

On balance, Stewart's commitment to the forms of current political science scholarship is unfortunate. For one thing, Dahl's approach is inappropriate to the Soviet situation. We are simply unable to conduct the interviews and surveys necessary to ascertain the influence patterns in a Soviet oblast. For another, the methodological jargon greatly detracts from the readability of the book. When Stewart lets himself go—for example, when he discusses decision-making style or when he uses passages from Kochetov's *Sekretar' obkoma*—he is very readable. Such passages are, alas, very few. Stylistic foibles aside, however, the book is a worthwhile contribution to the literature on Soviet local politics.

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ASPECTS OF MODERN COMMUNISM. Edited by *Richard F. Staar*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1968. xxiv, 416 pp. \$7.95.

Any collection of writings which attempts to summarize the present stage of Communist bloc relations is necessarily a highly perishable item, and this volume is unfortunately no exception. Since it went to press in the summer of 1968, it does not deal with the impact of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.

In putting together any comprehensive analysis of the current state of a vast and complex political field, the compiler faces a basic choice: either to stress the many aspects of present developments and try to build a picture—possibly ephemeral—from them, or else to stress the background of present developments on the assumption that the history of the last few decades furnishes useful knowledge of the present. Although this volume is possibly somewhat more lasting in value than others like it, it certainly falls between the two stools. Most of the authors strive to present both a historical framework and a more than superficial assessment of present trends. On the whole, they succeed better in the former aim than in the latter, although this may not have been the editor's intent. As a collection that is meant to be integrated both in themes and in treatment, it attempts far too much.

The three essays on Soviet developments—on general political events, foreign trade, and military strategy—all point toward a settled outlook of caution in the Kremlin and an increasingly realistic awareness of dangers and obstacles. James M. McConnell, in his piece on military strategy, finds an emphasis on strategic deterrence rather than on offensive strategy; W. W. Kulski describes a deliberately paced series of adjustments to domestic pressures for reform in a great variety of areas; Carl B. Turner finds a pragmatic expansion of horizons in Soviet foreign trade, coupled with a somewhat surprising new emphasis on the international division of labor.

While China and the other Asian Communist regimes are dealt with in separate essays, all of Eastern Europe is treated as a whole in three essays on the topics of polycentrism, economic integration, and the Warsaw Pact. COMECON is found to be making only slow progress against largely self-imposed obstacles, in the essay by Hermann Gross. William R. Kintner finds Warsaw Pact defenses improving, with emphasis on nuclear strategy, in the face of a distracted NATO alliance.

The three essays on China, by Richard L. Walker, Chu-yuan Cheng, and Juergen Domes, raise far more questions than they answer. Except for Cheng's interesting statistical summaries of China's foreign trade, these essays add little

to what an alert layman could have picked up from reliable news media during the last few years. The pieces on the other Asian Communist regimes are better as factual presentations, but worse as a group because of their diffuse subject matter. Hoang Van Chi finds that Hanoi's serious political and economic difficulties have not actually weakened Ho Chi Minh's regime either domestically or in its wartime struggles; war, in fact, has served to bolster its position.

A brief discussion and criticism follows each essay, and these convey something of the flavor of the Emory University conference that gave rise to this volume.

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THE ORIGINS OF COMMUNISM IN TURKEY. By *George S. Harris*. Stanford: Hoover Institution, 1967. xii, 215 pp.

George S. Harris, an official of the United States government, has provided the first book in English on communism and leftism in Turkey. The author has attempted to analyze factually the development of various socialist and Communist organizations in Turkey. He has stressed their heavy dependence on ideological nourishment and guidance from abroad, especially from the Soviet Union. In doing so, however, he has ignored the indigenous social and economic conditions which gave the Turkish left special ideological and organizational features. First, there were a few relatively small urban leftist groups made up of intellectuals and persons from the minorities, mostly in Istanbul. Second, and most important, were those groups formed throughout Anatolia in 1919–24. Third, there was the group formed in Baku by expatriates, mostly Ottoman-Turkish prisoners, and some natives of Turkestan and Azerbaijan. Harris seems to think that the first and third and some elements of the second groups coalesced somehow around 1925 and eventually fell under the leadership of Şefik Hüsnü, the head of the Istanbul group and a loyal follower of the Soviets. Actually, only the Anatolian groups displayed the features of a true movement. It was essentially an anti-imperialistic, antibureaucratic, social, and mostly a nationalist movement rooted in the conditions of Anatolia, in the cultural-religious ethos of the Turks and their drive for independent nationhood. Islam played a major mobilizing role in this movement, but in the process the religion itself was desacralized and became the subculture of the emerging national secular political feeling.

The Soviet leaders sensed the revolutionary appeal of Islam. The Muslim Bureau, organized under Stalin, and then the Congress of the Peoples of the East in Baku were the result partly of Soviet awareness of Islam's revolutionary potential and partly of the desire of the Turkish Communists in Baku to start a Muslim movement of liberation directed against the West. However, the Russians became increasingly suspicious of the Turks' appeal to Islamic identity, lest this be converted into Turanism or a nationalist heresy such as Sultangalievism. Atatürk, the leader of the nationalist movement, was able to contain and channel toward his own aim these leftist currents not only because of his tactical ability and intellectual prowess but also because he shared to a large extent the spirit of the Anatolian "leftist" nationalist upsurge. Eventually, intellectuals such as Şevket Aydemir, Vedat N. Tör, and several others associated with the Communist Party of Istanbul came to Atatürk's side when they had to choose between allegiance to a national government and loyalty to an international movement controlled by the Soviet-