

to play by the rules, Li recommends the advanced democracies delink their economies from China's, a tit-for-tat strategy that will require coordination and commitment. That is a large prerequisite for success. Li acknowledges the collective action problem inherent in his policy recommendation: all would benefit if they teamed up against China, but each is trying "to maximize their own benefit by undercutting other countries to make a deal with China" (p. 262). What would make them change their behaviour?

Li assumes that the natural alternative to CCP rule is democracy, and that interaction with foreign countries brings knowledge of, and desire for, democracy. But many in China believe that Western-style democracy is not suitable for China and that current democracies are dysfunctional.

His advice to researchers, specifically to those in business management, is to investigate the CCP's policies toward business. While it is true that scholars have not come up with a place along the democracy-dictatorship and capitalism-communism continua that fits China's case, much research has been done on the nature of the CCP and its relations with social actors and private firms. Li cites none of the social science literature on these topics. His observation that "China is no longer a communist state" is not a new insight, nor an accurate one: China may not be Marxist, but it certainly is Leninist.

In general, the arguments in the book are not necessarily wrong, just overly simplistic. The book may be useful as your first book on the CCP's relationship with firms, but don't let it be your last.

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The Party Leads All: The Evolving Role of the Chinese Communist Party

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The Party Leads All: The Evolving Role of the Chinese Communist Party is an insightful and thoroughly researched and interdisciplinary tour de force assembling some of the world's preeminent scholars of China to examine the different roles and functions of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). In his introduction to the edited volume, Jacques DeLisle writes that the Party "oversees, steers, or reaches into all corners of China's governance, economy, society, and external affairs, or at least claims the authority, and often has the capacity, to do so" (pp. 2–3). This distinction between the Party's proclaimed authority and actual influence is important, since in practice it is often challenging to attribute an event or a development to the Party, rather than the state or an individual. The authors are clearly aware of this. As DeLisle notes, "the party's mediated role often coexists with more direct party influence, with the mix varying by field" (p. 18). While that does not ultimately resolve the problem, it is an important caveat to the following 13 chapters that are tied together by Franz Schurmann's classic themes of "organization" and "ideology" (p. 9) and treat a different aspect of the Party's leadership each.

In what could be regarded as the first part of the volume, four chapters delve into the intricacies of the CCP. Bruce J. Dickson's contribution explores the CCP's "Leninist revival" and its capacity to

repurpose past practices that reflect its “adaptability” (p. 44). His illuminating treatment of the CCP’s membership and Party-building efforts is followed by Cheng Li’s empirically rich analysis of elite politics, which highlights both continuity and change by showing the “continued fluidity of CCP elite turnover” and “changes in the factional lineup” (p. 74). The fourth chapter by Cheng Chen adds an ideological perspective. Aptly titled “Ideology for organization”, it argues that the “weakening of ideology poses inherent danger to the CCP’s organizational integrity and strength” (p. 110). Rendered a “disciplinary weapon” (p. 110) under Xi Jinping, his re-emphasis on ideology, the chapter shows, should be viewed as a response to a “perceived crisis in party-building” (p. 129). In the fifth chapter, Melanie Manion provides a fresh perspective on corruption in the Party. Rather than detailing its features, she examines its significance for the “CCP as a ruling party” (p. 138) under Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping and Xi Jinping. She finds that under Xi, corruption is both aimed at purging individuals and wielded against the “problem of factionalism” (p. 139).

Building on the previous analysis of the CCP’s internal workings, the following chapters examine how the Party’s influence is mediated in various areas, including the judiciary, business, media, civil society, religion, rural areas, military, and foreign affairs. In his chapter on judicial reforms, Xin He finds that while illegitimate influences have declined, legitimate influences have persisted or even increased. Margaret M. Pearson discusses how the Party blurs the lines between state and private enterprises by demanding political loyalty and blending state and private ownership, which shows the Party’s willingness to keep an increasingly complex and global economy “under its control” (p. 188). Somewhat unexpectedly, Yue Hou argues that the Party’s policy toward the private sector is not significantly different from previous administrations and that challenges mean the “party will have no choice but to deepen market-oriented reforms” (p. 212). Maria Repnikova explains how the media’s monitoring role is being downplayed while its “control and propaganda” (p. 241) functions are becoming more pronounced, leading the way for intensification in the years ahead. These chapters set up Diana Fu and Emile Dirks’s contribution on how the Party uses regulatory reform coupled with repression and a deeper reach of the party-state to form a system of “centralized suppression” (p. 270) of civil society. Shifting to religion, Karrie J. Koesel reaches similar conclusions, arguing that Xi’s emphasis on “Sinicization” ultimately makes religion serve the Party-state. Yanhua Deng examines the Party’s attempt to implement a single power structure in rural areas. While responding enthusiastically, some officials and cadres had serious doubts, all the while admitting that the “party rules all” dictum will lead to its implementation. In the penultimate chapter, Andrew Scobell analyses the Party’s grip over the military and concludes that ultimately its position as the Party’s army renders it vulnerable to “centripetal forces of CCP politics”, which make it impossible “to completely avoid intraparty factional warfare (p. 363). In the final chapter, Bates Gill looks at the Party’s influence on foreign affairs and finds that the Party’s “legitimacy and longevity” are the “overriding priorities” (p. 372) in foreign affairs, making its authority the ultimate determinant of national interest. This influence is seen in the establishment of Xi Jinping Diplomatic Thought, and the increasing role of the Propaganda, International Liaison, and United Front Work Departments.

In his introductory chapter, DeLisle asks if the period since Xi Jinping came to power entailed “a qualitative break with the first decades of the reform era” (p. 17). While continuities and discontinuities both depend on the specific area analysed, the contributors’ overall answer is a “qualified yes” (p. 17) – and, I would venture, they are quite right. For this reason alone, this wonderfully edited volume is essential reading for anyone interested in how the Party is exerting its power in China under Xi Jinping – and I will certainly make good use of it in my teaching.