prosopographical account of the individuals mentioned in speech 13, with the speech's wider context in view (241-48). The introductory overviews of both speeches' persuasive strategies (38-43, 248-53), by contrast, feel slightly brief and over-selective in the rhetorical aspects that are introduced: much of the substance of the rhetorical analysis is reserved for the commentary sections proper, where it can be tied to specifics. Todd's introduction to the rhetorical profile of speech 16 (606-12) is much better-proportioned relative to this speech's (excellent) introduction as a whole (595-614). Speeches 14 and 15 bring with them the question of their relationships with extant speeches by Isocrates and pseudo-Andocides, and Todd's coverage here is concise and balanced (463, 465, 474-79). Indeed his economical and acute mediation of complex material is a feature of the whole volume. Specialists are admittedly the group of readers best served in general, but Todd confines much supporting detail (including granular critique of older commentaries) to the numerous and often very full footnotes, making the core content more widely accessible (though non-specialist readers may still wish to read Todd's succinct speech introductions in his 2000 translation volume first). Readers working with Lysias' speeches primarily as texts for Greek language learning will probably need more specific support than Todd offers them in the commentary sections here. They are nonetheless bound to have their understanding of a given speech's expressive framework enriched by his precise discussions of a wide variety of relevant linguistic and rhetorical features, including individual technical terms (stylistic aspects as such tend to be less of a priority for comment). Production quality is high, and the book's clear internal referencing system makes it straightforward to use. Like the first volume, it is also equipped with four indexes (including an excellent index of personal names), further enhancing its utility as a reference work.

In summary, Stephen Usher's judgement in *JHS* that the first volume of this commentary would be 'very unlikely to be superseded in the foreseeable future' holds true for this second volume. Anyone interested in Lysias, Athenian oratory or late fifth- and early fourth-century Athens will benefit from the great wealth of insights to be found here.

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LANDAUER (M.) **Dangerous Counsel: Accountability and Advice in Ancient Greece**. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2019. Pp. viii + 240, illus. £72. 9780226654010.

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Accountability is a major issue in modern democracies. This well-written and closely argued book is aimed primarily at political theorists, but it offers much of interest for Greek historians and classical philosophers. Matthew Landauer's thesis is, first, that Greeks thought of the tyrant and the demos (in a democracy) as similarly unaccountable rulers and, next, that those rulers depended on accountable counsellors for advice. Landauer employs the ordinary contemporary meaning of 'accountable', as being expected to give reasons for one's words or deeds and being held responsible, and potentially blamed and/or punished, for them. He notes that Athenian procedures for holding individuals accountable were remarkable in their scope and intensity: like magistrates,

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proposers of legislation were legally accountable. The book traces the asymmetry of power and risk between rulers, accountable to no one, and the counsellor, who must offer reasons for his recommendation and risked being punished by those he advised. Landauer asks how the asymmetry could have been justified by the Athenian demos. The question arises, however: justified to whom? In modern democracies lawmakers are, in principle, accountable to the citizenry, who can, via elections, 'throw the bums out'. In Athens, the citizens themselves were the lawmakers and, as *dikastai*, legal judges of advisers. Notably, while *hupeuthunos* was a common Greek term for 'accountable person', there was no equivalent Greek term for the abstraction 'accountability'.

Advisers were held to account by rulers, individual and collective. Landauer cites, as a limit case, the bouleutes ('counsellor') Lycides, stoned to death (along with his family) by his fellow Athenians for advising surrender to Persia. Ordinarily, however, speakers who proposed legislation in the Athenian assembly were punished either informally, by loss of reputation and influence, or by formal legal process. So, unlike counsellors to tyrants, Athenian advisers worked within established norms and procedural rules and they took their chances accordingly. The degree of adviser/ruler asymmetry is, as Landauer notes with reference to the Sicilian expedition, limited, when we think of accountability as liability to suffering: counsel could be dangerous to the advised as well as to advisers. Tyrants, like most modern lawmakers, might insulate their persons from the worst effects of bad policy choices. But Athenian citizens risked suffering (in some cases, as in Sicily, terribly) when they followed advice about policies involving mortal risks. Accountable advisers, at risk of punishment, had incentives to reveal the potential costs as well as potential benefits of their policies. Moreover, asymmetric power was counterbalanced by asymmetric reward: the accountable counsellor gave advice in anticipation not only of possible costs to himself, but also of benefits. Successful advisers were amply rewarded, materially and with honours. The ruler might be rewarded with flattery but, as Landauer points out, flattery was dangerous when rulers came to overestimate their capacities.

The book's chapters can be read as stand-alone essays, but form a coherent whole: chapter 1 concerns accountability and unaccountability in democratic Athens, as noted above. Chapter 2 turns to the unaccountable tyrant, noting the association between tyrants and the Athenian demos in Aristophanes and in Xenophon's narrative of the affair of the Arginousai generals. Chapter 3 argues that Herodotus portrays power asymmetries between advisers and rulers as even more politically salient than the distinction between freedom and slavery. Chapter 4 centres on the Mytilenean Debate in Thucydides: Cleon emphasizes the irresponsibility of advisers and the fecklessness of the demos that neglects to punish them; Diodotus by contrast urges moderation in calling advisers to account and emphasizes that the demos is not accountable for its decisions. Chapter 5 considers parrhēsia ('freedom of speech') across regime types, showing that frank speech is not uniquely associated with democracy. Chapter 6 addresses expert advice in Plato's Gorgias, arguing that Plato subverts the positions both of Gorgias, Polus and Callicles (the orator is powerful in being able to get whatever he wants) and of Socrates (the orator is controlled by the powerful demos). Landauer rightly points out that, for Plato, neither orators nor demos were truly powerful in that neither knew nor, consequently, aimed at what is truly beneficial to themselves. He also argues, I think less convincingly, that Plato had a practical purpose: helping the Athenian demos to learn from its errors and teaching non-philosophical readers to moderate their desire for power. Landauer's Plato, then, shares with other Greek writers an 'insistence on a kind of political realism' (184-85). Plato certainly does insist on a certain psychological realism, in taking self-interest and strategic behaviour as given, but his political philosophy seems to me to be fundamentally critical on the one hand and idealizing on the other.

Whatever quibbles classical historians or philosophers might have with specific arguments, *Dangerous Counsel* does a great service by demonstrating how reading classical texts

in the light of a salient modern political concept highlights neglected features of the texts and contributes to democratic theory.

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PAPAIOANNOU (S.), SERAFIM (A.) and DEMETRIOU (K.) (eds) **The Ancient Art of Persuasion across Genres and Topics** (International Studies in the History of Rhetoric 12). Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2020. Pp. xiv + 410. €136/\$164. 9789004412545. doi:10.1017/S0075426922000465

This rich volume stems from a 2015 conference at the University of Cyprus. Its major objective is to outline a framework that will deepen our appreciation of both the context-specific and trans-generic features and manifestations of ancient persuasion. The volume achieves its purpose by investigating a wider range of genres (oratory, historiography, poetry and epistolography) and means of persuasion (narrative, emotions, gender, style, performance) than previous scholarship has so far considered. Its 20 contributions, distributed across six thematic parts, cover a broad temporal spectrum that ranges from fifth-century Greece to Imperial Rome. Below I offer a brief overview of each section, with a focus on selected chapters concerning Greek literature in accordance with the interests of this journal.

To circumscribe the meaning of 'persuasion' is, of course, no small task. The introductory chapter 1 provides the volume's understanding of the term and sets out its methodology. The authors define persuasion as 'all the techniques, mechanisms and symbols, both cognitive and emotional, deployed in oral or written discourse, used to influence, *voluntarily or not*, the attitudes, behaviours and beliefs of target audiences' (3). They ground this definition in both ancient and modern approaches to persuasion by fruitfully integrating Aristotle's *Rhetoric* with contemporary notions of 'group identity', 'imagined community' and 'emotional community' (4–5). A connecting thread throughout the volume is Aristotle's classification of means of persuasion into *logos*, *ēthos* and *pathos*, which serves as the theoretical foundation of most chapters.

After a detailed overview of each contribution (8–16), the volume moves to part 1, on 'Dramatic debates in poetry', which features two chapters on Seneca's *Agamemnon* (Andreas N. Michalopoulos) and Ovid and Quintus of Smyrna's reworking of the *Hoplōn krisis* (Sophia Papaioannou).

Part 2 is made up of five chapters, which examine persuasive strategies and their outcomes in narratives from Attic forensic speeches (Eleni Volonaki), Thucydides (Antonis Tsakmakis and Maria Kythreotou), Livy (Georgios Vassiliades) and Virgil's Aeneid (Michael Paschalis). This type of interdisciplinary dialogue is particularly valuable for assessing the outcome of persuasion, which is difficult to judge in speeches from Classical Athens as we often do not know whether they were successful. Chapters 5 and 6, on unpersuasive communication in Thucydides, are especially promising. Antonis Tsakmakis proposes that the failure of Teutiaplus' speech (3.30) should be located within the larger Mytilenean narrative. Maria Kythreotou argues that Thucydides seemingly undermines Brasidas' speech (4.85–87) in an attempt to call his readers' attention to the 'ineffectiveness' of (some) speakers within his work.

Part 3 focuses on indirect ways of stirring up emotions. Gabriel Evangelou and Jennifer Devereaux examine Cicero's *Letters to Atticus* and Seneca's *On Anger* respectively. Andreas Serafim's piece adds to our understanding of inexplicit appeals to emotions in Attic