

stories written by Soviet authors, or in the reports of current political defectors.

None of these major problems are dealt with adequately, and the main point that seems to emerge from the anthology is that Soviet sociology is undergoing a rebirth. While this is by no means an unimportant fact, it has already become well known and hardly needs further documentation or argument. The book contains twenty-one items, nine by United States sociologists, three by Soviet sociologists, and the rest by persons of other nationalities and backgrounds. All have been published previously in reasonably accessible form, except the two contributions by Professor Simirenko, which unfortunately are not up to the standard of quality or interest set by most of the other materials.

For the benefit of readers who are not trained in sociology, the following caveats are essential: (1) The editor apparently lacks a firm grasp of the nature of sociology, confusing it with both speculative thought and political polemics. Included in the roster of persons whose ideas we are invited to consider are Lenin, Trotsky, Bukharin, and Stalin. If it were deemed desirable to cull and republish materials about the Soviet scene of sociological interest written by nonsociologists (which in itself is debatable), the work of Soviet journalists, legal scholars, and ethnographers rather than that of politicians would have been more helpful. (2) In a number of places in the two essays by Simirenko he seems out of touch with Soviet political reality. For example, he refers to the ruling strata of Soviet party officials as "a body of technicians" (p. 22), and he argues that "the passing of the older generation" and "relative international peace" (pp. 34–35) are the essential conditions required for Soviet sociologists to acquire the right to freedom of research. Simirenko's general tone is immoderately laudatory and optimistic. It is premature and naïve to write of a "new era" in the development of Soviet sociology starting in October 1963—largely, it would seem, on the basis of decisions and directives taken at that time by party authorities and a new "definition of sociology" (pp. 25–30). Similarly, the claim of an "enormously rapid advancement and change of Soviet sociology since 1963" (p. 329) is overstated. Such extreme positive reactions do no service to anyone, least of all to the struggling sociologists and their sympathizers in the USSR who are all too conscious of the continuing limitations placed on their freedom of inquiry.

Regrettably, this reviewer is forced to conclude that Simirenko's publication is a book of small worth, offering the reader little except the convenience of some interesting articles and book excerpts—some of which concern Soviet sociology—gathered under a single cover.

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SCIENCE POLICY IN THE USSR. By *E. Zaleski, J. P. Kozłowski, H. Wienert, R. W. Davies, M. J. Berry, and R. Amann*. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1969. 615 pp. \$15.00, paper.

Except in high-priority areas such as armaments and aerospace industries the Soviet Union lags far behind the United States and industrial countries of Western Europe in its level of technology and rate of technological change. This "technological gap" persists despite an enormous effort to catch up and despite the many achievements that the USSR has made in scientific research over the last few decades. This seems to be the main conclusion of the new study prepared for OECD by a group of European and American researchers.

Science Policy in the USSR is a collection of five research essays, each accompanied by several self-contained appendixes. The topics range from organizational problems and the financing of research within the general framework of Soviet economic planning (Zaleski) to the employment of scientists and engineers (Kozlowski), from a brief history and description of the USSR Academy of Sciences to research in higher education (both by Wienert) and industrial research and applied technology (jointly by Amann, Berry, and Davies). This breadth of topics makes this book a comprehensive and useful survey. The strength of the volume is in its summary of information and discussion of the tools the Soviet regime employs in planning research. Although there are some helpful summaries, a glossary, and an index, the reader must rely upon his own ingenuity to discover what is most important in the wide array of facts and figures, organizational charts, and tabulations. This fragmentation—along with the heterogeneous points of view and the highly uneven quality of individual analyses belaboring (in both the text and the appendixes) diverse aspects of “science policy” in the USSR—makes the book cumbersome and the presentation difficult to follow, particularly for the nonspecialist.

In order to trace recent developments the OECD survey examines data primarily for the period 1955–65 as they relate to the problems of reorganization of management and coordination of research in the USSR. The recent reorganizational turmoil of the Soviet research establishment was part of an attempt to redress the balance between high-priority (military, space, heavy industry) and low-priority (consumer goods industries and services) areas of research. Reorganizational efforts were also aimed at providing for a wider and speedier diffusion of new technology, the elimination of duplication in research, and the development of greater economic incentives for the adaptation of inventions, new products, and processes in production. To achieve these goals attempts were made to break down strong administrative barriers between different institutional networks that created serious obstacles to technological innovation and led to the duplication of research. It is argued that the creation of various economic incentives and calculations of “returns” to different types of research as a newly adopted planning tool could lead to a wide “reassessment” of the Soviet government policy toward science and technology. The new bonus system for management and individual scientists, aimed at speedier introduction of new technology, could aid growth of productivity. Only time will tell how effective these measures might be.

As the authors themselves point out, in the absence of a systematic study of the relative technological level, the broad judgments about the goals of science policy in the USSR must be viewed as “tentative” indeed. Although the study makes a great deal of the “priority” areas in research, it really does not present conclusive factual evidence concerning the magnitude of effort or the efficiency of research in these fields. Although there is extensive evidence that Soviet scientists, particularly at the USSR Academy of Sciences and in universities, are greatly concerned with basic research, most of the arguments in the study tend to emphasize that the major obstacle to progress in the USSR is the application of science to technology. It is indeed an impression that might be obtained from voluminous literature on the subject in the Soviet press recently. However, it still remains to be seen which aspects of science policy—the basic research or the applied technology—are of greater strategic importance for Soviet progress in the long run.

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