

In sum, the author has made a valuable contribution to our understanding of a complicated person. Moreover, the book demonstrates the impressive craftsmanship and intellectual courage of some historians in Poland today.

GEORGE J. LERSKI
University of San Francisco

SVEDECTVO O SLOVENSKOM NÁRODNOM POVSTANÍ. By *Gustáv Husák*. 2nd revised edition. Bratislava: Epoque, 1969. 635 pp. Kčs. 30.

The story of the Slovak resistance movement in World War II, which culminated in the Slovak National Uprising (August 29–October 29, 1944), remains virtually untouched in Western historical literature. To the knowledge of this reviewer, there is only one substantial account of it in a Western language: Wolfgang Venohr, *Aufstand für die Tschechoslowakei: Der Slowakische Freiheitskampf von 1944* (Hamburg, 1969). On the other hand, the Slovak and Czech literature about it is extensive, but varies greatly in approach and quality. During the witch hunt against the Slovak nationalist (Titoist) Communists in the 1950s the Slovak resistance was maligned and its participants persecuted. One of the prominent victims was Gustáv Husák, the present secretary-general of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (KSC), who was imprisoned from 1951 to 1960 for “bourgeois nationalism.” His book on the Slovak National Uprising, which was originally published in 1964, is an attempt to vindicate the Slovak resistance and his personal role (as well as that of other Slovak Communists) in it.

After the breakup of Czechoslovakia into the German Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia and the German-protected Slovak state in March 1939, the Slovak Communists organized, with the permission of the KSC leadership in Moscow (Klement Gottwald), an autonomous underground Communist Party of Slovakia (KSS). At first, Husák—a lawyer by training and a very junior member (he was born in 1913) of the *Davisti*, a group of Slovak Communist intellectuals so named after their review *Dav* (*The Masses*)—played only a minor role in the resistance. However, as a result of successive arrests of Communist leaders by the Slovak police, Husák moved up the party hierarchy until by 1943 he was the leader of the KSS’s Fifth Underground Central Committee. In this capacity it fell to him to negotiate the well-known “Christmas Agreement” of 1943 with the leaders of the Slovak democratic resistance (Ján Ursiny and Jozef Lettrich). The agreement provided for the formation of the Slovak National Council to direct the resistance. As a result of it, unlike the resistance in Poland or Yugoslavia, no East-West, Communists versus nationalists schism developed in the Slovak resistance. The Slovak Communist and democratic resistance movements cooperated, albeit warily, to the end of the war. This served partly as the basis for the charge of “bourgeois nationalism” leveled against Husák after the war.

Unlike most Soviet historians who have lived under a totalitarian regime so long that they have lost the habit of supporting their arguments with anything but cant, Husák was trained as a Communist before the Communist seizure of power in Czechoslovakia and has not lost the habit of supporting his arguments with logic. He is a combative polemicist and adroit dialectician. Unlike most Soviet historiography, which is numbingly dull, this is a lively and provocative book. Husák directs his fire in many directions—the Slovak Stalinists (V. Široký and K. Bačilek), the Slovak democrats (Ursiny and Lettrich), and the Czechoslovak government in exile (President Beneš). He is not very candid or revealing about the peculiar

tactics of the KSS during the period of Nazi-Soviet cooperation in 1939–41, when it endorsed Slovak independence and later the absorption of “Soviet Slovakia” into the Soviet Union on the model of the Baltic republics. Nor does he elucidate Soviet policy much, although he does bring to light important evidence for the responsibility of Soviet partisans in Slovakia for precipitating the Slovak National Uprising prematurely and thus condemning it to defeat.

Altogether, despite its blatantly partisan approach and highly subjective personal views, Husák’s book constitutes an important contribution to the historiography of the Slovak resistance movement in World War II.

VICTOR S. MAMATEY
University of Georgia

A RÁKÓCZI-SZABADSÁGHARC ÉS EURÓPA. Edited by *Béla Köpeczi*.
Budapest: Gondolat, 1970. 390 pp. 36 Ft.

Köpeczi, a specialist in the international relations of Prince Ferenc Rákóczi’s government, has already produced a great deal of material on the subject. *A Rákóczi-szabadságharc és Európa*, his major work, was first published in 1966. Like all Marxist and pre-Marxist Hungarian historians, he speaks of the Rákóczi war of 1703–11 as a war of independence rather than as the Rákóczi Rebellion, the term disparagingly used by Austrian historians and in contemporary Habsburg diplomatic writings. Contemporary Habsburg publicists denied that the rest of Europe showed any interest or concern for the Rákóczi war, but the editor concludes differently: “All the accounts, I think, give abundant testimony that the Hungarian War of Independence did not want for European echoes, as some researchers have claimed” (p. 29).

Such, then, is Köpeczi’s theme. His technique is to reprint contemporary documents, either in their original Hungarian or in Hungarian translations of those that were originally written in Latin, French, English, or German. All the translations, glosses, and introductions for each document are the work of the elite of Hungary’s historians, foremost among them Domokos Kosáry and Kálmán Benda, who are well known to students of the area. They are joined by László András, Katalin Krén, Gábor Hajnal, István Jánosy, and Béla Holl (in the order in which their work appears).

Two kinds of documents are included. First there are the Rákóczi government’s manifestoes and other publications. Of these there are many, for “the Prince [Rákóczi] was convinced from early on of the importance of information activities at home and abroad in order to persuade the public of the justice [of the cause] of the insurgent Hungarians” (p. 8). The most notable of these documents is Rákóczi’s manifesto, drafted by his confidential secretary Pál Ráday early in 1704, which has become known to history by the first word of its text: “Recrudescunt . . .” (“Inclytæ Gentis Hungariæ vulnera . . .”) (pp. 33–46).

The other documents included in the book illustrate European reaction to the war and to the Rákóczi government’s pronouncements. The French publications, of course, were very sympathetic toward Rákóczi, who was an ally of Louis XIV. The most remarkable West European commentaries, however, are contained in a series of articles written by Daniel Defoe between September 2 and December 5, 1704, and published in his own *Review of the Affairs of France*. Not a single issue of the weekly came out during that period without an article on the Hungarian situa-