

due to Soviet collusion in this "disinformation" ploy. Both authors, moreover, appear to suffer from a lack of appropriate information concerning the precise operational utility of the Soviet weapons supplied surreptitiously, but in generous measure, to Egypt and Syria, between February and October 1973. This hardware was precisely suited to the purposes for which it was to be employed in October 1973, and there is no way in which its Soviet designers and developers could have been under any illusions whatsoever in this connection; consequently, the tendency to question whether Moscow *approved* of the October War is incompatible with the specific weapons (and quantities) transferred. Furthermore, there is no reference at all to the launching by the Soviet Union from Plesetsk of *Kosmos 596* and *597*, which indicates early and detailed tactical knowledge of the Egyptian and Syrian operational plans. In any case, why is there this compulsion to seek evidence that Brezhnev had misgivings concerning the military venture, when he was the very man who tried to prod Iraq and Algeria into more active participation in the same war?

This is not to imply that the two books, and particularly Galia Golan's, cannot be useful and compact reference sources for this period, if employed with due care. It is a pity, however, that they did not make fuller and more appropriate use of the wealth of material that is available.

Dr. Nir's book, on the other hand, constitutes a valuable visual, as well as documentary, compendium, with very helpful, if brief, commentary. The caricatures speak for themselves and raise another issue to which Dr. Nir alludes, but which he does not discuss in detail: namely, to what extent does this material reflect non-rational, almost obsessive, elements in the approach of the Soviet leadership to the "Zionist" issue, rather than constituting merely an extension of cold-bloodedly manipulative—that is, "rational"—aspects of the linkage between Soviet foreign policy and domestic propaganda (as many observers assume)?

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THE SOVIET UNION AND INTERNATIONAL OIL POLITICS. By *Arthur Jay Klinghoffer*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1977. xii, 389 pp. \$16.50.

The one firm, though unstated, conclusion to emerge from Arthur Klinghoffer's book is that "oil politics" play only an occasional, at most modest, role in Soviet foreign policy. This is not much of a return for so much effort (nearly three hundred pages of text and eighty pages of notes). The nuggets of usable facts scattered through the book do not add a great deal to the return because they are so difficult to find. The paucity of results can be traced to flaws of conception, method, and execution.

In tackling a subject as broad and complex as Soviet foreign policy, one needs a conception of the task which breaks the subject down into separate, but related, components—much as a prism breaks a light ray into component colors. Professor Klinghoffer's "oil politics," while perhaps lending topicality, makes for a poor prism; the effect is more that of an inverted telescope. In chapters dealing with every region of the world—Europe, Asia, North America, the Middle East, the Third World—he discusses basic issues of Soviet foreign policy solely with reference to trade in oil. The result is to shrink rather than to enlarge our understanding of Moscow's foreign policy decisions.

By way of analytical method, the first six chapters (one hundred fifteen pages) describe and discuss foreign trade and national power, Soviet uses of foreign trade, energy policies of the USSR, Soviet trade in oil, the "strategy and tactics" of that trade, and the "geopolitics" of Middle East oil. Numerous quarrels with particular details of this material are the least of the book's problems. More basic is the failure

of a single testable hypothesis to emerge from all the space supposedly devoted to method. Furthermore, "oil politics" and the related "oil weapon" are presented as self-evident concepts, which are of obvious importance in international relations; as they are neither self-evident nor obviously important, however, they remain nebulous throughout the book. Finally, the author has a tin ear for economics; one typical example is a paragraph on "Pacific options" (pp. 278–79) in which straightforward applications of opportunity cost and price are sabotaged by "essential" efforts, soaring "requirements," domestic and East European oil "needs," and a "growing oil squeeze." This would be an unfair criticism of Professor Klinghoffer (a political scientist) by this reviewer (an economist), were it not for the necessity of using economics once one decides to study foreign trade in oil.

The lapses of execution are of three kinds, listed here in order of decreasing seriousness but increasing vexatiousness: First, there is no relative weighting of the footnote citations, so that popular and scholarly, biased and objective sources rank equally in authority. Second, the author has a penchant for attributing motives and feelings instead of interpreting actions, as though he had access to the inner thoughts of world leaders. Thus, "the Soviets felt left out of the diplomatic maneuvering" (p. 166), while the "prime Soviet motivation [in selling oil to ENI of Italy] was to weaken the hold of the major Western oil companies over the Italian market" (p. 221). (The accepted view, given the evidence, is that Moscow sought to sell oil for hard currency.) Saudi Arabia "distrusted Soviet intentions" (p. 167), and China "also hopes to spread some political good will" (p. 276). Third, the book is riddled with annoying mistakes of style and usage (which a good editor would have corrected); the most curious is the almost studied absence of commas between independent clauses.

Readers who question whether the largely negative remarks in this review are warranted may conduct their own inexpensive test by reading the last two chapters (pp. 280–97).

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THE SOVIET UNION 1976–77: DOMESTIC, ECONOMIC, AND FOREIGN POLICY. Edited by *Wolfgang Berner* et al. New York and London: Holmes & Meier, 1978. 270 pp. \$24.50.

This yearbook, fourth in a series edited at the Bundesinstitut für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien in Cologne, is a must purchase for university libraries. It provides the advanced specialist or neophyte with an authoritative survey of Soviet domestic and foreign policies in 1976–77 and, for those wishing to delve deeper, an invaluable starting point for further research. Each chapter is rich in factual material and interpretation, buttressed with ample references to Soviet and Western sources. Although the authors' interpretations should not be regarded as definitive, they do offer a set of balanced judgments and propositions that may be tested and refined by further research.

The book differs from the many almanacs that give statistics on Soviet military forces two or three years prior to publication. While such volumes are often dated and redundant by the time they appear, this book provides a vivid cross section of Soviet history of enduring interest. Thus, the comments of Soviet trade unionists on human rights problems offer many gems. One sales clerk, for example, held that individual freedom is the freedom to be a "person of the state [*gosudarstvennyi chelovek*]"! Important acts by the Soviet government and party are also noted, such as Moscow's ratification of both human rights conventions in 1973, followed by reticence on them in 1976–77. The review of the sparring among Soviet writers over the definition of "the Soviet socialist way of life" is no less interesting, as is the