PATRONAGE, TRUST, AND STATE CAPACITY
The Historical Trajectories of Clientelism

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WHEN do politicians engage in clientelistic exchange with their voters? Direct or mediated patron-client relations built on personal ties preceded the emergence of faceless bureaucracies tasked with ambitious public projects.[1] Yet clientelism, a seemingly ancient way of getting things done in exchange for votes, flourishes even among wealthy democracies in the twenty-first century.[2] We focus on the historical origins of trust in the state and show that they have a lasting impact on patronage. We argue that lack of trust in the state, rather than affluence, greases the wheels of patron-client linkages.[3] Trust, which ultimately reduces clientelism, originates in competence. Where public administration has historically failed to satisfy citizens' needs, entrenched memories of that failure lead to skepticism and deepen the reliance on personalized, clientelistic relationships today.

We account for both the demand side and the supply side of clientelism. Past experiences with public administrators create reputations that shape individual expectations about state capacity, constrain

[1] Auerbach 2016; Brun and Diamond 2014; Hale 2014; Harding 2015; Helmke and Levitsky 2006; Koter 2013.
[2] Hicken 2011; Piattoni 2001; Warner 2007.
[3] Cleary and Stokes 2006.

politicians' strategies, and explain cross-national differences. On the demand side, if voters expect electoral promises to be implemented by a bureaucracy with a weak reputation, they do not find party platforms based on public goods provision credible. On the supply side, in states with weak historical state capacity, politicians facing reelection refrain from making promises to deliver public goods since the expectation of a deficient and lengthy implementation process is not likely to lead to electorally visible outcomes, despite best intentions. We show that century-old infrastructural state capacities shape accumulated levels of trust and that for voters and parties, distrust nurtures clientelism.

Trust in the state, rooted in historical state capacity that affects current public goods delivery through reputations, is at the center of our theory. To capture historical state capacity, we therefore focus on the bureaucratic strength of states in the early twentieth century, immediately prior to universal suffrage, tracing the early efforts of states to reduce infant mortality.[4] We test our expectations on developed and developing countries at the macro- and microlevels.

We first situate our theoretical argument within debates that link state capacity, economic development, and democratic institutions to the clientelistic provision of goods. Then we discuss our identification strategy using an instrumental variable approach and describe our proxy for historical state capacity. We present results from a cross-national analysis and address alternative explanations along with potential concerns about endogeneity. This cross-national analysis is supplemented with microlevel evidence from the 2010–14 wave of the World Value Survey. We conclude with implications and limitations.

STATE CAPACITY, DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS, AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Consensus on the proper definition of clientelism is lacking.[5] Scholars typically refer to a contingent relationship between politicians and voters, sometimes mediated by brokers, in which concrete benefits are exchanged for votes. This relationship formalizes power asymmetries, entails personalization and coercion, and unlike a one-time bribe to a bureaucrat, is subject to repeated interactions.[6] The exact content of this exchange is subject to debate, but it is often context specific and encompasses a range of items, such as cash, consumption goods, public sector jobs, government decisions, and selective access to publicly provided

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[4] Shefter 1977; Shefter 1994.
[5] Hicken 2011.
[6] Hicken 2011; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; Stokes 2007.

benefits that favor only those who promise to vote for a specific candidate or party.[7] By contrast, programmatic parties do not treat voters selectively and therefore voters cannot be excluded from the delivery and consumption of public goods.[8]

Competent, reputable bureaucracies are essential for public goods provision. The cornerstone of clientelism is personalized trust in a politician or in party brokers in place of impartial public administrators.[9] In theory, the most common sites of everyday interaction between citizens and the state are offices that issue driving licenses, business permits, or social assistance benefits, as well as public health clinics, employment agencies, and the institutions of police protection, justice, and taxation. But in practice, a state reputation for weak administrative performance and a low stock of trust preclude any direct experience with official bureaucratic channels to such a degree that citizens in many parts of the world do not even bother, choosing instead to get things done by relying on the politicians they know. In the words of an Indian MP, "My people come directly to me, they do not go to the constable or to the rest of the administration. Of course, they can go to them directly, but they *trust* me more."[10] In cases where public bureaucracy has a reputation of underperforming or selectively doling out services and benefits, the lack of trust renders voters likely to accept—and politicians likely to give—personalized handouts in exchange for votes.

The major theoretical debates about the determinants of clientelistic goods provision focus on three main lines of argument. The first emphasizes economic development as a key factor that shapes political strategies to secure votes.[11] Prominent studies report both linear and curvilinear associations between levels of development and clientelism.[12] As income levels rise, the voter's marginal utility for clientelistic goods in exchange for votes decreases, thus in more developed countries, the cost to patrons of providing such goods exceeds the marginal electoral benefit.[13] If material well-being renders clientelistic goods less desirable, then economic development should suppress patronage, and this effect should be strongest in more developed polities.[14]

[7] Calvo and Murillo 2013; Mainwaring 1999; Medina and Stokes 2007; Robinson and Verdier 2013; Schaffer and Schedler 2007; van de Walle 2007.
[8] Medina and Stokes 2007; Keefer 2005. Clientelistic and public goods platforms can also coexist, as politicians engage in mixed strategies to hedge their electoral risks; Singer 2009.
[9] Cleary and Stokes 2006, 10; Tilly 2007.
[10] Chandra 2004, 137.
[11] Kitschelt and Kselman 2013; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; Piattoni 2001; Remmer 2007; Stokes 2007.
[12] Hicken 2011; Kitschelt and Kselman 2013; Remmer 2007; Wantchekon 2003.
[13] Hicken 2011.
[14] Keefer 2006; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; Kitschelt and Kselman 2013.

Although we do not challenge the notion that wealth reduces clientelism, we distinguish between wealth and the infrastructural capacity of the state, which do not always go hand in hand.[15] We discuss this claim in greater detail in the empirical section. We suggest that trust sprouts from competence and not from wealth per se. Historically rooted positive experiences with a good, but not necessarily wealthy, state breed trust in public institutions and undermine clientelism. Therefore, from a historical perspective, we conjecture that bureaucratic capacity more than wealth determines current levels of clientelism.

The second line of argument postulates that the quality of democracy facilitates the ability of political parties to credibly precommit public goods provision to their voters. Conversely, the absence of inclusive institutions results in more private, or clientelistic, provision of goods.[16] Philip Keefer and Razvan Vlaicu examine the effect of democratic longevity on the exchange of votes for clientelistic goods in democracies, and show that the credibility of preelectoral commitments to voters is constrained by the longevity of democratic institutions.[17] In younger democracies, political parties have had less time to establish a reputation for delivering public goods and are therefore more likely to engage in clientelism.

The third line of the argument, reputation, is at the core of our position, but its effect on contemporary clientelism is mediated by trust in the state rather than by trust in political parties. We suggest that the reputations of parties are shaped by historical state capacity in addition to the limitations imposed by democratic longevity emphasized by Keefer and Vlaicu.[18] Politicians, as principals, have to rely on bureaucracies, as agents, to implement their policy goals. Our argument suggests that even politicians seeking to run on programmatic platforms face a credible commitment problem due to the constraints imposed by a malfunctioning bureaucracy that is incapable of implementing policy. Memories of bureaucratic incompetence make voters doubtful. Therefore, political parties are constrained in their portfolio of actions due to the expectations associated with the preexisting infrastructure of service delivery and by the degree to which voters trust the state to implement policies initiated by political parties. This situation leads to a path-dependent equilibrium whereby the immediate gains from patronage are more attractive than the uncertainty of public goods provision. Even

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[15] Acemoglu, García-Jimenez, and Robinson 2015; Mann 1986.
[16] Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Acemoglu and Robinson 2012; Keefer and Vlaicu 2008.
[17] Keefer and Vlaicu 2005; Keefer and Vlaicu 2008; cf. Keefer and Khemani 2009.
[18] Keefer and Vlaicu 2008.

political parties committed to universalism undersupply public goods to their voters if they expect public bureaucracies to negatively affect their electoral prospects.

Furthermore, clientelism transcends time and political regimes. Patron-client relations dominate elections in many autocracies around the world.[19] In the absence of independent and well-functioning bureaucracies that regulate politicians' access to public resources, political parties strive to colonize states and exacerbate the discord between voters and public bureaucracies.[20] We focus on the longevity of bureaucratic reputations, which allows us to account for a phenomenon that extends beyond democracies. We view the effects of both economic development and democratic longevity as *contingent* on the historical capacity of a state.

As with clientelism, the concept of state capacity is problematic and often accommodates vague and contradictory dimensions. Both Weberian and Marxist traditions use it extensively. Some scholars refer to centralized state power, whereas others emphasize the competence and autonomy of bureaucratic agencies, or their role as conduits of collective mobilization.[21] These classical sociological debates on what counts as state capacity, coupled with a renewed interest in the concept, have led to greater definitional precision.[22]

State capacity entails the development of a class of career officials recruited and promoted based on meritocratic criteria who have the competence and mandate to implement policies and who are relatively insulated from interest groups. Acknowledging some similarity between state capacity, autonomy, and strength, we emphasize three dimensions that distinguish capacity from such related concepts: meritocracy, territorial reach and distribution, and evidence-based policymaking ability with respect to public goods delivery.

We define state capacity as human and physical capital investments that led to the creation of bureaucratic authority, independence, efficacy, and penetration within a national territory. This definition encompasses the presence of well-trained civil servants at all levels of government distributed evenly across administrative jurisdictions; institutionalized

[19] Hicken 2011; Magaloni 2006.

[20] Politicians tasked with simultaneously building states, markets, and political institutions cave in to the temptation to exploit state resources, especially in transitional junctures; Geddes 1996; Grzymala-Busse 2007; O'Dwyer 2006.

[21] Evans 1995; Herbst 2000; Evans, Rueschmeyer, and Skocpol 1985; Mann 1986.

[22] Acemoglu, García-Jimenez, and Robinson 2015; Besley and Persson 2015; Soifer 2015; Thies 2010. Capacity is currently studied along multiple dimensions: extractive, fiscal, administrative, despotic, infrastructural, and legal.

standard operational procedures; and the presence of buildings, equipment, and technology, as well as data-gathering capacity for evidence-based policymaking (maps, censuses, and surveys).[23]

We capture the early development of infrastructural state capacity with historical efforts to reduce infant deaths. As a robustness check, we also test other forms of capacity (extractive and territorial reach) that might influence our dependent variable. Current variation in clientelism, we suggest, is attributable to the historical effects of state capacity that have fostered citizen trust in the state and have shaped the incentives of political parties.[24] The next section develops each step of this proposed theoretical mechanism.

THEORY

The shift to programmatic, universalistic politics parallels the historical transition from personalized trust in politicians to impersonalized trust in bureaucracies. This argument is consistent with previous work emphasizing tensions between these two types of trust. Voters in democracies plagued with patronage tend to trust politicians more and have a low-level of trust in bureaucracies, whereas in programmatic polities voters' healthy skepticism of politicians is coupled with higher trust in institutions.[25]

Trust is a precious asset, especially when projected onto the institutions of the state, and is cultivated over an extended period of time. The argument that historically rooted trust in bureaucracies determines current levels of political clientelism rests on three claims. First, trust in the state reduces clientelism. Second, public trust is built over long periods of time and stems from early state capacity. Third, the relative timing of bureaucratization in relation to the extension of voting rights represented a critical juncture for the subsequent trajectories of patronage. This article brings all three of these claims together in a coherent narrative.

Many studies argue that personal and political trust are related to the quality of democratic institutions.[26] Mistrust in the state directly facilitates corruption as well as clientelism.[27] In a study of two Latin American countries, Matthew Cleary and Susan Stokes find that clientelism is an expression of personal trust in politicians, and that the

[23] Besley and Persson 2009; Besley and Persson 2015, 4; Scott 1998.
[24] On the relationship between foreign aid support, clientelism, and trust see Milner, Nielson, and Findley 2016.
[25] Cleary and Stokes 2006, 3.
[26] Fukuyama 1995; Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti 1993; Putnam 2000.
[27] Cleary and Stokes 2006; Della Porta 2000.

shift from personal to institutional trust curbs party appeals based on personalized handouts.[28] Despite strong evidence that trust and clientelism are closely intertwined, the causal direction of this relationship remains unclear.[29] We address this endogeneity problem by turning to the historical origins of trust.

The argument that the historical capacity of states determines public trust was developed in several seminal contributions.[30] For Charles Tilly, state formation and democratization are historical processes that led to the incorporation of private trust networks, such as patron-client relations, in the public domain.[31] For Margaret Levi, the trustworthiness of impartial bureaucracies is a cornerstone of public support for governmental policies.[32] Bo Rothstein proposes a theory of trust as collective memory that relates to the processes of historical state building.[33] Early patterns of state formation are hypothesized to produce long-lasting relationships between politicians and voters and to have a direct effect on public goods provision.[34] Historical legacies of state capacity also feature prominently in theories of economic development and political institutions.[35]

Recently gathered microlevel evidence also points to the historical origins of trust as it relates to bureaucratic capacity. Melissa Dell, Nathan Lane, and Pablo Querubin use a natural experiment to study how the historical origins of bureaucracies in North and South Vietnam influence current development. They find that citizens are more likely to mobilize effectively to achieve public goods provision in villages that inherited a strong local bureaucratic tradition from precolonial times.[36] Similarly, a study of corruption in Eastern Europe finds that citizens in localities with the bureaucratic legacy of the Austro-Hungarian Empire currently trust courts and the police more than citizens in localities with the bureaucratic legacy of the Russian and the Ottoman empires.[37] But with a few notable exceptions, historical state capacity has been

[28] Cleary and Stokes 2006, 109.

[29] Della Porta and Vanucci 1999; Morris and Klesner 2010; Rothstein and Stolle 2008.

[30] Levi 1998; Rothstein 2000; Tilly 2005.

[31] Tilly 2005.

[32] Braithwaite and Levi 1998.

[33] Rothstein 2000; Uslaner and Rothstein 2016.

[34] Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; Shefter 1977; Shefter 1994.

[35] Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001; Acemoglu and Robinson 2012; Besley and Persson 2009; Besley and Persson 2015; Bockstette, Chanda, and Putterman 2002; Charron and Lapuente 2013; Darden and Grzymala-Busse 2006; Greif and Tabellini 2010; Easterly 2007; Mann 1986; North 1982; North 1990; Pop-Eleches 2007; Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2011; Rothstein 2011; Tabellini 2010.

[36] Dell, Lane, and Querubin 2015.

[37] Becker et al. 2015. Unique natural experiments have also demonstrated that individual attitudes toward the state are strongly embedded in the past. Alesina and Fuchs-Schuendeln 2007 show that after the fall of the Berlin Wall, East Germans old enough to have witnessed the communist regime were more likely to prefer state intervention and redistribution than West Germans, even after controlling for all other individual characteristics.

overlooked in the new literature on clientelism and has not been tested empirically on a large sample of countries.[38]

Despite consensus that history matters, it is not clear which historical juncture is crucial for our understanding of the origins of patronage. But Martin Shefter's seminal argument that directly links historical bureaucratic quality to patronage politics provides a clue.[39] In Shefter's view, predemocratic political struggles over the creation of modern bureaucracies generated different relationships between states and parties. The introduction of universal suffrage represents a critical juncture in the history of public goods provision. Countries that established bureaucratic autonomy prior to the mass mobilization were more likely to produce programmatic political parties that supplied public goods. Political parties had opportunities to consolidate patronage machines if they were simultaneously developing state institutions at the time of suffrage, but not when an independent, entrenched bureaucracy with wide public support was established before the expansion of voting rights.[40]

We argue that the historical origin of patronage cannot be derived solely from the endurance of the original presuffrage pattern of party-voter linkages, as Shefter suggested. It is also due to the long-term effect of historical state capacities on trust in the state. The effect of historical state capacity is transmitted through reputation and matters today due to the long-lasting impact of bureaucratic quality on the expectations and strategies of voters and parties.

The Swedish or northern Italian voter assigns a higher probability to obtaining public goods, for example access to health services, quality education, or good roads, than the southern Italian voter, who will hedge uncertainty about access to public benefits by accepting side payments from parties. In Calabria, the underperformance of the state and the lack of public trust in it go back to Italian unification in the nineteenth century. As a consequence, even today in smaller southern Calabrian municipalities, political parties are estimated to secure up to 40 percent of all votes through various clientelistic brokers, including Mafia families.[41] Studies have shown that despite similar de jure institutions, northern Italian regions such as Bolzano and Valle d'Aosta have bureaucracies on par with Bavaria or Wales in terms of performance,

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[38] Shefter 1977; Shefter 1994; Besley and Persson 2009; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007, 5; cf. Charron and Lapuente 2013.
[39] Shefter 1977; Shefter 1994.
[40] Piattoni 2001.
[41] Paoli 2003, 199.

whereas Calabria's public service lags significantly behind. In fact, the differences between these two regional extremes are as large as the gap in bureaucratic performance between Germany and Slovakia.[42]

Despite the noble intentions of programmatic, universalistic parties, many voters simply do not value legislation ("because you cannot eat a law") if the implementation record is too weak to translate into concrete benefits for individuals.[43] If voters do not trust the state to deliver, they will prefer clientelistic exchange. Exogenous reputations signal the credibility of political promises that influence individual cost-benefit analyses on Election Day and similarly shape party strategies.

We expect that these bureaucratic reputations constrain the ability of politicians to deliver universalistic policies. We address the puzzling presence of clientelistic exchange in wealthy and established contemporary democracies, which one would not expect given their level of development.[44] The votes of wealthy citizens are more costly, since trivial clientelistic goods cannot buy them off, giving parties a greater incentive to deliver public goods. Public goods provision is thus more likely in wealthy democracies. But if parties and politicians anywhere want to campaign on universalistic appeals, they are constrained by voters' levels of trust and their own expectations that the public bureaucracy will get things done. This leads to three testable hypotheses:

—H1. Through trust, stronger historical state capacity decreases current levels of clientelism.
—H2. At similar levels of development, states with historically stronger capacity produce less clientelism today.
—H3. Democratic longevity decreases current levels of clientelistic exchange, but old democracies with subpar historical state capacity, which reduces trust, engage in clientelism.

To assess our hypotheses, we use historical infant mortality rates (IMRs) to proxy historical state capacity and to instrument for voter trust, current GDP levels for economic development, and democratic stock, the prorated cumulative number of years the country has been a democracy. We also use two alternative indicators of state capacity to verify the robustness of the main results. The next section justifies our use of the IMR indicator.

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[42] Charron and Lapuente 2013, 569.
[43] Taylor-Robinson 2010, 111.
[44] Warner 2001; Warner 2007; Piattoni 2001. On democratic longevity see Keefer and Vlaicu 2008; Robinson and Verdier 2013.

INFANT MORTALITY AS A PROXY FOR HISTORICAL STATE CAPACITY

In this section we discuss the centrality of infant welfare to state-building, and justify selecting infant mortality rates as a proxy for historical state capacity and as an instrument for trust.

STATE BUILDING AND PUBLIC CAMPAIGNS TO REDUCE INFANT DEATHS

The historical literature on infant mortality reduction strategies in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries converges on a narrative that places the issue of child welfare at the heart of state-building strategies and citizens' trust in the state.[45] For nineteenth-century European states, concerted policy efforts to reduce infant deaths originated, as did efforts to improve taxation, in anxieties associated with imperial war making. In England, replenishing the population was perceived as crucial for military recruiting and for the survival of the empire in an age of threatening overseas nationalism.[46] State investments in public health capacities closely followed military campaigns. The Crimean War (1853–56) led to the standardization of sanitary procedures in hospital care, and the Boer Wars (1880–81 and 1899–1902) made infant mortality an imperial priority. In nineteenth-century France, low fertility rates and the pressing risk of depopulation generated such a national crisis that the infant protection law (*Loi Roussel*) became a matter of state importance. In an otherwise contentious parliament, it passed unanimously without debate in 1874.[47] The futures of nations were inextricably linked with babies, as early slogans of the infant welfare movement touted. Beginning in the 1920s, fascist regimes in Italy and Germany became preoccupied with fertility and race, which resulted in efforts to reduce infant deaths.[48]

Insuring the replenishment of the native-born European settlers overseas gained imperial importance too, placing infant mortality reduction policies at the intersection of imperialism, racial philosophies, and patriotism.[49] Australian and African colonies were locked in fertility races between white and indigenous populations. Similarly, infant survival was framed as a national asset in Canada and was a major issue for French Canadian nationalists in Quebec.[50]

[45] Nathanson 2007, 66–67; Rollet 1997.
[46] Dwork 1987; Nathanson 2007, 67.
[47] Rollet 1997, 40.
[48] De Grazia 1992, 45.
[49] Smith 1997, 1.
[50] Nathanson 2007, 75–78.

All western governments recognized that the survival of infants was crucial for nation building, but the extent of state intervention in preventing newborn deaths was fiercely debated. Opponents of large-scale welfare programs targeting infants emphasized educational campaigns for "ignorant" mothers that focused on basic hygiene and breast-feeding techniques. Public health reformers who were determined to involve the state pushed for a more politically controversial set of policies that required increased budgetary allocations and strict regulation to prevent milk-borne infections from cow's milk, an important source of newborn deaths. The latter approach implied city-mandated pasteurization and the establishment of milk reserves with free or heavily subsidized access for poor mothers.[51]

Despite disagreements about specific policy targets, consensus regarding the deep structural causes of high infant death rates formed quite early. The lack of basic water filtration and chlorination was found to account for half of all infant deaths in the nineteenth century.[52] Reformers thus came to see investments in municipal sanitation, including city hygiene, clean water, and functioning sewage systems, as crucial for infant survival. As one medical officer in London put it, "There is no better index of sanitary conditions than the infant mortality rate."[53] At the dawn of the twentieth century, an age of rapid epidemiological innovations, the causal link between death and germs brought the importance of state capacity to the forefront.[54] Tackling infant mortality required substantial municipal investments in public sanitation, a competent body of public health officials active at all levels of government, standardized training of nurses and midwives in neonatal pediatrics, and collecting systematic birth registration data, as well as vaccinating and monitoring infants across all communities, poor and rich alike. By the mid-1920s, most states made some effort to address infant mortality within the territory they controlled.

Reducing infant deaths became one of the first policy targets that required significant infrastructural capacity and brought a large share of the population into direct contact with a service-providing state.[55] Contrary to literacy rates that could be boosted by nonstate actors, such as missionary schools and churches, curbing infant mortality was only possible with the involvement of states capable of sanitizing cities. Even in countries such as the United States, which adopted a minimalistic

[51] Rollet 1997.
[52] Cutler and Miller 2005.
[53] Nathanson 2007, 49.
[54] Skocpol 1992, 480; Rollet 1997.
[55] Skocpol 1992, 10.

version of policies aimed at reducing infant deaths, there was widespread recognition that only the state had the centralized capacity to coordinate large-scale information campaigns for mothers and to register births and deaths in a reliable fashion across a vast territory. Policies focused on infant survival dominated the agendas of states in the early twentieth century so decisively that all other public health crises, including tuberculosis, were almost completely ignored.[56]

INFANT MORTALITY RATES AND INSTRUMENT VALIDITY

Economists and political scientists often assume that state capacity is endogenous to either economic development or political institutions. Wealthier polities are more capable than poorer ones of investing in effective infrastructure that facilitates public goods delivery. Similarly, political institutions that preempt or penalize attempts to politicize the civil service certainly improve the general level of bureaucratic competency. We argue that there is also a preexistent, exogenous dimension of bureaucratic capacity that significantly constrains policy choices, and historical infant mortality data serves as its proxy.[57]

Infant mortality rates are the most robust cross-national indicator that distinguishes between failed and stable states.[58] IMRs accurately capture a government's control over its territory and population, as well as its capacity to raise revenue and implement policies.[59] Empirically, cross-national IMR has several merits as an instrument for contemporary trust built on cumulative experience with bureaucracy. As a sticky indicator, even mild decreases in infant deaths required many years of previous investment in capacity.[60] For instance, in European countries, rates remained remarkably stable throughout the nineteenth century and started to improve after 1900—following fifty years of effort dedicated to IMR reduction.[61] Unlike other potential instruments, underreporting and missing data reflect variations in the census capacity of states to record births and infant deaths during unassisted births.[62] In Europe, reliable data on infant deaths with wide coverage began to be reported only around WWI, in parallel with greater state investment

[56] Nathanson 2007, 13. Until the 1930s in the US and Britain, early antivaccination societies staged riots against state-mandated vaccines (Blume 2006), as some communities were alerted by the strong abilities of states to coerce compliance.

[57] Without long-term investments in capacity, states cannot enforce contracts, raise revenue, and provide services; Besley and Persson 2009.

[58] Abouharb and Kimball 2007; Esty et al. 1999; Goldstone et al. 2010.

[59] Dawson 2010; Shen and Williamson 2001. Studies across ethnic groups in Africa found that migration patterns of tribes, as opposed to sedentary settlement within one state, explain a significant share of intergroup differences in infant mortality; Brockerhoff and Hewett 2000.

[60] Navia and Zweifel 2003.

[61] Nathanson 2007, 49–50.

[62] Abouharb and Kimball 1997, 751.

in military capabilities.[63] In the US, the Children's Bureau, founded in 1912 by Progressive Era reformers, worked painstakingly with local women's committees to cross-tabulate birth registers and correct data at the neighborhood level in all states.[64]

The validity of the instrument also stems from its strikingly independent impact on trust in bureaucracies when compared to other potential instruments. Country-level IMRs measured in the 1920s are not strongly correlated with wealth within developing or developed groups of countries, nor within geographical regions (Figure 1). Even across levels of contemporary development, it is one of the few variables that showcases true historical reversals. Around 1925, Argentina's GDP per capita was comparable to that of Canada, Denmark, and France, while its infant mortality rate was 30 percent higher. Chile and Uruguay, which were once as economically developed as Sweden, offer even more dramatic examples: the IMR was twice as high in Uruguay and four times as high in Chile than it was in Sweden. Historically poor Baltic countries with low infant deaths provide yet another example of historical wealth being unrelated to IMRs, as well as to current levels of development. Furthermore, departing from correlations with other modernization indicators, the infant death rate in France was almost double in urban centers compared to rural areas, with the cities of Rouen and Rheims scoring record highs in the late nineteenth century (250 and 300 infant deaths per 1,000 births, respectively). Urbanization, a commonly used indicator of development, was therefore detrimental to infant survival, at least initially.

Seminal studies suggest that latitude and colonial legacies led to uneven developmental trajectories.[65] Intuitively, these factors could also affect historical infant mortality rates through causal mechanisms other than state capacities. Whereas gastrointestinal infections triggered most neonatal deaths in the northern hemisphere, malaria was one of the leading causes of death around the equator, making latitude an important factor to consider. Colonial strategies of local extraction coupled with the numbers of early European settlers also influenced investments in infant survival policies at the turn of the twentieth century.

Yet we do not find evidence that the IMR indicator maps onto these factors; historical IMR correlates at only −0.33 with latitude and is even less strongly related to the proxy for colonial legacies in our cross-

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[63] Miller 2008; Nathanson 2007.

[64] This was done to match ". . . the expedient which makes registration imperative in the great countries in Europe . . . the establishment of a conscription and standing army . . . ." Julia Lanthrop, the Head of the Children's Bureau 1912, cited in Skocpol 1992, 489.

[65] Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001; Acemoglu and Robinson 2012.

Historical State Capacity and Historical Wealth

(a)

Historical State Capacity and Historical Wealth (Rich Countries)

(b)

Historical State Capacity and Historical Wealth (Poor Countries)

(c)

FIGURE 1

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN HISTORICAL WEALTH AND
HISTORICAL STATE CAPACITY[a]

[a] The nonparametric fits are Lowess smoothers. Poor (developing) countries are defined as countries with GDP per capita (2002) less than US$14,068. Rich (developed) countries are above that threshold, which represents the top quintile of wealth. Historical wealth is measured as average wealth between 1870 and 1925. Historical state capacity is measured as infant mortality rates around 1925. The overall correlation between historical state capacity and wealth around 1900 is −.67. The correlation among the rich countries is −.59, and among the poor countries it is −.26. The correlations of GDP per capita in 1925 and IMR 1925 by geographical region are the following: Western Europe: −.42 (sixteen observations); Eastern Europe: .29 (eight observations); North and South America: −.45 (13 observations); Asia: −.46 (six observations).

national data set. Moreover, despite a shared British colonial legacy and a more unfavorable tropical climate prone to malaria, India's Southern Provinces, such as Bombay, Kerala, and Madras, significantly outperformed Northern Provinces in the reduction of infant deaths. Even today, the state of Kerala does not rank nationally among the top-five Indian states in terms of health spending, but its high capacity system of service delivery, acknowledged as one of the best on the subcontinent, results in a rural IMR that is one-seventh of the national average.[66]

For low latitude developing countries in particular, there are strong theoretical reasons to believe that adversarial colonial rule shaped state capacity and ensuing public trust. The "rubber regime" under King Leopold II of Belgium in the Congo and the Dutch colonists in the East Indies had little interest in building functioning bureaucracies. The predatory colonialism in the Belgian Congo, for instance, led to the rise of secret societies and messianic sects, which still exist today, as a direct expression of distrust in the oppressive colonial state. Therefore, to address the effects of early state formation and the capacities of former colonies, the empirical analysis accounts for latitude and uses colonial legacy as an alternative instrument jointly with infant mortality rate.

CRITICAL JUNCTURE: INFANT MORTALITY RATES, WOMEN'S SUFFRAGE, AND THE ORIGINS OF TRUST IN BUREAUCRACIES

Having argued above that IMRs provide a satisfactory proxy for early state capacity, in this section we justify why we chose to measure the ability of states to increase infant survival in the period between the first and second world wars. The primary reason for selecting this time interval is that the beginning of the interwar period preceded universal women's suffrage for most countries in our sample,[67] and the survival of infants was the most salient electoral issue for women fighting for political empowerment.[68]

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[66] Thachil 2014, 194. In India, the British administration already started to systematically collect census data at the local level with the help of village *chaukidárs* (watchmen) around the 1870s.

[67] Out of sixty-two countries in our sample, 63 percent passed women's suffrage after 1925, and 34 percent passed it one election cycle prior to 1925 (between 1918 and 1920). Only two countries (Finland and Norway) expanded suffrage earlier than one election cycle prior to 1925. We chose 1925 to avoid missing, unreliable, or war-inflated data at the end of WWI, and to capture the removal of all initial restrictions on women's voting that even early voting countries maintained for years. Historical evidence shows that it took at least one or two electoral cycles after the actual expansion of suffrage before parties started incorporating women in their organizations and female policy preferences in their platforms; Skocpol 1992, 505; cf. Abou-Chadi and Orlowski 2015. On gender differences that affect child survival see Miller 2008; Sear and Mace 2008; Thomas 1990.

[68] Skocpol 1992, 495–96; Lindenmeyer 1997.

In Anglo-Saxon countries, the nineteenth-century maternalist move-
ment became the catalyst for women thinking of themselves as a cohe-
sive social class.[69] Nevertheless, the modes in which female voters were
incorporated into traditional party politics were ambiguous. On one the
hand, general evidence suggests that women are less likely to respond to
clientelistic appeals.[70] On the other hand, some historical accounts show
that, after the extension of suffrage, women were as likely as men to be
coopted into preexisting patronage networks, either through public sec-
tor jobs for husbands or via public school employment.[71] This implies
that IMRs measured after the expansion of suffrage might be affected by
the ways in which political parties courted the female vote, rather than
by the preexistent capacity of bureaucracies to provide services.

The sequence in which capacity precedes empowerment therefore
allows the instrument to capture the degree of bureaucratization before
the extension of the franchise, and to distinguish state capacity that
fostered public trust from the political impact of female voters' prefer-
ences after they obtained voting rights. Theoretically, this chronology
also allows us to extend Shefter's argument. While his original logic
applied mostly to the critical juncture of working-class voting rights,
our empirical strategy tests this theory on universal suffrage. The tim-
ing of bureaucratic investments vis-à-vis the full extension of voting
rights was crucial for party strategies and the development of public
trust in the state.

The diverging trajectories of Great Britain and the United States
illustrate the mechanism. The bureaucratic rules of the former evolved
because of an aristocratic-bourgeois coalition aimed at insulating the
civil service from working classes and women; both cohorts were per-
ceived as threatening, emerging voters at the turn of the twentieth cen-
tury.[72] Civil service exams built on classical education were designed
to ensure restricted access to the state along class and gender lines and
decoupled state building from electoral politics. These early processes
had mixed consequences; they were less politically representative yet
they significantly increased policy transparency and fostered an image
of class neutrality along with the political disinterestedness of a meri-
tocratic bureaucracy.[73]

Public health in Great Britain became one of the first bureaucratic
domains of professionalization. The Medical Officers of Health in

[69] Bideau, Desjardins, and Brignoli 1997, 50.
[70] Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2004; Miller 2008; Wantchekon 2003.
[71] Lyons 2008, 51–52, 78; Shefter 1994, 113.
[72] Shefter 1994, 47–48.
[73] Daunton 2008, 88.

charge of infant mortality reduction campaigns were considered to be "among the most distinguished public servants of their profession." [74] At the end of the nineteenth century, the Medical Officers of Health had already begun collecting systematic data on infant mortality at the local level and were promoting general awareness of the issue. By 1928, at the time of full suffrage for women, bureaucratic standardization and public expectations about reputable state presence, albeit dominated by upper class men, were fully established.

By contrast, efforts in the United States to reduce infant deaths are a testament to maternalistic state-building driven entirely by a female-led bureaucracy that was empowered by the imminence of suffrage but then halted once women's voting patterns became clear for political parties in the postsuffrage era. [75] The simultaneity of state building and party politics around the vote-franchise time allowed patronage in some parts of the United States to survive for long periods of time.

At the turn of the twentieth century, two factions contended for power in the United States: the progressives, who advocated for professional bureaucracies, and the Jacksonian boss-dominated party machines. Within the first camp, the progressive Children's Bureau became the first government agency in the world to deal exclusively with child welfare issues. [76] By 1921, the Children's Bureau, led by women with strong ties to a complex nationwide network of women's grassroots organizations, conducted birth registration campaigns; generated the first evidence-based studies of infant mortality; went door-to-door to train mothers in basic hygiene and breast feeding techniques; monitored infants; and set the first national standards of age, weight, and height for children. Its recruitment strategies followed strict civil-service merit principles and garnered significant public trust. In the words of one activist, "The women of this country *trust* the Children's Bureau. [77] It has . . . become known in every state and city." [78]

The 1921 Sheppard-Towner Maternity and Infancy Act, one of the most important federal-level social welfare expansions in American history, passed one year after women's suffrage because of the mobilizing and lobbying efforts of the Children's Bureau, and out of fear that women would penalize congressmen who did not vote for it. [79] But

[74] Hardy 1993, 26; Nathanson 2007, 72.

[75] Skocpol 1992, 505.

[76] Skocpol 1992, 480.

[77] By 1929, the Children's Bureau reached one in two American babies and became the first federal agency to reach black and native American families, as well as remote rural areas through mobile infant care centers.

[78] Skocpol 1992, 497; Shefter 1994, 75–81.

[79] Miller 2008; Skocpol 1992, 504; Nathanson 2007, 58.

within five years, political parties realized that the female vote was not monolithic and fought back against the power of the bureaucracy. By 1930, infant welfare was transferred from the Children's Bureau to the Public Health Service.[80] This policy shift empowered private physicians and reduced the role of the federal government.[81] In cities dominated by party machines, it allowed for the continuation of patronage appointments and public health access in exchange for votes.[82]

Despite its defeat at the federal level, the bureau's legacy in terms of public trust survived for a very long time, especially in the western and some midwestern states, where it had the most significant impact. After the 1920s, in progressive stronghold areas health policies explicitly drew upon administrative practices built on past successes. New Deal reformers directly absorbed the bureaucratic expertise of the Wisconsin progressives, and the leaders of Children's Bureau, including Grace Abbott, Martha Eliot, and Katharine Lenroot, wrote the sections on child welfare and health insurance for the federal 1935 Social Security Act. At the same time, municipal politics on the East Coast continued to be dominated by machine politics.[83] This example illustrates the ability of public institutions to exert influence for more than a few electoral cycles.

We focus on the critical juncture prior to the expansion of universal suffrage that determined the institutionalization of party incentives to provide clientelistic goods to narrow segments of the electorate based on the strength of the bureaucracy and the public trust that ensued. Figure 2 illustrates a striking relationship between IMRs around 1925 and current levels of clientelism. The proposed theory explains this pattern by arguing that voters' past experience with well-operating bureaucracies was translated into voter trust that permitted parties to credibly commit to the delivery of public goods and to reduce clientelism. For these reasons, we model trust as an endogenous regressor and instrument it using historical IMRs.

CROSS-NATIONAL DATA AND ANALYSIS

DEPENDENT VARIABLES

We use four alternative measures to measure clientelism and public goods provision. First, to capture the degree to which parties engage in clientelism, we use a cross-national measure of clientelistic exchange

[80] Skocpol 1992, 505.
[81] Skocpol 1992, 514–22.
[82] Lindenmeyer 1997. The leaders and associates of the Children's Bureau explicitly kept nurse appointments outside the reaches of patronage politics.
[83] Lindenmeyer 1997, 183; Shefter 1994, 187.

FIGURE 2

CROSS-NATIONAL LEVELS OF CLIENTELISM AND HISTORICAL STATE CAPACITY [a]

[a] Historical state capacity is measured using IMR 1925. Clientelism is a measure of current clientelistic exchange.

based on an expert survey conducted by the Democratic Accountability and Linkages Project.[84] The survey assesses the prevalence of tangible, clientelistic benefits exchanged for votes between individual parties and voters in eighty-eight countries. Our main dependent variable is a composite measure that gauges the overall level of clientelistic exchange in a party system. The country-level measure comprises five types of exchanges—distribution of consumer goods, preferential access to social policy entitlements, employment in the public sector, preferential access to public contracts, and influence over regulatory proceedings—on a four-point ordinal Likert scale, where 1 is negligible effort and 4 is high effort. Higher levels indicate that more private goods are being targeted to narrow electoral constituencies, that is, higher levels of *clientelism*.[85]

[84] For a detailed description, see Democratic Accountability and Linkages Project 2009; Kitschelt et al. 2009, 750; Kitschelt and Kselman 2013; and Kitschelt 2012. A detailed explanation of the measure of clientelism, comprehensive list of all variables, summary statistics, and other analysis can be found in the supplementary material; Bustikova and Corduneanu-Huci 2017.

[85] Aggregate level of clientelism is weighted by vote shares of individual political parties in a country. Adding these five individual measures of political accountability yields a minimal value of five on the unweighted composite measure, and a maximum value of twenty. Higher levels indicate more

Second, to account for the preferences of voters emphasized in the demand side of our theory, we explore the perceptions of clientelism (with values ranging from 1 to 4) using microevidence from the 2010–14 World Value Survey. The individual-level analysis, which is presented below, aims to alleviate concerns about the shortcomings of expert surveys.

Third, since we posit a continuum where clientelism and public goods provision represent two poles of the spectrum, it follows that historically rooted trust in bureaucracies is likely to lead to better public goods provision as the incentives for clientelistic appeals diminish. By using indicators for both types of goods that political parties choose to provide—clientelistic and universalistic—we anticipate the critique that we are using a survey primarily designed to detect the exchange of votes for clientelistic goods. To capture the ability of governments to deliver public goods, for example health, education, transportation, electricity, water, and sanitation, and to evaluate the robustness of our findings, we use the *world governance indicator of government effectiveness* (WGI). This variable aggregates data from a variety of sources to minimize bias and allows us to probe aggregated perceptions of public goods delivery, civil service competency, and bureaucratic effectiveness. This measure is expressed in standard normal units that range between −2.5 and 2.5, with higher values indicating a greater capacity of governments to provide public goods.

Fourth, as an alternative to WGI, we use *relative political allocation* (RPA). RPA is a composite indicator that measures how public expenditures are prioritized in the government budget, and reflects the ability of states to distribute growth-inducing public goods, such as security, infrastructure, education, health, housing, and welfare.[86]

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

HISTORICAL STATE CAPACITY AND TRUST

What is the mechanism that transmits the impact of state bureaucratic capacity from almost a century ago to patronage in contemporary times?

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widespread practice of targeted exchange. The weighted national-level measure of accountability is weighted by the electoral support of the political party *k* in legislative elections. See the supplementary material; Bustikova and Corduneanu-Huci 2017.

[86] RPA evaluates the share of public revenues provided to competing national priorities contrasted to the optimal allocation based on maximizing economic growth. It identifies the gaps between actual expenditures and the "best" expenditures that maximize economic growth on any portion of the development path. We use RPA calculated from four different results of income level–specific group regression. Source: Kugler and Tammen 2012; Arbetman-Rabinowitz et al. 2013, 13–17.

We have argued that experience with historical state capacity shapes expectations and trust. Endogeneity is a concern because one might think that where clientelistic exchange is widespread, trust in the state is reduced, which in turn leads to greater demand for private handouts. In our subsequent analysis we therefore use historical IMRs before the expansion of suffrage as an instrumental variable (IV) in two-stage least square (2SLS) regressions to predict trust in the second-stage equation. Our measure of trust comes from the World Value Survey and ranges from zero to one hundred as a percentage of respondents who agree that that "most people can be trusted." Personal trust is learned and reflects past experience with institutional performance.[87] At the individual level, we use data on trust in the civil service.[88]

One possible weakness of the IMR instrument is that as a country-level indicator, it fails to adequately capture the true reach of the state within its territory and across income groups. A second issue is that using the interwar period cannot account for the trajectories of states that developed better state capacities in later decades, for example, communist and postcolonial countries. To address these concerns, we deploy two alternative measures of historical state capacity and test the robustness of our findings over time and space. The first is *historical political extraction 1960–70* and the second is *horizontal health inequality 1992–2002. Historical political extraction* averaged between 1960 and 1970 is an indicator that "approximates the ability of governments to appropriate portions of the national output to advance public goals," and reflects deviations from an optimal level of tax extraction contingent upon the economic profile of a country.[89] *Horizontal health inequality* averaged between 1992 and 2002 is a variable we computed based on two unique household surveys about within-country health outcome disparities, such as access to general practitioners and IMR across geographical regions and income quintiles (higher values imply more skewed access that favors the rich).[90] We use both of these measures as

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[87] Muller and Seligson 1994. We abstain from using institutional trust in the cross-national analyses because levels of trust in government are influenced by recent institutional and economic performance; Inglehart 1997; Mishler and Rose 2001.

[88] Mishler and Rose 2001. In the very long run interpersonal trust and institutional trust have mutually reinforcing effects. Interpersonal trust is projected into political institutions and eventually it enhances the quality of political institutions through cooperative networks; Almond and Verba 1963; Putnam et al. 1993. Conversely, well-functioning political institutions have a nurturing effect on interpersonal trust; Muller and Seligson 1994. Since we are interested in trust rooted in historical state capacity, using interpersonal trust is more appropriate because it is less affected by recent political and economic performance of countries.

[89] Arbetman-Rabinowitz et al. 2013, 11; Kugler and Tammen, 2012.

[90] van Doorslaer and Masseria 2004; Wagstaff 2002.

alternative instrumental variables to predict trust in the first stage to corroborate our findings.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Previous studies suggest that *wealth* (GDP per capita) is a robust predictor of current levels of patronage and public goods provision. In the cross-national models, we use the logarithm of the 2002 WDI measure of GDP per capita (purchasing power parity). In the microlevel analysis, we test the effect of *wealth* on public goods provision at two levels: GDP per capita at the country level and personal income at the individual level. Doing so allows us to understand individual incentives for poor voters to accept clientelistic goods in exchange for votes even in old, wealthy democracies.

DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS

To capture the impact of political institutions, we use a measure of democratic stock, *democratic longevity*, which is an aggregate measure of Polity IV scores with an annual depreciation rate of 1 percent.[91] We include a measure of current political institutions, *Polity IV*, to control for the immediate effect of regimes. We also employ *number of regime transitions* to account for the impact of regime volatility as a predictor of clientelistic exchange.[92]

OTHER CONTROLS

We control for *religious fractionalization* and *party fractionalization* because it has been argued that fractured systems create a stronger demand for the targeted delivery of goods to narrowly defined constituencies.[93] We also include *latitude* and *colonial legacies* to account for determinants of long-term underdevelopment and poor institutional outcomes.[94] Latitude is measured as the absolute value of the latitude of the country divided by 90 (to create values between 0 and 1).[95] Colonial legacy is a classification of the former Western colonial ruler of a country.[96] We also control for *British colonial origin*.

Tables 1 through 4 display the results from ordinary least squares (OLS) and 2SLS regressions and allow us to assess the three main hypotheses

[91] Gerring et al. 2005.
[92] Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland 2010; Kitschelt and Kselman 2013.
[93] We consistently found ethnic fractionalization not to be significant in our models.
[94] Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001.
[95] La Porta et al. 1999.
[96] This is a measure of Western overseas colonialism. It counts the last colonizers whose rule lasted more than ten years; Hadenius and Teorell 2007.

about clientelistic exchange and public goods provision on a sample of sixty-two countries.[97] We include our major instrument (IMR) and two alternative instruments (historical political extraction and horizontal health inequality) to determine the robustness of the findings in the OLS model. Table 1 shows that *wealth* and *democratic longevity* are important predictors. Poverty is correlated with more clientelistic exchange. Less experience with democracy, as well as lower religious fractionalization, are also associated with more clientelism. These two findings are consistent with most studies.[98] We also find that more regime transitions are associated with more clientelistic exchange, consistent with our proposition that volatility and instability of expectations reduce the ability of politicians to produce public goods. In models 6, 9, 10, and 12, we account for latitude and find that closer proximity to the equator contributes to the prevalence of clientelistic exchange in three of the four models, pointing to the developmental origins of clientelism.

Importantly, from the perspective of our proposed theory we find that more voter trust is robustly associated with less clientelism. On average, less trusting societies provide fewer public goods and more clientelistic goods. This effect is remarkably strong; its explanatory power is on par with the effect of wealth. For example, a thirty percent increase in the number of respondents who agree that "most people can be trusted" is associated with a two unit decrease on an ordinal scale of *clientelistic exchange*.[99] A two-unit decrease is comparable to Latvia becoming Finland (figures 2 and 4). If the number of respondents who agree that "most people can be trusted" increases from twenty-five to forty percent, the model predicts a corresponding one-unit reduction in the level of clientelistic exchange on a scale ranging from 5 to 20. Roughly speaking, that corresponds to the difference between Mexico and less clientelistic Taiwan.

To test the causal mechanism that historical state capacity operates through voter trust more directly, we use *historical state capacity* as an instrumental variable in a series of 2SLS regressions. Schematically, the model is depicted in Figure 3.

Historical infant mortality serves as a proxy for historical state capacity, which is an instrument for trust. The exclusion restriction implied by the instrumental variable regression is that conditional on the control variables, IMRs in the interwar period have no effect on patronage today

[97] This sample is the maximum size for which we are able to determine infant mortality rates in 1925 using either the Abouharb and Kimball 2007 data set or our own primary sources.

[98] On religious pluralism and public goods provision, see Barro and McCleary 2002.

[99] The empirical values of *clientelistic exchange* range between six and eighteen, and have a mean value of thirteen.

TABLE 1
DETERMINANTS OF CLIENTELISTIC EXCHANGE (OLS)[a]

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Trust	-.066***	-.064***	-.065***	-.065***	-.053***	-.033*	-.077***	-.073***	-.050***	-.062***	-.068***	-.031*
	(.016)	(.017)	(.014)	(.014)	(.016)	(.017)	(.015)	(.014)	(.015)	(.018)	(.017)	(.017)
Historical state capacity (log)	.853	.939	.152	.291	.813	-.024					.697	.044
	(.900)	(.910)	(.801)	(.809)	(.864)	(.748)					(.925)	(.739)
Historical relative political extraction (1960–70)							-.191	.349	.345			
							(.793)	(.715)	(.662)			
Horizontal health inequality (1992–2002)										2.425		
										(3.974)		
GDP per capita (2002) (log)	-1.484***	-1.423***	-1.300***	-1.270***	-1.199***	-1.166***	-.574	-.916***	-.727**	-.609	-1.530***	-1.121***
	(.460)	(.468)	(.402)	(.404)	(.409)	(.377)	(.349)	(.337)	(.339)	(.365)	(.470)	(.376)
Democratic longevity	-.001	-.001	-.002**	-.002**	-.002**	-.004***	-.004***	-.003**	-.003**	-.003*	-.001	-.004***
	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)
Political regime (Polity)		-.109	-.089	-.075	-.082	-.015		.068	.068			-.009
		(.118)	(.101)	(.103)	(.104)	(.098)		(.069)	(.065)			(.097)
Religious fractionalization			-3.913***	-3.819***	-2.942***	-3.361***		-3.639***	-4.138***	-3.645***		-3.726***
			(.946)	(.946)	(1.072)	(.900)		(.997)	(.917)	(1.071)		(.996)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Party fractionalization				−1.249 (1.700)	−2.368 (1.893)			−1.919 (1.534)				
Number of regime transitions					.262* (.149)			.135 (.109)				
Latitude						−4.790*** (1.578)			−4.802** (1.876)	−3.667 (2.355)		−4.813*** (1.557)
English colonial origin											−.627 (.739)	.607 (.651)
Constant	23.99*** (6.232)	23.90*** (6.264)	27.94*** (5.463)	27.78*** (5.462)	24.52*** (5.745)	27.84*** (5.085)	21.09*** (2.963)	25.15*** (2.877)	23.20*** (2.705)	22.68*** (2.972)	25.31*** (6.463)	27.09*** (5.069)
Observations	61	61	61	61	61	61	64	64	64	45	61	61
R-squared	.766	.769	.834	.836	.836	.857	.777	.840	.855	.896	.766	.863
Adjusted R-squared	.749	.748	.815	.814	.810	.839	.762	.817	.837	.879	.744	.842

SOURCE: Democratic Accountability and Linkages Project 2009.
Robust standard errors in parentheses; ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10
[a] Dependent variable is clientelistic exchange.

FIGURE 3
INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLE: HISTORICAL STATE CAPACITY[a]

[a] Hypothesized relationship between historical state capacity, trust, and clientelism.

other than through trust. *Trust* is therefore an endogenous regressor.[100] Figure 4 shows the empirical relationship between cross-national levels of contemporary trust and historical state capacity. The correlation coefficient between the variables is −.70, which satisfies the first assumption of the instrumental variable approach that the instrument (IMR 1925) should correlate with the endogenous regressor (*trust*). Formal endogeneity tests and diagnostics that verify the second assumption are reported below. We add colonial legacy to historical state capacity to instrument trust in an alternative specification (tables 2 and 3, model 6). We also use two additional proxies, *historical relative political extraction* and *horizontal health inequality* (tables 4 and 5), to assess the robustness of our findings across time, space, and income groups.

Tables 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 present our findings from the 2SLS regression. The dependent variable in tables 2 and 4 is *clientelistic exchange*. Table 2 shows that *trust* is a powerful predictor of *clientelistic exchange*, even after including wealth, democratic longevity, and current regime type, and Table 3 presents first-stage results associated with Table 2. The results are also robust to the inclusion of party fractionalization and religious fractionalization. Next, we test the robustness of our results and perform statistical checks on the instrumental variable approach. Tables 4 and 5 use an alternative specification of the instrument (*historical*

[100] The exclusion restriction implies that our instrument—historical state capacity—affects patronage only by influencing trust. The relationship between historical state capacity and patronage is thus not a direct one, but operates exclusively through trust. We also posit that our instrument is unrelated to factors such as late nineteenth-century urbanization levels, wealth at the beginning of the twentieth century, and patterns of warfare. Our instrument, measured as infant survival, is a strong predictor of trust, our endogenous regressor.

FIGURE 4
CONTEMPORARY TRUST AND HISTORICAL STATE CAPACITY (IMR 1925) [a]

[a] Cross-national differences in trust as it relates to historical state capacity using IMR 1925.

relative political extraction and *horizontal health inequality*). The dependent variables in Table 6 are measures of public goods provision: government effectiveness and relative political allocation.

In Table 2, *trust* is instrumented with *historical state capacity* and has a robust impact on the level of clientelistic exchange in the expected direction. Lower levels of *trust,* our endogenous variable, are associated with more clientelistic exchange. In model 6, we instrument *trust* jointly with historical IMRs and *colonial legacies* (model 6, Table 3). We also control for the effect of *latitude*. We find that colonial legacies do not exert a lot of influence on trust in the first stage, but that latitude is significant both in the first and second stage (tables 2 and 3), suggesting that proximity to the equator is associated with more patronage.

Table 3 presents the first-stage results based on the 2SLS regressions in Table 2. In all specifications, the value of the F-statistic from the first stage is mostly around 5, with the exception of model 5, where the value of the F-statistic is 9. Despite the modest values of the F-statistic, the p-value associated with the F-statistic is below the critical value of .05 in all

TABLE 2
DETERMINANTS OF CLIENTELISM USING 2SLS[a]

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Trust	−.118**	−.119**	−.078*	−.084**	−.090**	−.044*
	(.059)	(.057)	(.043)	(.044)	(.037)	(.025)
GDP per capita (2002) (log)	−.638	−.580	−1.101	−.983	−.804	−1.07***
	(1.084)	(1.012)	(.750)	(.786)	(.620)	(.392)
Democratic longevity	−.002*	−.002*	−.002***	−.002***	−.002***	−.003***
	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.0001)
Political regime (Polity)		−.041	−.074	−.054	−.045	−.009
		(.144)	(.078)	(.084)	(.082)	(.077)
Religious fractionalization			−3.820***	−3.786***	−3.467***	−3.295***
			(.808)	(.786)	(.910)	(.763)
Party fractionalization				−1.466	−1.857	
				(1.577)	(1.669)	
Number of regime transitions					.105	
					(.168)	
Latitude						−4.214**
						(1.810)
Constant	22.198***	22.058***	27.118***	27.163***	25.744***	26.93***
	(8.007)	(7.786)	(5.820)	(5.932)	(4.745)	(3.128)
Observations	61	61	61	61	61	61
R-squared	.754	.752	.850	.849	.847	.877
Adjusted R-squared	.741	.735	.836	.832	.826	.805
Hansen/Sargan/C test	1.081	1.305	.092	.200	1.302	.189
p-value	.298	.253	.761	.655	.254	.664

SOURCE: Democratic Accountability Project 2009.
Standard errors in parentheses; ***$p < 0.01$; **$p < 0.05$; *$p < 0.10$
[a] Dependent variable is clientelistic exchange. Trust instrumented with historical state capacity (IMR 1925). Hansen/Sargan/C test is the value of the statistic testing exogeneity of the instrument.

models. This gives us confidence that the instrument is not weak. Furthermore, the t-statistic of historical IMRs is roughly −3.0 in most of the models in Table 3, which also points to a strong instrument. *Trust* remains a strong predictor of *clientelism* in the second stage in all models, and the C-statistic affirms that instruments are exogenous (tables 2 and 3).

The effect of *wealth* on *clientelistic exchange* is less robust once endogenous trust is included (Table 2). This finding is consistent with studies that have found a curvilinear effect of wealth on clientelism

TABLE 3
FIRST-STAGE RESULTS FROM TABLE 2[a]

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Historical state capacity (log)	−16.043**	−16.586**	−16.885**	−16.987**	−21.315**	−9.180*
	(7.155)	(7.361)	(7.672)	(7.793)	(7.073)	(4.78)
Colonial legacies[b]						
Spanish						−11.76*
						(5.31)
British and US						−6.20
						(6.20)
Other						16.61
						(19.28)
GDP per capita (2002) (log)	15.663***	14.739***	14.776***	14.740***	11.078***	5.899**
	(2.696)	(2.901)	(2.944)	(2.990)	(2.768)	(2.30)
Democratic longevity	−.006	−.007	−.008	−.008	−.008	.017**
	(.008)	(.008)	(.008)	(.008)	(.008)	(.007)
Political regime (Polity)		1.015	1.019	1.004	0.888	−.736
		(.891)	(.887)	(.926)	(.799)	(.515)
Religious fractionalization			−1.679	−1.724	−15.345*	−11.67
			(9.104)	(9.241)	(8.921)	(7.291)
Party fractionalization				1.544	18.122	
				(16.149)	(15.706)	
Number of regime transitions					−4.341***	
					(1.076)	
Latitude						49.9***
						(12.42)
Constant	−31.221	−28.806	−27.103	−27.313	24.431	13.03
	(45.370)	(46.886)	(48.188)	(48.627)	(48.297)	(30.70)
Trust (1st stage)						
F-statistic	5.20	5.55	5.38	5.22	10.08	4.085
F-statistic p-value	.026	.022	.024	.026	.003	.006
Shea partial R-square	.084	.090	.090	.090	.160	.243

Standard errors in parentheses; ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10
[a] Trust instrumented with historical state capacity (IMR 1925).
[b] Baseline is never colonized by a Western overseas colonial power; "other" is a Dutch or Portuguese colony.

instead of a linear effect.[101] We tested for a U-shaped pattern of wealth in the 2SLS, but did not uncover such a pattern. As discussed above, this result might be due to the lack of data on infant mortality in very poor countries, since many countries in our analysis are at a medium level of development.

[101] Kitschelt and Kselman 2013; Magaloni, Díaz-Cayeros, and Estevez 2007.

We also examine alternative measures of historical state capacity (tables 4 and 5). We instrument trust with a measure of *historical relative political extraction 1960–70* and with a measure of past *horizontal health inequality 1992–2002*. We control for the effect of *wealth*, *democratic longevity*, and *latitude*. Trust remains a strong predictor of *clientelism* in the second stage in all models where either *historical relative political extraction* (models 1, 3, and 4) or *horizontal health inequality* (models 2 and 5) are used as instruments (Table 4). The C statistic affirms that instruments are exogenous in all models (Table 4).

The first-stage results (Table 5) show that all our alternative measures of historical state capacity are significant and that the p-value of the F-statistic is below the critical value. The past ability of states to appropriate portions of the national output to advance public goals (*historical relative political extraction 1960–70*) is used as an alternative measure of historical state capacity (models 1, 3, and 4, Table 4).[102] Consistent with our findings about the impact of infant mortality rates on trust, a higher capacity for political extraction leads to higher levels of trust, which reduces clientelism. We also find that the ability of states to reduce horizontal inequalities in health outcomes across income groups and geographical regions, our second alternative proxy for state capacity, results in higher levels of trust, which dampens clientelism (models 2 and 5, Table 5). Latitude has a strong effect in the first stage results, but since it was significant in the OLS regression, we could not consider it as a joint instrument.

Table 6 displays a similarly robust effect of *trust* on the two dependent variables that measure public goods provision, *government effectiveness* (GEf) and *relative political allocation* (RPA). The effect of democratic longevity and religious fractionalization is strong and robust across models 1 and 2 and models 2 through 4, respectively. When we use GEf as a dependent variable, we find that democratic longevity and more religious plurality increase public goods provision, consistent with the existing literature.[103] When we use RPA, longevity and fragmentation have no effect, but political regime type has a significant effect: more democratic states allocate resources better. Importantly, the first-stage results reaffirm the validity of using historical state capacity as an instrument (Table 6). Trust, instrumented with interwar infant deaths, increases both effectiveness (GEf) and political performance (RPA).

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[102] Arbetman-Rabinowitz et al. 2013; Kugler and Tammen 2012.
[103] Our findings are consistent with Alesina et al. 2003, who also found a positive association between religious fractionalization (indicating a more tolerant society) and good governance.

TABLE 4

DETERMINANTS OF CLIENTELISM WITH ALTERNATIVE MEASURES OF
HISTORICAL STATE CAPACITY USING 2SLS[a]

Trust Instru-mented with:	(1) Relative Political Extraction	(2) Horizontal Health Inequality	(3) Relative Political Extraction	(4) Relative Political Extraction	(5) Horizontal Health Inequality
Trust	−.095**	−.117***	−.094*	−.097*	−.141**
	(.039)	(.035)	(.057)	(.055)	(.059)
GDP per capita (2002) (log)	−.482	−.285	−.475	−.514	−.503
	(.454)	(.367)	(.318)	(.380)	(.403)
Democratic longevity	−.004***	−.003*	−.004***	−.004***	−.003
	(.001)	(.002)	(.001)	(.001)	(.002)
Political regime (Polity)				.027	
				(.080)	
Latitude			−.115	.175	3.440
			(4.699)	(4.485)	(4.739)
Constant	20.52***	19.50***	20.47***	20.60***	20.93***
	(3.175)	(2.615)	(2.412)	(2.596)	(3.095)
Observations	64	45	64	64	45
R-squared	.801	.841	.801	.800	.816
Adjusted R-squared	.791	.829	.788	.782	.798
Hansen/ Sargan/ C test	.216	1.830	.214	.304	1.512
p-value	.642	.176	.644	.582	.219

SOURCE: Democratic Accountability Project 2009.
Standard errors in parentheses; ***$p < 0.01$; **$p < 0.05$; *$p < 0.10$
[a] Dependent variable is clientelistic exchange. Hansen/Sargan/C test is the value of the statistic testing exogeneity of the instrument.

We use the Sargan/Hansen/C test to examine whether IMR 1925 is a proper instrument in this specification. The null hypothesis states that the instruments are properly exogenous. The C-statistic confirms the exogeneity of the instrument. In all specifications using *clientelistic exchange,* GEf, and RPA as dependent variables (tables 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6), we cannot reject the null hypothesis and therefore we conclude that our instrument is properly exogenous.

These findings are consistent with our core hypothesis that historical state capacity has an effect on contemporary public goods provision through current levels of trust. Trust is embedded in historical legacies of public bureaucracies that facilitate or constrain the ability of

TABLE 5
FIRST-STAGE RESULTS FROM TABLE 4

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Historical relative political extraction	16.10** (6.379)		10.919* (5.27)	11.53** (5.38)	
Horizontal health inequality		−109.4*** (30.24)			−64.98* (33.29)
GDP per capita (2002) (log)	8.986*** (2.890)	4.093 (2.488)	1.130 (2.96)	2.131 (3.193)	−1.319 (3.564)
Democratic longevity	.022* (.011)	.027* (.011)	.014 (.009)	.016* (.009)	.021* (.001)
Political regime (Polity)				−.635 (.627)	
Latitude			71.483*** (13.629)	68.58*** (14.42)	59.18*** (20.68)
Constant	−68.36*** (26.38)	.136 (20.07)	−16.22 (23.817)	−20.28 (23.75)	24.67 (24.67)
Trust (1st stage)					
F-statistic	5.980	10.69	3.812	4.230	3.810
F-statistic p-value	.017	.002	.056	.044	.058
Shea partial R-square	.091	.207	.061	.068	.087

Standard errors in parentheses; ***$p < 0.01$; **$p < 0.05$; *$p < 0.10$

politicians to deliver public goods via electoral mechanisms.[104] Given the nonexistence of infant mortality data for very poor countries, the results of our analysis mostly apply to middle-range income countries.

MICROLEVEL DATA AND ANALYSIS

To test our hypotheses on individual perceptions, we use microlevel data from the 2010–14 World Values Survey Wave 6, which was conducted in thirty-two countries and has a total sample of 41,205 respondents. *Clientelism*, the main dependent variable, measures individual perceptions of how often voters are bribed in exchange for votes in national elections. The variable ranges from 1 (not often at all) to 4 (very often). Higher values thus indicate an increased perception of clientelistic attempts of parties to appeal to voters.[105]

[104] We have also conducted an analysis where we split the saqmple by income levels. The effect of wealth on clientelistic exchange is much more robust in poorer democracies.

[105] To test our theoretical propositions, the direct experience of each respondent with vote buying during elections would have been preferable. But given the general reluctance of respondents to publicly report illicit transactions, the designers of the most recent wave of World Value Surveys chose to gauge perceptions rather than experience; Norris 2014, 66. Therefore, we work with a perception

TABLE 6

DETERMINANTS PUBLIC GOODS PROVISION: GOVERNMENT EFFECTIVENESS (GEF) AND
RELATIVE POLITICAL ALLOCATION (RPA) USING 2SLS[a]

Dependent variable	(1) GEf	(2) GEf	(3) GEf	(4) GEf	(5) RPA	(6) RPA	(7) RPA	(8) RPA	(9) RPA
Trust	.025*	.018*	.027	.017*	.013**	.012***	.024**	.010**	.020**
	(.015)	(.009)	(.020)	(.009)	(.006)	(.004)	(.011)	(.004)	(.010)
GDP per capita (2002) (log)	.317	.404**	.393**	.600***	-.195*	-.161*	-.127	-.094	
	(.281)	(.160)	(.183)	(.157)	(.114)	(.093)	(.099)	(.085)	
Democratic longevity	.001***	.001***	.0003		.0001	.0001	-.0005		-.001
	(.0002)	(.0001)	(.0004)		(.0001)	(.0001)	(.0004)		(.0004)
Political regime (Polity)	.028	.037	.054*	.062**	.026**	.024*	.048**	.037***	.046**
	(.035)	(.029)	(.030)	(.030)	(.012)	(.013)	(.023)	(.009)	(.022)
Religious fractionalization		.674***	.789**	.705***		.323	.243	.218	.184
		(.225)	(.307)	(.230)		(.202)	(.190)	(.156)	(.176)
Party fractionalization		-.233	-.371	-.375		.030	.087		.039
		(.407)	(.541)	(.415)		(.328)	(.381)		(.385)
Number of regime transitions		-.023	-.030	-.051*		.063**	.021		.014
		(.042)	(.044)	(.028)		(.028)	(.022)		(.025)
Latitude			-1.086	-.821			-1.668	-.528	-1.585
			(1.168)	(.593)			(1.070)	(.329)	(.992)
First-Stage Results									
Historical state capacity	-16.59**	-21.3***	-12.133**	-17.23***	-25.2**	-27.17***	-12.94*	-18.33***	-14.248**
	(7.36)	(7.073)	(6.06)	(4.23)	(9.39)	(7.81)	(6.404)	(4.975)	(5.866)
Colonial legacies									
Spanish				-6.963				2.283	
				(5.847)				(8.210)	
British and US				-1.335				14.641*	
				(6.797)				(7.653)	
Other				16.73					
				(18.33)					

TABLE 6 *cont.*

Dependent variable	(1) GEf	(2) GEf	(3) GEf	(4) GEf	(5) RPA	(6) RPA	(7) RPA	(8) RPA	(9) RPA
Shea partial R-square	.090	.160	.069	.280	.190	.263	.103	.345	.125
Constant	−3.331	−3.9***	−3.79**	−5.44***	2.218***	1.792***	1.707**	1.474**	.747***
	(2.088)	(1.253)	(1.562)	(1.288)	(.856)	(.693)	(.833)	(.617)	(.196)
Observations	61	61	61	61	43	43	43	43	43
R-squared	.799	.873	.839	.868	0.173	.327	.202	.392	.267
Hansen/Sargan/C test	2.273	2.367	2.377	.979	2.365	1.273	1.664	.059	1.195
p-value	.132	.124	.123	.323	.124	.259	.197	.808	.274

SOURCES: World Bank, World Bank Governance Indicators 2009; Relative Political Capacity Project 2013.
Standard errors in parentheses; ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10

[a] Dependent variables are government effectiveness (GEf) and relative political allocation (RPA) 2007–9. Trust instrumented with historical state capacity, log (IMR 1925) and with colonial legacies. Hansen/Sargan/C test is the value of the statistic testing exogeneity of the instrument.

Trust in civil service captures contemporary levels of confidence in state bureaucracy on a scale from 1 (none at all) to 4 (a great deal). To test the claim that clientelistic goods have decreasing marginal utility for voters as their level of economic wealth increases, we include household *income*, which records self-placement on a scale from 1, for the lowest income group, to 5, for the highest income group in a given country.

We control for occupational status through two variables, *public sector* and *unemployed*. The former indicates that the respondent works for the government or another state organization, and the latter records whether the individual is employed at the time of the survey. We also control for *political ideology* using a conventional measure that reflects a respondent's self-placement on an ideological scale from 1 (left) to 10 (right).[106] Other demographic controls include *education*, *age*, and *sex*.

To take full advantage of the nested structure of our data with individual respondents within countries, we estimate multilevel models.[107] All independent variables are centered to facilitate the interpretation of the empirical results. First, we present an analysis of variance (ANOVA) to decompose the variance into the two levels of analysis: cross national and within country. Table 7 presents the results. The intraclass correlation indicator shows that both levels explain significant shares of the total variance (25.63 percent at the country level and 74.37 percent at the individual level). The fact that the variance components are significant and large at both levels gives us confidence that multilevel modeling is the appropriate estimation technique.[108] Tables 8 and 9 present the main findings from our analyses.

The results are strongly supportive of the three hypotheses. The more trust respondents place in the civil service to deliver public goods, the less likely they are to experience attempts to buy their votes with private goods. Whereas both economic development and democratic longevity predict less clientelism, the interaction terms are also significant. This means that even in old and wealthy democracies, when respondents lack confidence in the state's capacity to provide universalistic, programmatic policies, they are more likely to demand and obtain targeted transfers (clientelistic goods) on Election Day. This is consistent with hypotheses 2 and 3. The addition of the GDP per capita and the interaction term with trust in model 4 improves the explained variance by about 14 percent compared to the baseline ANOVA model.

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variable, but argue that it comes conceptually close to our ideal measure of direct exposure to targeted transfers in a system of patronage.

[106] Anderson and Singer 2008; Singer 2011.
[107] Ingelhart 1997; Anderson and Singer 2008.
[108] Steenbergen and Jones 2002.

TABLE 7
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE

Fixed Effects	*(1)* *Clientelistic Exchange*
Constant	2.566***
	(0.09)
Variance (individual level)	.850***
	(0.03)
Variance (country level)	.293***
	(0.05)
N (individuals)	41205
N (countries)	32

Standard errors in parentheses; ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10

Several individual-level variables also have a substantively significant effect on the likelihood of vote buying. On average, lower income deciles are more exposed to clientelism, independent of the general level of development or democratic status of their countries. The poor witness more vote buying. Similar categories of economically vulnerable respondents also have analogous experiences. The young and the unemployed are more likely to report some experience with clientelism. In line with other studies, we find that the political ideology of individual respondents filters their perceptions of states' efforts to provide public goods.[109] Right-wing voters are less likely to report exposure to clientelistic exchange than left-wing voters, who tend to be more dissatisfied with democratic practices and state capacity in general.

Table 9 illustrates how historical state capacities shape the effect of personal income on exposure to clientelistic practices. A bad cumulative experience with bureaucratic performance (low historical capacity) results in more intense attempts of vote buying by politicians. The interaction term suggests that the upper quartiles (higher historical infant mortality rates and thus lower state capacity) are associated with higher levels of clientelistic exposure and more clientelistic goods provision for both rich and poor individuals.

Table 10 examines the determinants of *trust in civil service* to assess whether historical state capacity (historical infant mortality rates) can predict current levels of confidence in the civil service. Three individual-level variables shape trust in state bureaucracies: income, political ideology, and affiliation with the public sector. On average, wealthier individuals, public sector employees, and respondents with right-wing

[109] Anderson and Singer 2008.

TABLE 8

INDIVIDUAL AND COUNTRY-LEVEL DETERMINANTS OF CLIENTELISTIC EXCHANGE

Dependent Variable	(1) Clientelism	(2) Clientelism	(3) Clientelism	(4) Clientelism	(5) Clientelism
Trust in civil service	−0.092***	−0.100***	−0.100***	−0.055**	−0.042*
	(0.014)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.021)	(0.019)
Income	−0.018*	−0.024**	−0.024**	−0.024**	−0.033***
	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.007)
Education	0.014*	0.009	0.009	0.009	−0.002
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.010)
Age	−0.003***	−0.003***	−0.003***	−0.003***	−0.004**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Sex	0.015	0.016	0.016	0.016	0.014
	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Sector	−0.014	−0.013	−0.013	−0.012	−0.022
	(0.018)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.033)
Unemployed	0.034	0.066*	0.066*	0.066*	0.002
	(0.027)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.040)
Ideology	−0.014*	−0.013*	−0.012*	−0.013*	−0.013
	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.008)
GDP per capita		−0.000**		−0.000*	
		(0.000)		(0.000)	
Democratic stock			−0.001***		−0.002***
			(0.000)		(0.001)
Trust*GDP per capita				−0.000**	
				(0.000)	
Trust*democratic stock					−0.000**
					(0.000)
Intercept	−2.572***	3.018***	−2.484***	2.989***	2.314***
	(0.095)	(0.130)	(0.099)	(0.134)	(0.208)
Variance: trust in civil service	0.005***	0.004***	0.004***	0.002***	0.000***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Variance: country level	0.284***	0.262***	0.209***	0.252***	0.245***
	(0.051)	(0.090)	(0.050)	(0.086)	(0.075)
Variance: individual level	0.815***	0.799***	0.799***	0.799***	0.745***
	(0.037)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.064)
AIC	70607.698	51497.29	51491.912	51491.77	26219.474
BIC	70706.034	51599.74	51594.355	51602.09	26306.385
N (individuals)	26761	19540	19540	19540	10327
N (countries)	32	21	21	21	12

Standard errors in parentheses; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001; two-tailed tests

TABLE 9
CLIENTELISM, PERSONAL INCOME, AND HISTORICAL
STATE CAPACITY

Dependent Variable	(1) Clientelism
Age	−0.004***
	(0.000)
Sex	0.007
	(0.014)
Public sector	−0.001
	(0.017)
Unemployed	0.077**
	(0.029)
Political ideology	−0.015***
	(0.003)
Historical state capacity (IMR quartiles)	0.221
	(0.125)
Income*historical state capacity (quartiles)	0.013***
	(0.003)
Income	−0.055***
	(0.008)
Intercept	−3.534***
	(0.347)
Variance: trust in civil service	0.019***
	(0.007)
Variance: country level	0.271***
	(0.099)
Variance: individual level	0.769***
	(0.009)
AIC	40828.492
BIC	40920.502
N (individuals)	15795
N (countries)	16

Standard errors in parentheses *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001; two-tailed tests

beliefs place more trust in civil service. Interestingly, among the three major country-level variables, economic development, democratic longevity, and historical state capacity, only historical state capacity has a large and statistically significant effect on *trust in civil service*. This robust finding is consistent with our expectations. It gives us confidence that positive experiences with historical state capacity shape voter beliefs that bureaucracies and parties can credibly deliver public goods today, which diminishes patronage.

TABLE 10
INDIVIDUAL AND COUNTRY-LEVEL DETERMINANTS OF TRUST
IN BUREAUCRACIES

Dependent Variable	(1) Trust in Civil Service	(2) Trust in Civil Service	(3) Trust in Civil Service
Income	0.024***	0.024***	0.028***
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)
Education	0.005	0.005	0.008
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)
Age	0.002*	0.002*	0.002*
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Sex	−0.016	−0.016	−0.022
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.012)
Public sector	0.090***	0.090***	0.095***
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Unemployed	−0.020	−0.020	−0.015
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.017)
Political ideology	0.019***	0.019***	0.018**
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)
Ln (GDP per capita)	0.026		
	(0.063)		
Democratic stock		0.000*	
		(0.000)	
Historical state capacity (IMR)			−0.240**
			(0.078)
Intercept	−2.912***	−2.701***	−1.552***
	(0.582)	(0.063)	(0.350)
Variance: country level	0.104***	0.100***	0.089***
	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.022)
Variance: individual level	0.585***	0.585***	0.558***
	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.033)
AIC	68364.051	68362.842	52647.446
BIC	68455.291	68454.082	52736.083
N (individuals)	29570	29570	23340
N (countries)	31	31	23

Standard errors in parentheses; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001; two-tailed tests

CONCLUSION

This study offers a new perspective on political patronage. It shows that historically informed public trust in bureaucratic competence shapes current levels of clientelistic exchange. Competence leads to the belief that brokered relationships of patronage can be replaced by depersonalized administrations capable of public goods provision, which allows

political parties to make credible promises. Conversely, a lack of pre-existing capacity for public good provision negatively affects trust, which in turn increases the costs of delivering tangible results over short electoral periods and contributes to clientelism.

Economic wealth and political institutions are strong predictors of clientelism, consistent with the findings of previous research. But we also demonstrate that above and beyond these effects, historical state capacity has powerful effects on levels of clientelism today through its impact on trust. We use the ability of public bureaucracies to reduce infant mortality in the interwar period as a proxy for historical state capacity. Since most women were disenfranchised before states engaged in efforts to increase the survival of newborns, reductions in the IMR reflect the historical competence of states and not the ability of political parties to court the female vote. This century-old infrastructural capacity of states, captured at a critical juncture of mass politics, shaped accumulated levels of trust and trajectories of clientelism. Using multiple sources of data and evidence, the analysis provides strong support for the proposed theory of clientelism.

The article expands an earlier, seminal insight about the effect that the timing and sequencing of the creation of public bureaucracy had on the prevalence of clientelism. Our analysis focuses on the critical juncture before the mass expansion of voting rights for women. We highlight the long-term reputational consequences that building professional bureaucracies to address infant mortality has had on contemporary levels of patronage, and show that trust is the vessel that transmits the effect over time.

We also consider the constraints that young democracies face when trying to deliver public goods. We argue that credibility does not originate exclusively in political institutions and that even old democracies can be subject to the reputational curse. In our view, century-old public bureaucracies provide the foundation for trust that constrains the ability of current political parties to deliver universalistic policies and makes voters skeptical about unrealistic promises. Future research might further investigate the historical roots of patronage by examining how different patterns of colonial rule shaped the process of building credible public administration and a trusting relationship between citizens and states.

Clientelism is a system of political exchange built on personalized ties of trust, and diversion from the system of patronage ultimately requires that trust can be placed in the hands of depersonalized, professional agencies. We do not argue that legacies and the trusting expectations

that they create determine the fate of nations, but rather that they serve as constraints that curb the potential for future development. As Max Weber asserted, politicians and even regimes come and go, but bureaucracies stay. Factors outside the theory can intervene to blunt or strengthen the impact of historical state capacity. The discovery of new natural resources or a new technology that makes the production of public goods easier or the delivery of targeted goods harder, are likely to influence the incentives of voters and politicians in a more nuanced way. The analysis presented in this article cannot substitute for a detailed historical treatment of the cases. However, in the absence of significant exogenous shocks, our analysis provides a parsimonious and historically grounded explanation for the pervasive clientelism seen in much of the world today.

APPENDIX

COUNTRY CODES USED IN FIGURES

Albania	ALB	Lithuania	LTU
Angola	AGO	Macedonia, FYR	MKD
Argentina	ARG	Malaysia	MYS
Australia	AUS	Mali	MLI
Austria	AUT	Mauritius	MUS
Bangladesh	BGD	Mexico	MEX
Belgium	BEL	Moldova	MDA
Benin	BEN	Mongolia	MNG
Bolivia	BOL	Morocco	MAR
Botswana	BWA	Mozambique	MOZ
Brazil	BRA	Namibia	NAM
Bulgaria	BGR	Netherlands	NLD
Canada	CAN	New Zealand	NZL
Chile	CHL	Nicaragua	NIC
Colombia	COL	Niger	NER
Costa Rica	CRI	Nigeria	NGA
Croatia	HRV	Norway	NOR
Czech Republic	CZE	Pakistan	PAK
Denmark	DNK	Panama	PAN
Dominican Republic	DOM	Paraguay	PRY
Ecuador	ECU	Peru	PER
Egypt	EGY	Philippines	PHL
El Salvador	SLV	Poland	POL
Estonia	EST	Portugal	PRT
Finland	FIN	Romania	ROM
France	FRA	Russia	RUS
Georgia	GEO	Senegal	SEN

Appendix *cont.*

Germany	DEU	Serbia	SRB
Ghana	GHA	Slovak Republic	SVK
Greece	GRC	Slovenia	SVN
Guatemala	GTM	South Africa	ZAF
Honduras	HND	Spain	ESP
Hungary	HUN	Sweden	SWE
India	IND	Switzerland	CHE
Indonesia	IDN	Taiwan	TWN
Ireland	IRL	Tanzania	TZA
Israel	ISR	Thailand	THA
Italy	ITA	Turkey	TUR
Jamaica	JAM	Ukraine	UKR
Japan	JPN	United Kingdom	GBR
Kenya	KEN	United States	USA
Korea, Republic of	KOR	Uruguay	URY
Latvia	LVA	Venezuela	VEN
Lebanon	LBN	Zambia	ZMB

Supplementary Material

Supplementary material for this article can be found at https://doi.org/10.1017/S0043887116000265.

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