

have his readers believe. Most of the studies which have appeared since are in Hungarian and thus inaccessible to most non-Hungarians. Western scholars would therefore have every reason to welcome a compendious account of the subject which took into account all evidence now available.

Insofar as Professor Fenyo's book answers to this description it is to be welcomed, and it is a pleasure to record that it does answer it up to a point. The writer's list of sources consulted is impressive, especially the unpublished German ones (the Hungarian material less so, and he appears to have missed both the *Itél a Történet* and the *Hungarista Napló* series). He has clearly been at pains to present the results fairly: this is a history, not a polemic.

It is not the author's fault if the yield of his dredging has been meager, bringing up few, if any, new facts of major importance, and imposing no big reinterpretations. However, his treatment of the material displays several weaknesses. His system of "omitting the introduction" and beginning "in medias res" and mixing in the "background information with several of the chapters" (p. xi) is unfortunate. Such "background" would often have been necessary for a complete appreciation of many of the events discussed. When given, it is often parenthetical or in a form which disguises its importance from the uninitiated reader. Thus Hungary's fatal decision to allow German troops transit across her territory into Rumania is given only in connection with events occurring much later, and then only in the indirect form of a quotation from a letter from Hitler to Mussolini. It is not explained in any way. Some themes are omitted altogether, such as the Volksdeutsch problem. Professor Fenyo justifies this omission on the extraordinary ground that an excellent monograph exists on the subject. So there does; but the question was an important and integral factor in German-Hungarian relations, and omission of it leaves the story unbalanced. On the same argument, the writer might have omitted treatment of the Jewish question, or of several others on which he has nothing new to add to the work of predecessors. His use of sources is sometimes uncritical. Thus the dictated statements of the renegades Paulus and Ujszászy at Nuremberg are used as though they were evidence of fact. Other sources are sometimes wrongly paraphrased, or even misquoted, and there are many factual errors, ranging from such trivialities as wrong Christian names to such astonishing misstatements as that Ribbentrop and Ciano delivered the First Vienna Award "in the name of the Four Powers (Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy)" (p. 6) or that the Rumanians in the summer of 1940 expected to have to return only a "territory of 14 square kilometers" (p. 8n.). It will be said that such mistakes are mere slips, but they reflect a degree of carelessness of thought or expression, or both, which inevitably reduces the respect which the many merits of Professor Fenyo's work would otherwise command.

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HUNGARY AND THE SUPERPOWERS: THE 1956 REVOLUTION AND REALPOLITIK. By *János Radványi*. Foreword by *Zbigniew Brzezinski*. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1972. xvii, 197 pp. \$5.95.

This well-written volume consists of seventeen chapters which discuss mainly problems of Hungarian diplomacy after 1956, Hungarian-American relations in the same period, and specifically the Kádár government's endeavors for recognition of the Hungarian delegation by the General Assembly's Credentials Committee. Al-

though these events are familiar to students of East European affairs, the narrative is extraordinarily interesting because of the author's special qualifications for writing about the *modus operandi* of Communist diplomacy and the intricacies of policy-making in a small country under Moscow's thumb. The author was a member of the Hungarian foreign service for two decades and was Hungarian chargé d'affaires in Washington from 1962 to 1967. Subsequently he received a Ph.D. from Stanford University and is now associate professor of history at Mississippi State University. He was an inside observer of, or an active participant in, most events discussed in the volume. This special background he has supplemented by thorough research of documents and other publications available in the United States.

The book discusses questions of far wider interest than its title indicates. The narrative shows a connection between the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 and the Hundred Flowers policy in China. Although the Chinese may have sympathized with the Hungarians in the early stage of the revolt, Radványi relates that by the end of October an urgent message from Mao Tse-tung asked the hesitant Khrushchev for quick action "to smash the counterrevolutionary rebellion in Hungary." Several examples illuminate the strong Chinese interest and influence in East European affairs even before 1956. Chairman Mao mentioned to a Hungarian delegation in May 1959 his long-standing argument with Stalin over the leadership question in Eastern Europe. Although Stalin preferred to install Moscow-educated leaders of the Rákosi type, Mao considered homegrown leaders like Kádár to be more desirable.

The description of meetings of the heads of all the Communist embassies in Washington during the Cuban missile crisis reveals the ignorance of the Soviet ambassador, Anatolii Dobrynin, about Soviet policies in Cuba. Mikoyan's account, to the same group, of his stormy negotiations with Castro after the crisis is even more interesting. Mikoyan told the Communist ambassadors in Washington that the missile deployment had aimed at defending Castro and "at achieving a definite shift in the power relationship between the socialist and the capitalistic worlds."

Although Kádár fully supported Soviet foreign policy, Hungarian diplomacy had leeway to maneuver during Radványi's tenure in Washington, mainly because Moscow followed a less anti-American policy than Budapest did. Kádár apparently had more common sense during negotiations with Washington than lesser leaders in the Hungarian Communist Party. Eventually a political amnesty in Hungary, combined with the flexible attitude of some State Department officials and senators, made possible the improvement of United States-Hungarian relations—a practical precondition for removal of the Hungarian question from the General Assembly's agenda and full recognition of the Kádár government by the United Nations. All in all, this book is "must" reading for students interested in the working conditions of Communist diplomacy and the linkage between Communist Party organs and the implementation of foreign policy.

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FRAGMENTARIUM ILUMINIST. By *Dumitru Ghișe* and *Pompiliu Teodor*. Cluj: Editura Dacia, 1972. 245 pp. Lei 9.50.

The influence of the Enlightenment on the Rumanians of the Principalities and Transylvania has been one of the most important and fruitful preoccupations of