

casting system in 1968, he is able to review the inside history of the party after 1945 and also shed light on some obscure events during this period.

According to Hejzlar, what is usually referred to as the Prague Spring can be traced back to 1962, and the year 1968 can be seen simply as the culmination of a prolonged internal party struggle. The reform represented a coalition of two different tendencies, the technocratic and the humanistic. In the author's judgment the attempts to merge Czech democratic tradition with Stalinism (and later Brezhnevism) were doomed both in 1945–48 and in the 1960s by Soviet power, which the Czech leadership seriously underestimated. It was the Soviet embassy in Prague which initiated the famous letter asking for Soviet intervention early in August 1968. A group of Soviet and East German experts had begun meeting secretly in Dresden to plan the intervention as early as February of that year, and Ulbricht and the Soviet military urged intervention at that time. The Soviet political leadership was split on the matter, however, and made no move until assured that the United States would remain passive.

An interesting part of the narrative deals with the beginning of the "normalization" after the invasion. Reformers were still hoping to save some elements of the Prague Spring until early April 1969, when the Soviets issued another ultimatum. Until that time, Husák was still regarded as a moderate who sympathized with the reforms. It was then that he characterized the situation on his return from a meeting in Moscow as "We came, we saw, and we lost." From then on he made sure that Czechoslovakia would remain "Moscow's most reliable satellite." Hejzlar sees present trends as an attempt at a symbiosis of old bureaucratic and new technocratic tendencies. In his opinion, intensified ties between socialist and capitalist countries will speed this development. He also believes that the success of Eurocommunism in a West European country would work in the same direction, and that reform communism will inevitably reemerge, a conclusion not everyone will accept.

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PRAG 1968: SYSTEMVERÄNDERUNG UND SYSTEMVERTEIDIGUNG. By *Vladimír Horský*. Studien zur Friedensforschung, Forschungsstätte der Evangelischen Studiengemeinschaft, Heidelberg, vol. 14. Stuttgart and Munich: Ernst Klett Verlag and Kösel-Verlag, 1975. 534 pp. DM 25, paper.

An Anglo-American reader will not find it easy to digest Horský's lengthy book on the Prague Spring. On the technical side, his penchant for subdividing even small sections into still smaller ones, with standardized classification-type numbering (2.2.1.2. *Die Strategie der Interventen*, for example) leaves an impression of fragmentariness lingering in one's mind. Furthermore, the footnotes contain a great deal of additional comment and digression, not just references. There are literally hundreds of such particles of information. In a more substantive way, the genre crosses boundaries between history, political science, polemics, and ethical tract with greater ease than is normally the case, often landing in a no man's land which could perhaps best be described as historicopolitical psychology. Since the book has been written in German, however, it may find a readier response among kindred audiences.

The three main parts of the study are concerned with the Prague Spring, the invasion of August 1968, and alternatives to the confrontation—that is, courses of action which both Soviet and Czechoslovak leaders conceivably could have, or should have, taken when their respective policies reached the collision point. An appendix (in fact a fourth chapter) contains the author's rejection of the totalitarian approach to the study of Soviet-type states (his understanding of which is somewhat static, and his treatment of its proponents inadequate) and his own identification with the believers in the ability of these states to reform through the development of a "social-

movement-like society," such as Czechoslovakia became in 1968. (This concept was taken from Amitai Etzioni's book *The Active Society*, 1968.)

Despite the problems of language and organization, students of Czechoslovakia in particular and of Soviet crisis management in general would ignore Horský's book at their own peril. Horský's strong point—and we ought to teach our students more along these lines—is in identifying a decision-making issue (an event, a theory, a person) and then tackling it in depth. He does not only ask what and how, but also why and what are the alternatives. To this reviewer, some of the argumentation suffers from an excess of psychology, but attempts to determine psychological motivations for decisions are perhaps a dimension that ought to be added to our investigations. Are we not guilty of laying all the stress on macro- and microsocial relationships in which seeming illogicality may well be the outcome of psychological determinants, let alone the "free will" of the actors in our stories? It is in this field that Horský's work complements the other studies of Czechoslovak reformism which have by now filled many a library shelf. Without it, I dare say, our comprehension of the Prague Spring would be the poorer.

Insofar as I understand Horský's theoretical conclusions (and I apologize to the author if I do not), the weakness of his argument is the result of isolating the events of that fateful week in August 1968 as the fountain from which bucketfuls of wisdom are drawn about what was good and bad and what ought to be done in the future. There are also too many generalizations and platitudes, such as, "Freedom cannot be obtained while praying on one's knees." Horský, of course, is not the only one to look back on popular resistance to the occupation forces as the glorious culmination of a morally superior historic thrust. So dramatic a stand commands sympathy, but contributes little to an analysis of the processes which Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia set in motion. After all, the glorious resistance lasted only a week, and a somewhat less glorious one continued only until April 1969, but by that time the seeds of "normalization" had already begun to germinate. Only if viewed from the vantage point of, say, August 25, 1968, could it be claimed that might had been defeated by ethos. Even if the target of our investigation is confined to "nonviolent defense," an inquiry ought to be made into not only why it came about, but above all why it collapsed so soon and so meekly.

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DUBROVNIK I ENGLSKA 1300–1650. By *Veselin Kostić*. Odeljenje jezika i književnosti, 26. Belgrade: Srpska akademija nauka i umetnosti, 1975. 660 pp.

Veselin Kostić, who has already given us an excellent volume on the cultural relations between Yugoslav lands and England until the year 1700 (*Kulturne veze između jugoslovenskih zemalja i Engleske do 1700 godine* [Belgrade, 1972]), has recently published a second, very important book—dealing with Dubrovnik (Ragusa) and England from the year 1300 to 1650—which complements the first volume. *Dubrovnik i Engleska 1300–1650* deals with economic, maritime, and political relations between Dubrovnik and England, but it contains much more than the title implies, because it covers other Yugoslav areas as well and discusses many related problems of both Yugoslav and English history.

Kostić starts with a detailed survey of Venetian navigation to England and Flanders and examines the participation of the Ragusans and other Dalmatians who served as sailors and oarsmen. An interesting discussion of people from Yugoslav regions in medieval England follows, after which the author moves into what is really the core of his book—the sixteenth century. He deals here with the organization of Ragusan trade with England, the presence of Ragusan ships in English harbors, and the mer-