to go up with him into a high place. It is his chance to transfigure himself and disclose his glory, so that like his apostles we should want to stay there with him. If we stay in a monastery guest house we may get no conferences, but the retreat can be just as valid if we take the opportunity to pray and read and reflect. No one will stop our drawing up a simple timetable or asking for counsel which will hardly be refused. The kind of retreat that best suits us we discover by forethought, advice, or trial.

The least satisfactory result will be a sigh of relief and a sort of doggy shaking down with the thought, 'Now that's over for a year'. If the retreat renews our spirit it should tend to make habits of what we previously tried with an effort. The good work of a retreat can be continued in our normal life by an occasional day of quiet and prayer which even husband and wife can easily share at home. By way of suggestion—assist at a high mass with sermon, in the afternoon make perhaps a short pilgrimage, attend an evening service, conclude with carefully selected night prayers. Above all keep the atmosphere of the home orderly and quiet, even if it means persuading the children to go on an outing. And bear in mind that these retreats into the presence of God are sources of future vitality and action in the cause of spreading his kingdom.

Reviews

THE IDEA OF PUNISHMENT, by Lord Longford; Geoffrey Chapman, 10s. 6d.

Socrates:	Is it ever right for a just man to harm anybody?
Polemarchus:	Of course: he should harm the wicked and those who are his enemies.
Socrates:	When horses are harmed, do they become better or worse?
Polemarchus:	Worse.
Socrates:	They lose, that is to say, part of what makes a horse a good horse?
Polemarchus:	That's right.
Socrates:	Must we not say, then, that when men are harmed they lose part of what makes a man a good man?
Polemarchus:	Yes.

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Socrates: Is not justice what makes a man a good man?
Polemarchus: Certainly.
Socrates: So men, when they are harmed, must become more unjust?
Polemarchus: Yes.
Socrates: Now can a learned man use his learning to make others more unlearned?
Polemarchus: Of course not.
Socrates: Can a just man, then, display his justness by making others more unjust? Must we not rather say that it is never right for a just man to harm anyone at all? (*Republic I*, 335b-d, abbreviated).

Throughout most of his book, Lord Longford is on the side of Socrates. He tells us that he feels pride and joy 'that our modern ideas of punishment are conceived far more deliberately in the interests of the delinquent than those of earlier times'. He is rightly anxious that the element of reform of the criminal should play a part in our penal practice; and he very justly points out that it is an odd way to reform a man to place him for *n* years in demoralising conditions, enforced idleness and bad company. He realises that if our present penal system is to be justified at all, it must be on grounds of deterrence or retribution, or both; and he does much to clarify the concepts here involved. With Socratic patience he draws the necessary and often neglected distinctions between crime and sin, between individual deterrence and general deterrence, between the purpose of the prison system and the purpose of the penal system as a whole; and he dispels the popular illusion that a deterrent theory of punishment leads necessarily to less severe punishments than a retributive theory. With Socratic modesty, he is always ready to learn from other writers, and if he disagrees with an author, it is never without complimenting him first. Indeed, the reader may feel that Lord Longford is too modest, and wish that he had reduced the number of his quotations in order to expound his own views at greater length. This is particularly so with regard to Chapter II, where Lord Longford reduces his role to that of a teller counting votes for and against retribution; votes whose significance is difficult to assess, since no two of the voters seem to have meant the same thing by 'retribution'.

But there are passages where Lord Longford seems to speak with the voice of Polemarchus. He is convinced that retribution is an important element in punishment, and that it has been wrongly neglected in recent treatments of the topic. By 'retribution' he sometimes means the proportioning of the punishment to the crime; but this cannot be all he means, since a purely deterrent theory may include this element no less than a retributive theory. Sometimes, again, he means the payment of compensation by the criminal to his victim; but again, he must mean more than this if his theory is to apply to such punishments as imprisonment, which in no way benefit the victim of a crime. One is forced to the conclusion that sometimes at least he is using the word 'retribution' to refer to some alleged restitution which a criminal makes to his victim or to society *merely by suffering*, no matter whether this suffering is likely to benefit anyone

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or not. To demand retribution in this sense is to make the suffering of the criminal an end in itself. And to seek the harm of another as an end in itself is an evil thing; which, I take it, is what Socrates meant.

Lord Longford writes: 'In terms of strict justice it seems to me that the man who has broken the law has placed himself in the debt of society. Society, therefore, has a right to insist on some form of restitution or compensation' (p. 60). But one can pay a debt to someone only by benefiting him in some way; and how does society benefit by the useless suffering of any of its members? I can think of only one way in which it might be thought to do so. Suburban housewives, if we may believe the *New Statesman*, feel an intense desire to have young hooligans thrashed. It might well be thought, therefore, that a juvenile delinquent who is chastised in this manner is performing, perhaps for the first time in his life, a public service: he is keeping the suburban housewives happy. I have heard this argument put forward seriously by a philosopher: but I hardly think it would appeal to Lord Longford any more than it does to me.

But isn't it true that criminals *deserve* to be punished? Yes, if they have broken a law which carries a punishment as its sanction: this is what in this context 'deserving punishment' means. But don't the wicked deserve to suffer, quite apart from any context of law and sanction? No: not in any sense of 'deserve' in which an injustice is done if a man does not get his deserts. If a bad man deserved, in this sense, to suffer, then every time an offence was forgiven, an injustice would be done. A good man deserves to be happy, and a bad man does not deserve to be happy; that is all. But doesn't the good man deserve to be *happier than* the bad man, so that *he* is cheated of *his* desserts if the bad man is happy after all? No: we cannot say that a good man deserves to be happier than a bad man; unless, that is, we accept the philosophy of the Prodigal's elder brother.

Perhaps I have misunderstood Lord Longford's theory of retribution; I trust that I have. But it seems to me sad that a book so obviously full of goodwill and earnest thought should even appear to lend the authority of his name to a theory so mistaken.

Since the book will certainly be reprinted, it may be worth while to point out some misprints: 'McDoughall' (p. 29), 'Teilhard du Chardin' (p. 74), 'Hobbs' (p. 80), 'Bloomesbury' (p. 81), 'Fr Kevin S.J.' (for 'Fr Kelly S.J.', p. 92), 'Routledg' (p. 103), and, quaintest of all, 'Irish Murdoch' (p. 84).

ANTHONY KENNY

PAUL AND HIS PREDECESSORS, by A. M. Hunter; S.C.M. Press, 15s.

The first 115 pages of this book are a reprint of a study which appeared in 1940, reacting against the widespread exaggeration among Protestant biblical scholars of St Paul's role as a doctrinal innovator. It was then argued more frequently than it is now that Paul was the source from which other New Testament writers

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