

tiating alliances in the Middle East, extending economic aid to Asia and Africa to encourage republicanism, denouncing Marxism around the world, and reduced consumption of Arab oil. At the level of means, Eidelberg places great faith in recognition and nonrecognition, in words and attitudes; he assumes that power can control even where interests are secondary. On the matter of ends, he assumes that Soviet gains have been substantial, although the limitations which the world imposes on the United States apply equally to the USSR.

Rummel's study of U.S.-Soviet relations focuses on the military balance and its effect on American interests and will. For him, a successful deterrent requires the prevention of Soviet first-strike capability, power to cover all danger points, and conventional forces of sufficient strength to deter or win a local, limited war without resorting to nuclear weapons. Rummel believes that détente, as an effort to limit power and establish a web of transactions for the purpose of strengthening peace, was based on false assumptions. Cooperative efforts, he asserts, do not bring peace; nor does the restraint of power, because power, to be effective, requires capability, will or credibility, and interests. Power compels cooperation; any loss of strength, in time, reduces will and contracts interests. Thus peace requires political dominance—"a dominance not alone in military capacity, but also in the strength of a nation's interests and the force of its will" (p. 56).

Rummel fears that the USSR will soon have a dominant first-strike capability and a preclusive first-strike capability by 1981, by which time it will be able to confront the West with the choice of war or surrender. Therefore, by placing the United States in a position of military inferiority, détente has merely increased the danger of war. "When a nation's purposes become confused, its strength eroded, or its credibility questioned," he writes, "aggression against it is encouraged, and is likely to occur" (p. 149). Rummel's recipe for success in meeting the onrush of Soviet power and ambition, like that of Eidelberg's, requires that the United States assert a national interest in freedom, make clear to its people the dangers which they face, build the required levels of nuclear and conventional power to deter attack, stop aiding the USSR with trade and technology, and negotiate only on problems of mutual interest. In their plea for greater defense spending, these two authors have written books that will enhance the arguments of those leaders, in Congress and out, who share their fears and expectations.

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SOVIET STRATEGY IN EUROPE. Edited by *Richard Pipes*. New York: Crane, Russak & Company, 1976. xvi, 316 pp.

ARMS CONTROL AND EUROPEAN SECURITY: A GUIDE TO EAST-WEST NEGOTIATIONS. By *Joseph I. Coffey*. New York and London: Praeger Publishers, 1977. 271 pp.

*Soviet Strategy in Europe* raises important questions in several arenas. First, what is the impact on professional standards of crash studies sponsored by the government on policy relevant matters with important budgetary consequences? The problem is how to get good advice and support basic research without skewing the outcome. It may be desirable for competent scholars to update their previous findings and revise them as necessary in light of recent developments, but scholarly standards can easily crumble when specialists mix their relatively well researched history with more speculative assertions based on events recounted in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine* or doctrinal hints in *Voennyi vestnik*. This danger exists when policy implications extend only to proper management of retirement pensions, but it mounts precipitously when issues of war and peace intrude in East-West relations. After the authors' historical

excursions and somewhat one-sided interpretations of recent events, most of the military and political essays in this collection justify an affirmative response to the defense planner's question, "spend more or less?" All concur that NATO needs to act more decisively to counteract rising Soviet power.

Second, what good can it do for military planners to have papers prepared in 1974 published in 1976? Assuming the validity of the combination of history and current events, there is little point in committing it to book form two years later, when many of the vital numbers and some interpretations will have changed. And if the mix is dubious, as I think it is, why bother the academic and his libraries with such material? Indeed, why have the book reviewed in *Slavic Review* five years after the original studies were prepared—except to crusade against such books?

Third, why do the editors of such collections not try to iron out inconsistencies in the selections or at least comment on them? Thus, Michel Tatu tells us that Peter Shelest was downgraded in 1972–73 for resisting détente (p. 64), while Christopher Cviic explains that Shelest fell because he did too little to restrain Ukrainian nationalism (p. 116). Richard Pipes credits Moscow with forging tools of economic warfare with which to dominate the West (pp. 36–37), but the essays by economists Philip Hanson, Michael Kaser, and John and Pauline Pinder show the limited extent to which this has happened. (Pipes also emphasizes Brezhnev's 1971 turn to the West for economic assistance [p. 18], but overlooks similar overtures by Khrushchev in the 1950s.) Indeed, the economists' essays indicate that the USSR and her CMEA partners have embarked upon policies likely to deepen their economic interdependence with the West, perhaps leaving the Eastern regimes more vulnerable to manipulation by the other side—a strategy that fits oddly with the campaign for military-political primacy painted in the other essays.

Fourth, how can scholars produce sound studies about East-West relations unless they give equal attention to the perceptions and interests of both sides, and unless they fuse data collection with sound theory? Obtaining the time, energy, and space for such studies is a real challenge, and it is manifested in most of these essays. The Pinders' article, however, provides a valuable indication of how to meet this challenge. They summarize oligopoly theory and how economic actors can corner a market for bargaining advantage. They then analyze how the CMEA countries could manipulate the West and follow this with a study of Western levers on the East. There are hints of this approach in the other essays, for example, in John Erickson's passing reference to the fact that Soviet strategists do not share West Europeans' "inferiority complex" about NATO, although he does not give "equal time" to Soviet perceptions.

Fifth—a question stimulated by Erickson's masterful blend of information about Soviet maneuvers, doctrine, and deployment—why don't Western intelligence agencies publish more about what they know about Warsaw Pact maneuvers? Are such data really more sensitive than the missile counts that have become familiar since Robert McNamara's years at the Pentagon? Bits of information on maneuvers and troop movements (during the 1973 Middle East crises, for example) filter into the public domain, but Erickson clearly knows how to separate the wheat from the chaff. Western intelligence (in the broadest sense) would gain if more information were available. Indeed, outside critics might even become more sympathetic to those who cry "wolf!"

Solutions to some of these problems are provided by Coffey's research, funded by the University of Pittsburgh and conducted at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, using facilities that are not opulent but are adequate, close but not too close to any government, and more conducive to independent thought than some other premises. A one-man effort, *Arms Control and European Security* integrates history with recent events more organically and with fewer gaps than papers written specifically to guide policymakers in their present problems. Coffey explicitly addresses

the security concerns not only of West Europeans but also of East Europeans, indeed, of all Europeans.

But his book also suffers from the fact that its data and interpretations may quickly become dated. One sees a significant discrepancy between Coffey (p. 26) and Erickson (in *Soviet Strategy in Europe*, p. 182) on whether Soviet tactical nuclear warheads are stored in Eastern Europe, and in what magnitudes. Comparing these two authors further, one wonders whether the analyst who is unable to use East Europeans' languages can ever cover their literature and feel their political cultures so as to assess accurately their security policies. (Erickson uses not only Russian but original German, Polish, and Czechoslovak sources.) And although Coffey is encyclopedic on arms and arms control—at least as they are understood in the West—his book is almost atheoretical.

Both books have their uses, but I would not trade them for Thucydides and *Khrushchev Remembers* in tandem.

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MULTIPLE EXPOSURE: AN AMERICAN AMBASSADOR'S UNIQUE PERSPECTIVE ON EAST-WEST ISSUES. By *Jacob D. Beam*. New York: W. W. Norton, 1978. 317 pp. \$10.95.

Jacob Beam had a distinguished career as a diplomat, capping it with a tour as ambassador to the USSR in the years when détente was bursting into flower. Unlike his more widely known colleagues in the Foreign Service who had held that post—Kennan, Bohlen, and Thompson—Beam had had a series of prior assignments in other Communist capitals: Belgrade, Warsaw, and Prague. This was the multiple exposure. It gave him perspectives on the Soviet Union's problems of empire and on the diversity of communism in different national environments that those whose focus was on Moscow did not have. He was in Yugoslavia during the critical years after Tito's break with Stalin; he was ambassador to Poland in the early years of the Gomulka regime when, after a confrontation with the Russians, limited freedom bloomed and then faded; and he was ambassador to Czechoslovakia in 1968 when hopes for a freer and more human type of socialism turned to dust after a showdown with the Russians.

Ambassador Beam has written neither a detailed historical account of these events nor a broad disquisition on their meaning. Scholars will not find much that throws new light on American foreign policy or on developments in the USSR and Eastern Europe. The book was not written for specialists searching for bits of evidence to flesh out a footnote or prove a theory, but for the general reader, for whom he gives the background of the issues he dealt with in Washington and in the field, recounts episodes that illustrate a point or reveal a personality, and does it all with urbanity and a touch of humor. He has a good chapter on the negotiations with the Chinese in Warsaw from their beginning in 1958 to the time he left that post in 1961.

Beam was a diplomat's diplomat, a good negotiator, cautious and discreet, giving his best counsel to his government and carrying out its instructions. Now that he has retired, he permits himself the expression of some personal views on those with whom he had to deal, including a number of secretaries of state of the United States and Richard Nixon (who personally chose him for the Moscow post). He was a member of the U.S. delegation at the Nixon-Brezhnev summit meetings of 1972, and he played a constructive role throughout that period, never losing touch with the realities and the limitations of détente. Unfortunately for him and for readers of this book, how-