

streltsy regiments. No map is provided—surely a serious omission in an introductory work. Still, despite these rather minor imperfections, Professor Oliva should be congratulated for his provocative, lively reappraisal of a fascinating period and personality.

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KREST'IANSKAIA VOINA 1773–1775 GG.: NA IAIKE, V PRIURAL'E, NA URAL'E I V SIBIRI. By *A. I. Andrushchenko*. Akademiia nauk SSSR, Institut istorii. Moscow: "Nauka," 1969. 360 pp. 1 ruble, 65 kopeks.

The author of this posthumously published monograph devoted the last sixteen years of his life (1906–67) to studying the massive insurrection of 1773–75 that scourged the southeastern provinces of imperial Russia. In the process he compiled an immense collection of archival notes on the subject. The present volume, portions of which have appeared as articles over the past decade, capped Andrushchenko's long labors and served as his *doktorskaia dissertatsiia*. It is a fitting monument to a man who, despite disability from war wounds, mobilized his mental and physical resources to produce a respectable body of scholarship.

Andrushchenko's study exemplifies both the virtues and the defects of the dissertation genre. Meticulously researched and documented, his book is, within its chronological and territorial boundaries, exhaustive. His argumentation is clearly presented and his material logically arranged. He moves from generalizations to specifics and back again. He carefully assays previous scholarship, and voices his own opinion on controversial points. An exponent of Marxism-Leninism, he is aware of the variety and contradictions of past social phenomena. His monograph testifies to the percolating influence of recent theoretical debates in the USSR—elucidated for us in articles by Arthur P. Mendel—concerning methodology, social psychology, and the writing of history. Crucial terms which recur in Andrushchenko's interpretive passages are "complex," "peculiar," "contradictory," and the ubiquitous *odnako* ("but/however") which invariably heralds a qualifying phrase.

Compared to previous, often dogma-ridden Soviet scholarship on this topic, Andrushchenko's work generally displays levelheaded analysis based on the sources. He presents an original discussion of the rebels' ideology, stressing the importance of tsarist forms, and he demonstrates the insurgents' confusion over the shape of their revolutionary or postrevolutionary regime. He devotes half of one lengthy chapter to examining those industrial enterprises that did not support the rebels. Here he candidly observes that a prominent factor in frustrating the rebels' appeals was "the centuries-old inertia" of the enserfed peasantry (p. 321). He also acknowledges that religion, while not a major force in the rebellion, exerted some influence upon rebel ideology and that the clergy in several instances played an important role in the uprising. Finally, he indicates the military mistakes of the rebels, admits the existence of plundering and internal tensions among them, and refuses to idealize their methods of conscription and confiscation.

Andrushchenko's forte is facts and documentation. He is understandably proud of discovering some heretofore unknown archival sources. Three appendixes tabulate statistical data detailing the participation of non-Russian peoples in the revolt, the industrial enterprises that supported the rebels, and those that did not. These materials represent a pioneering effort at quantifying aspects of the uprising.

Like many Soviet dissertations, this one is quite dull to read. Andrushchenko was no literary stylist, and the dissertation genre evidently brought out the worst in him. His prose is stolid, without flair or humor. Considerable repetition occurs, and true to his love for archives, the author greatly overuses quotations from sources. Worse still, he lets his material overwhelm him, so that he treats insignificant episodes in absurd detail. If my own experience is any guide, even scholars working on the same subject will find Andrushchenko's forest difficult to discern amidst the profusion of timber and underbrush. The publishers have served the late author badly, too. There are several obvious errors in dates. In many cases archival citations are provided for materials that have lately been published: for example, Pugachev's interrogations, which R. V. Ovchinnikov edited for *Voprosy istorii* in 1966. The omission of maps is inexcusable in such a detailed work.

This monograph exhibits, in short, something of the best and the worst in recent Soviet professional historical scholarship.

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AUTOCRATIC POLITICS IN A NATIONAL CRISIS: THE IMPERIAL
RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT AND PUGACHEV'S REVOLT, 1773-1775.

By *John T. Alexander*. Russian and East European Series, vol. 38. Bloomington and London: Indiana University Press, for the International Affairs Center, 1969. xii, 346 pp. \$8.50, paper.

The significance of the great peasant revolt under the leadership of Emelian Pugachev, 1773-74, for both the social and the institutional development of imperial Russia, can hardly be exaggerated. It was the last of the "great" peasant wars; it goaded Catherine II into reforming the provincial administration by granting a greater participatory role to the upper classes; and last, but not least, the revolt fostered new attitudes toward the peasantry on the part of the educated elite, and led to the creation of a new image of the Russian people in literature and thought. It is therefore a source of amazement that the relevant documents have not yet been properly published and that there still is no adequate history of the revolt itself. Despite the great attraction that this subject might have offered Soviet historians, ideological and political circumstances have so far conspired to prevent the publication of a comprehensive synthesis, even within the Marxist explanatory framework. We have a mass of disparate detail, but not even a clear and reliable chronicle of the major events and aspects of the revolt. Needless to say, there is virtually nothing in Western languages, except for short résumés or sensational popularizations.

Under the circumstances, Mr. Alexander's book is very welcome indeed. As its title indicates, the focus is on the government's reaction to the revolt and on the measures taken to quell it and to deal with the institutional weaknesses laid bare by Pugachev's initial successes. In this, his avowed aim, Alexander has done a very creditable job. His documentation is impressive in its completeness and breadth: he has read all the published sources and also rummaged in archives in the Soviet Union and England (the bibliography is excellent and very useful). Unfortunately, the archives have yielded only a few details that merely add a touch of concrete vividness to a picture otherwise adequately suggested by published sources.

Alexander makes several interesting observations. He agrees with the conclusion reached by the investigating commissions that there was no foreign intrigue or collusion behind Pugachev's rising. He shows that Catherine contemplated tactics