

strong alternative candidate; and when external pressures inhibit an internal power struggle. The outcome, Rush argues, is determined by the interaction of Soviet leadership, indigenous leadership, indigenous elites, and the "nation" at large.

It may well be that nothing more novel or exciting can be said on the subject. Students of Eastern Europe will hardly be surprised that the first secretary of the party has the inside track (but then, how did he get into *that* position in the first place?). The number of cases is still small, and as a result the patterns are often ambiguous (or all too obvious). It is hard to tell what is unique or characteristic for Communist systems and what is not. There is no apparent logic linking intervening variables and outcomes in particular cases; no clear correlation between succession types and criteria such as level of development, proximity to the USSR, political culture, or age of regime.

Actually the book has a broader scope than the title suggests. It also deals, somewhat selectively, with factional struggles, purges, and "plots against rulers." On the other hand, focusing on the succession question, the author tends to see Soviet intervention in Eastern Europe as an effort to remove individual leaders rather than to inhibit or reverse unacceptable policies.

Rush also examines the fate of potential heirs and finds them frequently in exposed positions—as Liu Shao-ch'i, Lin Piao, and Ranković, among others, had occasion to learn. It is interesting to note that all former leaders have been posthumously attacked—except for Lenin, Dimitrov, and Ho Chi Minh. Rush only alludes to the interesting problem inherent in the shift of power from a charismatic leader to a bureaucratic successor, and his sketch of typical attributes of successful, as against unsuccessful, candidates for the top position is not entirely convincing. There are also a number of apparent contradictions and truisms in the volume.

ALEXANDER DALLIN  
*Stanford University*

THE MARKET IN A SOCIALIST ECONOMY. By *Włodzimierz Brus*. Translated from the Polish by *Angus Walker* and revised by the author. London and Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1972. 199 pp.

THE ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF SOCIALISM: COLLECTED ESSAYS. By *Włodzimierz Brus*. Foreword by *Maurice Dobb*. London and Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973. 117 pp.

Students of political economy of socialism and planning reforms should welcome the long overdue English translations of some of the writings of one of the most outstanding East European economists, Professor *Włodzimierz Brus* of Poland. Brus's writings are of considerable interest for a variety of reasons, and I can only touch on a few of them here.

Brus was among the first of East European economists to call publicly for a radical overhaul of the planning system. (Excerpts from his speech, "On the Role of the Law of Value in a Socialist Economy," delivered at the Second Congress of Polish Economists in June 1956, were translated and reprinted in *Oxford Economic Papers*, June 1957, pp. 209–21.) His courageous and outspoken stand was particularly striking in view of his high position within the citadel of orthodoxy. At that time he was much more of an insider—the party economist—than Oskar

Lange, yet his critique of the system was much more trenchant and thorough and his proposals more far-reaching. Brus definitely deserves major credit for the ferment and renaissance in economics in Poland and Eastern Europe after 1956.

Brus played a major role both as a searching critic and constructive adviser. In *The Market in a Socialist Economy* (originally published under the title *Ogólne problemy funkcjonowania gospodarki socjalistycznej*, Warsaw, 1961), in his articles since the latter half of the 1950s, and in his various lectures both on Poland and other East European economies, he demonstrated considerable pragmatism and a grasp of political and social constraints. His book might be called a manifesto for economic reform in Eastern Europe, and had considerable impact on discussions and consequent reforms, especially in Czechoslovakia and Hungary.

As with most writings in political economy, Brus's contributions have to be placed in historical perspective. I would like to draw attention to the fact that *The Market in a Socialist Economy* was one of the first postwar economic writings in East Europe to break the vacuum created by the Stalinist injunction against pre-1930s history of economic thought in the USSR. Brus related his analysis to the great Soviet industrialization debate of the 1920s. He clearly outlined the logic of the traditional "centralized model," and contrasted it with a model of a centrally planned economy with a built-in market mechanism.

Brus shows clearly that plan and market should not be treated as diametrically opposed alternatives and provides a general framework for blending the two. However, in view of the complexity of the subject and the pioneering character of *The Market in a Socialist Economy* within the East European context, it provides pointers, rather than elaborate solutions. Had Brus written the book in 1975, with the benefit of hindsight, his approach would have been somewhat different. He might have placed more emphasis on the blending of growth strategy and on the actual functioning of the system.

The collection of essays represents a more concrete approach to the subjects of political economy of socialism and planning reform. It is particularly enhanced by Brus's illuminating analysis of recent Polish economic and political history—the tragic December 1970 events.

The role of economic advisers in general flourished only briefly in Poland, mainly during the years 1956–57. Thereafter, the influence of professional economists—of independent thought—was steadily on the decline as sycophants climbed over them to positions of greater voice in the nation's affairs. Those who stubbornly defended truth, efficiency, and social interest, irrespective of the interests of the party machinery, increasingly fell into disgrace. One of Brus's outstanding qualities is his integrity and inflexible advocacy of the course in which he believes, regardless of the winds of change at particular periods of time. One could not agree more with the assessment of Brus's work and personality by Maurice Dobb, a leading Western Marxist: "Most readers will, I think, be struck by the frankness, indeed fearlessness, as well as the clarity and balance with which such questions are formulated and discussed—an outspokenness that has been rather rare previously in discussion of this type."

As the Gomułka regime became more restrictive, Brus was increasingly branded a revisionist (his support of student activists did little to endear him to the leadership) and he became *persona non grata* in official circles. He was dismissed from his chair at Warsaw University in 1968. Unlike his colleagues, he refused to emigrate and was shunted into the position of research worker at the

Institute of Housing Economy. It is a sad commentary on the times, and their legacy, that those who suffered unjustly in 1968 have not been "rehabilitated" by Gierek.

GEORGE R. FEIWEL  
*University of Tennessee*

FOREIGN TRADE PRICES IN THE COUNCIL FOR MUTUAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE. By *Edward A. Hewett*. Soviet and East European Studies Series. New York and London: Cambridge University Press, 1974. xii, 196 pp. \$17.50.

Edward Hewett has tackled a difficult, timely subject in a professional manner. This book is a useful contribution to a relatively small number of works on the topic.

The timeliness of the subject is illustrated by recent reports in the 1975 meetings that intra-CMEA prices have changed significantly. According to Hungarian and Polish reports, prices will now be tied to world market prices and changed annually on the basis of a five-year moving average. This means that Soviet oil, which has been sold in Eastern Europe at as low as \$2.50 a barrel, may rise to \$7.00 a barrel next year and to over \$10.00 a barrel by the end of the next five-year plan. Clearly, the subject of Professor Hewett's book has become the most important issue in CMEA.

Hewett's focus is on another significant, though earlier, development in CMEA—the publication of the Comprehensive Program providing guidelines for the current plans (1971–75). His treatment of foreign trade pricing is an empirical approach to price formulation and analysis. He develops a general model to aid in an analysis of the importance of foreign trade prices as determinants in the movement of resources.

Hewett finds the Comprehensive Program to be an important step in the identification of shared goals, institutions, and problems in CMEA. CMEA economists agree on goals of high growth to raise real income per capita and productive capacity relative to Western economies. They also agree that the vehicles for improvement are technological change and increased efficiency in resource allocation. But the Soviets and many of the East Europeans differ on the approach: continued central control versus decentralization with use of the market mechanisms. On this debate Hewett comes down on the side of the East Europeans. "It seems likely, therefore, that events and debates will continue to educate Soviet policy-makers (with the assistance of perceptive East European economists) and that eventually they will understand the logic of a decentralized system. Such a drastic evolution in viewpoints will come neither rapidly or easily. When it does occur, it will be so clothed in jargon that it may be difficult to recognize. Nevertheless, decentralization, and all that follows from such measures, seems quite probable and has been since sustained economic growth became the goal of CMEA planners" (p. 192). What may be wrong in Professor Hewett's perception is the assessment of the politics rather than the economics of the issue. It may be that Soviet economists such as Academician Igor Bogomolov understand the arguments of the East European economists but do not feel that it is in the Soviet national interest to emulate them. The Hungarian New Economic Mechanism (NEM) and the Polish New Strategy may be fine for the Hungarians and the Poles, but what do