

THE SOVIET UNION AND THE ARAB EAST UNDER KHRUSHCHEV.

By *Oles M. Smolansky*. The Modern Middle East Series, vol. 6. The Middle East Institute, Columbia University. Lewisburg, Pa.: Bucknell University Press, 1974. 326 pp. \$15.00.

In this book the intricacies of Soviet-Arab relations during the Khrushchev era are displayed and explained through a series of narratives dealing with periods of crises in these relations. Accounts of the origins (1954–55) and of subsequent critical moments (1956–58) in Soviet-Arab relations are followed by narrations, with running commentary, of Arab (Egyptian, Syrian, and Iraqi) actions and Soviet reactions in 1959–63, and of Khrushchev's visit to Egypt in May 1964. The concluding chapter, "The Ultimate Failure of Khrushchev's Policies," resumes and reconsiders the successive stages—initiation, evolution, and complication—in Khrushchev's general enterprise of establishing patron-and-client relationships with three of the most important Arab states.

For the Soviet side of the picture, the author's coverage of Soviet and other published sources is extensive, and his selection of them is judicious and well organized in relation to the story he tells. The Cairo, Baghdad, and Damascus press has not been neglected, but is necessarily more selectively and summarily used. While Soviet-Arab relations are the essential foreground of the study, the logically inseparable theme of Arab-Western relations is not relegated into a mere background position; the model (p. 297) of "a trio of partially intersecting circles each representing the interests of one of the parties concerned"—the Arabs, the USSR, and the West—is a simple but fine aid to clarity about a subject which has too often been obscured by the turbid waters of rhetoric.

But the greatest value of this exemplary investigation of Soviet foreign policy conduct—in a particular part of the world during a particular period—is the thoroughness and consistency with which it has been carried out. It is an object lesson in how much illumination about the USSR's perception of its foreign policy interests can be derived from Soviet published sources. The book is an impressive and at the same time a modest exercise. It is impressive in its methodical marshalling of the evidence. It is modest in keeping, in self-denying fashion, within the limits of its brief. Dr. Smolansky deserves the gratitude of all those concerned for the enlargement of public understanding on this important subject.

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THE END OF THE POSTWAR ERA: A NEW BALANCE OF WORLD

POWER. By *Alastair Buchan*. New York: Saturday Review Press/E. P. Dutton & Company, 1974. x, 347 pp. \$8.95.

This is an essay in global history, analysis, and prescription—military, political, and economic. Alastair Buchan, for twelve years director of the Institute for Strategic Studies, since 1970 professor of international relations at Oxford, is one of the few qualified to try his hand at so large a canvas.

The book was formally completed in September 1973. A footnote catches up with the fourth Arab-Israeli war, and passages are added on various implications of OPEC's quadrupling of the oil price; but President Nixon's resignation, the

congressional elections of 1974, the Communist takeover of Indochina, the Indian explosion of a nuclear device, the combination of accelerated inflation and deep recession in the OECD world, the North-South rhetorical confrontations in the United Nations of 1974–75, the meetings and agreements at Vladivostok and Helsinki all lie beyond. These and other events have altered the setting of the book which, at times, has an antique, late-Nixon flavor; but its underlying argument is sufficiently sturdy to remain relevant almost three years after the date of the preface.

Buchan's central theme is the progressive diffusion of power away from Moscow and Washington since the late 1950s, except in nuclear matters; his central objective is to define what will be required if the resultant multipolar world is to yield order rather than chaos in the face of the issues of the 1970s.

He begins his argument with a four-chapter, eighty-three-page history of the world since 1945. The analysis focuses toward its close on how President Nixon, from a relatively weakened American position in the world economy, confronting also a strong popular impulse to reduce America's external burdens, sought a new stable power balance by opening relations with China while dramatizing also the long, slow movement toward détente with the USSR. It concludes by asking, in effect, if an America operating within these economic and political constraints can play the minimum necessary role required for this new multipolar balance—embracing Western Europe and Japan as well as the United States, the USSR, and China—to remain reasonably stable.

Looking to the future, Buchan finds the global agenda will be shaped by certain powerful forces at work altering the relations between the state and society, rendering the world's economy increasingly transnational and interdependent at a time of chronic resource scarcities, when inhibitions on the use of military force are continuing to rise. This effort to define certain general characteristics of the international scene (chapter 5) is one of the most interesting and least conclusive sections of the book.

Buchan then turns to a more conventional mode of analysis. He considers in sequence the strengths and weaknesses in the time ahead of the USSR, China, the United States, Western Europe, and Japan (chapters 6–9). The strengths and weaknesses are occasionally related to the new agenda of chapter 5, but a good deal of time is spent on constitutional issues of more general significance—for example, the problems of succession in Moscow and Peking, the implications of Nixon's decline, the likely degree of political unity within the Common Market, the Japanese rearmament dilemma, and so forth.

With his five main characters now defined, Buchan explores (chapter 10) what kind of behavior is required of them to avoid major conflict in the two most sensitive areas of the world: the Middle East and Southeast Asia. In the Middle East, Buchan doubts stable peace will emerge except on the European model; that is, "by [the two superpowers] signing alliances with each party and stationing troops in the area . . ." (p. 284). In Southeast Asia, on the contrary, only mutual restraint by all the interested powers is judged compatible with peace.

The book closes with more general reflections centered on the interconnections among negotiations proceeding with respect to SALT II, European security and force reductions, trade and monetary affairs, OECD-OPEC relations, and the law of the sea. For these to succeed, Buchan concludes, there are three fundamental requirements (p. 315): "First, the maintenance of an organic political and eco-

conomic relationship between the United States, Europe and Japan; second, the encouragement of all promising forms of regional association while maintaining the accessibility of their component states, especially in the developing world, to all the major powers; third, the creation of new forms of international organization to remove certain new, global problems from the interplay of power politics. These are not pieties, but, in my view, requirements which if neglected may create great and perhaps irreparable damage to order, prosperity and justice." And these, in turn, require a new passage of political creativity in the West (p. 320): "However great the power of Russia, however fine and fair the civilization of China or of India, however just the claims of the developing countries, if the springs of political improvisation in the West dry up then the new agenda of world politics will be a barren one."

I find Buchan's analysis and prescription broadly congenial; but no two men are likely to view so large a panorama in identical terms. In the historical chapters, for example, I was surprised that his analysis of the origins of the Korean War fails to take account of the credible narrative in the first volume of Khrushchev's memoirs; and that he does not deal with the post-Sputnik Moscow summit conference of November 1957, the proximate occasion for both a definitive widening of the Sino-Soviet split and the re-starting of war in Indochina. His view of President Johnson's motives with respect to Southeast Asia are unnecessarily simplistic; and he is quite wrong in asserting (p. 38) that President Johnson's "preoccupation with Vietnam made it difficult to prepare an American position" for the SALT talks. There is, literally, no issue to which Johnson devoted more attention and to which he attached higher priority in 1967-68. Problems in Moscow, not Washington, delayed SALT I. Nevertheless, in getting the reader briskly from 1945 to the latter months of 1973, Buchan's short course history of the cold war is quite serviceable.

More serious problems lie in the clash between Buchan's acceptance of a five-centered world of power and the tasks that lie ahead in energy, food, raw materials, and so forth. The split between Moscow and Peking, the Western European role in NATO and in negotiations about European security and mutual troop withdrawals, the potential Japanese as well as Chinese roles in avoiding major conflict in Korea and Southeast Asia are real enough elements in the balance of power. But more is obscured than illuminated by elevating these factors into a general theory. I roughly estimate that India and the Middle East each get, at most, a sixth of the space devoted to China in this book, Africa and Latin America an eighth. This is, in my view, a serious disproportioning of thought and attention even if the focus of analysis were the balance of power in the narrow, conventional sense. The disproportion becomes unmanageable if one recognizes, as Buchan does, that a much wider diffusion of power has occurred and, related to it, a whole new agenda highly charged with strategic as well as political meaning. Recall Buchan's three fundamental requirements for stability: intimate cooperation within the OECD world; more effective regionalism in the developing continents; new forms of international organization on inherently global economic tasks. Buchan makes a lucid case for the first of these requirements; but the foundations for the latter two are not laid. Indeed, they could not be laid without detailed attention to the problems of Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, and Asia which would have made this a quite different kind of volume.

In a sense, then, Buchan's book suffers from the same problem as American, Western European, and Japanese diplomacy: it was struck from the blind side by the Price Revolution of 1972-75 and all its implications. Both the book and Western diplomacy perceive certain directions in which policy must go. But the intellectual and political foundations for policies to match the new agenda are thin and uncertain. The older balance-of-power tasks remain: SALT and assuring stability in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. But the constructs of September 1973 no longer suffice. It is a virtue of Buchan's study that, while framed by these constructs, it also contributes to the search for new perspectives and policies.

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LES INSTITUTIONS SOVIÉTIQUES. By *Michel Lesage*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1975. 128 pp. Paper.

Michel Lesage, France's most prominent specialist on the Soviet governmental system, assesses the current Soviet scene in this new popular text. The author believes that the Soviet system serves as an important model for much of the socialist world, that Soviet political institutions are in transition from Stalin's model to some modified form because of urbanization and an increase in the number of Soviet scientists and technocrats, and that goals have changed from a desire for rapid and radical overthrow of traditional institutions to a mere "bending" of existing forms to meet the new needs. The Communist Party is seen as changing its role from an authority imposing its will on the public to one of mediator between various social groupings, searching for an equilibrium acceptable to all. Today's emphasis is upon stability of relationships with ever-increasing recourse by the party to discussions among these groupings prior to the issuance of final directives. The debate today is between those favoring equilibrium in arms with the West rather than absolute supremacy; between those preferring investment in consumer goods rather than heavy industry; and between those favoring an increase in the local soviets' authority to provide lodging and services rather than central direction of the entire administration. In short, Lesage sees the revolution from above as largely over.

The state constitution promised by Brezhnev for 1976 is, in Lesage's view, unlikely to introduce organizational changes. Rather, it will confirm in law changes already occurring in economics and in the social, cultural, and political systems. It may resolve some debates, however—notably those over economic administration, where there is no agreement on the modalities of increasing productivity whether through self-financing, premiums and so forth, or through central direction. Lesage sees the trend toward a middle way through use of giant new industrial combinations to replace the smaller individual factories organized as corporate entities.

On the subject of "interest groups," brought to the fore by H. Gordon Skilling in 1960, Lesage partially agrees with Skilling. Differing "milieux" (party, administration, police, army, and so forth) whose expressed interests serve to modify the political climate are forming in Soviet society, but the party still intervenes to influence the direction in which these groups express their interests publicly. The dismissal of *Novyi mir's* editor, Tvardovskii, is seen as an indication of the limita-