1982), 221–51; Charles Tilly, *Popular Contention in Great Britain, 1758–1834* (Cambridge, 1995). See also Brian Harrison, "A Genealogy of Reform in Modern Britain," in *Anti-Slavery, Religion, and Reform: Essays in Memory of Roger Anstey*, ed. Christine Bolt and Seymour Drescher (Dawson-Archon, 1980), 21–51.

9. Harriet Taylor Mill, "The Enfranchisement of Women" (originally published in the *Westminster Review*, July, 1851), in *Essays on Sex Equality*, ed. Alice S. Rossi (Chicago, 1970), 91–121, quotation 96.

10. Andrew Rosen, *Rise up Women! The Militant Campaign of the Women's Social and Political Union, 1903–1914* (London, 1974); Jill Liddington and Jill Norris, *One Hand Tied Behind Us: The Rise of the Women's Suffrage Movement* (London, 1978); *Equal or Different: Women's Politics, 1800–1914*, ed. Jane Rendall (Oxford, 1987); Jane Rendall, *The Origins of Modern Feminism: Women in Britain, France and the United States, 1780–1860* (Chicago, 1985). Richard J. Evans published the first comparative study of women's movements: *The Feminists: Women's Emancipation Movements in Europe, American and Australasia, 1840–1920* (London, 1979).

11. Evans, *The Feminists*, 223.

12. Susan Pedersen, *Family, Dependence, and the Origins of the Welfare State: Britain and France* (Cambridge, 1993) compares the politics of the passage of family allowances and other social policies affecting families and mothers. For other comparisons of the passage of social policies see Seth Koven and Sonya Michel, "Womanly Duties: Maternalist Politics and the Origins of Welfare States in France, Germany, Great Britain, and the United States, 1880–1920," *American Historical Review* 95 (1990):1076–1108, which compares the organizations of, and policies promoted by, "maternalist" American, British, French, and German women and contrasts the results along a continuum between noncentralized, noninterventionist states (American, British) and the more politically centralized interventionist ones (German, French); and Jane Lewis, "Gender and the Development of Welfare Regimes," *Journal of European Social Policy* 2 (1995):159–73, which compares Ireland, Britain, France, and Sweden according to the strength of the "male breadwinner model."

13. Pamela Graves, "An Experiment in Women-Centered Socialism: Labour Women in England," in *Women and Socialism/Socialism and Women: Europe between the World Wars*, ed. Helmut Gruber and Pamela Graves (forthcoming).

14. Lewis, "Gender and Welfare Regimes." From this point on, I invite the reader to observe without my comments the ways in which rights of redistribution and recognition appear—constantly, separately or intertwined—in the history of women's citizenship.

15. *Ibid.*, 164.

16. Graves, in "An Experiment," provides an important addendum to Pedersen's argument by showing that many Labour party women, taking exception to the male Labourite position, adopted the postwar feminist position supporting family allowances.

17. Jane Jenson, "The Modern Women's Movement in Italy, France, and Great Britain: Differences in Life Cycles," *Comparative Social Research* 5 (1982):141–375, quotation 365.

18. Steven C. Hause, with Anne R. Kenney, *Women's Suffrage and Social Politics in the French Third Republic* (Princeton, 1984); Christine Bard, *Les filles de Marianne: Histoire des féminismes, 1914–1940* (Paris, 1995), quotation 359. For the missed connection between socialist and bourgeois women supporting women's rights see Charles Sowerwine, "The Socialist Women's Movement from 1850 to 1940," in *Becoming Visible: Women in European History*, ed. Renate Bridenthal, Claudia Koonz, and Susan Stuard (Boston, 1987), 399–426. For greater detail on the working out of socialist politics and women's issues (including information about initiatives at the local level) see Helmut Gruber, "French Women in the Crossfire of Class, Sex, Maternity, and Citizenship," in *Women and Socialism/Socialism and Women*, ed. Helmut Gruber and Pamela Graves (forthcoming).

19. Pedersen, *Family, Dependence, and the Origins of the Welfare State*; Lewis, "Gender and Welfare Regimes."

20. Jane Jenson, "Both Friend and Foe: Women and State Welfare," in *Becoming Visible*, ed. Bridenthal, Koonz, and Stuard, 535–56, argues that because the French feminist movement was not adequately concerned with the state it was unable to defend women against the economic restructuring that began after 1974, including greater recourse to women as part-time workers (hence eligible for fewer benefits). However, as shown by Gisela Kaplan, *Contemporary Western European Feminism* (New York, 1992), 125, France had one of the lowest rates of female part-time work among western European countries (fifteen percent in 1983); this as compared to forty-six percent in Sweden, forty-three percent in Denmark, thirty-eight percent in England, and twenty-four percent in Germany. Women are now a majority of part-time workers in the United States, as reported in Chris Tilly, *Half a Job: Bad and Good Part-Time Jobs in a Changing Labor Market* (Philadelphia, 1996). For the European Community in 1991, Chiara Saraceno shows that France (at 23.8 percent) continued to be below the median in terms of women part-time workers. Germany (30.6 percent) and the United Kingdom (44.2 percent) were above the median, as was Denmark (41.5 percent). Saraceno, "Gender and Europe: National Differences, Resources, and Impediments to the Construction of a Common Interest by European Women," in *European Integration as a Social Process: Historical Perspectives, 1850–1995*, ed. Jytte Klausen and Louise A. Tilly (forthcoming). According to Josette Trat, "Autumn 1995: A Social Storm Blows over France," *Social Politics: International Studies in Gender, State, and Society* 3 (1996):215 (citing *Le Monde* in June 1996), thirty percent of French women worked part-time, compared to five percent of men. France's proportion of women doing part-time work is edging up, but it continues at the low end of the more developed countries. The Mediterranean countries have the lowest rates of women part-time workers. Deborah Mitchell and Geoffrey Garrett, "Women and the Welfare State in the Era of Global Markets," *Social Politics* 3 (1996):185–94, provide further evidence in an analysis of the effects of globalization on women as workers of fourteen countries (including the four discussed here) based on OECD data from 1960–1990. This aggregate analysis, which does not look at differences among countries, finds that levels of trade with non-OECD countries and the extent of capital mobility (both indicators of globalization) are correlated with increased state expenditure for child benefits. At the same time, the analysis suggests that the level of government expenditure on child benefits has decreased, which the authors suggest could be related to governments shifting child care costs back on families via strategies such as dual wage earning in households as wives enter the labor market. (Inadequate data make it impossible to test this.) This combination of findings may be related to increased part-time work by women who might not otherwise have been employed. Such a household-level response to the problem in the United States and Europe does not bode well for women workers.

21. Jane Jenson, "The Liberation and New Rights for French Women," in *Behind the Lines: Gender and the Two World Wars*, ed. Margaret Randolph Higonnet, Jane Jenson, Sonya Michel, and Margaret Collins Weitz (New Haven, 1987), 272–84. Jenson points out that in the early postwar debates there was no "broad discussion of the real needs of women . . . the French welfare state, founded on family policy, shored up and cemented a family structure in which wives and children were dealt with as minors and appendages of men" (281). See also Jane Jenson, "Changing Discourse, Changing Agendas: Political Rights and Reproductive

Policies in France," in *The Women's Movements of the United States and Western Europe: Consciousness, Political Opportunity, and Public Policy*, ed. Mary Fainsod Katzenstein and Carol McClurg Mueller (Philadelphia, 1987), 64–88. Catholic support declined sharply when questions of the legalization of abortion, government support of birth control clinics, or sexual freedom were addressed in the 1960s and 1970s.

22. Lewis, "Gender and Welfare"; Linda Hantrais, "Women, Work, and Welfare in France," in *Women and Social Policies in Europe: Work, Family and the State*, ed. Jane Lewis (Aldershot, 1993), 116–37. Jane Jenson, "Introduction: Some Consequences of Economic and Political Restructuring and Readjustment," *Social Politics* 3 (1996):1–11, sees increased female part-time work as a consequence of French adjustment to global restructuring; see also note 20 above.

23. Pippa Norris, *Politics and Sexual Equality: The Comparative Position of Women in Western Democracies* (Boulder, 1987), 116; Jane Jenson and Mariette Sineau, *Mitterand et les Françaises: Un rendez-vous manqué* (Paris, 1996), 371.

24. Kaplan, *Western European Feminism*, 164; Norris, *Politics and Sexual Equality*, 67.

25. Shirley Dex and Patricia Walters, "Women's Occupational Status in Britain, France and the USA: Explaining the Difference," *Industrial Relations Journal* 20 (1989):203–12. On the comparative rates of part-time work among women workers in western Europe, see note 20 above.

26. Jane Jenson and Mariette Sineau, "Le Mitterandisme: Espoirs et échecs d'une nouvelle synthèse républicaine pour les femmes," *French Politics and Society* 14 (1996):39–49; Jenson and Sineau, *Mitterand et les Françaises*, 355–58.

27. Trat, "Autumn 1995."

28. Kaplan, *Western European Feminism*, 103–4.

29. Evans, *The Feminists*, 110; see also Amy Hackett, "Feminism and Liberalism in Wilhelmine Germany, 1890–1918," in *Liberating Women's History: Theoretical and Critical Essays*, ed. Berenice A. Carroll (Urbana, 1976), 127–36.

30. See Renate Bridenthal and Claudia Koonz, "Beyond *Kinder, Küche, Kirche*: Weimar Women in Politics and Work," in *Liberating Women's History*, ed. Carroll 301–29; and Adelheid von Saldern, "Modernization as Challenge: Perceptions and Endeavors of German Social Democratic Women," in *Women and Socialism/Socialism and Women*, ed. Gruber and Graves (forthcoming).

31. Von Saldern, "Modernization as Challenge"; Atina Grossman, "German Communism and New Women: Dilemmas and Contradictions," in *Women and Socialism/Socialism and Women*, ed. Gruber and Graves (forthcoming).

32. As cited by von Saldern in "Modernization as Challenge": Christl Wickert, "Von der Hausarbeit zur Sozialarbeit: Sozialdemokratische Frauenpolitik und 'Arbeiter wohlfahrt' in Berlin, 1919–1933" in *Studien zur Arbeiterbewegung und Arbeiterkultur in Berlin*, ed. Gert-Joachim Gläessner et al. (Berlin, 1989), 119.

33. Claudia Koonz, "The Fascist Solution to the Woman Question in Italy and Germany," in *Becoming Visible*, ed. Bridenthal, Koonz, and Stuard, 58–59.

34. Ilona Ostner, "Slow Motion: Women, Work and the Family in Germany," in *Work, Family, and the State*, ed. Jane Lewis (Aldershot, 1993), 92–115, quotation 92; Brigitte Young, "The German State and Feminist Politics: A Double Gender Marginalization," *Social Politics* 2 (1996): 159–84.

35. See also Myra Marx Ferree, "Equality and Autonomy: Feminist Politics in the United States and West Germany," in *Women's Movements*, ed. Katzenstein and Mueller, 172–95.

36. Ilona Ostner, "Back to the Fifties: Gender and Welfare in Unified Germany," *Social Politics* 1 (1994):32–59, quotation 55.

37. The account that follows is based primarily on two chapters in Louise A. Tilly and Patricia Gurin, eds., *Women, Politics, and Change* (New York, 1990): Tilly and Gurin, "Introduction," 3–34; and Suzanne Leacock, "Women and American Politics," 35–62.

38. Evans, *The Feminists*, 227, citing Ross Evans Paulson, *Women's Suffrage and Prohibition: A Comparative Study of Equality and Social Control* (Brighton, 1973) and Joseph R. Gusfield, *Symbolic Crusade: Status Politics and the American Temperance Movement* (Urbana, 1963). Feminist historians such as Linda Gordon, *Heroes of their Own Lives: The Politics and History of Family Violence, Boston, 1880–1960* (New York, 1988) have demonstrated that the kind of social control argument made by Paulson and Gusfield needs to be modified by studying popular resistance to pressure from above.

39. See J. Stanley Lemons, *The Woman Citizen: Social Feminism in the 1920s* (Urbana,

1973); William L. O'Neill, *Everyone Was Brave: The Rise and Fall of Feminism in America* (Chicago, 1969).

40. Among the other important projects of socially aware middle-class women were the National Consumers' League and the National Women's Trade Union League.

41. Quoted in Linda Gordon, *Pitied but Not Entitled: Single Mothers and the History of Welfare, 1890–1935* (New York, 1994), 60; see also Gwendolyn Mink, *The Wages of Motherhood: Inequality in the Welfare State, 1917–1942* (New York, 1995).

42. See Nancy F. Cott, *The Grounding of Modern Feminism* (New Haven, 1987).

43. Barbara Jean Nelson, "The Gender, Race and Class Origins of Early Welfare Policy and the Welfare State: A Comparison of Workmen's Compensation and Mothers' Aid," in *Women, Politics, and Change*, ed. Tilly and Gurin, 413–35; Gordon, *Pitied but not Entitled*, 254.

44. See Jo Freeman, "From Protection to Equal Opportunity: The Revolution in Women's Legal Status," in *Women, Politics, and Change*, ed. Tilly and Gurin, 457–81; and Jane Mansbridge, "Organizing for the ERA: Cracks in the Façade of Unity," in *Ibid.*, 323–38.

45. Freeman, "From Protection to Equal Opportunity."

46. Helga Maria Hernes, "Women and the Welfare State: The Transition from Private to Public Dependence," in *Women and the State: The Shifting Boundaries of Public and Private*, ed. Anne Showstack Sassoon (London, 1992), quotations 76.

47. Young, "The German State and Feminist Politics," 175.