

THE COLDEST WAR: RUSSIA'S GAME IN CHINA. By C. L. Sulzberger.
New York and London: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1974. xii, 113 pp. \$2.45,
paper.

In this work, *New York Times* correspondent C. L. Sulzberger depicts the Chinese leadership as viewing the USSR as the prime foreign menace, threatening to encircle China. He also states that "when historians in the year 2000 look back on the final quarter of this century, they will see that it was the present Sino-Soviet relationship that shaped their world" (p. 6).

The book's five chapters are unevenly related to the central theme, and there are some oversimplifications regarding the historical Sino-Soviet relationship. But on the whole, Sulzberger maintains a commendable critical balance, especially in regard to the Chinese. He notes Mao Tse-tung's proclamation that "it will be intolerable if after several decades we are not the greatest nation on earth" (p. 53). Thus it happens that the Chinese compete with the Soviets for influence in the Third World. In addition, he says that "it is plain that China will do its utmost to keep the U.S. and Russia at odds . . ." (p. 106). But Sulzberger observes that both Chairman Mao and Chou En-lai are nearing the end of their days, and quotes Milovan Djilas on the post-Mao prospect: "After he [Mao] dies everything will change" (p. 46). The author finally speculates on the post-Mao Sino-Soviet relationship, without reaching definitive conclusions, and ends his survey on a cautious note: "What we now await is proof that Maoism without Mao can survive a contest against Stalinism without Stalin" (p. 113).

The reader is left unconvinced that it is basically the Sino-Soviet "Coldest War" that will shape the world of the year 2000.

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THE TOTALITARIAN PARTY: PARTY AND PEOPLE IN NAZI GERMANY AND SOVIET RUSSIA. By Aryeh L. Unger. International Studies.
London and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1974. x, 286 pp. \$13.95.

For some decades now political scientists in liberal, constitutional systems have been fascinated by similarities between the Third Reich and the Soviet Union. Those who regarded these similarities as crucial came to bracket German National-Socialism and Soviet Communism together under the rubric of totalitarianism, a concept which has become more and more controversial. The book reviewed here seeks, rather cautiously, to rehabilitate the concept of totalitarianism. For this purpose, its author compares the single ruling parties of the Third Reich and the USSR, or at least, some of their functions. Specifically, his book deals with the relations of the CPSU and the NSDAP to the citizens in their respective countries.

Using a rich array of sources, Unger examines ideological statements both parties have made about their relations with the people, and then describes party organization, agitation, welfare measures, and attempts to gauge public opinion. He also includes a chapter on the attempts to mold people and opinions through entertainment, ritual, and the organized use of leisure. All these operations are examined primarily as they function at the grass roots level, that is, in the workshop, the neighborhood, the town. In short, Unger is interested in the parties' impact on the daily lives of the citizens.

Commendably, Unger seeks to examine activities rather than rhetoric, but he is not always successful. He seems, at times, to take the parties' accounts of their activities more seriously than they deserve; and he is quite aware of this. Unavoidably, the comparison of the parties is also marred by the uneven treatment Unger had to give them: the source material for the two parties is very different, especially since the author does not appear to have used the Smolensk archive. Further, the CPSU has been in power almost five times as long as the NSDAP. Both parties have, however, gone through stormy, troubled times and significant changes, and generalizations must be made with extreme caution. Despite these difficulties, Unger has enriched the literature on these parties by providing interesting details and fascinating glimpses into their inner workings. For this reviewer, his chapter on the functions of the block leader in the Third Reich was, perhaps, the most rewarding.

The author's thesis is the essential similarity in the relations of these parties with the masses of the population. He argues that totalitarian parties need mass support, but distrust spontaneity. Hence they must attempt to impose total control even over private lives, and they do this not only through propaganda and organization, but also through surveillance, provision of welfare, and organized use of leisure. The aim of this control is total mobilization, that is, the activation of the citizens to regime goals and norms.

Except for numerous details which Unger adduces, this thesis has been stated many times, and it has not become any more convincing by repetition. His own book is unconvincing for a variety of reasons, many of which he himself provides. First, it is theoretically weak. Much work has been done on fascist and communist regimes and on elite-mass relations in general. Unger has disregarded most of this vast literature in favor of the shopworn model of totalitarianism. As a result, the book seems one-dimensional and unhistorical. Unger writes that without total control over the population, totalitarian societies would collapse (p. 265). Awareness of the historical background of both regimes might have caused him to reverse this sentence to state that without totalitarianism these societies would have been out of control, for both parties came to power because of the chaos that preceded them. In a sense, both regimes were symptoms of the failures of liberalism. Unger also writes that mobilization is always for action (p. 35). Had he been more aware of the theoretical literature, he would have had to take issue with the thesis advanced by Organski and others, that the aim of the NSDAP was the *demobilization* of the masses, while the CPSU does, indeed, seek to mobilize them for productive work and for participation, no matter how contrived (pp. 120ff.). The whole elite-mass relationship appears misplaced to this reviewer, since it obscures many essential differences in the composition, organization, and functioning of these parties, differences of which Unger must certainly be well aware. For example, the parties may have laid very different stress on the need to indoctrinate their subjects, and especially their various elites—because the CPSU seems much more interested in indoctrinating elites, Unger's stress on its impact at the grass roots may be misplaced.

Thus, the entire theme of the book tends to obscure the overall differences in the functions of the two parties, just as it seems to overestimate the role played by the NSDAP, both in running the country and in the daily lives of its citizens. The role of the CPSU is that of ruling a growing industrial empire; the role of the NSDAP appears to have been little more than that of a societal cheerleader. Soviet

administration appears purposive, rational, and reasonably well-coordinated in contrast to the "intrigues and enmities that riddled the leadership of the Third Reich" (p. 245). In the Third Reich the assessment of public opinion generally resulted in self-deception, while in the USSR the leadership is more likely to obtain a realistic image. Soviet politics is the politics of productive work, while National-Socialist politics was politics as a staged show. Many other differences are made clear in the book: the most glaring difference between the NSDAP and the CPSU is, perhaps, the care with which the NSDAP refrained from encompassing business and industry in its organization. Significant differences in the composition of the membership are also noted, although much more could have been added, especially concerning the differences between rank-and-file members and party professionals. Unger himself points out that rank-and-file membership in the NSDAP was encouraged for its demonstration effect, while in the CPSU it entails genuine leadership functions. The list of significant differences could be lengthened at will.

As a result, this book should be welcomed for the rich information it provides to readers unfamiliar with the German and Russian sources; but, as a contribution to the theory of one-party systems, it fails.

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YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST AFFAIRS, 1974. Edited by *Richard F. Staar*. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1974. xix, 648 pp. \$25.00.

A colleague of mine thinks that to undertake any review demonstrates a lack of professional good judgment. He may be right. Certainly a single scholar who undertakes to review a *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs* reveals hopeless pretension, unsound judgment, or very limited objectives. My plan is to place this review squarely in the latter category.

The review concerns itself with only two questions: how does this volume of the *YICA* succeed as a yearbook, and what uses does the 1974 edition have for Communist studies? With respect to the second question, my competence to judge the scholarly quality of the individual pieces which make up the *YICA* is limited to essays on the Soviet Union, with some additional, although uneven, interest in and competence to judge the chapters on East and West Europe.

The scope of the *YICA* requires the above disclaimers. It devotes approximately 100 of its 648 pages to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, another 100 pages to Western Europe, and then includes sections on the Middle East and Africa, the Americas, Asia and the Pacific, and finally, a section on International Communist Front Organizations. Within these geographical divisions, individual countries are described according to a general, but apparently flexible pattern—some history, data on the composition of individual Communist parties and their elites, and description of the basic developments in domestic and foreign policies. It is apparent that the editor (Richard Staar) and the publisher (the Hoover Institution Press of Stanford University) have permitted the individual authors considerable latitude of style and judgment within this general framework, and this sensible decision also explains the principal virtue of the *YICA*—that it appears at all, that it has done so through eight successive editions, and that it appears soon enough to be of use to students of Communist affairs with an interest in contemporary developments.