

The book includes a selected list of works in English related to domestic politics and a helpful glossary of Soviet terms and usages.

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SOVETSKII KOSMICHESKII BLEF. By *Leonid Vladimirov*. Frankfurt am Main: Possev-Verlag, 1973. 211 pp. DM 14.50, paper.

THE RUSSIAN SPACE BLUFF: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE SOVIET DRIVE TO THE MOON. By *Leonid Vladimirov*. Translated by *David Floyd*. Foreword by *Anatoli Fedoseyev*. New York: Dial Press, 1973. 190 pp. \$5.95.

Only a few years ago this book would have been unbelievable and its publication impossible. Yet the author tells us that he knew of the Soviet lag and even disarray in the space-exploration efforts and their semiclever, semiclumsy camouflage for some ten years before 1966, when he, a Moscow journalist specializing in science and technology, defected to the West. Almost immediately on crossing over he tried to reveal this inside story, but Western publishers, in the words of one of them as quoted by Vladimirov, turned it down: "All I know is that Russia was first to launch a satellite, first to send a man into space, first to carry out a space flight with more than one man aboard and first to send a spaceman on a walk outside the spaceship. As for the moon, even there the Russian Lunik was the first." To cap this winning streak, the Soviet Russians were generally expected to land their cosmonauts on the moon long before any American astronauts could arrive there.

This attitude changed in 1969 when Americans made the first moon landing. To this date no Russians have followed. It was nevertheless said, in 1969–71, that the Soviets would instead concentrate on, and lead in, space stations. Yet by 1973 their Salyut was a definite failure, while America's Skylab emerged as a resounding success. Vladimirov could rightly say "I told you so," as at last his full tale of the Soviet tries and their failure, and the real reasons for this failure or at least lag, found its publishers and public.

The author makes it clear that the chief cause of the lag was (and presumably still is) the gross interference of the Communist politicians with that nation's scientists and engineers. Only the high talents and the incredible ingenuity of the spacecraft experts allowed the late Sergei Korolev and his aides to achieve whatever was achieved before 1969—despite the rulers' ignorant caprices. And the reason the false impression in the West lingered so long was (says Vladimirov) the colossal Western gullibility. Yet (we should add) the alarm—almost panic—sown by the early Soviet space successes did serve as a mighty impetus to the American space effort, which resulted in the triumphs we have witnessed since 1969.

One may offer a few exceptions to Vladimirov's thesis, among them the continuous Soviet accomplishments with their Mars spacecraft: in July–August 1973 four of these units were sent on the 300-million-mile trip. But on the whole this reviewer second's Wernher von Braun's opinion of the book: "Fascinating, informative, and worthy of a wide readership in the United States."

The book was originally published in London in 1971 and its Russian text in Frankfurt, West Germany, in 1973. The translation by that masterful Sovietologist David Floyd is most faithful and otherwise felicitous. The English-language edition also has a brief but worthwhile foreword by Anatoli Fedoseyev, who now

lives in Great Britain (before his defection in Paris in 1971 he was a high-ranking Soviet radar scientist). There is, in addition, a useful map of Russia's space-launching sites—and prisons where Korolev and his staff once worked!

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SUPERGESCHÄFT OST-WEST: DER SCHLÜSSEL ZUM WELTFRIEDEN. By *Samuel Pisar*. Translated from English by *Uwe Bahnson*. Foreword by *J. J. Servan-Schreiber*. Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe, 1970. 377 pp. DM 25.

In this book, written two to three years before Nixon went to Peking and Moscow and before the people of West Germany gave Willy Brandt a mandate for his liberal *Ostpolitik*, Pisar makes his case for maximum expansion of East-West trade as the only hope for lasting peace.

The author argues convincingly that an expansion of economic relations is highly desirable, mutually beneficial, and an important step on the road to peaceful coexistence if not peaceful cooperation, and that nuclear equilibrium and trade embargoes are unacceptable alternatives for securing peace (the former is too costly and too risky, the latter has proved to be unenforceable and worthless). But he does not fully substantiate his thesis, suggested by the title of his book, that "super-business East-West" provides the *sole* "key to world peace," for he fails to give due consideration to some other alternatives such as negotiated treaties (which would settle border disputes, restrict armed forces and weapons, and allow for free international travel), United Nations peace-keeping forces, or supranational political organizations (there are those who advocate world government as the *only* solution).

Pisar is no utopian. He is fully aware that it is no mean task to free East-West trade from artificial restrictions and encumbrances. Decades of bitter controversy have left their mark; there are still two camps facing each other with IBM's pointed at each other's cities and with armies standing in readiness on each other's frontiers. And the Western businessman in his dealings with Communist countries finds himself confronted not by competitive enterprises operating in a familiar market environment but by state monopolies, and in his negotiations he needs, in Pisar's words, "the patience of a saint, the constitution of an athlete, and the well-trained liver of an alcoholic" (p. 235).

European by birth, a graduate of leading universities in the United States, England, and France, a U.S. citizen by special act of Congress, international lawyer, member of the board of directors of various multinational organizations, and former economic adviser to President Kennedy, Pisar has had extensive dealings with Soviet and East European enterprises, party officials, and governments, and is considered one of the West's outstanding experts on East-West trade. Yet the book does not contain new or unique insights, nor does it disseminate heretofore unknown information. What may be of importance is the author's attempt to discuss and analyze all or most of the often vexing and frequently controversial issues that underlie East-West economic relations. Successes and shortcomings of Comecon integration, the trustworthiness of Eastern business counterparts, the establishment of mutually beneficial commercial relations that would not substantially strengthen either side's military capability, price formation not necessarily related to relative