

ISSUE

A QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF OPINION



PUBLISHED BY THE AFRICAN STUDIES ASSOCIATION

EDITOR'S NOTE

Preparations for a special *Issue* on Mozambique began in February 1974. Following the coup d'état in Portugal on April 25, it was evident that several articles which had been submitted as timely assessments of a colony experiencing a nationalist rebellion had become significant accounts of the course of the war and Portuguese policies during the last months of Lusitanian empire. While Portugal's acceptance of an independent Guinea-Bissau has been greeted with relief, the brief ceremony of September 10 was no more than the final acknowledgement of an established state. An independent Mozambique has also been assured—but the circumstances surrounding the emergence of this nation are still debated, and the exact form the new government will take is speculative. We believe that this *Issue* will encourage an independent appraisal of events in Mozambique before and after the coup.

I am especially grateful to the Angola Comité in Amsterdam for making available the Diary of Inhaminga—to which James Duffy has added a short introduction—and to Wolf Roder, who supplied the maps which appear on pages 3, 8, and 48. The map of the Zambezi Valley Plan will be most helpful as an accompaniment to the article on Cabora Bassa by Wolf Radmann. Additionally, this map, and the map of Mozambique indicating areas of white settlement and areas controlled by FRELIMO, will be recognized as valuable attempts to coordinate information from a number of sources.* Mr. Roder, a geographer at the University of Cincinnati, writes that:

Drawing maps from Portuguese sources and documents is a painful experience because these sources are few, they are of poor quality and inaccurate. It may be truly said that anyone who has not read Portuguese government documents is unacquainted with fantasy and fiction. I am absolutely not astounded that nobody could find Wiryamu; I could not find half the places mentioned in *Southern Africa* as sites of fighting. Place names in Mozambique change with bewildering rapidity. Places I know to exist are not on the map; places on the map don't seem to exist. . .

It is clear from the maps and from what the Portuguese and FRELIMO say that the pattern of control of territory resembles the leopard spots of Vietnam: the Portuguese can assert their presence anywhere they choose to concentrate their superior armament, but nowhere can they eliminate the guerrillas—who are apt to hit anywhere.

The essays by Walter Opello and Richard Leonard focus on the war waged by the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique from 1964 through the spring of 1974. Mr. Opello concludes that at the time of the coup the balance of military force was in favor of the Portuguese, whereas Mr. Leonard argues that the Portuguese were being defeated by FRELIMO. This view is forcefully expressed in the statement issued by the FRELIMO Executive Committee, which maintains that the coup itself is proof of the impact of the Mozambican struggle on metropolitan Portugal.

In "South Africa and Portugal," Basil Davidson provides statistics to support the contention that by 1973 the Portuguese regime had reached the limit of its ability to control the situation in the colonies, and he discusses the reaction within South Africa to the failure of Portuguese intransigence. In considering South Africa's previous miscalculations he concludes that Pretoria's options are now few and that South Africa's interests in territories formerly administered by Portugal will best be protected if an unstable situation prevails in these territories. The potential for such instability is recognized by Douglas Wheeler as well, whose commentary on U.S. policy towards Southern Africa urges new initiatives which would help to guarantee the decolonization of Mozambique and Angola.

Economic issues take precedence in Mr. Wheeler's article and in essays by Mohamed El-Khawas and Wolf Radmann. Mr. El-Khawas discusses the relationship between foreign investment and Portugal's military effort and notes that a major consequence of foreign economic activity in the Cabora Bassa Dam Project is the entrenchment of South Africa in Mozambique. In "The Zambezi Development Scheme: Cabora Bassa," Wolf Radmann examines plans dating from 1953 for the development of the Zambezi Valley, the role of the ZAMCO consortium in the hydro-electric scheme, and the history of African opposition to Cabora Bassa. Mr. Radmann views the dam project as an example of international cooperation with lasting advantages for Mozambique which far outweigh the political advantages to the white minority regime sponsoring it. This is disputed by Richard Leonard who suggests that the project may create demands which the new government is neither equipped to meet nor desirous of confronting.

As Mr. El-Khawas demonstrates, Portugal's economic policies in Africa have been designed to keep the African majority under permanent subjugation. That those who led the ten-year struggle against these policies have been recognized as the legitimate representatives of an independent Mozambique would seem to dictate not merely the modification of these policies but their reversal. There is no doubt that the development of the Mozambican economy would be hamstrung by such action—in the same way that the Portuguese conceived of Mozambique's development being hindered by UN sanctions against Rhodesia. It is true that power from the dam could be used to fuel Mozambique's first iron, steel and aluminum industries—but it is also true that a FRELIMO government may well prefer to concentrate on its only real resources thus far: the rich agricultural land and the people who have supported FRELIMO in the effort to effect not only the liberation of a nation but a social revolution.

Whatever the transition, it will not be easy. Already Marcelino dos Santos—a FRELIMO fighter and intellectual with perhaps the greatest sense of Western enterprise—has made it clear that he favors a line more consistent with the revolutionary background of the new government than do either Samora Machel or Joaquim Chissano, who seem to acknowledge the call to adopt what the Western press (particularly the liberal South African press) terms "pragmatic" policies. It is likely that earlier pronouncements such as "Cabora Bassa—Why We Say No" will acquire a new significance. They will either be viewed as a formative and integral part of Mozambican policy—or they will be understood as the rhetoric of a struggle which, in Africa, can only be successful if the full weight of international capital is not brought to bear. The war in Mozambique has shown that, no matter how powerful the enemy, the people will be heard. Whether or not their voice will carry—whether a sophisticated wind of change will further muffle the revolutionary soundings of a peasant society—will be evident by mid-year when, on June 25, 1975, part of the world will celebrate the independence of Mozambique.

PSB

**Atlas de Moçambique* (Loureço Marques: Empresa Moderna, Lda. 1960)

Francis X. Maier, *Revolution and Terrorism in Mozambique* (New York: American African Affairs Association, 1974)

Southern Africa Magazine (New York: Southern Africa Committee, monthly)

Relatório das actividades do Ministério do Ultramar (Lisbon: Agência-Geral do Ultramar, annually for 1969-1972)

Cabora Bassa: Daten, Fakten und Meinungen über einen Staudamm in Mozambique (Düsseldorf: Zapp-PR [for Ministry of Information and Tourism, Lisbon] 1971)

Cabora Bassa on the Move (Lisbon: Ministry of Information and Tourism, n.d.)

ISSUE

A Quarterly Journal of Africanist Opinion

VOLUME IV, NUMBER 2

SUMMER 1974

Paula Stapleton Barker, *Editor*
Jane-Ellen Long, *Production*

Editorial Advisors:
Ann Seidman
Richard Sklar
David Wiley

CONTENTS


- 4 AMERICAN POLICY TOWARD SOUTHERN AFRICA: CRITICAL CHOICES
Douglas L. Wheeler
- 9 SOUTH AFRICA AND PORTUGAL
Basil Davidson
- 21 FOREIGN ECONOMIC INVOLVEMENT IN ANGOLA AND MOZAMBIQUE
Mohamed A. El-Khawas
- 29 GUERRILLA WAR IN PORTUGUESE AFRICA: An Assessment of the Balance
of Force in Mozambique
Walter C. Opello, Jr.
- 38 FRELIMO'S VICTORIES IN MOZAMBIQUE
Richard W. Leonard
- 47 THE ZAMBEZI DEVELOPMENT SCHEME: CABORA BASSA
Wolf Radmann
- 55 FRELIMO: 1970 and 1974
56 Cabora Bassa: Why We Say No
58 Statement by the FRELIMO Executive Committee on the Events in Portugal
- 60 Statement by Senator Edward M. Kennedy Regarding Independence for Angola,
Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau
- 62 DIARY OF INHAMINGA
Fathers J. Martens, A. Verdaasdonk, J. van Rijen, A. van Kampen, and J. Tielemans

Maps on pp. 2, 3, 8, and 48.

Articles in *Issue, A Quarterly Journal of Opinion* represent neither the views of the African Studies Association nor those of its officers. The Editor is responsible for the final selection of the content of *Issue* and reserves the right to reject any material deemed inappropriate for publication. Responsibility for opinions expressed and for the accuracy of facts published in articles rests solely with the individual authors.

Copyright© 1974 by the AFRICAN STUDIES ASSOCIATION INC

Any author has the right to republish his article in whole or in part without requesting permission from the Association. Others desiring permission to republish material should apply to the Editor



MAP NO. 1388 REV.4 UNITED NATIONS
FEBRUARY 1971

