

VOPROSY ISTORII: SUBJECT INDEX, 1945–1975, 3 vols. Compiled by *Angelika Schmiegelow Powell*. Nendeln, West Germany: KTO Press, 1977. 1168 pp. S.fr. 432.

VOPROSY ISTORII: AUTHOR INDEX, 1945–1975. Compiled by *Angelika Schmiegelow Powell*. Nendeln, West Germany: KTO Press, 1977. x, 460 pp. S.fr. 144.

ISTORICHESKIE ZAPISKI: CUMULATIVE INDEX (AUTHOR AND SUBJECT), VOLUMES 1–90: 1937–1972. Compiled by *Angelika Schmiegelow Powell*. Nendeln, West Germany: KTO Press, 1976. viii, 103 pp. S.fr. 54.

Some years ago a colleague of mine was hospitalized and forbidden to work. Deprived of his regular research materials in medieval history, he turned to the local telephone directory and conceived a sociological analysis of Madison. This story comes back to me as I leaf through these volumes. An index can tell us much more than just where to walk for this or that.

The subject index of *Voprosy istorii*, for example, contains almost four pages devoted to items by or about Stalin, but only one dates from after 1954. Neither Khrushchev nor Brezhnev is listed, but there are several entries for J. F. Kennedy and even one listing for “Kennedy clan—history.” References to the peasantry, peasant movements, and peasant uprisings take up almost sixteen pages. Less than four pages are devoted to World War I, and almost eighteen to World War II. For workers one is referred to “Labor and laboring classes,” comprising twenty-one pages with an additional five on “Labor movements.” The index to *Istoricheskie zapiski* tells somewhat the same story, although, significantly, there is proportionately much less on Stalin and nothing on the Kennedys.

The volumes generally use the Library of Congress classification system, and one finds a topic often refined with two narrower definitions, for example, “Labor and Laboring Class—USSR—Leningrad” or “History—Soviet Historiography—Conference December 1961.” The author sections are printed in Russian, the subject sections in English. My students find the volumes most useful, and I can only express gratitude for the labor that I know must have gone into this project.

ALFRED ERICH SENN
University of Wisconsin, Madison

SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY: ITS SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONDITIONS.

Edited by *Egbert Jahn*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1978 [1976]. 160 pp. \$16.95.

Interpreting Soviet foreign policy is more often an exercise in examining birds' entrails than in “political science,” so difficult is it to penetrate the wall of official silence and of Soviet explanations that tell nothing of why and how decisions are made. Part of the problem, as Professor Jahn avers in the introduction to this series of essays, lies in the inadequate or mistaken approach of Western analysts, who have not worked out a well-developed theory of Soviet society whereby the international strategy of the Soviet Union can be related to its social and economic structure. Beyond outlining four approaches, however, and indicating some paths a differential analysis should pursue, Jahn does not delve much further into the subject. This task is left to the other contributors, who do not choose to follow his outline but nevertheless have something of interest to say.

Apart from a tenuously related case study of Khrushchev's decision in 1960 to reduce the armed forces, the remaining essays are remarkably similar in argumentation, although some authors are Marxist in their thinking and others are not. The contributors disagree on matters such as which phenomena in the Soviet system are

manifestations of socialism and of capitalism—and here we catch echoes of Charles Bettelheim, Ernest Mandel, and even Trotsky—but there is general agreement on the characterization of the USSR as a bureaucratic class state, on the continuing clash of interests between technocrats and bureaucrats, and on the fundamental weakness of the Soviet economy and its need to turn to the world market. These themes are presented most cogently in Antonio Carlo's central essay on the structural causes of the Soviet coexistence policy.

A recurrent conclusion found in the book is the direct relationship between the Soviet Union's dependence on the capitalist world market and its choice for an international policy of *détente*. Whether this choice means abandonment of a "socialist" foreign policy, as some Marxist observers deplore, is beside the point, for, as Rainer Rotermundt and Ursula Schmiederer make clear, this question involves the application of a moralistic or ideological standard with little relevance to the facts of power within the country and to the facts of the international system. If the Soviet Union's foreign policy has been "conservative" (according to Jahn) or "weak" (according to Carlo), there are good political, economic, and even class reasons for it.

Whatever the interpretations—and these essays are still theoretical disquisitions rather than the empirical inquiry the editor calls for—the Soviet system does not emerge as having positive choices for the future. It cannot seem to reform itself and it cannot solve its problems without trade and coexistence with the West, but the price of relations with the West is further economic dependence and social tension.

JOHN C. CAMPBELL
Cohasset, Massachusetts

THE ILLUSION OF PEACE: FOREIGN POLICY IN THE NIXON YEARS.

By *Tad Szulc*. New York: The Viking Press, 1978. x, 822 pp. \$20.00.

Tad Szulc's impressive book provides a narrative history and analysis of American foreign policy during the Nixon years. It contains abundant evidence of the high priority which President Nixon gave to foreign policy and of the uniqueness of the Nixon-Kissinger team in conducting it. The book also substantiates the charge, widely heard at the time of pervasive suspicion and mistrust in the White House, an atmosphere which easily begot Watergate and which contributed to the passion for secrecy in the making of foreign policy.

The portrait of Henry Kissinger will not be the subject's favorite. It shows him conspiring from the day of the inauguration for control of foreign policy, displacing Secretary Rogers ("the despair of his associates at the State Department" [p. 281]), by-passing and humiliating distinguished American ambassadors, and conducting such a distinctly personal diplomacy that "virtually nobody—possibly not even Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford—knows precisely what promises and commitments Kissinger made to foreign leaders during his eight years in power: to Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai, Brezhnev and Dobrynin, Le Duc Tho, Sadat and King Faisal, Golda Meir, or any number of other foreign presidents, foreign ministers, and ambassadors" (p. 776).

Nixon and Kissinger receive praise for the basic concepts guiding their diplomacy, especially involving American-Soviet *détente* and the new relationship with China. But Szulc challenges the illusion that "confrontations are altogether behind us," finding it part of the larger "illusion of peace" which provided the guiding theme of Nixon's diplomacy. Upon this illusion was founded the Nixon-Kissinger "linkage" theory—"that the Soviet Union would restrain itself from overextending its influence in exchange for a general *détente* with the United States" (p. 432). The absence of meaningful linkage was apparent in Soviet Middle Eastern policy, yet faith in the notion led both Nixon and Kissinger greatly to oversell *détente*, and especially the significance of the strategic nuclear weapons agreements contained in SALT I. Szulc's description of the SALT negotiations, the conduct of which was apparently greatly