

ANALYZING LATIN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICIES

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- THE DYNAMICS OF LATIN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICIES: CHALLENGES FOR THE 1980S.* Edited by JENNIE K. LINCOLN and ELIZABETH G. FERRIS. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1984. Pp. 325. \$35.00.)
- LATIN AMERICAN NATIONS IN WORLD POLITICS.* Edited by HERALDO MUÑOZ and JOSEPH S. TULCHIN. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1984. Pp. 278. \$33.50.)
- AMERICA LATINA: POLITICAS EXTERIORES COMPARADAS.* Edited by JUAN CARLOS PUIG. (Buenos Aires: Grupo Editor Latinoamericano, 1984. Pp. 556 in 2 volumes.)
- GEOPOLITICA Y POLITICA DEL PODER EN EL ATLANTICO SUR.* Edited by CARLOS J. MONETA. (Buenos Aires: Editorial Pleamar, 1983. Pp. 238.)
- LATIN AMERICA, WESTERN EUROPE, AND THE UNITED STATES: REEVALUATING THE ATLANTIC TRIANGLE.* Edited by WOLF GRABENDORFF and RIORDAN ROETT. (New York: Praeger, 1984. Pp. 295. \$37.95.)

Several new collections of essays on Latin American foreign policies, including those considered here, have appeared in the last few years.¹ My aim is not so much to assess the quality of individual essays in the collections under review (many, in fact, are excellent); rather, it is to use them as a springboard for reflections about the utility of various theoretical approaches and concepts for the analysis of Latin American foreign policies. Jennie Lincoln and Elizabeth Ferris in *The Dynamics of Latin American Foreign Policies*, Heraldo Muñoz and Joseph Tulchin in *Latin American Nations in World Politics*, and Juan Carlos Puig in *América Latina: políticas comparadas exteriores* as well as a few of their contributors also deal with this subject, as did this reviewer some years ago with reference to inter-American relations.² But it has become increasingly clear that the international relations and foreign policies of Latin America should be studied in their own right. U.S. hegemony in the hemisphere has continued to decline, Latin American countries have established an ever-widening network of international relationships, several countries in the region have pursued notably "activist" and "in-

dependent" foreign policies, several have emerged as important regional actors and significant middle-range powers on the world scene, the foreign-policy decision-making processes in most countries have grown more complex, and we know more than ever before about the content of Latin American foreign policies and the factors shaping them.

Nevertheless, despite substantial progress, we are as yet unable to make many systematic generalizations about why Latin American countries "behave" as they do internationally. Alberto van Klaveren's essay in the Muñoz and Tulchin volume suggests that part of the problem is that most work to date has been historical and descriptive (sometimes prescriptive) case studies of specific countries, rather than genuinely comparative analyses (van Klaveren in Muñoz and Tulchin, p. 2). The rest of the problem is that theory in the general field of international relations is itself in a state of chaos. In van Klaveren's words, "there are many disparate elements available for [cross-national analyses], but they have yet to be systematized and integrated into a coherent and comprehensive approach." We are encountering information and theoretical "overload," with the result that, in a sense, we have never been so profoundly ignorant.

THE STATE AND SOCIETY IN LATIN AMERICA

State and Nation

Consider at the outset the central unit of international relations—the state. Whatever else a state may be, in modern times it has been a territorial unit. Most Latin American states have been in existence for over 150 years, yet a surprising number of them have boundaries still actively disputed, as is shown by Jack Child's contribution to the Lincoln and Ferris collection. Nor does Max Weber's notion of a state—an entity that possesses a monopoly of legitimate violence—seem to be relevant to Latin America, where many governments are so lacking in legitimacy that any claim to control over violence, let alone the legitimate exercise thereof, is strictly hypothetical. Moreover, despite many years of formal independence, much of Latin America continues to be plagued by the "absent nation" phenomenon. In this regard, territory has often acted as a barrier. For example, Waltraud Queiser Morales's essay on Bolivian foreign policy in the Lincoln and Ferris collection states: "Tremendous geophysical obstacles to transportation and communications infrastructure complicate the divisive forces in socio-cultural patterns. . . . Except for the altiplano, no region is well integrated

as a region much less with the rest of the country. This situation has influenced commentators to characterize Bolivia as a 'land divided,' and three nations, not one" (Morales in Lincoln and Ferris, p. 172). W. Raymond Duncan observes that Indians "differentiate between highland and lowland Indians in Bolivia or village identities in Guatemala or Peru. At least 73 languages are spoken [by Indian groupings in Latin America] and more than 355 separate tribes have been identified."³ In addition, persistent patterns of emigration—from Mexico to the United States, from Guatemala to Mexico, from El Salvador to Honduras, from Colombia to Venezuela, and so on—demonstrate that loyalty to "nation" is inadequate to keep many citizens within the national territory when they face chronic poverty or political instability. Yet there is no denying that nationalism is a potent force influencing Latin American foreign policies and, indeed, is the primary reason why boundary disputes so easily escalate into confrontational behavior.

Regimes and Political Change

As Joseph Tulchin has noted, much of the writing on regime types suggests that "the more closed the regime, the more restricted or inflexible its foreign policy." Nevertheless, it does not follow that one can predict a country's foreign policies simply by knowing that its political system is "bureaucratic-authoritarian." Writing before recent civilian leadership in Argentina and Brazil, Tulchin points out that "Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, three bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes, exhibit markedly different patterns of international behavior and that each has altered its international behavior in the course of the period during which it has been a B-A state" (Tulchin in Muñoz and Tulchin, p. 188). Democratic regimes have also evidenced similar peregrinations. William Hazelton observes in the same collection that declining economic conditions curtailed the foreign-policy "activism" of Venezuela during the Luis Herrera Campins presidency and threatened to do the same in Colombia under Belisario Betancur (Hazelton in Muñoz and Tulchin, p. 170). A change in regime does often result in important policy shifts, however, as occurred in Argentina during the transition from the bureaucratic-authoritarian military regime to the democratic regime of Raúl Alfonsín regarding support for the campaign against Nicaragua and the FMLN in El Salvador. Yet equally noteworthy shifts in policy have occurred when only administrations—not regimes—have changed. For instance, subsequent administrations in Mexico and Venezuela have given much less enthusiastic support to SELA than did those of founders Luis Echeverría and Carlos Andrés Pérez. Are the underlying reasons changes in administrations, economic problems, both, or still other factors? Rosario Green makes the interesting obser-

vation that the international economic crisis had a different impact on Mexican and Brazilian policies regarding their bilateral and multilateral relationships: Mexico drew closer to the United States and appeared less interested in multilateralism, while Brazil sought to establish and strengthen bilateral ties other than its traditional link with the United States and favored increased multilateral cooperation (Green in Puig, 2:500–501).

Another approach to analyzing the influence of regime types is the impact on foreign policy of external views of the regime. Heraldo Muñoz concludes regarding Chile, “The problem of the authoritarian internal order continues as a fundamental obstacle to the strategies of the military government aimed at ending external political isolation” (see Muñoz’s essay in the Puig collection, 2:378). The atrocious human rights record of the military regime in Argentina also made it an international “pariah.” Were military elites therefore more likely to undertake foreign adventures like the Malvinas campaign? Did they have more riding on a successful outcome of the war than a regime that most of the international community might have seen as “legitimate”? How are international and domestic “legitimacy” related?

Is legitimacy almost exclusively a reflection of domestic perspectives on a regime? Tulchin states:

... the capacity of an authoritarian regime to commit national resources to achieve foreign-policy objectives is a function not only of the popularity of the objective but also of the success of the adventure, in the short run, and the degree of national consensus previously earned by the regime for its political and economic models. Further, it suggests that an authoritarian regime runs much greater risks than a regime based on popular support in committing those resources for international adventures. The consequences of defeat are much greater than they would be for a democratic regime. (Tulchin in Muñoz and Tulchin, pp. 195–96)

But is the legitimacy of a regime a function of regime type or of the success of its economic policies or both? If not, what factors explain legitimacy? Howard Wiarda and others have maintained that Latin America’s essentially “corporatist” political tradition (as well as that of much of the rest of the Third World) is “distinct” from the “liberal” Western political tradition.⁴ Why, then, have authoritarian regimes like those in Argentina prior to Alfonsín experienced such difficulty establishing their legitimacy? Was it “merely” a failure of their economic policies or has the problem been a more fundamental one? Is it not that in Argentina, as in most of Latin America, a dominant authoritarian tradition has coexisted with aspirations for political liberalism (not to mention Marxist revolution), making it difficult for any regime not arising from the ballot box to establish its legitimacy—and causing elected regimes, in turn, to fall victim to the pull of the authoritarian tradition?⁵

Policy Tradition and Ideology

Van Klaveren has observed that in Brazil after 1964,

during the first years the new authoritarian regime completely reversed the policies of its predecessors. . . . [T]he last two democratic governments had attempted to pursue an activist and reformist foreign policy, oriented toward the establishment of new links with other countries and regions, especially in the Third World, and toward the adoption of a more independent policy vis-à-vis the United States. However, and this is particularly interesting, this reversal from an independent pro-Third World policy proved to be short-lived. Although the authoritarian regime remained essentially the same, in the early 1970s Brazil shifted again to an active foreign policy, characterized by pragmatism and adaptability to external changes. (Van Klaveren in Muñoz and Tulchin, p. 11)

As the Brazilian experience suggests, policy tradition is itself a potent factor in shaping subsequent foreign policy. Wayne Selcher writes: "Brazil's foreign policy rests upon a broad consensus of values within the government. . . . Sharp divisions within the government, over major issues, have been by far the exception rather than the rule. Controversies today are still more common over matters of priority and style than over divergent goals" (Selcher in Lincoln and Ferris, p. 102). Mexico has steadfastly defended the principles of nonintervention and ideological pluralism. With reference to Peru, Helan Jaworski comments:

One of the points most heavily debated is whether or not there really was a break in Peruvian foreign policy with the change of regimes in 1968. The answer is both yes and no. In terms of action, in the space of only a few months there was put into effect an aggressive foreign policy that was without precedent in Peruvian diplomacy. . . . On the other hand, . . . it is no less certain that, in all matters of greatest importance, the principal lines of action did no more than continue, emphasize, and eventually put into effect the very proposals that Peruvian diplomacy had been elaborating for years. (Jaworski in Muñoz and Tulchin, p. 204)

To explain the foreign policy of the post-1976 military rulers of Argentina, Tulchin also relies in part on "the historical strength and continuity of axiomatic principles of foreign policy" (Tulchin in Muñoz and Tulchin, p. 198).

Where do "axiomatic principles" and "broad consensus of values" shade off into "ideology"? For example, numerous authors note the influence of "geopolitical" thinking on the foreign policies of South American states, a topic that is the focus of Carlos Moneta's collection, *Geopolítica y política del poder en el Atlántico Sur*. Tulchin refers to the Argentine military's determination "to secure the nation's frontiers," especially in the Beagle Channel and over the Malvinas. Howard Pittman comments that "Chile has been a leader in the development and application of new geopolitical concepts to the sea and Antarctica." Pittman

also characterizes the Pinochet regime as presiding over a veritable “renaissance in geopolitics” and recalls that President Pinochet himself is a former professor of geopolitics at the Chilean army academy and the author of a book on the subject. Pittman states that Pinochet’s government “uses geopolitical analyses to arrive at geopolitical solutions, which are translated into government policy and action” (Pittman in Lincoln and Ferris, p. 131). Of the Southern Cone military regimes generally, Selcher writes:

Since about 1975 . . . the Southern cone regional subsystem has been increasingly affected by the adoption of a “high politics” diplomacy of national security. With internal subversion defeated and their expanded political role still in serious question, the military-dominated governments in particular turned their formerly internally oriented national-security doctrines outward toward an agenda of largely territorial and resource issues that by definition involved conflict with the national interests of neighboring states claiming the same land, ocean area, or resource. (Selcher in Muñoz and Tulchin, p. 111)

Selcher nevertheless warns against assuming any clear distinction between the behavior of “peaceful” democracies in the North and that of “the ‘aggressive,’ geopolitically minded military governments of the Southern Cone, with the Brazilian *abertura* (liberalization) as a third model. . . .” Regime assumptions explain neither the continuing skirmishes between Peru and Ecuador nor the build-up of Venezuela’s air force, a matter of serious concern to Guyana and Colombia because they are engaged in border disputes with Venezuela (Selcher in Muñoz and Tulchin, p. 102).

As for other countries, Morales comments that Bolivia’s geopolitics appears to be the antithesis of ideology, an almost inevitable reaction to external influences (Morales in Lincoln and Ferris, pp. 171–72). Jorge Morelli Pando argues similarly that Peru’s foreign policy cannot avoid being largely dictated by the policies of its Andean and continental neighbors (Pando in Puig, 2:522–25).

This point raises yet another question: the extent to which traditional foreign-policy goals or ideology are themselves important factors in explaining foreign-policy outcomes or are only reflections of other factors. For instance, Manfred Wilhelmy comments on the policies of the Frei government in Chile: “The ideological emphasis on foreign policy was especially marked in the first three years of the presidential period. Christian Democratic ideology, to a large extent expounded upon by Frei in numerous writings, contributed to establishing the principal themes of his diplomatic offensive, to structuring the perceptions of government, and to shaping a style of international action of a reformist type, with marked activism” (Wilhelmy in Muñoz and Tulchin, p. 50). To what degree, accordingly, was Chilean policy during this period a reflection of the PDC party, Christian Democracy as an

international movement, Eduardo Frei's personal views, or the presidential role in Chile?

On Venezuela, John Martz writes, "Of Venezuela's two dominant parties, COPEI has been more strongly influenced by, and more responsive to, ideological principles and philosophical tenets. The cornerstone has long been the thought and writing of Rafael Caldera [especially his conceptions of international social justice and ideological pluralism], a fact which did not change fundamentally under Herrera despite the rivalry and hostility between the two men" (Martz in Muñoz and Tulchin, p. 142). As for Acción Democrática, according to Martz, ideological considerations have been

a less crucial factor in the determination of foreign policy. . . . The two major international objectives of the AD can generally be identified as, first, advocacy of political democracy and independence and, second, an emphasis on Latin American solidarity. Clearly, neither constitutes an unmistakable ideological principle from which concrete policy might logically follow in predictable directions. Both reflect the domestic as well as hemispheric political context from which the AD emerged four decades ago and no longer serve to provide a meaningful distinction from rival party organizations. (P. 143)

Hence in Venezuela are we dealing with policy traditions or ideology, the influence of party (COPEI and AD), Christian Democracy and Social Democracy as international movements, the personal views of leading statesmen Caldera and Betancourt, the presidential role in Venezuela that provided a link between those personal views and policy, or reactions to a general international or hemispheric context—current or historical or both? Likewise, what do we make of Edward González's identification (highlighted by van Klaveren) of "three distinct foreign-policy tendencies" in Cuba: "the pragmatic economic tendency, headed by Carlos Rafael Rodríguez; the revolutionary political tendency, headed by Fidel Castro; and the military mission tendency, headed by Raúl Castro and other officers of the ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces." As van Klaveren observes, "The implication is that complex interactions between these tendencies [explain] important decisions and shifts in foreign policy."⁶ Is the emphasis here on competing ideologies, particular individuals, various groups of political elites, or bureaucratic politics?

Even if one can distinguish ideology from other factors, ideology often proves to have limited explanatory power. First, as in present-day Bolivia, where extreme ideological fragmentation and polarization exist, political instability can become so much the order of the day that the issue of ideological influences on policies is essentially moot. Second, as Martz's comment about Adeco principles in Venezuela suggests, many ideological tenets are so general that they do not provide much guidance for concrete policies. Brazil's longstanding ambition to be

come a “great power” falls into this category.⁷ Third, some tenets—like the concepts of the South Atlantic,⁸ the Atlantic Triangle,⁹ or *hispanidad*—seem to be basically rhetorical. Because they are undergirded by few significant “real-world” relationships, one suspects that policymakers usually give them little more than lip service. Yet a policymaker’s perceptions and ideological frame of reference need not make sense (be “rational”) to analysts to help explain what a policymaker does. Finally, however useful ideology may be to explain some policies, only “pragmatism” (itself reflecting varying specific values and influences) can explain others. For instance, Dennis Gordon, in his essay in the Lincoln and Ferris volume, discusses Edward Milenky’s classification of two basic “tendencies” in Argentina’s foreign-policy community: the “classical liberal” and the “statist-nationalist.”¹⁰ Yet, Gordon comments, “These ideological distinctions aside, the most influential groups in Argentine foreign policy tend to cluster in the middle,” and “most governments have employed aspects of both the classic liberal and statist-nationalist perspectives” (Gordon in Lincoln and Ferris, p. 87). Presumably, this point helps explain such anomalies as the right-wing post-1976 military regimes’ cultivating a closer trading partnership with the Soviet Union. Similarly, Tulchin, after advancing three distinct Argentine perspectives on relations with Brazil (geopolitical, traditional Eurocentric, and Wilsonian), observes that a mixture of elements from the three perspectives has been the actual policy under different administrations (Tulchin in Moneta, pp. 54–55).

The President as Role-Player and Individual Decision-Maker

In Latin America, even more than in the United States, foreign policy has traditionally been the special preserve of the president, but the increasing complexity of Latin American governments and societies forces analysts to consider a wider range of actors in the policy-making process. It is significant, nevertheless, that Wilhelmy’s essay in the Muñoz and Tulchin collection devotes most attention to the Chilean presidency. For example, Wilhelmy characterizes Frei’s role in foreign policy as “an *animateur* more than a referee between contradictory positions,” a situation that Wilhelmy does not believe prevailed in domestic affairs. Allende, too, was central to the process of defining Chile’s international positions during his years in power, but his administration was of necessity preoccupied with domestic problems. Pinochet, in Wilhelmy’s view, “also has distinguished himself by his active direction of foreign policy. . . . [I]mportant foreign-policy undertakings have originated directly from presidential initiatives.” Like Frei, Pinochet is viewed as an “ideological *animateur*” (Wilhelmy in Muñoz and Tulchin, p. 51).

As noted, the primacy of the presidential role is difficult to distinguish from the impact of the individual and other levels of analysis. Because Frei and Pinochet played the key presidential role, Frei's personal formulation of Christian Democratic ideology and Pinochet's geopolitical worldview became far more than individual opinions. Much the same might be said for Ríos Montt's eccentricities in Guatemala. Jennie Lincoln reports that "his often erratic behavior prompted other Central American leaders to view him with suspicion and to some extent to isolate him" (Lincoln in Lincoln and Ferris, p. 201). Elizabeth Ferris's insights regarding recent Mexican presidents also suggest some of the analytical problems involved:

Foreign policy-making has traditionally been the exclusive domain of the president and there were strong personal political reasons for López Portillo's open sympathy with (at least some of) the revolutionary movements in Central America. Such sympathy responded to his desire to be remembered as a statesman, to distract attention away from Miguel de la Madrid's campaign, and to remove himself from the negative consequences of the almost catastrophic economic situation. While Echeverría sought a place in history for his Third World activism, López Portillo sought the same objective through his innovative Central American policies. De la Madrid, in turn, has tried to develop regional foreign policies which set him apart from López Portillo's initiatives while building on the tradition of Mexican support for progressive social change in the region. (Ferris in Lincoln and Ferris, p. 219)

López Portillo's attempting to remove himself from the "almost catastrophic economic situation" implies causation at the levels of internal and external pressures, reminiscent of the classic interpretation of Mexican foreign-policy "radicalism" as a calculated "distraction" from failures of the Revolution at home and dependent external relationships. De la Madrid's building on a traditional theme in Mexican foreign policy recalls my previous remarks about the influence of policy tradition and ideology.

Moreover, Ferris observes, "all Mexican presidents face pressures from within the government which make foreign policy-making still more difficult." In the case of López Portillo: "Bureaucratic and political pressures . . . [came] from the Partido Revolucionario Institucionalizado (PRI), from opposition parties, and from members of the government itself" (Ferris in Lincoln and Ferris, p. 219). It is to these kinds of pressures that I next turn.

Bureaucracy, Legislatures, and Political Parties

Van Klaveren observes that the bureaucratic politics perspective on foreign policy-making "has never been very popular among Latin Americanists, which seems understandable given the high levels of centralization and power concentration that characterize political sys-

tems in the region." Also, whatever bureaucratic competition does occur "takes place within certain limits because there are external constraints and . . . common values shared by all participants." But as van Klaveren sees it,

. . . the approach is still valuable. In the first place, some Latin American foreign bureaucracies are relatively complex. They include highly differentiated and specialized groups, each endowed with their own perceptions and interests. In the second place, even in those cases where only one sector of the bureaucracy seems to hold sway in important issues, this group need not necessarily be monolithic. Finally, there have been clear indications of bureaucratic infighting in some crucial foreign-policy decisions in Latin America. (van Klaveren in Muñoz and Tulchin, p. 14)

According to Gerhard Drekonja-Kornat, for example, bureaucratic divisions in Colombia are so pronounced that one must speak of "una política exterior fraccionada." The Ministry of Foreign Relations has had to contend with competition not only from the Ministry of Development but also from the banks as well as a host of export-promotion bureaus like INCOMEX and PROEXPO (Drekonja-Kornat and Ulloa in Puig, 2:336–39).

But it is often far from easy to determine precisely what "bureaucratic" behavior is and to identify the specific units that may be relevant to the analysis. Tulchin's treatment of the Argentine case is illustrative of the first of these two basic problems. He writes that in analyzing the experience of the post-1976 military governments, one "should include, though perhaps not rely heavily on, the methodological approaches known as bureaucratic politics and political culture" (Tulchin in Muñoz and Tulchin, p. 187). He attaches considerable significance to the "closed" nature of decision-making. In Tulchin's opinion, the "dilemma" of the military governments and the cause of their foreign-policy failures was "not a lack of professionalism among the diplomatic corps nor a lack of information . . . [but rather a] lack of channels for that information to reach the decision makers in the cabinet and the junta" (Tulchin in Muñoz and Tulchin, p. 191.) Does Tulchin's explanation fall into the category of "bureaucratic politics," regime analysis, or "groupthink" at the cabinet or junta level? Carlos Pérez Llana shares Tulchin's view that the Foreign Ministry found itself largely "displaced" by the military but attributes substantial individual independence to the Minister of Economy, José Martínez de Hoz (Pérez Llana in Puig, 1:173). Does Pérez Llana's perspective fall under bureaucratic politics or the individual level of analysis?

A second problem arises in identifying the bureaucratic units involved. Tulchin mentions "a vast, shifting array of ad hoc subcommittees." Ferris, in describing conditions in Mexico, stresses the fact that there are not only competitions between agencies (as in the GATT case,

considered below) but also serious factional disputes within units. Alexandre Barros's discussion of Brazil under the military highlights yet another dimension of the problem, the blurring of bureaucratic lines through overlapping memberships:

. . . one feature of the Itamaraty that has become more pronounced recently is that of diplomats occupying positions in other government agencies. Just as an example, the current chief of the civilian household of the presidency has three advisers who are professional diplomats, the spokesman for the president is a professional diplomat, and diplomats have been assigned to the National Intelligence School. The president of the Brazilian Nuclear Authority (Nuclebrás) is a diplomat and so are advisers on international matters in several ministries. . . . Instead of [Itamaraty] being occupied by military officers, as had happened in other countries and as happened in virtually all other ministries in Brazil, the movement has been reversed; it was the diplomats who increased their presence outside of their own professional realm. (Barros in Muñoz and Tulchin, pp. 32–33)

Lastly, to what extent should "the military" be treated as a "just another" bureaucratic actor? As Tulchin notes, the services often go to great lengths to put up a united front, but interservice rivalries and policy differences continue to exist. Gordon cites "splits within the military command" as the reason why "Argentina did not provide direct assistance in support of the faltering government of Anastasio Somoza in Nicaragua" (Gordon in Lincoln and Ferris, p. 93). On the one hand, the military can behave like other bureaucracies, and its identity may be blurred by military "occupation" of bureaucratic roles outside of the presidency or ruling junta. On the other hand, the military obviously is not like other bureaucracies in that it has a special capacity to wield force to impose its policy positions and to protect its institutional interests. Accordingly, even in countries where the military has supposedly been "tamed," it still tends to exert significant influence on policy. Ferris says of Mexico, "While rumors of a military coup in Mexico were largely unfounded, under López Portillo the military came to exercise an increasingly important role in foreign-policy formulation. The military has continued its activist role under de la Madrid" (Ferris in Lincoln and Ferris, p. 220).

Limitations aside, the bureaucratic politics approach does offer important insights into the policy-making process in those Latin American countries that have developed significant bureaucracies. Selcher illuminates the process in Brazil, where President Figueiredo delegated substantial authority because he was preoccupied with domestic economic problems and the abertura. The result was "an acceleration during 1983 of the diffusion of foreign-policy power, with the various ministries seizing whatever opportunities presented themselves." As for the line-up in the contest:

Itamaraty, with its elitist recruiting patterns and emphasis upon merit, is the paragon of technocratism and has benefited greatly from the adoption of that mode of governance as it reached an activist zenith under Presidents Medici and Geisel (1969–1979). Ironically, even with the growing criticism of the technocratic process by the political elements under *abertura*, Itamaraty with its success, capabilities, and reputation for competence and honesty is one of the few ministries in the Figueiredo government to enjoy significant prestige, consensus, and favorable public image. . . . Yet the habit of that same closed, reserved style makes it difficult for the Ministry to adapt to the current conditions of greater competition and debate. (Selcher in Muñoz and Tulchin, pp. 103–4)

In recent years, Itamaraty has had to face increasing competition especially from what is known as the “economic area,” “a term widely used to designate the Ministries of Planning, Finance, Industry and Commerce, and Mines and Energy, along with the Bank of Brazil and the Central Bank.” In Selcher’s view, “the rise in power of the economic area has been a function of the vigorous personal styles of Delfim Netto and his team, so a change in personnel could change its degree of aggressiveness and supposed First World orientation. . . . Yet even their substitution by a team operating under different premises would not cause a major institutional power shift, because the economization of foreign policy has proceeded too far” (Selcher in Muñoz and Tulchin, p. 107). Selcher’s conclusion accepted, the analytical problem remains as to the degree to which the Brazilian case evidences straightforward bureaucratic rivalries, the impact of personalities like Delfim Netto, or the influence of “organizational process” (for example, the “closed, reserved style” of Itamaraty).

Given the lack of meaningful democracy in most countries and the dominance of the presidency even where elections are held, national legislatures have traditionally played only modest roles in formulating foreign policy. A few legislatures may be growing more assertive, however. Selcher mentions that some Brazilian senators and deputies are working toward the U.S. model but may well settle for greater oversight or investigatory capacity concerning such issues as debt, multinational corporations, trade, and security. But the Figueiredo government’s Partido Democrático Social could be depended upon to stifle any inquiry with potentially embarrassing implications for the executive. Meanwhile, according to Selcher: “Foreign Minister Guerreiro has been cultivating relations with Congress, speaking to the body frequently by invitation and showing openness to their comments. Delfim Netto has spoken to both houses on international economic policy, but with favorable receptions and notably less openness.” Perhaps even more intriguing was the 1983 request by 196 congressmen of President Figueiredo, calling for an explicit Brazilian rejection of U.S. pressures on Nicaragua (Selcher in Muñoz and Tulchin, p. 109). Ferris also sees “some signs

that the Mexican Senate is becoming more involved with foreign-policy [especially refugee] issues" (Ferris in Lincoln and Ferris, p. 220).

Political parties have also had an impact on policies. I have already mentioned the role of the Christian Democratic Party in Chile and that of COPEI and AD in Venezuela. Van Klaveren notes that many Latin American parties have developed links with ideologically similar parties elsewhere in the region and the world (van Klaveren in Muñoz and Tulchin, p. 13). This tendency has been especially evident among Christian Democrats, Social Democrats, Socialists, and Communists, and has occasioned more European involvement in the Central American arena than would otherwise have been the case. Ferris explains that in Mexico, "Sectors of the PRI . . . reportedly were dismayed by the Franco-Mexican initiative and extended only lukewarm support to López Portillo's Central American policies. The growing strength of the conservative opposition party, the Partido de Acción Nacional (PAN), in municipal elections has placed pressure on de la Madrid to adopt more conservative policies" (Ferris in Lincoln and Ferris, p. 219). Bolivia may be the country that has suffered the most consistent paralysis from party conflict. Morales details the ongoing impact of such conflict (Morales in Lincoln and Ferris, p. 180).

Interest Groups, the Press, Public Opinion, and "Outlaws"

Van Klaveren asserts that specific interest groups in Latin America have had a major impact on foreign policy. His examples are the Federación Nacional de Cafeteros, the coffee growers' association of Colombia, which "officially takes part in the administration of coffee policy both at the national and international levels," and the Federación de Cámaras de Comercio (FEDECAMARAS), the national association of entrepreneurs in Venezuela, which for many years blocked that country's membership in the Andean Common Market (ANCOM) (van Klaveren in Muñoz and Tulchin, p. 13). But one of the most interesting cases of interest-group involvement was Mexico's 1980 decision not to join GATT, an outcome that George Grayson has analyzed in detail.¹¹ The Ministry of Commerce and the Bank of Mexico found their pro-GATT position supported by a host of trade groups like the Conference of Industrial Chambers (CONCAMIN), the Mexican Employees Federation (COPARMEX), and the American Chambers of Commerce of Mexico that represented mainly large domestic firms and multinational corporations. On the anti-GATT side, the Ministries of Finance, Patrimony, and Foreign Relations found support from the National College of Economists (CNE) and especially from the National Chamber of Transforming Industries (CANACINTRA), which represents some sev-

enty-five thousand member firms in the automobile, chemical, food-processing, and metallurgical industries.¹²

Nevertheless, although one can certainly encounter important cases of interest group influence, the fact remains that in most Latin American countries, interest-group activity appears to be minimal when compared with that in the United States. Selcher describes the Brazilian scene: "The term 'lobby' and the concepts behind it, in American practice, are still novel in Brazil. Few groups are yet organized as foreign affairs lobbies, beyond the existence of sectors pushing for advantages from government in foreign trade and sales of services, or broader segments speaking out on the debt" (Selcher in Muñoz and Tulchin, p. 112). Some analysts would insist that interest-group activity is definitely present but usually subtle in form. Marxist and dependency theorists posit the existence of a *comprador* class in league with foreign capital; analysts using "corporatist" models emphasize the links between government bureaucracies (and in Mexico, the dominant party) and various organized and unorganized interests.

The press and other media in all countries are essential information links between government and the citizenry and will doubtless become increasingly significant with the current wave of democratization. Mexico and Brazil during the abertura period indicate the potential and limitations of the role of the press in some authoritarian political systems. The Mexican government has long kept newspapers under some control through its monopoly of newsprint, manipulation of unions, and willingness to shut down publications that go beyond the bounds of "acceptable" criticism (Echeverría's treatment of *Excelsior* being a case in point). Yet, as Ferris comments, the press has attempted to enter the debate on the Mexican government's Central American policies: "Right-wing publications such as *Impacto* subscribe to the domino theory of Central America while *Proceso* and *Unomásuno* have been critical of the government's economic policies with editorials calling for more open support of the revolutionaries and more open admissions policies toward the refugees" (Ferris in Lincoln and Ferris, p. 219). In Brazil, according to Selcher:

Only a few metropolitan newspapers and national magazines consistently provide quality analytical coverage of foreign policy; furthermore, this is the work of a small circle of journalists, about ten strong professionals at most. Even these are disadvantaged by the media's practice of assigning reporters to individual ministries rather than to functional topics, such as trade policy or international finance. Most of those covering foreign-policy matters, then, are assigned to and enamored of the Foreign Ministry, accept its explanations largely at face value, defend its "prerogatives" against "encroachment" from other areas, and serve as sympathetic "leaks" in bureaucratic battles. (Selcher in Muñoz and Tulchin, pp. 109–10)

On the other hand, Selcher observes, "The weight of foreign affairs in national life and the freer atmosphere and euphoria of *apertura* are producing more frequent press comments and editorials on foreign policy." As for Argentina, Gordon concludes: "With a highly literate population and excellent coverage of international events in the press, the public is, by and large, well informed" (Gordon in Lincoln and Ferris, p. 88).

Assessing the impact of "public opinion" on foreign policy is no easier task in Latin America than in the United States. Drekonja-Kornat states that "foreign policy is not a subject that mobilizes either Colombian public opinion or the two large political parties" (Drekonja-Kornat and Ulloa in Puig, 2:340). One might logically assume that dictatorships enjoy even greater immunity from public pressures. Yet, as Tulchin has noted, some may operate on a shorter citizens' leash precisely because they are viewed as inherently "illegitimate." Gordon sees the foreign-policy role of the "well-informed" citizens of Argentina as "primarily a reactive one" (Gordon in Lincoln and Ferris, p. 88). That "reactive" role can be a potent one, however, as the Malvinas episode conclusively demonstrated. Some evidence suggests that the Argentine military never intended to fight a war over the islands, that their intention was simply to stage a show of force to convince the British to negotiate with greater seriousness. As it happened, according to one account, the Galtieri government was dumbfounded by the extent of the Argentine popular reaction to their country's military "victory" in seizing the Malvinas and became convinced that it would be political suicide to withdraw from the islands to the negotiating table.¹³ Everyone agrees that the Argentine military misjudged the British under "Iron Lady" Margaret Thatcher, but the fundamental miscalculation may have been of the mood at home. Even more important was the subsequent repudiation of the military regime when it lost the war.

Selcher's assessment of the role of the general public in Brazil parallels his verdict on the press—it is modest but growing:

Because of habitually low public interest in foreign affairs and the rather closed decision making system which did not encourage such interest, the impact of public opinion on foreign-policy formulation has been minimal. . . . [Nevertheless,] the educated urban segments, despite parochialism, are aware of international events and trends affecting Brazil. . . . The degree of sophistication among the recently aware may not be high, but nationalistic public pressure on foreign-policy issues with an economic component will grow inevitably as the social impact of the austerity program takes hold and is linked to Brazil's international financial commitments. (Selcher in Muñoz and Tulchin, pp. 110–11)

Finally, one comes to the role of that aspect of "public opinion" expressed in individual countries through activities that are essentially "outlaw" in nature. Military coups motivated by political concerns or personal ambition are one aspect of such behavior. More to the point

are guerrilla movements because they only rarely succeed in capturing the citadel of power. Lincoln cites an estimate that the Sendero Luminoso movement in Peru cost a thousand deaths and more than one billion dollars in property damage by 1983 (Lincoln in Lincoln and Ferris, p. 145). Sidestepping the issue of the validity of their respective causes, the FMLN in El Salvador and the contras in Nicaragua have been even more destructive. Additional examples that come to mind are those groups assisting illegal immigrants in penetrating the borders of the United States and drug dealers. Military involvement in drugs led to the 1980 "cocaine coup" of General García Meza in Bolivia; Colombian drug peddlers have declared open warfare on all who would thwart them at home or abroad; and Mexican cooperation in antidrug campaigns has been severely undercut by government corruption.

EXTERNAL CONSTRAINTS

Looking outside the boundaries of Latin American states, the first question that arises is what is the nature of the external universe? What is its "structure"? Historically, the international relations of Latin America have been viewed as basically those between the countries of Latin America and the United States. This interpretation has become more of a caricature since U.S. hegemony began to wane in the late 1960s, and it also neglects other significant bilateral and multilateral relationships between Latin American countries and between individual countries and the international community as a whole.

Let us start with what Selcher terms the "Southern Cone subsystem":

The Southern Cone of South America is of the greatest importance in analyzing continental balance-of-power maneuvers in both political and military terms. This region has been identified as particularly conflict prone because it is the setting for numerous frontier disputes, resource conflicts, and the two major axes of historical interstate rivalry on the continent (Chile-Argentina and Argentina-Brazil). In terms of capability for organized violence should peaceful settlement fail, the Southern Cone defined in a larger sense (i.e., including Brazil) takes in much of the sophisticated and upper-income sector of Latin America, as well as 49 percent of its population, 56 percent of its economic product, 42 percent of its arms imports, and 53 percent of its military expenditures in recent years. Of the various possible geopolitical divisions of South America—Southern Cone, Andean Region, Amazon Basin, River Plate Basin—the Southern Cone concept takes in the greatest number of actors that constitute a loose but active subsystem. (Selcher in Muñoz and Tulchin, pp. 102–3)

In Selcher's view, the most significant development in the Southern Cone in recent years has been the Argentine-Brazilian rapprochement dating from 1980 because analyses of continental rivalries have usually assumed continued rivalry between the two countries. He sees this de-

velopment as potentially comparable to the Mexican-Venezuelan "axis" that has been a major factor in the Caribbean. Other bilateral relationships of considerable significance exist between Argentina and Peru (regarding trade, nuclear power, and mutual support on the issues of a Bolivian outlet to the sea and the Malvinas) and between Brazil and Suriname (in the form of Brazilian assistance to the government of Deysi Bouterse, in an effort to forestall Cuban influence). Bolivia, as usual, has been caught in between. Morales comments:

Bolivia's inter-American relations, especially with the two South American "giants," have been heavily conditioned by geopolitical forces: natural resources, political and ideological affinities, balance-of-power blocs, and territorial disputes. Various patterns have emerged: (1) a pro-Argentine tilt, (2) a pro-Brazilian tilt, (3) a balance between the A and B powers, (4) the balancing of Argentina and Brazil through cooperation with Chile and/or Peru, and (5) integrated regional—Andean Pact, Southern Cone, Bolivarian nations, and Amazon Basin Pact. (Morales in Lincoln and Ferris, p. 187)

North of the Southern Cone, other bilateral relationships come to the fore, including boundary disputes between Ecuador and Peru, Colombia and Venezuela, Venezuela and Guyana, Guyana and Suriname, and Suriname and French Guiana. As mentioned, Mexico and Venezuela have cultivated something of a joint sphere of influence over the Caribbean Basin, based largely on their providing supplies of cut-rate petroleum. The Contadora powers (Venezuela, Colombia, Panama, and Mexico) and a larger "support group" have been actively attempting to find a workable peace formula for Central America. Within the Central American subregion, special bilateral relationships exist between Costa Rica and Nicaragua, Honduras and Nicaragua, El Salvador and Honduras, Guatemala and Belize, and Guatemala and Mexico. In the Caribbean area generally, the same might be said for relations between Cuba and Nicaragua and between the Dominican Republic and Haiti. On a global scale, the United States has long had a special bilateral relationship with Mexico and, less dependably in recent years, with Brazil; the Soviet Union has maintained bilateral relations with Cuba, Nicaragua (since the revolution), and (in the area of trade) with Argentina; and the United Kingdom has been engaged in a conflict-ridden bilateral relationship with Argentina.

In addition, a variety of "integration" experiments have involved a number of Latin American countries in different combinations: LAFTA/ALADI, CACM, CECLA, OPANAL, CARIFTA/CARICOM, ANCOM, OLADE, SELA, the La Plata Basin power agreements, cartels, and the Amazon Pact. Such experiments, although far from fully successful, have produced an increase in intraregional trade, greater coordination of industry in certain economic sectors, the creation of a few Latin American multinationals, and a remarkable degree of consensus

on many issues of international economic policy. Many Latin American countries have also been enmeshed in other multilateral institutions, including the OAS, the United Nations, the World Bank, the IMF, the IDB, the Group of 77, the Non-Aligned Movement, and UNCTAD. Add to this mosaic the participation in hemispheric affairs of such entities as a host of foreign-based multinational corporations, the Paris Club, the Vatican, and the Socialist International, and one encounters a complex pattern of relationships indeed. This pattern is further complicated by the ebb and flow of the “old bipolarity”—the rivalry between the superpowers, the United States and the USSR—and networks of political, economic, social, and cultural dependency and interdependence linking the First, Second, Third, and Fourth worlds.

As Hazelton points out, any number of concepts in the literature of international relations purport to explain these larger relationships, like complex interdependence, complex conglomerate, “intermestic politics,” political adaptation, dependency, and unorthodox dependency (Hazelton in Muñoz and Tulchin, p. 151). The central problem is that merely recognizing the existence of such patterns, however defined, does not reveal much about the actual foreign-policy behavior of individual states. The revival of superpower competition after a period of relative detente can partially explain policies regarding the turmoil in Central America, and Latin American development patterns virtually insure that most governments in the region will line up with the South on major issues in the North-South debate. But beyond such simple generalizations, it is not easy to go.

Consider some of the limitations of the dependency approach, which van Klaveren examines in detail:

[M]ost authors who utilize this approach would be willing to recognize that economic class structures—which, as we have seen, are closely related to international structures—affect in the last analysis all political processes, including foreign policy, but this causal chain is too undetermined, mediated, and abstract to allow for precise relational hypotheses. . . . [Moreover,] “*dependencia*” theory usually focuses on the relationship between, on the one hand, a highly aggregate external unit, the global capitalist system, and, on the other, a highly disaggregate and fluid dependent society, composed of distinct class arrangements, alliances between local and external groups, and so forth. By contrast, foreign-policy analysis maintains a state-as-actor perspective. (van Klaveren in Muñoz and Tulchin, pp. 8–9)

His point is well-taken, although I have cautioned that a state-as-actor perspective tends to conceal not only “external” influences but also such “internal” variables as the roles of bureaucracies, political parties, interest groups, and individuals. In addition, says van Klaveren: “*dependencia*” theory does not consider foreign-policy behavior as a very significant indicator of dependency; thus, the fact that several Latin

American countries exhibit an independent behavior at the United Nations . . . and even dare to resist U.S. pressure in bilateral and multilateral negotiations does not say much about the structural economic dependency of these countries vis-à-vis the world economy or even the North American one" (p. 9). The fact remains that

Latin American countries are now adopting foreign policies that are increasingly autonomous from the hegemonic power in the region. Those societies continue to be characterized by a general situation of structural dependency, but the new realities of the international system and the relative autonomy of the state and its bureaucracy vis-à-vis the dominant classes allow for considerable independence in the field of foreign policy. Accordingly, the foreign policy of a hegemonic power cannot be viewed as the mere instrument of the main transnational corporations seated in that country, nor can the foreign policy of a dependent state be automatically identified with the interests of the ruling social sectors. The relationships in this field are much more complex and include also important strategic, historical, and political elements. (van Klaveren in Muñoz and Tulchin, p. 8)

Only a few observations need to be added to van Klaveren's critique. First, there are obviously many forms of dependency—political, economic, cultural, and so on—and dependency in one realm does not necessarily translate into dependency in another. Second, several levels of dependency relationships are inherent in any conception of an international hierarchy, as the Marxist notion of "subimperialisms" implies. Marxists, however, place too much emphasis on linkages to the "center" and too little on the existence of more than one center in the old bipolarity (that is, the Soviet Union), the implications of increasing multipolarity affecting international economic issues, and the pursuit by aspiring "middle powers" of their own separate spheres of influence. Third, dependency can sometimes be a source of strength for a government, insofar as dependency creates nationalist resentments that can be rallied in support of a calculatedly "independent" foreign policy. Fourth, the dependency perspective neglects the other side of the coin—substantial interdependence: for example, a sizable percentage of the developed countries' markets and sources of supply are in the Third World; multinational corporations have occasionally themselves been held "at bay" and in many countries must contend with a plethora of restrictions on their investment strategies and day-to-day operations; and overexposed private banks and international financial institutions have perhaps as great a stake as debtor countries in a satisfactory resolution of the ongoing debt crisis.

Reference to several specific countries may help to clarify some of these points. Guadalupe González argues that Mexico's lack of military power has paradoxically "fortified the political-ideological bases of Mexico's international presence and its capacity to influence the course of regional events" (González in Puig, 2:433). Ferris notes that Mexico is

“economically dependent on the United States to an embarrassingly high degree.” Nevertheless, the “myth of foreign policy independence is a strong legitimizer of the Mexican government and has been skillfully used in times of domestic difficulty. López Portillo’s heralded Central American peace initiative was announced . . . only four days after the first devaluation of the peso.” Ferris continues, “Given the fact that the costs of reducing Mexican dependence on the U.S. are so high, it is more politically expedient for Mexican administrations to demonstrate their *political* independence of Washington. And when the government pursues policies that are obviously opposed by Washington, opposition forces publicly unite behind the president in his defiance of the U.S.” (Ferris in Lincoln and Ferris, pp. 223–24, emphasis in original). As a measure of U.S.–Mexican interdependence, former U.S. Trade Representative William Brock estimated that the Mexican debt crisis alone resulted in the loss of some 240,000 jobs for the U.S. economy.¹⁴

It has already been observed that “independence” and a Third World orientation have been recurrent themes in contemporary Brazilian foreign policy. Roberto Fendt, Jr., insists that Brazil cannot avoid becoming enmeshed in new multilateral relationships, reflecting what he sees as the principal long-range trend in the world economy—growing interdependence (Fendt in Grabendorff and Roett, pp. 144–45). Panama succeeded in negotiating a staged takeover of the canal from the Colossus of the North. According to Gordon, Argentina presents a case of “asymmetrical interdependence”:

Argentina possesses many resources to pursue its foreign policy goals. These resources include the nation’s vast agricultural potential, its ability to offer markets and investment sites, its geopolitical importance, and its political support, particularly in the East-West competition. The elements of Argentina’s power, however, lack the depth and dimension of other more developed nations, and often [as in the Malvinas episode] can only be used at significant risk. . . . In its dealings with other Latin American states, on the other hand, Argentina’s policy instruments are more useful due to its relative strength compared to most of its neighbors. (Gordon in Lincoln and Ferris, p. 86)

Argentine trade is unusually diversified, and the Malvinas War certainly demonstrates the capacity of the Argentine public to rally round the flag (at least as long as success appears possible). The Alfonsín government has been a hard bargainer in the international debt negotiations, well aware that, “as one international banker has observed, ‘if a country owes one billion, it’s in trouble; if it owes 50 billion, the banks are in trouble’ ” (Gordon in Lincoln and Ferris, p. 86; see also Green in Grabendorff and Roett, pp. 147–65).

What, at last, is one to make of Cuba? There is no doubt of that country’s dependence on Soviet aid and (to some extent) protection. According to Juan del Aguila, “Cuba’s position in the socialist bloc, its

hyperbole regarding the 'wonderful achievements of the socialist fatherland' (the Soviet Union), and its routine support for Soviet foreign-policy goals (from Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia to the 'proper' incarceration of irksome counterrevolutionaries in Poland), raise questions regarding its ability to act independently of its superpower patron" (del Aguila in Lincoln and Ferris, p. 258). Yet many analysts who are hardly pro-Cuban have found that country to be something more than a Soviet puppet and to be acting in places like Africa and Bishop's Grenada as much or more in response to the Castro government's perceptions of Cuba's "national interest" as in support of Soviet goals. The emphasis, in this view, is on shared goals and "partnership" rather than a patron-client relationship.¹⁵ Maybe, then, a closing item should be added to the list of problems with the dependency perspective—the extreme difficulty of distinguishing between behavior that is compelled by a dependent relationship and behavior that might well have taken place regardless of the relationship.

CONCLUSION

As noted at the outset, despite our increasing theoretical sophistication and growing bank of information about Latin American foreign policies, analysts are still unable to make many adequate generalizations about why Latin American countries "behave" as they do internationally. We now have the classic "levels-of-analysis" problem with more actors, less discrete levels, and many more linkages between levels than might initially have been foreseen. In a sense, the more we have come to know, the more confused we have become. Although one cannot absolutely rule out a future theoretical breakthrough, a grand synthesis of sorts, it does not appear likely. What, then, to do?

Perhaps, under the circumstances, the most prudent approaches are to confine ourselves largely to country case studies or to follow Ferris's suggestion that we focus on issue-areas. She makes a valiant attempt to classify "issue-areas" (into military-strategic, economic-developmental, and status-diplomatic) and to generate a few hypotheses that she regards as testable (Ferris in Lincoln and Ferris, pp. 269–84). But this approach also has its fairly evident limitations. First comes the matter of delineating issue-areas. I would prefer to drop the "areas" and try to disaggregate them into more specific issues like Nicaragua, oil, the Malvinas, debt, human rights, and so on. Having established the issues thus, one might proceed to identify for each specific issue the relevant actors and patterns of behavior on all levels. Presumably, certain governments, bureaucracies, international organizations, interest groups (and not others) are involved in reasonably predictable ways with specific issues (and not others). Nevertheless, the "not others"

part of the foregoing suggests the most basic limitation of this approach: any number of issues exist in international politics and what happens with regard to one of them often impacts on others. One may treat issues as "isolated systems" for purposes of analysis, but some of the most interesting outcomes happen when they overlap.

Before López Portillo headed off into the political sunset to enjoy his allegedly ill-gotten gain, he left behind at least one nugget of wisdom: Everything is a part of everything else.¹⁶ This description would make an entirely appropriate, if somewhat melancholy, motto for the student of Latin American foreign policies.

NOTES

1. The Grabendorff and Roett volume has also been published in Spanish under the title *América Latina, Europa Occidental y Estados Unidos: ¿Un nuevo triángulo atlántico?* (Buenos Aires: Grupo Editor Latinoamericano, 1984).
2. *Contemporary Inter-American Relations: A Reader in Theory and Issues*, edited by Yale H. Ferguson (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1972); and Yale H. Ferguson, "Through Glasses Darkly: An Assessment of Various Theoretical Approaches to Interamerican Relations," *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 19, no. 1 (Feb. 1977):3–34.
3. W. Raymond Duncan, *Latin American Politics: A Developmental Approach* (New York: Praeger, 1976), 121.
4. See, for example, Howard J. Wiarda: "Democracy and Human Rights in Latin America: Toward a New Conceptualization," *Orbis* 22, no. 1 (Spring 1978):137–60; and Wiarda, *Ethnocentrism in Foreign Policy: Can We Understand the Third World?* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1985).
5. On this subject, see especially John D. Martz and David J. Myers, "Understanding Latin American Politics: Analytic Models and Intellectual Traditions," *Polity* 16, no. 2 (Winter 1983):214–41.
6. See Van Klaveren in Muñoz and Tulchin, 15. The reference is to Edward González, "Institutionalization, Political Elites, and Foreign Policies," in *Cuba in the World*, edited by Cole Blasier and Carmelo Mesa-Lago (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1979), 3–36.
7. See Carlos Pérez Llana, "Brazil and Western Europe in a Global Context," in Grabendorff and Roett, 124–46. Although Pérez Llana personally is not especially optimistic about Brazil's prospects in this regard, he comments, "The idea of the possibility of a 'jump,' both qualitative and quantitative, to 'rich country' status is permanently in the minds of a large sector of the Brazilian elite" (p. 132).
8. See Margaret Daly Hayes, "Brasil y el Atlántico Sur: cambios en las perspectivas de un problema que se vislumbra," in *Moneta*, 89–102.
9. In his introduction to the Grabendorff and Roett collection, Wolf Grabendorff poses the question "A New Atlantic Triangle?" He and most of the authors in the collection express considerable doubt as to whether the answer is "yes."
10. Gordon in Lincoln and Ferris, 87. He refers to Edward S. Milenky, *Argentina's Foreign Policies* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1978), 3–5.
11. George W. Grayson, *The United States and Mexico: Patterns of Influence* (New York: Praeger, 1984), 126.
12. *Ibid.*, 128–29.
13. Lawrence Freedman, "The War of the Falkland Islands, 1982," *Foreign Affairs* 61, no. 1 (Fall 1982):196–210.
14. William E. Brock, "Trade and Debt: The Vital Linkage," *Foreign Affairs* 62, no. 5 (Summer 1984):1045.
15. See, for example, Cole Blasier, *The Giant's Rival: The USSR and Latin America* (Pitts-

- burgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1983), chap. 5; and Wolf Grabendorff, "Cuba's Involvement in Africa: An Interpretation of Objectives, Reactions, and Limitations," *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 22, no. 1 (Feb. 1980):3–29.
16. Viron P. Vaky subsequently appropriated it as part of the title of his article, "Hemispheric Relations: 'Everything Is Part of Everything Else'," *Foreign Affairs* 59, no. 3:617–47. This issue is entitled "America and the World 1980."