

Since the average length of haulage of cement in the Soviet Union was only 41 percent as great in 1964 as in the first half of 1936, it is difficult to believe that efficiency of spatial allocation of this product had so sharply diminished between those years. It seems more likely that the Soviet criticisms made during the 1930s were correct.

For this as well as other reasons, it is a pity that Abouchar has paid no attention to the work published by Soviet scholars concerning linear programming models of the cement industry during the 1960s. While his monograph seems a model of its kind when judged purely on internal evidence, such external evidence raises questions about at least his most important conclusion.

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THE MYTH OF LIBERATION: EAST-CENTRAL EUROPE IN U.S. DIPLOMACY AND POLITICS SINCE 1941. By *Bennett Kovrig*. Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973. xi, 360 pp. \$11.50.

The general conclusion of this book on "liberation" as American policy is not startling. If John Foster Dulles himself ever believed it, neither he nor anyone else could reasonably have done so after the stifling of the Hungarian revolt in 1956 while America looked on. The worth of this book is not in puncturing a myth but in analyzing its place in the continuing evolution of U.S. policy on East Central Europe over a quarter century. Despite the existence of a large body of writing on the subject, there has long been a need for a cool and comprehensive account, and Bennett Kovrig has now written it. For obvious reasons much of it has to do with domestic policy.

In covering this long span he has not gone into exhaustive detail year by year but has had the good sense to tarry awhile in the critical periods and track down the evidence. One of those periods was that of World War II, when the basic decisions were made—or allowed to go by default. Here the author makes good use of a wealth of published material, and it does not lead him to give credence to the various themes espoused by the revisionists. He is more sympathetic to the charges from the other direction that Roosevelt's naïveté delivered the region into the hands of Stalin, though realist enough to know that the president never had it to give away. He reserves his severest strictures for the Roosevelt-Hull policy of trying to keep wartime strategy separate from decisions on the postwar political settlement, for it led to a fatal compromising of the principles on which the settlement was to rest. Roosevelt at Yalta, in telling Stalin that American troops would not stay in Europe and in not pushing for a strong international commission to supervise the administration of liberated areas, "implicitly sanctioned the entrenchment of Soviet power and influence in the heart of Europe." Perhaps that interpretation puts too much emphasis on what happened at Yalta. That the Western powers were satisfied with paper concessions to democratic principles, and were thereafter reduced to a policy of diplomatic protests and public declarations, was less because they negotiated badly than because they were not prepared to resort to force to change realities their Soviet ally had already created.

For the later critical periods the author did not have the classified official documents available, but he was fortunately able to consult the Dulles papers, which

add authority to his account of the 1950s. The book deals fully with the Hungarian revolt, less so with the Prague Spring. Indeed, the account of U.S. policy in October–November 1956 deserves very high marks. Kovrig speculates that Dulles's "perhaps gratuitous assurance" (in Dallas on October 27) that the United States under no circumstances would use force strengthened the hand of those Soviet leaders who favored repressing the Hungarian revolt. Since we know the Politburo was divided on that decision, it may have been so. Dulles's purpose was surely to persuade the Soviets that they could have security without repression, and in that he failed. But the determining facts were those of power, not Suez or confusion in Washington. Kovrig makes clear that the United States could not have done anything effective militarily (unless it chose to use atomic weapons), and the Soviets were aware of that. Indeed the Soviet repression of the Hungarians, like other Soviet actions in East Central Europe over the years, took place almost without reference to the United States. The shades of difference in U.S. declaratory policy—as it moved from nonacceptance to liberation to bridge-building and finally to peaceful coexistence, a term invented in the Soviet Union—depended mainly on how loudly Washington chose to advertise its impotence.

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THE ODER-NEISSE BOUNDARY AND POLAND'S MODERNIZATION: THE SOCIOECONOMIC AND POLITICAL IMPACT. By *Z. Anthony Kruszewski*. Foreword by *Morton A. Kaplan*. Praeger Special Studies in International Politics and Public Affairs. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972. xvii, 246 pp. \$16.50.

One-third or more of the prewar Polish territory was taken over by the Soviet Union as a consequence of World War II, while Poland was pushed far west into one-time German territories, up to the Oder-Neisse line. Thus Berlin found itself almost at commuting distance from the Polish border.

In 1939 this entire area was inhabited by about 7 to 8 million people, over 6 million of them German nationals. More than 3 million Germans fled or were transferred during the war; the remaining 3.5 million were transferred in a gigantic *Ostflucht* by 1945–59. What remained, in addition to some Germans, was about one million or more of so-called autochthonic Polish population, who declared themselves Poles, knew the language, and were permitted to stay. Towns and villages, ports and factories, lay abandoned. This vacuum was again filled by a mass migration of about 6 to 7 millions. People from the Eastern Polish territories, taken over by the Soviet Union, were moved toward the West. Streets and villages were filled with an entirely new population. A new society was formed on a territory which was first vacated like rented rooms, and then filled with new tenants.

Somehow those changes were marked on maps and in school atlases and diplomatic manuals, but the great historical drama resulted in little if any major interest of historians and social scientists in the West. This gap is filled with skill and expertise by the balanced and scholarly Kruszewski volume. Kruszewski, in a clear and well-organized presentation, tells us about the new society which emerged in this area and was molded together by two powerful though sometimes opposing forces—the Communist Party and the Catholic Church. (The official functions of