

Three case studies from the 1960s follow. The final three chapters—"The Nature of Participation," "The Effects of Participation," and "Specialist Participation Reconsidered"—supply the promised integrated assessment.

This reviewer is somewhat concerned about Professor Solomon's generalizations about Soviet policy making from a few episodes in the development of Soviet criminal policy alone and, even more so, about his attempt at a cross-systemic comparison. In choosing a policy area for study, Professor Solomon first "tried to find a policy area which would typify a broad range of Soviet policy-making"; and second, he "sought a realm in which the relevant specialists were likely to have participated to some extent in the formation of public policy" (p. 8). It was most fortunate that criminal policy was the typical area. This find neatly dovetailed with Sir Radzino-wicz's urging that the author study Soviet criminology (p. ix). And research on specialist participation in an area where there was none would have been a most unrewarding enterprise. If the participation and influence of criminologists was typical, the author muses at the end of the book, "one could generalize from their experience about the role of specialists in Soviet policy-making as a whole" (p. 160). He then cites several reasons why it might be so. The discovery that, in the few criminal policy decisions studied, the top law enforcement officials played a more active part than did the relevant Central Committee staff is cited to contradict Brzezinski, Huntington, and Avtorkhanov, who held that Central Committee *apparatchiki* usually were the principal source in Soviet policy making (p. 111). On page 152, Professor Solomon states emphatically: "*Soviet criminologists seemed to have had about as much influence on criminal policy as did their counterparts in at least two major western states [the United States and England].*" This reviewer is still at a loss as to what is being compared. The author himself allows that participation is not confined to formal service on blue-ribbon committees or commissioned research reports. In fact, it may go on in many virtually undetectable ways. In a Western-type polity, it might be expressed in the education of future policymakers by specialists and in what the popular press writes under the influence of specialists of varied and warring viewpoints. What, then, exactly are the earmarks of a "specialist"? And was Vyshinskii a specialist?

The very last pages of the book take cognizance of problems of this nature. But under this light of awareness the pearls of science quickly turn into glass beads.

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ZAPADNIA: CHELOVEK I SOTSIALIZM. By *A. Fedoseev*. Frankfurt/Main: Possev-Verlag, 1976. 373 pp. DM 21.80, paper.

Some potential readers may be put off by the polemical title of this book, which might lead them to assume that the contents of the book are predictable and not very interesting. That would be unfortunate. In fact, this account of one man's career in Soviet science, and his decisions to abandon it, is well worth reading.

The strongest feature of the book is not Fedoseev's analysis of socialism but his own personal story, a very unusual story indeed. The author made headlines in 1971 after his spectacular defection while in Paris as a member of a high-level Soviet delegation. That occurred in May; in April, only a month before his break with the USSR, he had received the highest award bestowed by his country—the title "Hero of Socialist Labor."

Until May Day of 1971 his life can be considered an illustration of the indisputable achievements of the Russian Revolution—the swift transformation of Russian science and technology which enabled the Soviets in some areas to match the most

sophisticated achievements of the West, a transformation which was, of course, impossible without dramatic changes in the lives of the people involved in the process. In a very short time, Fedoseev, a boy from a blue-collar family, became a prominent Soviet researcher. In 1938 (during the height of the Great Purge), at the age of twenty-eight, he was sent to the United States to work at RCA. He received the Lenin Prize, the highest award for scientific achievement, when he was fifty years old. He earned a salary about five times higher than the median salary of the ordinary Soviet citizen and directed large groups of researchers. He achieved this prominent position without even being a party member. The explanation for this lies in favorable social circumstances, native ability, and good luck. Suddenly (at least so it seemed to his superiors), of his own free will, he destroyed it all, breaking totally and irreversibly with his social environment. At the age of sixty, he began anew.

The author, of course, does not attempt to give a short, simple answer to his reasons for doing this. Rather, he tries to explain by telling the story of his life. Reading his story, the reader is confronted with the circumstances which gradually pushed him to his unique decision: his difficult struggle for higher education, his political neutrality, the high standards he set for the quality of research. His quest for excellence brought him into the part of the Soviet R&D community which did research for the military. Mr. Fedoseev became one of the originators of an entirely new field of research: Soviet electro-vacuum devices.

In his recent book on the innovation decision in Soviet industry, Joseph Berliner described Soviet military research as "foreign" to the main body of Soviet industry, with the military R&D community enjoying higher priorities, competing directly with the West, and having access to higher levels of the Soviet political hierarchy. Undoubtedly, all these circumstances helped Fedoseev to form his own independent political views. On the other hand, his everyday experience showed the impossibility of isolating the Soviet R&D community from the rules of the game which prevail in Soviet society as a whole. The fear of originality, which characterizes all dogmatic ideologies, manifested itself in authorities' reluctance to support research in areas which had not already been explored in the West. Usually a period of ten years is required to transform a sample of Western equipment which has been smuggled into the country into a genuine Soviet product; it seemed as though the government deliberately perpetuated this lag, despite the efforts of enthusiasts like Fedoseev. The author speaks in great detail about the inflexibility of the whole system which manages R&D, about the negligence of workers that is the outcome of the lack of incentives, about the deterioration in quality of industrial production in such previously developed countries as East Germany and Czechoslovakia, and about the vexing complexities of Soviet everyday life.

Fedoseev's personal experience brought him to the pessimistic conclusion that the socialist system as a whole will not improve, that it is incapable of evolution. He rejects socialism in general, although he is not clear about what alternative he prefers.

Many witnesses to the tremendous changes following the death of Stalin might regard this opinion as too pessimistic. An overwhelming majority of Fedoseev's former colleagues continue their research for the military or as civilians with professionalism and the dedication of good and loyal citizens. But it would be quite reasonable to assume that during private chats many critical comments are uttered. They might refrain from a condemnation of socialism as a trend of political thought, but they would undoubtedly be as critical as Fedoseev about the realities of Soviet life.

This partial overlapping of ideas makes Mr. Fedoseev's book a valuable testimony about the moods, aspirations, and frustrations of the Soviet R&D community.

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