

stand how Fourier's ideas developed. Consideration is also given to his influence on the socialist and social reform movement of the last century, including—with surprising brevity, considering the author's major interest and expertise—that of Russia and Eastern Europe. The index is good for names and the more obvious concepts, but unfortunately is no help in locating more subtle ideas. Evidently the author is a historian more than a philosopher or theorist.

The principal weakness of the study, to this reviewer, is that it does not adequately present or attempt to explicate a central aspect of Fourier's analysis, the idea of "series," which underlies his "mathematics of the passions," as Leroy called it, and his communitarian schemes. Without this, one can understand his influence on Marx but not his influence on Proudhon or other advocates of systematic association as the basis for a human life both harmonious and free. It was Fourier's approach to "natural law" that Proudhon used, in his own way, as he explicitly acknowledged. Marx, on the other hand, appreciated Fourier's social criticism, but had his own logic and version of materialism to guide his analysis and expectations. It may be some indication of the validity of Fourier's basic ideas, his psychological perspective, and his serial logic that they have been rediscovered by many who never heard of him.

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FOR MARX. By *Louis Althusser*. Translated by *Ben Brewster*. New York: Pantheon, 1970. 272 pp. \$6.95, cloth. \$1.95, paper.

Althusser's *Pour Marx*, published in 1965, brings together seven articles originally published between 1960 and 1964 in various leftist periodicals such as *La Nouvelle Critique*, *La Pensée*, and *Cahiers de l'ISEA*, as well as the Catholic review *Esprit*. Only the introduction, twenty pages long, was written in 1965. The English translation by Ben Brewster contains in addition a preface "To My English Readers" (which is but a literal translation of the preface, "An die deutschen Leser," to the German edition of 1968) and a useful "glossary" by the translator that briefly comments upon more than thirty special terms used by the author.

Althusser, born in 1918, a member of the French Communist Party since 1948, and presently a member of the Central Committee as well as professor of philosophy at the *École Normale Supérieure* in Paris, has become known as the leader of a French trend trying to combine Marxism, and even Marxism-Leninism, with the Structuralism of authors such as Lévi-Strauss and Foucault. As is to be expected, the results are somewhat ambiguous. Without necessarily questioning the interesting results emerging in some of the writings of the French Structuralists, the present reviewer has never been able to discover precisely what it is that Structuralism purports to claim; occasionally he even succumbs to the temptation to regard it as little else than a version of ideas familiar to any honest philosopher of social science, mutilated beyond recognition by a typically French tendency to use grand vogue-words. Since recent developments have also made it increasingly difficult to say what Marxism amounts to, it hardly needs pointing out that a synthesis of Marxism and French Structuralism (which should not be confused with the linguistic structuralism of de Saussure or Trubetskoï) is a disturbingly ambiguous theoretical position.

It would, of course, be unjust to pass over in silence the fact that Althusser

does ask some significant questions about what Marxist philosophy possibly might be, whether this philosophy has any right to existence, and in which way it does differ from other philosophies. It is almost impossible, however, to discover what Althusser's answers might be. Several of the articles fall into the category of "Marxological" studies and differ from other studies of this kind solely in being comparatively ahistorical, in trumpeting well-established historical facts as if they were new discoveries, and in quoting Lenin, Stalin, and even Mao more often than is today common among Marx specialists. Thus we read that there is an "unequivocal epistemological break" in Marx's work and that it occurs in *The German Ideology*; that this break concerns both the theory of history and the notion of philosophy; that the same epistemological break divides Marx's thought into two "long essential periods"; that the "works of the break" raise delicate problems of interpretation; and that these problems concern not only the relation between Marx and Feuerbach but also the relation between Marx and Hegel. It is difficult to disagree. Yet it is even more difficult to see why anyone should consider such well-established facts worth mentioning with such emphasis. After all, virtually all books concerned with the "young" Marx center on these issues. More precisely, they presuppose them and proceed to an analysis, be it historical or systematic, of the details. With respect to the "epistemological break," even the glossary is of no help. We are told that the expression "coupure épistémologique" has been introduced by Bachelard and that it designates the leap from the prescientific world of ideas to the scientific world. Ever since the publication of *The German Ideology* in the thirties both Marxists and critics of Marxism have agreed that this book contains the first complete version of Marx's materialistic conception of history, which Marx himself considered a break with all past philosophies. The question remains, however, whether Marx's conception is a new philosophy or a new *type* of philosophy. Althusser claims the latter, but, as far as I can see, does literally nothing more than claim it.

Somewhat more interesting are the sections entitled "Marxism and Humanism" and "Contradiction and Overdetermination." In the former Althusser argues against Communist theoreticians such as Lefebvre and Garaudy that socialist humanism is a bourgeois ideology and that genuine Marxism is a "philosophical antihumanism." To a large extent, however, this is a quibble over terminology: since Althusser understands humanism in terms of Feuerbach's "anthropotheism" and draws a sharp dividing line between a prescientific and a scientific conception, his claim that Marxism is an antihumanist philosophy simply amounts to saying that Marxist philosophy is not ideological but scientific. This is an echo of the Structuralist thesis that science is by definition value-neutral.

In the section entitled "Contradiction and Overdetermination" Althusser tries to throw light on the difference between Hegelian and Marxist "dialectics" by reflecting upon the notion of "contradiction." He argues that while Hegelian contradiction is separable from the social instances it governs, Marxist contradiction is "overdetermined" in the sense that it is wholly bound up with the social formation which it determines. Other Marxists have argued the same by saying that Hegelian dialectics, and Hegel's notion of contradiction as the moving force of history, are "abstract"—that is, separable from the concrete historical epoch. The basic difficulty of such discussions, however, always remains the same: it is presupposed that "dialectics," "social contradictions," and "practice" are realities which it is the task of a philosopher to grasp adequately (in the same way in which it is the task of a physicist adequately to explain the rainbow or of the historian adequately

to describe the French Revolution). It would seem, however, that expressions such as "dialectics" and "practice" do not designate any entities that exist independently of what philosophers say about them. In other words, most discussions about dialectics, or contradiction, or practice ought to be discussions about how to use certain philosophical expressions; for what is relevant to the social scientist is how the real world looks—and dialectics, contradiction, and practice are not parts of this real world but constructs for adequately modeling the given. Accordingly, questions such as those treated by Althusser in the section under review cannot be adequately discussed without a considerable amount of semantic analysis. Since any hint of such an analysis is missing, one puts Althusser's book aside with the unsatisfactory feeling that he may have something to say but does not succeed in getting it across to his reader. This may be different with French readers who share with Althusser the quasi-mystical experience of the role of Marxism and communism during the war and in postwar France. I would argue, however, that scholarly studies should be intelligible even to those who do not share the peculiar experiences of the author.

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MARX BEFORE MARXISM. By *David McLellan*. New York and Evanston: Harper & Row, 1970. xi, 233 pp. \$6.50.

Although Marx's writings prior to 1845 comprise but two of the forty-two volumes of the complete edition of his works published in East Germany, the ideas of the "young" Marx have, in the last twenty years, been studied infinitely more carefully than his mature thought. The literature on the subject would amount to a middle-sized private library, and new books are unlikely to add anything significant. However, one task still remains meaningful: to familiarize the *English*-speaking reader with this subject (most of the books are in German and French) and to incorporate into one book as much as possible of the relevant scholarship. McLellan, who two years ago published a book on the Young Hegelians and their influence on Marx, has in his recent book admirably succeeded in both respects. After an introductory chapter on Germany before 1848 and another chapter on Marx's birthplace, genealogy, parents, and school days, he traces Marx's intellectual development from his early attempts in poetry to the Paris Manuscripts of 1844. In contrast to most writers on the "young" Marx, he makes virtually no attempt to offer an interpretation which goes beyond the texts and manuscripts as they stand. Thirty years ago H. P. Adams did the same in a book which is all but forgotten now. McLellan's work, however, does not deserve to be compared with Adams's; for although he refrains from analyzing and interpreting, his paraphrases and summaries incorporate virtually all available scholarship concerning the structure of the various manuscripts, the influence of Hegel and the Hegelians on Marx, and the general background. In consequence, his book contains a wealth of information that is relevant even for those who consider themselves "Marxologists." In a concluding chapter McLellan offers a carefully documented analysis of the development of the interpretation of the "young" Marx as well as some well-balanced reflections on the relationship between the "young" and the "old" Marx.

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