

flict between it and the Soviet Communist Party are described in detail. Economic development, the status of the worker and peasant, public opinion, the nationality problem, and intellectual life are dealt with in more cursory fashion.

The author has put together a useful survey, but has not, in my opinion, gone deeply enough into the problem of continuity and change. Adequate treatment of it would require the study of intellectual and spiritual development and the evolution of institutions. The author has relied heavily upon secondary works in English; and the monographs, interpretive works, collections of sources, and newspapers in Rumanian have hardly been touched. Perhaps this is why the three introductory chapters are superficial and the remaining ones seldom take us beyond what is already known.

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THE MEMOIRS OF PROTA MATIJA NENADOVIĆ. Edited and translated from the Serbian by *Lovett F. Edwards*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969. 1, 227 pp. \$7.00.

Prota (Archpriest) Matija Nenadović is known mainly as the diplomat of the First Serb Revolt (1804–13); he visited Russia in 1804–5 and was a steadfast admirer of Russia during the rest of his long life. He has long deserved more than the bare mention he gets in the historical literature outside Yugoslavia.

Nenadović was a remarkable man. Although his education was surprisingly meager considering the means of his family and the schools available, he made an excellent impression in Russia at the relatively early age of thirty. He was a capable negotiator; he was always able to deal with the Turks in the midst of a revolt which he helped to start, made a valiant effort at the Congress of Vienna where he obtained an audience from Emperor Francis, and was often used by the princes of Serbia to settle complicated domestic and foreign issues.

He served Serbia as a statesman and administrator from 1807, when he became the first president of his country's first Legislative Council, until he retired from politics for the third and final time in 1852. He was an independent who was ready to disagree even with his own politically very important family, to oppose on a few key issues the leader of the revolt, Alexander Karageorge, and the first two princes of Serbia, Miloš and Michael Obrenović. As a result his life was often in danger, and once he knew prison and exile too, although only for a short period.

During the First Serb Revolt, Nenadović was one of his country's most important military field commanders, and during the second revolt (1813–14) he occupied himself with smuggling arms into his country before he returned to serve it again as a diplomat. It is not surprising that such an active, versatile man wrote memoirs; what is surprising is that in them he proved to be an excellent historian. Modern scholarship has found relatively few and minor errors in his work, which Vuk Stefan Karadžić, the poet-historian, used as one of the main sources for his history of the Serb Revolt and which also served Leopold von Ranke in writing his famous *History of Serbia*. This good history is superbly written. Edwards is absolutely correct when he states that "the opening pages of the Memoirs are among the most beautiful in the Serbian language."

Edwards has translated these memoirs and also some shorter historical

writings of Nenadović, which together give us his recollections of the crucial decade 1804–14. One has to read only the famous opening pages to realize that the great master of the Serb language found a worthy translator in Edwards. Nenadović speaks to us from these pages, yet he does so in clear and excellent English. Admittedly drawing on the work of the well-known Serb historian, Vladimir Čorović, Edwards has written an introduction which gives us not only a very good short biography of Nenadović but also a fine account of the events described in the memoirs, ending with a short survey of the bibliography dealing with his hero. Both introduction and translation are footnoted with the needed translations of Turkish and Serb terms, and explanations of historical events, local customs, and the special significance of certain localities. A glossary at the end of the volume supplements these footnotes; regrettably, an index is lacking.

Students of East European history and literature owe Mr. Edwards their sincere thanks for this well-done volume.

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SVETOZAR MILETIĆ I NARODNA STRANKA: GRADJA, 1860–1885. KNJIGA II, 1870–1875. Edited by *Nikola Petrović*. Sremski Karlovci: Isto-rijski arhiv autonomne pokrajine Vojvodine, 1969. 779 pp.

This second volume of documents relating to the National Liberal Party founded by Svetozar Miletić contains three sections. The first, entitled "The Defeat of the Clerical Party," includes, among other things, a report showing that Miletić was in the pay of the St. Petersburg Slavophiles in 1871. The second section covers events in the Vojvodina during the years 1872–74, but does not fully illuminate the problems that disrupted the party during these years. More informative annotation and commentary would have been welcome in this section. The last part, covering 1875, is potentially the most intriguing, but unfortunately it adds little to our understanding of the crisis of 1875. Translation of all documents into Serbo-Croatian makes the collection useful to those who do not read Hungarian, but this advantage is partially offset by the lack of a good map.

Nikola Petrović, the editor of the Miletić papers, maintains that the occupation of Bosnia and Hercegovina in 1878 by Austria-Hungary proved that the left-liberals and radicals were correct in advocating armed seizure of Bosnia, and that Prince Michael and the regimes that followed him were wrong in following more moderate and diplomatic policies on behalf of Serbian unity. The moderates feared the masses, Petrović claims, and could not adopt a progressive, revolutionary position. Therefore, they lost Bosnia.

The question of Prince Michael's preparedness for action in Bosnia is one of the oldest in Yugoslav historiography, and Petrović's opinion has not gone unchallenged in his own country. Prince Michael did not reject revolt in Bosnia out of hand. He planned to foment an uprising in 1867, for example, but abandoned the scheme for many good reasons. The Serbian army was very weak, as one document in this collection demonstrates; all the major powers, including Russia, opposed his plans; and Michael's experiences in 1862 and 1866 with potential guerrilla supporters were not reassuring. Michael and his successors rejected an uprising because they had, as the opposition had not, considered the possibility thoroughly. Does anyone believe that Serbia, inspired by revolutionary élan, could have defeated Turkey, and possibly Austria too, in 1867 or in 1872?