

Like its predecessor, the present work reveals a voluminous mastery of detail, offset to some extent by a certain disdain for footnotes. To single out one from a legion of examples: Fejtő asserts that Khrushchev wanted to rehabilitate Bukharin, but was prevented from doing so by his nervous colleagues. No sources are given for such intriguing assertions, yet the reader must keep in mind that Fejtő was once associated with the extreme left in Hungary and that over many years he has been the responsible editor for Communist affairs at Agence France-press.

Fejtő also offers much that is suggestive and exciting in the way of interpretation. He views Chinese influence as a major, if behind-the-scenes, factor in East European politics after 1956. It was no accident that the last wave of collectivization in Eastern Europe began at the time of the Great Leap Forward. The counterpoise to Mao's dogmatism came to be Tito's revisionism: the second Yugoslav revolution, initiated by the market reform of 1965, was accompanied by the thunder of the Chinese Cultural Revolution. For another thing, our author lays great stress on the intelligentsia as a threat to the power of the apparatus. He is inclined to think that the *apparatchiki* are not in the long run capable of governing a complex industrial society, and he sees the continuing emphasis on the leading role of the party primarily as a defensive maneuver of the *apparat*. The evidence for such positions is by no means definitive, but Fejtő's argumentation is well worth the reading.

There are, unfortunately, some surprising gaps in Fejtő's structuring of events. Despite his emphasis on Chinese influence, there is no reference to the 1960 effort to overthrow the pro-Chinese Albanian leadership, pivoted on the Soviet submarine base at Sazan. Nor does he place Khrushchev's 1958 educational reform, widely imitated in Eastern Europe, in the context of the struggle between the *apparat* and the new professional class. Of greater importance is Fejtő's failure to distinguish between economic reform which seeks only to improve the central planning system, thus preserving the preponderance of the *apparat*, and marketization, which tends to undermine it. In fact, the economic part of his presentation is the weakest.

On the whole, however, Fejtő's new work is a most useful acquisition. If past experience is any guide, many years will pass before it faces a worthy competitor.

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THE WARSAW PACT: CASE STUDIES IN COMMUNIST CONFLICT RESOLUTION. By *Robin Alison Remington*. Studies in Communism, Revisionism, and Revolution (formerly Studies in International Communism), no. 17. Cambridge and London: The M.I.T. Press, 1971. xix, 268 pp. \$10.00.

No book-length study of the Warsaw Treaty Organization has appeared recently in the West, and earlier published works are now out of date—for example, Boris Meissner, ed., *Der Warschauer Pakt* (Cologne, 1962), Kazimierz Grzybowski, *The Socialist Commonwealth of Nations* (New Haven, 1964), Friedrich Wiener, *Die Armeen der Warschauer-Pakt-Staaten* (Vienna, 1965), and Jens Hacker and Alexander Uschakow, *Die Integration Osteuropas, 1961 bis 1965* (Cologne, 1966). Hence the student of East European affairs will welcome this book as a contribution to a difficult subject on which primary source materials are scattered in a dozen foreign languages. Dr. Remington acknowledges the help of assistants for access to

some of the more esoteric tongues, and she is to be commended for wading through the masses of data cited in the footnotes.

The book is a study in coalition politics and focuses mainly on three specific examples of conflict (Rumania, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany). Fifteen documents (pp. 201–48) round out the text. One is impressed with the analysis of the December 1970 crisis in Poland, which must have occurred as the manuscript was going to press. A brief postscript deals with May–June 1971 events.

This political instability is one of the problems in writing about East European politics. The Dubčeks, Ulbrichts, and Gomułkas are replaced with little or no advance notice. Ferment of this kind and the paucity of hard data force the analyst to engage in speculation regarding perceptions and motives. Dr. Remington's conclusions in which she compares the Warsaw Pact with the Organization of American States—and, specifically, the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia with the 1965 Dominican crisis—appear somewhat strained. Also, to place the Chilean election and the Polish riots of 1970 in the same context, as similar examples of Great Power restraint, does not seem valid to this reviewer (p. 195, n. 48).

One hopes that Dr. Remington will be encouraged by the favorable reactions to her work of painstaking research to delve into the military aspects of the Warsaw Pact. A good study is needed on the role of the East European armed forces in Soviet military strategy. The inferiority of NATO in terms of conventional forces and the qualitative build-up of the Warsaw Pact countries militarily require analysis, regardless of whether a mutual and balanced reduction of forces is attained. Recent books by Maria Hildt, ed., *Potencjał obronno-gospodarczy państw układu warszawskiego*, and Marian Jurek and Edward Skrzypkowski, *Układ warszawski* (both published in Warsaw, 1971), unfortunately do not go beneath the surface in this respect.

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THE THIRTY YEARS WAR. By J. V. Polišíenský. Translated by Robert Evans. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1971. x, 305 pp. \$10.00.

This is Professor Polišíenský's third book relating to European history in the first half of the seventeenth century. Its predecessors were two solidly documented monographs in Czech, one on England and Bohemia at the time of the anti-Habsburg rising in 1618–20, and the other on the Netherlands and Bohemia in the same period. In addition, he has published a large number of analytical studies and concise essays pertaining to specific problems of either Bohemia or Europe as a whole. On several occasions he took active part in the controversies stirred up by scholars of such repute as C. V. Wedgwood, Christopher Hill, and H. R. Trevor-Roper. By publishing his comprehensive study of the Thirty Years' War the University of California Press contributed significantly to the progress of international exchanges which no barriers or "curtains" should hinder.

The terse title covers a multitude of problems which vexed Western and Central Europe for several decades as dissatisfaction accumulated prior to the outburst in 1618, and then during the successive diplomatic and armed conflicts up to 1648. To get at their roots and to acquaint modern readers with their substance, the author decided on an unconventional approach. He presents the highly complicated