tricably intertwined with the Cold War. Passions have not yet cooled enough for a detached verdict. Whether the paths chosen by President Truman and his secretary of state were the only ones that were possible, or the best of alternatives that were proposed at the time, is still a matter of historical debate. What can be said with assurance is that Acheson's experience with the Russians during and after World War II invariably proved to be most frustrating. It was to instill in him the conviction that negotiations with the Soviet Union were impossible.

As undersecretary and secretary of state, Acheson was to define the premises and assumptions that shaped American foreign policy in the crusade against Soviet communism. During the critical years from 1945 to 1947, which witnessed the formation of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, he became, as Gaddis Smith puts it, "the balance wheel, the coordinator, the provider of continuity and sense of direction during an extraordinarily baffling time." And Smith adds: "His ideas and direction contributed substantially and continuously to the sharpening and hardening of American policy toward the Soviet Union. . . ." The blueprint for the waging of the Cold War by the United States was subsequently set forth in NSC-68, drafted in the spring of 1950. This document reflected Acheson's strategic views, and contained the military recommendations designed to ensure the defense of Western Europe and the containment of the Soviet Union.

To Acheson, the singular threat to Western civilization lay in the danger of Soviet imperialism and its hegemony over the European continent. As he states in *Present at the Creation,* this was similar to the danger "which Islam had posed centuries before, with its combination of ideological zeal and fighting power." In that earlier time, the threat had been met by "Germanic power in the east and Frankish in Spain," both energized by military power and social organization on the continent. "This time," wrote Acheson, "it would need the added power and energy of America, for the drama was now played on the world stage."

McLellan is correct when he points out that the secretary of state's greatest success was in establishing a strategic basis for dealing with the USSR. However, to Acheson success was, in effect, tied to an ideological struggle—backed by the physical, military, and moral resources of the United States and its allies—that would be fought until a fundamental change of attitude occurred on the Soviet side. Nothing less, he believed, would guarantee freedom of conscience, individual rights, human freedom, and the treasured heritage of Western civilization. It is regrettable that McLellan largely ignores the implications and consequences of Acheson's strategic "success" in dealing with the Soviet Union. By failing to do so, in the opinion of this reviewer, he overlooks what is perhaps one of the most important aspects of Acheson's diplomacy.

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DÉTENTE AND THE DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT IN THE USSR. By *Frederick C. Barghoorn.* New York and London: The Free Press and Collier Macmillan, 1976. x, 229 pp. $12.95.

After his many years of probing Soviet society through analysis of official actions and pronouncements, Professor Barghoorn in this book examines post-Khrushchev foreign policy from the new and unique perspective provided by the critical voices of dissent. His focus, as is evident from the title, is on one key policy—détente with the West—and his sources are that part of the broad spectrum of dissent which has articulated demands for greater civil liberties and human rights. Despite sympathy for the dissenters' views and belief in their potential impact, Professor Barghoorn reluctantly concludes that repressive actions against democratic dissidents and the strength of

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conservative forces in Soviet society point to a long indefinite period ahead before significant salutary changes occur in Soviet foreign or domestic policy. Accordingly, he sees the study of dissentient views and Soviet treatment of their proponents as a source of "useful information" about the official meaning of détente which can provide guidelines for Western policies.

Professor Barghoorn's book is divided into four chapters. The first gives a short general description of how the conflict between the regime and the dissenters developed. The second expands on the specific foreign policy views of the major dissenters whom Professor Barghoorn includes in his "democratic" roster: Sakharov (who has pride of place), Solzhenitsyn, Amalrik, Galanskov, and Roy Medvedev. A short third chapter focuses on foreign policy aspects of the human rights movement as reflected by Zhores Medvedev, Valery Chalidze, and others. The final and longest chapter pulls together the strands of Professor Barghoorn's arguments along with his policy recommendations.

Professor Barghoorn has no quarrel with the need for "a measure of regularization and accommodation" between the United States and the USSR, especially in light of the "malign magic of contemporary weapons," but it is his central thesis that détente "will remain seriously flawed and limited as long as the Soviet rulers maintain an oppressive regime" (p. ix). He sees the Brezhnev version of détente as an approach in the Stalinist tradition, though more sophisticated, designed to enhance Soviet interests at the expense of the West. And whereas under Khrushchev, relaxation abroad was accompanied by a measure of relaxation at home, Brezhnev has adopted more stringent measures to insulate the Soviet people from outside influences. This combination leads Professor Barghoorn to conclude "that central features of the Soviet system, in particular its reliance for legitimacy largely (though not exclusively) upon the official creed to 'Leninism' and the power monopoly of the highly centralized CPSU, strongly impel and indeed almost certainly force the Soviet authorities to create an atmosphere of hostile 'vigilance' toward the 'bourgeois' world" (p. 123).

It is not only the challenge to the party's monopoly but the dissenting views themselves which the regime finds intolerable. One of the most striking aspects of these views, as described by Professor Barghoorn, is their growing pessimism about the prospects for change either domestically or in Soviet foreign policy. In effect, the dissenters have come to share with the regime the estimate that the world correlation of forces is shifting in the Soviet Union's favor, a shift which they interpret as a threat to all nations and to which they advise the West to respond with firmness. Thus, form and substance combine in the regime's increasingly repressive treatment of dissent.

Written before the advent of a new American administration which is obviously concerned with the questions raised by this book, Professor Barghoorn's recommendations for U.S. policy have a special interest. He advises that "except in very special circumstances, the executive branch of the United States had best refrain from open and direct interventions on behalf of Soviet dissenters," because it might lend credence in the USSR "to the official Soviet line that dissenters and critics are really camouflaged enemy agents" (p. 176). Instead, he recommends continued pressure by individuals and groups on behalf of those struggling for human rights in the USSR.

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