

KARL W. RYAVEC

## Six Soviet Books on the American Political System

S.Sh.A.: GOSUDARSTVO, POLITIKA, VYBORY. By *Vladimir Izrailevich Gantman* and *Sergo Anastasovich Mikoyan*. Moscow: Iuridicheskaiia literatura, 1969. 190 pp. 30 kopeks.

FRANKLIN RUSVEL'T: CHELOVEK I POLITIK. By *Nikolai Nikolaevich Iakovlev*. 2nd ed. Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1969. 502 pp. 1.76 rubles.

POLITICHESKAIA NAUKA V S.Sh.A.: KRITIKA BURZHUAZNYKH KONTSEPTSII VLASTI. By *Valerii Georgievich Kalensky*. Moscow: Iuridicheskaiia literatura, 1969. 103 pp. 33 kopeks.

S.Sh.A.: POLITIKA I UPRAVLENIE (FEDERAL'NYI PRAVITEL'STVEN-  
NYI APPARAT). By *Sergei Borisovich Marinin*. Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye  
otnosheniia, 1967. 239 pp. 80 kopeks.

FERMERY I VASHINGTON. By *Vladimir Petrovich Zolotukhin*. Moscow:  
"Mysl'," 1968. 270 pp. 1.03 rubles.

MISTERY MILLIARDY. By *Valentin Sergeevich Zorin*. Moscow: Molodaia  
gvardiia, 1968. 268 pp. 73 kopeks.

These books make it obvious that contemporary Soviet analysis of American society cannot be automatically consigned to any narrow political category. Soviet policy makers and others who need to know about the outside world require facts. These can best be provided by specialists not dominated by ideological preconceptions and formulas. Most of the six books reviewed present reasonably accurate, though ideologically colored, information about the United States in a way understandable to almost any Soviet citizen. This can have its light side; for example, Gantman and Mikoyan engage in a lengthy and serious physical description of an American voting machine, comparing it to a Soviet soft drink dispenser.

Four of the books reviewed here seem to have been written using only materials available in the USSR. However, the authors of the other two, Zolotukhin and Zorin, seem to have worked in the United States. Zorin describes two meetings with J. Paul Getty, the wealthy oilman, and Zolotukhin uses sources such as a recording in Columbia University's Oral History project, a typescript at the New York Public Library, a National Archives Records Group, and a manuscript collection of the Library of Congress. Of

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This article was written while the author was a research fellow at the Russian Research Center, Harvard University.

the six studies, Zolotukhin's has the best "feel" for the United States. The reliance of the rest of these works upon printed source materials available in the USSR does not, on balance, turn out to have been a serious limitation. Their authors had access to a multiplicity of U.S. government documents, the main secondary American works in their fields, the major newspapers and periodicals (those of the "establishment" predominating, however), and numerous minor items. Publications of the CPUSA make up only a sprinkling among American sources used. Interestingly, no use is made of West European studies of the United States except for a few of D. W. Brogan's books.

Three of the books were printed in quite small editions (*tirazh*) of approximately five thousand copies each. The other two serious works were printed in larger quantities: the one by Gantman and Mikoyan in twenty thousand copies and Iakovlev's in fifty thousand.<sup>1</sup> Zorin's book, the only one of the six that is plainly propagandistic in content and purpose, was published in sixty-five thousand copies.<sup>2</sup>

Kalensky's *Political Science in the USA* is the first scholarly Soviet book on American political science.<sup>3</sup> This small paperback contains three main sections: (1) a history of the development of American political science which stresses its movement away from a legal and institutional orientation to a behavioral one; (2) a discussion of some of the influential concepts in use since World War II stressing those involving interest groups, elites, and power; and (3) an outline presentation of the sociologically based aspects of the field such as personality, alienation, legitimacy, and political culture.

One of Kalensky's main purposes is to explain why this way of studying political phenomena developed first in the United States. His central thesis is that American political science is a necessary tool or instrument of the leaders of American state monopoly capitalism in governing the "empire" acquired during and after the Second World War (pp. 20 and 61). He correctly notes that the war provided impetus for the great development of American social sciences, partly through the mobilization of scholars for various war-related purposes (e.g., psychological warfare). He is not justified, however, in saying that American political scientists are concerned mainly with preserving the stability of society; many are indifferent or even hostile to

1. S. A. Mikoyan is the son of the former president of the Soviet Union, Anastas Mikoyan, and is now chief editor of the journal *Latinskaia Amerika*.

2. A figure surpassed by a similar book of his, *Nekoronnannye koroli Ameriki* (Moscow, 1968), which was printed in one hundred thousand copies.

3. It no doubt grew out of his previous work on the same topic—for example, "O predmete i metode burzhuaznoi politicheskoi nauki," *Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo*, 1966, no. 9, pp. 33–41. Kalensky was then a *kandidat* of juridical sciences employed by the Institute of State and Law of the USSR Academy of Sciences. A review of this book by Peter H. Solomon, Jr., is in the *American Political Science Review*, 64, no. 1 (March 1970): 188–89.

the status quo. He is also incorrect in his contention that American political leaders generally depend upon the findings of academic political scientists (Henry Kissinger being a notable exception). Even political analysts in government service often are without influence in policy-making. There are many in the federal foreign-affairs bureaucracy, for example, who are against the war in Vietnam.

In the second part of his book the author strongly criticizes interest group theory and its use, stating that although the "group" view is somewhat "realistic" for the politics of "bourgeois" societies, the main developers of the theory "vulgarized" the political process. Equilibrium in a political system cannot be automatically achieved by the competition of interest groups alone, he asserts. He considers that during the New Deal the interests of "particular groups of the ruling class" were subordinated to the general interests of the bourgeoisie. Kalensky also considers Bentley, Truman, and other interest group theorists to be apolitical because they do not examine which strata of society form effective interest groups and why this is so. Obviously he assumes that an analysis of the "social content" of interest group politics would lead one to a Marxist position. It should be mentioned, however, that many of the objections made by Kalensky and other Soviet writers to influential concepts and views in American political science are also being made, but on a non-Marxist basis, by American observers and students of American politics.

As for theories of elites, Kalensky writes as a continental European and, although C. Wright Mills's "power elite" view might support a vulgar Marxist view of American society, he instead seems to accept Dahl's criticism of Mills because the latter ignored the growing independent role of the state bureaucracy. Such an emphasis on the state as an independent factor appears in four of the books reviewed. It does not fit easily into a Marxist-Leninist view of politics and seems to belong to a frame of reference more fundamental than ideology. Kalensky tries, however, to force this view back into a Marxist framework by arguing, unconvincingly, that the "contemporary bourgeois state is the weapon of the rule of this [i.e., the bourgeois] class" (p. 46).

In the book's last section and in the conclusion Kalensky launches an attack upon behavioralism in American political science and seems at times to side with the traditionalists. He criticizes behavioralism for being too abstract and formalistic and for avoiding broad generalizations because they cannot be tested empirically. He charges that, partly as a result, behavioralism constitutes a "screen for the antidemocratic and conservative character of political science in the USA" (p. 99), and he cites Bay to the effect that the "pseudo-political" facts of American behavioralism do not have a moral value and provide no ideals. He also cites Meehan, saying that to make methodology and quantitative analysis ends in themselves is only avoiding the solution of

acute political problems. By doing this he attempts to muster American support for the Soviet Marxist view that American society suffers from basic and ineradicable contradictions which eventually will destroy it.

Notable among his other criticisms is the not unwarranted charge that Almond and Verba in their *Civic Culture* display a patent sympathy for Anglo-American political forms and standards, underestimate the unavoidable difficulties of new nations in the process of political development, and ignore the current fragmentation and even polarization present in American politics itself. In a more ideological vein, he attacks the comparative study by Brzezinski and Huntington, *Political Power: USA/USSR*, because it posits the disappearance of the party and its monopoly of power (p. 92).

Overall, Kalensky's presentation is scholarly. He presents the views and findings of various American scholars straightforwardly without alterations and then presents his or a "Soviet style" demurrer. An example of such relative objectivity is the citing of Lipset's view in *Political Man* that many lower-class people do not want great political roles. He even recognizes the existence of right-wing extremism among workers, notes that a revolutionary situation does not exist in the United States, and recognizes that "a certain level of political rights and freedoms is preserved . . ." (p. 76) (where is the formerly ever-present adjective "bourgeois"?). He even says of the behavioralists that "many facts . . . brought to light by them in the course of empirical research doubtlessly can and must be used by Marxist scholars studying the political organization of contemporary capitalist society" (p. 98). An amusing lexical addendum is Kalensky's use of non-Russian terms (e.g., *bikheviorskii, isteblishment*) and his Russianization of others (e.g., *prokurennaiia komnata, belyi boomerang, and mozgovoi trest*).

Another book for "Americanologists" rather than the general Soviet public is Gantman and Mikoyan's *USA: The State, Politics, Elections*. Stylistically, it is better than Kalensky's book. Its intent is equally serious: to provide an explanation for the emphases and drives of American foreign policy, the outcomes of the 1964 and 1968 presidential elections, and some of the problems now faced by the American polity. Its sources are American best sellers on politics, mass circulation periodicals, and a few of the major newspapers. Publications of the CPUSA are referred to only twice. It emphasizes the president and his role in the making of foreign policy, but also deals with elections, the Congress, and parties. The president is called a most powerful "elected monarch," although the impact of this is lessened by saying that he governs for a ruling elite.

Although the authors' view of Congress is basically realistic in terms of recognizing the power relations involved, they ascribe too limited a role to the Congress, which among the world's legislatures may make the best attempt

to compete with the executive. Also, their low estimate of the power of Congress when the party other than the president's is in the majority is completely unfounded.

Their discussion of American political parties is better and also more interesting. Although the long-standing official Soviet view of bourgeois parties can be found here—all serve monopoly capital, thus cheating the voters of meaningful choice—the two major American parties are examined seriously. The authors assert that the main political divisions in America exist within the two major parties, not between them. Third parties are seen as only temporary propaganda apparatuses for the selection of a presidential candidate. The CPUSA is given only two pages, although it is assigned undue importance within those. The discussion of factions is of interest. The Democratic Party is seen as having three wings, and an essentially historical, non-Marxist explanation is given for their existence. Curiously, the main difference between the Republican and Democratic parties is said to be the fact that the Republican Party has almost no left wing.

The most significant part of the book is the section dealing with United States foreign policy, particularly policy toward Vietnam. The attitudes expressed here are an indication that a group in the Soviet political elite is willing to view American involvement in Vietnam as an accident—that is, an activity which did not arise directly out of logical, conscious planning that predicated the end result prior to the implementation of policy. The Tonkin Gulf Resolution is said to have been an electoral ploy, and it is recognized that President Johnson had been against intervention in Indo-China earlier, for example in 1954 at the time of Dienbienphu. The Vietnam war is called a “mistake,” and it, like others, is blamed upon bipartisan foreign policy, which is called an “unprincipled” pattern. United States “ruling circles” are viewed as people who could not avoid recognizing that the effort in Vietnam was futile. The authors even state that opposition to the war has been present in “all” circles, including the higher military (p. 108) and big business (p. 107). In a more theoretical vein, the authors state that there is no “automatic” connection between the relation of forces in the world and the concrete foreign policies of the United States, since various political factions view events and act subjectively. This implies that Marxist assumptions and categories of analysis may be avoided in some Soviet analyses and policy decisions. Here again we see an implicit recognition of the independent power of the state and a tendency to view some of the political processes in the United States as similar to those in the Soviet Union. Vietnam apart, the other major foreign policy concern in the book seems to be American policy toward Europe. The authors predict that the United States's prime area of concern will again be Europe and display annoyance at the Atlantic “partnership” idea but say it is too complicated a plan to be carried out. They also speak out strongly against “bridge-building”

as an antisocialist (read “anti-Soviet”) outgrowth of the “convergence theory” and the ideas of Tinbergen, Sorokin, and Rostow. They say the United States is demonstrating a definite cleverness in trying to limit nationalism in Western Europe while promoting it in Eastern Europe. Perhaps this concern indicates that such a policy, if intelligently pursued, is viewed as potentially effective.

The book is quite favorable to Kennedy, and even Nixon is not portrayed as a potential villain. It is noted that no recent presidential legacy has been so “difficult and complicated” as the one Johnson bequeathed to Nixon. Although it is obvious that the passing of Kennedy is regretted, the book ends with an optimistic note on the possibilities for better U.S.-Soviet relations and a more stable American domestic situation inherent, ironically, in the 1972 elections. However, it is clear that from the Soviet point of view a “good” U.S. foreign policy would be one in which United States interests would be defined narrowly. The Americans most often quoted favorably by the authors are Fulbright, Reston, Lippmann, and Galbraith—all of whom advocate a more limited American foreign policy.

This book contains no new facts or interpretations (though hints of new interpretations are present), but it is a good journalistic study showing a relative balance, with lapses into propaganda apparent only on the few occasions when social problems are mentioned.

V. P. Zolotukhin justifies his book, *Farmers and Washington*, by asserting that one of the “most acute” questions in American politics is the farm problem, a claim that would have been appropriate in the 1950s or earlier but hardly today when less than 5 percent of the work force is engaged in agriculture. The author stresses the significance of farmers’ politics through overemphasis and some topicality (e.g., mention of the recent strikes of agricultural laborers in California). However, I believe the actual purpose of this book is to examine a segment of American “bourgeois” society which has often been against the industrial proletariat (i.e., the farmers), in order to show that they could still join forces with the proletariat in an anticapitalist revolution. The book does not search for American agricultural policies that might serve to alleviate some of the chronic difficulties of Soviet farming. Zolotukhin does not suggest borrowing any American patterns or practices, although that is something the Soviet government is not against, as its recent call for the adoption of vertical integration in agriculture indicates.<sup>4</sup>

This book is essentially a history of the American farmers’ movement since the 1920s which attempts to examine the interaction between the three main farmers’ organizations and federal legislation. The author divides farmers into three strata on economic grounds and states that the farm organizations

4. Although this type of agricultural-industrial combination in the United States has been denounced in two articles in *S.Sh.A.* (June 1970), an *Izvestiia* article of August 6, 1970, urges its adoption in the USSR.

have been essentially agents of the businessmen-farmers. However, the book is a sociolegal study rather than a political one. The author covers the actual politics of the farm organizations on the basic issues of parity and subsidies only in the second half when he discusses the conflicts among them. The study is divided into essentially four chapters which deal with various time periods: 1932–33, 1933–40, 1940–45, and 1946–65. The author accepts the view that much of the violence farmers displayed in their struggles with banks, industrial corporations, and the government was due not to any revolutionary desires or goals but to the understandable reactions of God-fearing conservatives unable to bear the burdens they considered to be injustices (p. 76). Despite undue emphasis upon the activities and programs of the CPUSA and the author's search for a revolutionary crisis in the farmers' situation, the book is readable, solidly based on the necessary sources, and relatively unbiased.

Marinin's *USA: Politics and Administration* is written from a definite point of view with theses forcefully argued but with occasional lapses into error and even propaganda. It is interesting both as a serious Soviet study of the American government's executive branch and as a significant source indicating what Soviet political analysts say about this key institution.

Marinin deals with the reasons for the growth of executive power, the basic organizational features and functions of executive organs, the major agencies of the executive (e.g., the National Security Council), the White House staff, the Cabinet, independent agencies, and the departments. The brief conclusion is a sharp critique of Western theories of the liberal-democratic state. Of the books reviewed here, this one, despite some errors and exaggerated statements, presents the most powerful attack upon the claims commonly made for the vitality and viability of democracy in the American political system, and in this sense is the most significant of the books reviewed.

The ostensible reason for the book is the increasing importance of the "executive apparatus" in the United States. The stated goal is the presentation of the "functional characteristics" of the executive agencies. The tone and some of the content, however, have no doubt been formed by the change in the Soviet view of the United States since 1965—subscription to the thesis of the "activation of reaction" which was facilitated, although not at all caused, by the increasing American involvement in Vietnam after early 1965.<sup>5</sup>

A presentation of Marinin's theses reveals the basic problems of the book: the president and (somehow) the monopoly capitalists run the country; the president controls and (at the same time) is independent of Congress yet (somehow) is a puppet of his staff (who are appointed by the president

5. For a discussion of the effects of the Vietnam war on Soviet-American relations see William Zimmerman, "Soviet Perceptions of the United States," in Alexander Dallin and T. B. Larson, eds., *Soviet Politics Since Khrushchev* (Englewood Cliffs, 1968), esp. pp. 174–79.

without Congress's having any effective say in the matter); the United States now is ruled, in effect, by a centralized state of the classic continental European type in which bureaucrats make major decisions on their own, yet (somehow) lobbies run destructively amok through the bureaucracy's intricate policies. Despite such apparent contradictions, Marinin scores some telling points in his verbal bouts with the American "Leviathan." Notable among these is his charge, similar to those made by veteran American civil servants, that the machinery of the United States government is overbureaucratized and so mired in a network of joint committees that effective decision-making is difficult. For example, he labels the Department of State a *zaputannyyi* structure that overemphasizes paperwork (p. 174).<sup>6</sup>

Marinin writes of the growth of federal power in an almost naïvely "conservative" tone, his narrative suggesting that such growth should not have occurred and is in some way "un-American." Iakovlev writes in the same vein. Several times Marinin cites statements which are obviously from the conservative side of the American political spectrum. He also continually notes how small a particular department or agency was in the early nineteenth century, as if such a scale were still appropriate. The author considers the great growth in the federal government's power and agencies as a mid-twentieth-century phenomenon of three stages—the New Deal, World War II, and the postwar years. According to him the "executive apparatus" has three main functions ("intereconomic," "interpolitical," and "external"), which have been strengthened through development in three ways: the broadening of the competence of the "traditional departments," the addition of new "independent agencies," and the creation of a suprdepartmental coordinating apparatus (probably meaning the White House staff) which "defines the essence of presidential decisions" (p. 91). He asserts that since the United States is now the main capitalist power, the "external" grouping of functions "is coming to the fore" (*vydvigaetsia na pervyi plan*, p. 51).

Although there are several errors in the book, it is unclear whether these errors should be ascribed to ignorance or to deliberate obfuscation. For example, the author (1) overemphasizes the power of the president, (2) states that the Supreme Court's main achievement has been the strengthening of the executive power but ignores its role in increasing the degree of security of the individual, (3) misinterprets the means of presidential influence with Congress as effective powers over it, (4) regards the states and localities as subordinate to the federal government, (5) says that the Department of Justice is in charge of the "police," and (6) categorizes the Department of the Interior as

6. For a critique of the Department of State by a member of the U.S. Foreign Service (who is a former staff assistant to the undersecretary of state) see John Franklin Campbell, "What Is To Be Done?—Gigantism in Washington," *Foreign Affairs*, 49, no. 1 (October 1970): 81–99.



a “punitive” (*karatel'nyi*) agency. In saying these things he wrongly attributes to the United States a number of the characteristics of the Soviet state.

He may be correct, of course, in saying that the White House organization has superseded the Cabinet in importance. Interestingly, he stresses the role of the National Security Council, especially during the Cuban missile crisis, but writes less about the Central Intelligence Agency or the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, which is said to be a part of the State Department. The power and importance of the chief presidential assistants of Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson are emphasized. This section of the book is a functionary's primer of the U.S. government's national security agencies.

Marinin's sources are varied. He uses the major works of Binkley, Fenno, Finer, and Koenig, the texts of Carr et al. and Ferguson and McHenry, the memoirs of presidents since World War II and of some of the key personages of the executive branch (e.g., Sorensen and Adams), government documents and reports (e.g., various budgets, statutes, and Congressional committee reports), and miscellaneous journalistic books and articles. When not using standard sources, the author cites right-of-center publications and writers who are against “big government.”

The conclusion constitutes an interesting attack upon the standard Western concept of the democratic state. Marinin asserts that “bourgeois” theorists are trying to justify the capitalist state by citing its economic and social activities and by claiming that it now serves the general good as a pluralistic democracy or a people's capitalism. He cites Europeans, not Americans, as the main progenitors of this reformulation—Duguit, Laski, Finer, and Keynes, but implies that the American state is the form which most closely approximates their ideas. Marinin categorically rejects any idea of the “fractionalization” (*drobienie*) of state sovereignty and asserts that the social actions of a state do not support such a notion.

Although Iakovlev's entire biography of Roosevelt is of interest to a student of the USSR, the latter half, emphasizing as it does the antecedents and preliminaries of World War II and the war itself, merits the most attention here. The attitude of Roosevelt and his administration to the USSR is presented as one of basic ideological hostility, cold realism, overriding concern for strengthening the position of the United States and for consciously limiting the power and influence of the Soviet Union. The author argues, for example, that at Yalta Roosevelt effectively defended the interests of the United States (p. 489). Iakovlev intimates that Roosevelt did not want Britain and France to fight Germany during the “phony war” period because the war might then be ended before the United States could intervene and thereby correct its economic difficulties. He repeats without qualification the columnist Drew Pearson's charge of 1942 that Secretary of State Cordell Hull

wanted to weaken the USSR. To the same end, he presents American offers to send military aid to the Soviet Far East in 1942 as underhanded attempts to incite Japan to attack the Soviet Union. Concerning the issue of a second front, Iakovlev says that the United States used the matter in an "unworthy" manner in 1942 to cover up its refusal to recognize the new borders of the USSR, and cites Feis's *Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin* (p. 61) for support. He strongly argues that for Roosevelt the second front was a political tactic. The account of wartime relations is capped with the argument that as early as 1942 Roosevelt recognized that after the war the USSR would be in a pre-eminent position in a Europe ripe for revolution and he made it government policy to limit the wartime ally's gains and postwar influence. Taken together, this constitutes an argument which diverges sharply from the common favorable Soviet view of American-Soviet relations during the Roosevelt administration and which perhaps will make this important period of United States foreign policy subject to additional Soviet criticism.

Iakovlev also discusses United States domestic politics during the Roosevelt administration. He says that after the electoral victory of 1940 FDR pursued a new general policy emphasis which contributed directly to the emergence of a qualitatively different political system in the United States. Iakovlev sees Roosevelt becoming an "administrator above all" (p. 369) who turned away from the philosophy and goals of the New Deal, purged most of the remaining New Dealers, replaced them with representatives of big business (Averell Harriman is named as an example), and came to rely greatly upon the federal bureaucracy. This is not a completely erroneous view, but it is an exaggerated one, particularly in the assertion that Roosevelt did not take democratic freedoms seriously after 1941. It is evident that a major purpose of the book is to provide a quasi-Marxist interpretation for the growth of a power which cheated the Soviet Union out of its hard-won and supposedly just gains of the war. After all, how otherwise than through deceit and skillful maneuvering could what is presented as a minor land power (pp. 472–73) emerge as a powerful rival to the state favored by history? In this respect the book supports a thesis of Marinin's work, which presents a similar view of the power bases of the American political system.

Although Iakovlev cites numerous standard sources, he did not have access to the Roosevelt library at Hyde Park and did not interview members of the Roosevelt family or administration. No original research is reflected in the book. The published sources cited include several biographies of Roosevelt, about ten books dealing with him (e.g., Rosenman's *Working with Roosevelt* and Sherwood's *Roosevelt and Hopkins*), approximately forty books on the period, including Davies's *Mission to Moscow*, the *Forrestal Diaries*, the *Stilwell Papers*, Truman's memoirs, and Feis's *Churchill, Roose-*

*velt, and Stalin.* Among American journals and newspapers he refers only to *Foreign Affairs*, the *New York Times*, and *Time*. References to Communist sources are few.

Defects in the book include the frequent use of important quotations and statements without giving the source. In addition, Iakovlev presents several incidents in Roosevelt's life without relating them to the body of his work. In sum the book, though it suffers from having to serve various purposes, is useful for its presentation of some interesting Soviet views concerning the one brief but unstable partnership of the two great powers.

Zorin's *Messrs. Billionaires* is a propagandistic book which makes accusations through innuendo, gossip, and distortions of fact. Its publication by the Komsomol's publishing house and its colloquial style indicate that its purpose is to influence the attitudes of Soviet youth toward the United States. The basic plan is obvious and not without its advantages—to single out four wealthy Americans (Getty, Hunt, Thornton, and the now deceased Joseph Kennedy) and in an entertaining way show them to be men of bad character operating in an environment of cutthroat competition and shady, even criminal deals. This satisfies curiosity about the United States while implanting (it is probably hoped) a very negative image of it in the reader's mind. The book's stated purpose is the analysis of men of "new money" who are said to have "enormous influence" on American politics and who oppose the Rockefellers and other men of "old money."

A model for explaining the political involvement of some new millionaires is constructed. The men of new wealth are said to be dynamic and willing to take risks. However, Zorin does not show, even approximately, how their wealth and influence become operative politically. Since John Kennedy's policies in regard to Soviet-American relations and the oil-depletion allowance supposedly threatened this group's interests, some of them, it is alleged, master-minded the plot against him. (This "old" versus "new" money formula was also used by the Soviets in 1964 to explain Goldwater's victory over Scranton.) The fact that this exercise in propaganda was written by an editor of *S.Sh.A.* creates concern about some of the ancillary purposes of the new journal and its parent institute.<sup>7</sup>

7. The new Institute of the USA of the USSR Academy of Sciences, headed by G. A. Arbatov, publishes a monthly journal under the editorship of V. M. Berezkhov entitled *S.Sh.A.: Ekonomika, Politika, Ideologiya*. For an analysis of the first six issues see Merle Fainsod, "Through Soviet Eyes," *Problems of Communism*, November-December 1970, pp. 59-64. An example of gross distortion by the Soviet journal is its excision of all passages favorable to the United States and all mention of China from its unauthorized publication of a condensation of Justice William O. Douglas's book, *Points of Rebellion*, in the issues of September and October 1970. For a short textual analysis, see the *New York Times*, Mar. 15, 1971, p. 2. A recent article by Arbatov on the United States is in *Prauda*, May 4, 1971, pp. 4-5.

Each writer, but particularly Kalensky and Zolotukhin, has a reasonably good knowledge of the United States in the sphere with which he is concerned, including the appropriate source materials. This is true despite the existence of some errors and even distortions of fact, as in the books by Marinin and Zorin. The USSR houses large collections of data on the United States, although it would appear that the great diversity of views present in print in the United States is not represented in these collections. (Judging from citations in these books, the CPUSA is the only element in the American left.) Despite the continued influence of ideology, much is discussed factually and neutrally. Of course, the ideology has exacted its toll in objectivity, but an even more insidious process has been at work—projection of features of the Soviet system onto the United States. These books present a picture of a state far more centralized and powerful than reality warrants. Perhaps such an emphasis is difficult for a Soviet writer to avoid. Certainly Americans often see nonexistent elements of democracy, effective public opinion, and open conflict in Soviet politics.

Obviously, more and more Soviet persons are being brought into work affecting the ties of the USSR with the United States. Soviet policy-making toward the United States is coming to involve people with a wider range of opinions and greater depth of knowledge than heretofore. Whether in the immediate future Soviet policy toward the United States softens or hardens, such increase in knowledge and sophistication is a phenomenon of consequence.